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Understanding China's Reform Looking beyond Neoclassical Explanations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2011
Extract
The relative success of post-Mao reform in China has raised a number of questions regarding the neoclassical perspective: How could China have achieved rapid economic growth without privatization? Why have Chinese officials not been resistant to market reform? What makes the Chinese state developmental rather than predatory? The four recent works reviewed in this article attempt to answer these questions by moving away from the neoclassical approach, yet none offers a better alternative. The search for the secret of China's economic “miracle” must be continued.
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- Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2000
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