¹ See, for example, Edmonds, Robin, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years (New Oxford University Press, 1983), 137–222Google Scholar, and Nogee, Joseph L. and Donaldson, Robert H., Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Pergamon, 1984)Google Scholar.

² See Porter, Bruce D., The USSR in Third World Conflicts (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1–35, 216–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hosmer, Stephen T. and Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts (Lexington, MA: D. C. 1983). 53–124Google Scholar.

³ Heikal, Mohamed, The Sphinx and the Commissar (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 193–94Google Scholar; el-Sadat, Anwar, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 196–97Google Scholar; Whetten, Lawrence L., The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), 154Google Scholar; Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Red Star on the Nile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 163Google Scholar; Glassman, Jon D., Armsfor the Arabs (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 196Google Scholar. For a more detailed discussion of Soviet Middle Eastern policy in 1967–73, see Spechler, Dina R., “Soviet Policy in the Middle East: The Crucial Change,” in Marantz, Paul and Steinberg, Blema, eds., Superpower Involvement in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 133–71Google Scholar.

⁴ Heikal (fn. 3), 186–87, 193, 195, 216–17, 222; Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, in Al Ahram, July 10, 1968, quoted in Middle East Journal (Autumn 1968), 493; Cairo Radio, July 24, 1972 (Sadat speech); Sadat (fn. 3), 249; “The Soviet Attitude to the Palestine Problem: From the Records of the Syrian Communist Party, 1971–1972,” Journal of Palestine Studies 2 (Autumn 1972), 188–89; Alexander Prlja, “A Reappraisal in Soviet-Egyptian Relations,” International Affairs (Yugoslavia) 23 (November 5–20, 1972), 29; Kissinger, Henry A., Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 204Google Scholar.

⁵ Pravda, April 30, July 14, and October 19, 1972; Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Glassman (fn. 3), 84. Only after expelling the Soviets did Sadat feel free to go to war. (Sadat, fn. 3, p. 232.)

⁶ Heikal, Mohamed, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Books, 1975), 161–63Google Scholar; Glassman (fn. 3), 105, 111.

⁷ Heikal (fn. 3), 220, 249–50; Sadat (fn. 3), 198; Lt. General el-Shazly, Saad, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), 159Google Scholar; Glassman (fn. 3), 96, 104–07.

⁸ Glassman (fn. 3), 108–10.

⁹ Cairo Radio, July 24, 1972 (Sadat speech); Newsweek, August 7, 1972 (Sadat interview); Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Sadat (fn. 3), 187, 198, 212, 219–21, 225–28; Heikal (fn. 3), 249–51; Shazly (fn. 7), 28–29, 102, 106, 141, 157–58, 160–62; Glassman (fn. 3), 90–94, 102, 111–12.

¹⁰ Sadat complained that, between February and October 1973, the Soviets never abandoned their preference for a negotiated solution and never ceased to pressure the Egyptians to “rule out” military means. See Cairo Radio, May 1, 1973, May 14, 1973, and April 3, 1974 (Sadat speeches); Time Magazine, March 25, 1974 (interview with Sadat). Cf. Golan, Galia, Yom Kippur and After (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 47–55Google Scholar.

¹¹ Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Kissinger (fn. 4), 469.

¹² Shazly (fn. 7), 197–98; Newsweek, April 9, 1973 (Sadat interview); Cairo Radio, July 23, 1973, and April 3, 1974 (Sadat speeches).

¹³ Shazly (fn. 7), 197–98; Heikal (fn. 3), 253–54; Glassman (fn. 3), 105–07, 112–14.

¹⁴ Shazly (fn. 7), 199. See also Heikal (fn. 3), 253–54.

¹⁵ Newsweek, April 9, 1973 (Sadat interview).

¹⁶ Ibid.; Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Glassman (fn. 3), 102, 113; Golan (fn. 10), 66.

¹⁷ Cf. George, Alexander L., “The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: Origins and Impact,” in George, ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 148, 150; Glassman (fn. 3), 2Google Scholar.

¹⁸ E.g., Glassman (fn. 3), 3–4, 93, 103–04; Golan (fn. 10), 21; George (fn. 17), 140; Cairo Radio, August 29, 1967 (comments by Heikal); Heikal (fn. 4), 493; “The Soviet Attitude to the Palestine Problem” (fn. 4), 188.

¹⁹ Allison, , The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar.

²⁰ This is the thrust of the argument in Freedman, Robert O., “Detente and U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Middle East During the Nixon Years (1969–19.74),” in Sheldon, Delia W., ed., Dimensions of Detente (New York: Praeger, 1978), 84–121Google Scholar.

