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² Lucian Pye, “Armies in the Process of Modernization,” in Johnson (fn. 1), 69-90.

³ Pye, “The Army in Burmese Politics,” in Johnson (fn. 1), 231-52; Guy Pauker, “The Role of the Military in Indonesia,” in Johnson (fn. 1), 185-230.

⁴ Cf. Pauker, Guy, “The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia,” Far Eastern Survey, xxvii (September 1958)Google Scholar, and “Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade,” World Politics xi (April 1959)Google Scholar.

⁵ See Finer, S. E., The Man on Horseback (New York 1962)Google Scholar; Janowitz, Morris, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago 1964)Google Scholar; Pye (fn. 2), 69-90.

⁶ Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven 1969), 192–263Google Scholar.

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⁸ See Gutteridge, William F., Military Institutions and Power in New States (London 1964)Google Scholar, passim.

⁹ Janowitz (fn. 5), 63.

¹⁰ Ibid., 63-64.

¹¹ Finer (fn. 5), 33.

¹² American University, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Senegal (Washington 1963), 463Google Scholar.

¹³ Gutteridge (fn. 8), 119.

¹⁴ Ibid., 97.

¹⁵ The military establishments of the Middle Eastern states reflect more reliance on indigenous training institutions than do those of Africa and Asia. This may be a reflection of pre-colonial Ottoman military traditions existing in the area, and of the less lengthy and less intense colonial experience undergone by these states. See Manfred Halpern, “Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class,” in Johnson (fn. 1), 292-93 and passim.

¹⁶ Cf. Newcomb, T. M., Social Psychology (New York 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Newcomb, T. M., “Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups: The Bennington Study,” in Maccoby, E. E. and others, eds., Readings in Social Psychology (New York 1947), 265–75Google Scholar; Sherif, M., An Outline of Social Psychology (New York 1948)Google Scholar; Sherif, M. and Sherif, C., Groups in Harmony and Tension (New York 1953)Google Scholar; Sherif, M. and Cantril, Hadley, The Psychology of Ego-Involvements (New York 1947)Google Scholar; Sherif, M., The Psychology of Social Norms (New York 1936)Google Scholar; Sherif, M. and Sherif, C., Reference Groups (New York 1964)Google Scholar; Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe 1957)Google Scholar, chaps. 8 and 9; Kelley, H. H., “The Functions of Reference Groups,” in Swanson, G. E. and others, eds., Readings in Social Psychology (New York 1952), 410–15Google Scholar; Festinger, Leon, Schachter, Stanley, and Back, Kurt, Social Pressures in Informal Groups (Palo Alto 1950)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See Richard Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes (Princeton 1949), 126Google Scholar. See also Eulau, Heinz, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective,” Journal of Politics, xviii (May 1956), 232–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Key, V. O., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York 1961), 138–44Google Scholar.

¹⁸ This phenomenon, by which new recruits go through a period of isolation from outside social groups, is characteristic of organizations whose belief systems are distinct from that of the social system in which they operate, and who thus must change the reference-group identifications of their new members. Thus we find church organizations utilizing monasteries. Likewise, revolutionary political parties that have been successfully institutionalized are likely to have gone through a period of isolation during which new reference-group identities are formed by novice cadres. Thus in the history of the Chinese Communist Party the “Yenan Period” and the Long March that preceded it provided the conditions under which members were geographically and socially isolated from their past membership and reference groups, allowing for highly effective cadre-formation, i.e., socialization to new reference groups. For a discussion of the importance of isolation in building political parties of the Leninist type, see Selznick, Philip, The Organizational Weapon (Glencoe 1953), 25–28Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Training given to “third-world” military officers in the U.S. differs in at least one significant aspect from its European counterpart. In the U.S., training is of a special nature, in which groups of officers from the same nation are given a course designed to be relevant for their home environment.

²⁰ Cf. Schachter, Stanley, “Deviation, Rejection, and Communication,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVI (April 1951), 190–207CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Back, Kurt, “Influence Through Social Communication,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVI (January 1951), 9–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eddy, Elizabeth, “Attitudes Toward Desegregation Among Southern Students on a Northern Campus,” Journal of Social Psychology, LXII (April 1964), 285–301CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Siegel and Siegel, “Reference Groups, Membership Groups, and Attitude Change,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LV (November 1957), 360–64Google Scholar; Rosen, Bernard C., “Conflicting Group Membership: A Study of Parent-Peer Group Cross Pressures,” American Sociological Review, xx (April 1955), 155–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lewin, Kurt and Grabbe, Paul, “Conduct, Knowledge, and Acceptance of New Values,” Journal of Social Issues, 1 (August 1945), 53–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jackson, J. M. and Saltzstein, Herbert D., “The Effect of Person-Group Relationships on Conformity Processes,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LVII (July 1958), 17–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Festinger, Leon and Thibaut, John, “Interpersonal Communication in Small Groups,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVI (January 1951), 92–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ The experimental literature on the power of groups to elicit conforming behavior from their members is voluminous. A few of the classic experiments in this area are: Asch, S. E., “Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments,” in Proshansky, H. and Seidenberg, B., eds., Basic Studies in Social Psychology (New York 1965), 393–401Google Scholar; Crutchfield, R. S., “Personal and Situational Factors in Conformity to Group Pressure,” Acta Psychologica, xv (1959), 386–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deutsch, Morton and Gerard, Harold B., “A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI (November 1955), 629–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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²³ Afrifa, A. A., The Ghana Coup (London 1966), 51Google Scholar.

