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Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

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Extract

We may argue about the wisdom of announcing ‘unconditional surrender’ as an aim in the last major war,” observes Schelling in his recent book, Arms and Influence—as one might expect, a brilliant and important study—“but seem to expect ‘unconditional destruction’ as a matter of course in another one” (p. 23). Secretary McNamara does in fact require “adequacy of our forces from the standpoint of convincing others that the initiation of general nuclear war would inevitably bring about” not their facing the choice between capitulation and devastation, but exclusively “their own destruction.” Suppose the enemy underestimates our force and its defenses or exaggerates the obstacles he can put in our path—suppose, that is, we have failed to be “clear and convincing” about our capabilities. Assume that the enemy then attempts to disarm us, disarming himself in the act.

Type
Review Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1967

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References

1 I shall deal with only one of the several major contributions made by Schelling, that concerning the coercive use of nuclear weapons.

2 Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, February 18, 1965, 42.

3 Ibid., 38.

4 Wellman, Paul I., A Dynasty of Western Outlaws (Garden City 1961), 255.Google Scholar

5 McNamara, 38.

6 Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense appropriations, 1966, 53.

7 Ibid., 51.

8 Ibid., 46.

8 Ibid., 54.

10 Ibid., 46.