²¹ Particularly after Sadat came to power, Egypt's constant demands for weapons and repeated reproaches for the U.S.S.R.'s failure to deliver them created substantial tension between the two countries. For this reason, the Soviets made a major effort in 1971–1972 to diversify their bases of influence in the Middle East. (Glassman, fn. 3, pp. 96–97; Whetten, fn. 3, p. 216; Freedman, Robert O., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, 3d [New York: Praeger, 1982], 51–84Google Scholar.) By 1972, Sadat was already issuing thinly veiled warnings that if the Soviets were not more forthcoming, he would “have to act—a decision [would] have to be taken.” (Sadat, fn. 3, p. 228.) That the Soviets understood what he had in mind is indicated by Brezhnev's rejoinder: “the presence of Soviet advisers in Egypt [is] an international necessity.” (Shazly, fn. 7, pp. 161–62.) Mohamed Heikal, editor of the influential Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram, notes on the basis of his contacts with high Soviet officials that the Soviets were not surprised by the expulsion and, indeed, “had prepared themselves in advance for something of the sort.” (Heikal, fn. 6, p. 175.) Even Henry Kissinger acknowledges that the Soviets had been prepared to sacrifice their relationship with Egypt in order to preserve détente. (Kissinger, White House Years [Boston: Little, Brown, 1979], 1297; Kissinger, fn. 4, p. 204. Cf. Glassman, fn. 3, p. 3.) Kissinger likewise notes that the Soviets had sacrificed the goodwill of their Vietnamese allies and would make significant compromises in domestic policy, such as rescinding the exit tax on Soviet Jews, for the sake of their developing relationship with the United States. (Kissinger, fn. 4, pp. 252–53, 287.)

²² See George Breslauer, “Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967–1972” in George (fn. 17), 89–95.

²³ See Freedman (fn. 20), 102.

²⁴ See Kissinger (fn. 4), 460.

²⁵ Kissinger (fn. 21), 1141–42; Kissinger (fn. 4), 231, 247–49, 268, 274–76, 986.

²⁶ Their disillusionment set in only in the autumn of 1973—after the U.S.-supported coup in Chile and the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment by the House Ways and Means Committee. (Glassman, fn. 3, pp. 118–19; Kissinger, fn. 4, pp. 990–98.)

²⁷ Glassman (fn. 3), 119.

²⁸ Freedman (fn. 20), 102; Freedman (fn. 21), 137.

²⁹ Kissinger (fn. 21), 1246–48; Kissinger (fn. 4), 247.

³⁰ This is the way Sadat understood Soviet statements at the time. (See Middle East Journal, Autumn 1973, p. 489.)

³¹ Glassman (fn. 3), 98.

³² Shazly (fn. 7), 28–29.

³³ Heikal (fn. 3), 256–57.

³⁴ Freedman (fn. 21), 136; Rubinstein (fn. 3), 235; Golan (fn. 10), 41.

³⁵ Rubinstein (fn. 3), 246; George (fn. 17), 145.

³⁶ Sadat (fn. 3), 233–34; Heikal (fn. 3), 251–52.

³⁷ Shazly (fn. 7), 172; Golan (fn. 10), 35, 268, n.84.

³⁸ Rubinstein (fn. 3), 212, 224; Kissinger (fn. 21), 1300; Radio Amman, October 23, 1972, and Al-Nahar (Beirut), October 31, 1972; both quoted in The USSR and the Third World 11 (No. 10, 1972).

³⁹ Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Sadat (fn. 3), 237–38.

⁴⁰ See fn. 21.

⁴¹ Glassman (fn. 3), 97.

⁴² The inconsistencies in Soviet behavior, if taken alone, might be explained simply by the existence of two contradictory goals that could not both be adequately served by any single policy. However, it would still be necessary to explain why one goal was given primacy until January-February 1973, and the other, contradictory, objective was clearly emphasized after that time. Taken together with the dramatic change in policy, the inconsistencies strongly suggest elite conflict.