²⁴ Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe 1963), 265Google Scholar.

²⁵ American University, Special Warfare Area Handbook for Ghana (Washington 1962), 518Google Scholar.

²⁶ Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism (New York 1944), 20Google Scholar.

²⁷ Afrifa (fn. 23).

²⁸ Ocran, A. K., A Myth is Broken; An Account of the Ghana Coup d'État (London 1968)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Ocran (fn. 28), xviii, italics added.

³⁰ Afrifa (fn. 23), 108.

³¹ Ibid., 93.

³² Ibid., 108.

³³ Ibid., 37.

³⁴ Ocran (fn. 28), 4, italics added.

³⁵ Afrifa (fn. 23), 54, italics added.

³⁶ Objection may be raised here that Ocran and Afrifa are merely expressing their identification with one strand of Ghanaian nationalism—that represented by the “intelligentsia” who opposed Nkrumah and the CPP. It is true that such identification is expressed in these passages, but it would seem that what we find in these passages is more than comparison between two Ghanaian political traditions. Rather, the thrust of the argument is a comparison between the proper behavior of the colonial power and the illegitimate activity of the dominant anti-colonial forces in Ghana. To the extent that the political opposition to Nkrumah perceived and expressed its opposition in a pro-British mode, then the extent and intensity of its nationalism can also be called into question.

³⁷ Afrifa (fn. 23), 104, italics added.

³⁸ Ibid., 112, italics added.

³⁹ Ibid., 71.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 66, italics added.

⁴¹ Cf. Hoskyns, Catherine, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (New York 1965)Google Scholar; O'Brien, Conor Cruise, To Katanga and Back (New York 1963)Google Scholar.

⁴² Ocran (fn. 28), 9.

⁴³ Ibid., 13-14.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁴⁵ Cf. Afrifa (fn. 23), 109.

⁴⁶ Because of the colonial background of the African countries, nationalism in its external aspect is usually associated with orientations toward the ex-colonial power and its great-power allies. Indeed, this is so much the case that nationalistic orientations toward the European powers have usually coincided with non-nationalist, i.e., pan-African, orientations toward other African peoples. Nevertheless, it is possible for Africans to have nationalistic orientations toward other Africans, or toward non-European immigrant entrepreneurial groups in their midst—Lebanese in West Africa and Asians in East Africa. Our discussion is concerned with the first type of nationalism—orientations toward European powers. It is possible that military officers with European reference groups would exhibit nationalism in the other two types of cases, because in such situations their European reference-group identifications would have low salience.

⁴⁷ Cf. Janowitz (fn. 5), 64.

⁴⁸ Huntington (fn. 6), 203.

⁴⁹ Ocran (fn. 28), 41-43, italics added.

⁵⁰ Afrifa (fn. 23), 104.

⁵¹ Ocran (fn. 28), 45-47.

⁵² The development of this tension can be traced in the pages of the Legon Observer, published and largely written by members of the faculty of the University of Ghana.

⁵³ Ghanaian Times (January 9, 1969), 1.

⁵⁴ Cf. Radix, A., “Foreign Participation in State Enterprises: The Case of Abbott Laboratories (Ghana) Ltd.,” Legon Observer, 11 (November 1967), 4Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Cf. Legon Observer, ii (December 1967), 26; note that Abbott, not Abbott-Ghana, is the party with the lease option.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 57.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 28.

⁵⁹ “National Self-Reliance or Dependence?,” Legon Observer, 11 (November 1967), 1Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ The “ten times over” statement was made by R. S. Amegashie, the then civilian Commissioner for Industries and the head of the National Liberation Council's contract negotiating committee. Cf. Legon Observer, 11 (December 1967), 28Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Scott, Douglas A., “External Debt-Management Policy in a Developing Country,” in Farrer, T. J., ed., Financing African Development (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 58–59Google Scholar.

⁶² Cf. ibid., 55.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Cf. Arhin, Kwame, “Why Should We Let Sleeping Dogs Lie?,” Legon Observer, iv (November 1969), 11–12Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ , Ghana, The Financial Statement, 1968-1969 (Accra 1968), 3Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Although dissatisfaction with the NLC's economic policies focused primarily on relations with European and American businesses and governments, the military rulers were also under pressure to act so as to reduce the extensive role played by Lebanese entrepreneurs in Ghanaian commerce. The military government responded with promises of restrictive policies but never actually implemented these. It was not until a civilian government succeeded the NLC that policies that placed restrictions on the type of businesses that non-Ghanaians could own and operate were actually implemented.

⁶⁷ Cf. Janowitz (fn. 5), 64; Huntington (fn. 6), 203.

⁶⁸ Daily Graphic (June io, 1968), 5Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Ocran (fn. 28), 2.

⁷⁰ Afrifa (fn. 23), 37.

⁷¹ Ocran (fn. 28), xviii.

⁷² Cf. Pye, Lucian, Aspects of Political Development (Boston 1966), 64–65Google Scholar.