⁴³ Although elite conflict paradigms have been employed frequently by students of Soviet domestic policies, they have been far less widely used for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy. The prevailing view among scholars working in this area is that such paradigms are of limited—indeed, quite dubious—utility for the study of Soviet decision making in external affairs. See Adomeit, Hannes, “Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior,” Adelphi Paper No. 101 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1973), 6–7Google Scholar; Dawisha, Karen, “The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case,” Studies in Comparative Communism 13 (Winter 1980), 300–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meyer, Stephen M., “Soviet National Security Decisionmaking: What Do We Know and What Do We Understand?” in Valenta, Jiri and Potter, William, eds., Soviet Decisionmakingfor National Security (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 273–74Google Scholar. Studies of Soviet foreign policy decisions that have focused on elite conflict are noted in Dawisha, 304ff., and Meyer, 275–76. Also see Kass, liana, Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formulation, 1966–1973 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978)Google Scholar, and Cutler, Robert, “Domestic and Foreign Influences on Soviet Policy-Making,” Soviet Studies 37 (January 1985), 60–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ In 1975–1982 the author interviewed Soviet émigrés who had served as or been in frequent contact with journal or newspaper editors or party officials responsible for supervising the media. The results of this research are reported in Spechler, Dina Rome, Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978)Google Scholar; Spechler, Dina Rome, Permitted Dissent in the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1982)Google Scholar; Spechler, Dina Rome, Russian Nationalism and Political Stability in the USSR (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and Center for International Studies, MIT, 1983)Google Scholar. Cf. Cutler (fn. 43); Yanov, Alexander, The Russian New Right (Berkeley: Institute of International Relations, University of California, 1978)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ The papers were Pravda, Izvestiia, Komsomol'skaia pravda, Trud, Krasnaia zvezda, and Sovetsfaia Rossiia. A more detailed description of this study and its findings may be found in Spechler (fn. 44, 1978).

⁴⁶ See ibid., 17–70, for a fuller description of and evidence for the four images.

⁴⁷ Until 1971, Izvestiia had espoused a different line which was more antagonistic to détente. It is probable that in the earlier period, the newspaper was controlled by a different group, consisting of state officials from the defense and producer-goods sectors. The pro-detente group probably became more influential as the possibilities of and need for a highly profitable economic relationship with the West began to loom larger in the early 1970s.

⁴⁸ Cf. Breslauer (fn. 22), 88.

⁴⁹ Heikal, Nasser's close confidant, gives an account of the Egyptian President's meeting with the Soviet leaders in January 1970. When Nasser begged the Soviets to assume responsibility for the air defense of Egypt, Heikal writes, Brezhnev put up stiff resistance, declaring that such a step “would provide all the makings of a crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States.” (Heikal, fn. 6, p. 86.)

⁵⁰ Heikal, who participated in many high-level talks between the Egyptians and the Soviets, writes that the Politburo was split on the question of whether Kosygin should meet President Johnson after the June 1967 War to attempt to reach agreement on the terms of a settlement. Brezhnev's defense of the plan was decisive. (Heikal, fn. 3, pp. 188–89.)

⁵¹ Heikal recalls that almost as soon as the guns stopped firing in the 1967 War, the Soviets began pressuring the Arabs to come to terms with Israel, even if this required diplomatic recognition. The two Politburo figures most involved in this effort, Heikal notes, were Brezhnev and Kosygin. (Ibid., 186–87, 194.) Apparently Kosygin had initially taken the lead in this area. Even before the June War, he had tried to bring the Arabs to the bargaining table with Israel, suggesting to Nasser in 1966 that he consider an “Arab-Israeli Tashkent” to resolve the conflict. (Ibid., 280.) But Brezhnev appears to have been equally, if not more, eager for a peaceful solution. When Presidents Aref of Iraq and Boumédienne of Algeria went to Moscow shortly after the June War to plead for greater assistance to the Arab cause, Brezhnev was not sympathetic. He reportedly told his guests that he spent sleepless nights worrying about a new war in the Middle East. Such a war, the General Secretary declared, “would bring the whole world to the brink of catastrophe.” (Heikal, fn. 6, p. 48.) When the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian armed forces, Mohamed Sadek, visited Moscow for the same purpose in June 1972, Brezhnev's response was similar but more pointed. Sadek was told that Egypt and the U.S.S.R. must work together within the framework of U.N. Resolution 242. If the Egyptians did not cooperate in this effort and tried to go to war, the Soviet Party Chief warned, they could not expect the U.S.S.R. to rescue them. (Shazly, fn. 7, pp. 161–62.)

⁵² Brezhnev made no attempt to disguise his impatience with the Egyptians over their repeated requests for more and better arms. He told Sadat more than once that he was “sick and tired of being asked for new aircraft and refused to discuss it anymore.” (Heikal, fn. 6, p. 158.)

⁵³ Brezhnev reportedly told Sadat that he personally, “and nobody else,” decided to delay the delivery of the strategic weapons promised on several occasions prior to February, 1973. (Ibid., 158–59.)

⁵⁴ Nasser learned, for example, that Party Secretary Suslov had vigorously attacked the proposed Kosygin-Johnson meeting in 1967, declaring that no good could come of it. (Heikal, fn. 3, pp. 188–89.)

⁵⁵ On the occasion of the visit of Egypt's Commander-in-Chief, Mohamed Sadek, to Moscow in June 1972, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko took the extraordinary step of telling the Politburo in Sadek's presence that the policy of restraint must be abandoned. The Egyptians should prepare for war, Grechko declared, and “Egypt must be supplied with the weapons to insure victory.” (Shazly, fn. 7, pp. 161–62.)

⁵⁶ Grechko said as much on at least two occasions. When the Egyptian Minister of War was about to leave Moscow just prior to the June 1967 War, his Soviet counterpart admonished him, “Stand up to them! The moment they attack you, or if the Americans make any move, you will find our troops on your side.” Two years later, after the Israeli raid on an Egyptian military post at Ras Zafarana on the Red Sea, Grechko complained to members of the Egyptian mission in Moscow, “You should be more daring. You should have stopped them.... Why are you afraid? The Soviet navy in the Mediterranean is following the American Sixth Fleet like a shadow. They can't do anything. If the Americans put their marines into Israel, we are ready to land our troops on your territories.” (Heikal, fn. 3, pp. 28, 194.)

⁵⁷ Cf. Dawisha, Karen, “Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle East: The 1973 October War and the 1980 Gulf War,” International Affairs (London) 57 (Winter 1980/1981), 47Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ E.g., Shelepin in January 1969; Grechko in February and May 1972; Gorshkov in May 1972. (Heikal, fn. 6, pp. 67, 164; Kass, fn. 43, pp. 208–09; Shazly, fn. 7, pp. 156–57.)

⁵⁹ See fn. 53.

⁶⁰ Krasnaia zvezda initiated a campaign following the expulsion to convince the leadership of the importance of the Soviet-Arab alliance. (Kass, fn. 43, pp. 210–11.)

⁶¹ Heikal (fn. 3), 253; Heikal (fn. 6), 164.

⁶² Prlja (fn. 4), 29.

⁶³ TASS, October 16, 1972.

⁶⁴ Reports that such a demand had been made of the Egyptians circulated in the West in September 1972. (Le Monde, September 2–3, 1972, cited in Golan, fn. 10, p. 40.)

⁶⁵ Shazly (fn. 7), 172.

⁶⁶ Golan (fn. 10), 35, 268, n.84.

⁶⁷ Knowledgeable East European diplomats concluded at the time that the U.S.S.R. had decided not to resume an active role in Egypt. New York Times, December 20, 1972.

⁶⁸ On the money made available in December-January and its impact on Soviet decision making, see ibid., and Rubinstein (fn. 3), 242. That Kosygin was among those who supported the sale is indicated by his assertion in Stockholm a few weeks later that “we consider that Egypt is entitled to have a strong army at the present time in order to … liberate its own lands.” New Times, No. 15 (April 1973). That Kosygin's “defection” was a decisive factor is suggested by Kissinger's observations on the Soviet leadership in action in May 1972. Although Brezhnev was “clearly the top man” Kissinger notes, he “appeared to need the support of Kosygin and Podgorny to carry the Politburo with him.” (Kissinger, fn. 21, p. 1214.)

⁶⁹ Although Sadat had begun making serious preparations for war as early as August 1972, it was only in January 1973—evidently on the basis of reports of Moscow's changed position—that he concluded he would be able to go through with his plans. Ahbar al Yom, August 3, 1972 (Sadat interview); Middle East News Agency, October 8, 1974 (Sadat interview); both cited in Golan, fn. 10, p. 37. Toward the end of January 1973, the Soviet propaganda apparatus began to issue militant statements about the Middle East which justified and affirmed the new policy. The propaganda weekly New Times accused Israel of preparing for war against the Arabs; Moscow Radio, commenting on the visit of a Vietnamese delegation to the U.S.S.R., suggested that Vietnamese use of “resolute military action, together with different forms of political and diplomatic struggle,” should be a model for the Arabs. New Times, No. 4 (January 1973) and No. 7 (February 1973); Moscow Radio (in Arabic), January 27, 29, and 31, 1973; both cited in Golan (fn. 10), 38–39.

⁷⁰ Even some holders of the competitive image apparently were not persuaded of the merits of the new course. Izvestiia drew a very different analogy between the Middle East and Vietnam, maintaining that U.S. experience demonstrated that arms were irrelevant for obtaining solutions, and even the most difficult conflicts could be resolved. (March 8, 1973, cited in Golan, fn. 10, p. 39.)

⁷¹ Brezhnev's speech to the Vietnamese reiterated his longstanding fear of a superpower confrontation in the Middle East and stressed that U.S.-Soviet cooperation would make possible a peaceful settlement of the crisis there. TASS, January 30, 1973, cited in Golan (fn. 10), 39.

⁷² Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech).

⁷³ That the reversal of Soviet policy in January-February 1973 was the result of a gradual increase in the power and influence of holders of the antagonistic image who opposed detente is confirmed by several developments in the following months: (a) In April 1973, Minister of Defense Grechko and KGB head Andropov, both leading subscribers to the antagonistic image who had expressed serious reservations about detente, were elevated to the Politburo—indicating a major political victory on their part. See Dawisha, Karen, Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Egypt (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 147CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The appointment of Foreign Minister Gromyko to that body at the same time does not appear to have represented a gain for the proponents of detente. Gromyko was known not so much for his support for any particular line or set of priorities as for his technical expertise on a wide range of subjects, especially relations with the United States. (Cf. Kissinger, fn. 4, p. 230.) He was probably placed on the Politburo to allow his expertise to be more fully exploited, (b) Also in April 1973, resolutions issued by the Party Central Committee began to express similar reservations about detente, emphasizing “the need for constant vigilance and readiness to rebuff any provocations of the aggressive reactionary imperialist circles.” (Pravda, April 28, 1973.) (c) At the beginning of August 1973, for the first time since the mid-1960s, the Politburo issued a public statement echoing those sentiments: “In contemporary international conditions, as before, vigilance is necessary against the intrigues of the reactionary forces....” (Izvestiia, August 5, 1973.) (d) Soon after, Brezhnev's speeches on detente began to take on a defensive tone, as if he now felt it necessary to contend with the arguments of a more powerful opposition. (See, for example, Pravda, September 25, 1973.)

⁷⁴ Data in Kaplan, Stephen, Diplomacy of Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981)Google Scholar, indicate that the U.S.S.R. conducted 29 “political-military” interventions in third-world conflicts between 1970 and 1979, as against 16 in the previous decade. The U.S.S.R. intervened in 21 distinct conflicts in 1970–1979, 8 in 1960–1969. (Blechman and Kaplan define intervention in such a way that there can be more than one in a given conflict.)

⁷⁵ Compare Hosmer and Wolfe (fn. 2), 129, 246, n.5, with Strategic Survey, 1970 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 47Google Scholar; see also The Economist, October 27, 1984, p. 42.

⁷⁶ Hosmer and Wolfe (fn. 2), 131–32; Kaplan (fn. 74), 89, 160–61; Zagoria, Donald S., “Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World,” Foreign Affairs 57 (Spring 1979), 733–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁷ Colin Legum, “Angola and the Horn of Africa,” in Kaplan (fn. 75), 623–24; Hosmer and Wolfe (fn. 2), 117, 121.

⁷⁸ See Porter (fn. 2), 232, and Kaplan (fn. 74), 170–72.

⁷⁹ See Katz, Mark, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 11ffGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ See, for example, Dmitry Volsky, “Soviet-American Relations and the Third World,” New Times, No. 36 (September 1973), 4–6.

⁸¹ See Valenta, Jiri, “Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola,” in Albright, David E., ed., Communism in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 109–10Google Scholar.

⁸² Interview with V. Fedin, First Deputy Director of the International Information Department of the Party Central Committee, Stern (Hamburg), January 31, 1980, cited in Jiri Valenta, “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” Orbis 24 (Summer 1980), 209.

⁸³ In sharp contrast to Krasnaia zvezda, Pravda spoke favorably of Hafez Amin, the Afghan leader whom Soviet troops deposed, up to the day before Soviet forces entered the country. High military officers and prominent ideologues appear to have been key supporters of the invasion. See Komsomol'skaia pravda, November 23, 1979 (speech by Aleksei Epishev); Mi khail Agursky, “Nitzim v'yonim nusach hapolitbiuro” [Hawks and doves in Politburo form], Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), February 7, 1982; Valenta (fn. 83), 210–12; Valenta, Jiri, “From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion,” International Security 57 (Fall 1980), 123–27Google Scholar; Simes, Dimitri, “The Military and Militarism in Soviet Society,” International Security 6 (Winter 1981/1982), 135–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁴ The actions of the Carter administration, Brezhnev complained shortly after the invasion, had demonstrated that the United States was “an absolutely unreliable partner.” (New York Times, January 13, 1980.)