Crossref Citations
This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.
Wu, Samuel S. G.
1990.
To Attack or Not to Attack.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 34,
Issue. 3,
p.
531.
Huth, Paul K.
1990.
The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 34,
Issue. 2,
p.
270.
Kilgour, D. Marc
1991.
Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 35,
Issue. 2,
p.
266.
Harvey, Frank
and
James, Patrick
1992.
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate Testing and An Alternative Research Agenda.
Conflict Management and Peace Science,
Vol. 12,
Issue. 1,
p.
17.
Herrmann, Richard K.
1992.
Soviet Behavior in Regional Conflicts: Old Questions, New Strategies, and Important Lessons.
World Politics,
Vol. 44,
Issue. 3,
p.
432.
GREFFENIUS, STEVEN
and
GILL, JUNGIL
1992.
Pure Coercion vs. Carrot-and-Stick Offers in Crisis Bargaining.
Journal of Peace Research,
Vol. 29,
Issue. 1,
p.
39.
James, Patrick
and
Harvey, Frank
1992.
The Most Dangerous Game: Superpower Rivalry in International Crises, 1948- 1985.
The Journal of Politics,
Vol. 54,
Issue. 1,
p.
25.
Huth, Paul
Gelpi, Christopher
and
Bennett, D. Scott
1993.
The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism.
American Political Science Review,
Vol. 87,
Issue. 3,
p.
609.
Huth, Paul
and
Russett, Bruce
1993.
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models.
American Political Science Review,
Vol. 87,
Issue. 1,
p.
61.
1993.
Crises in World Politics.
p.
621.
Allan, Charles T.
1994.
Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?.
The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 17,
Issue. 3,
p.
203.
Goertz, Gary
and
Diehl, Paul F.
1995.
Taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalry: The rivalry approach to war and peace.
International Interactions,
Vol. 21,
Issue. 3,
p.
291.
Inbar, Efraim
and
Sandler, Shmuel
1995.
The changing Israeli strategic equation: Toward a security regime.
Review of International Studies,
Vol. 21,
Issue. 1,
p.
41.
Harvey, Frank P.
1995.
Rational Deterrence Theory Revisited: A Progress Report.
Canadian Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 28,
Issue. 3,
p.
403.
Harvey, Frank P.
and
James, Patrick
1996.
Nuclear Crisis as a Multi-stage Threat Game: Toward an Agenda for Comparative Research.
International Political Science Review,
Vol. 17,
Issue. 2,
p.
197.
Mares, David R.
1996.
Deterrence bargaining in the Ecuador‐Peru enduring rivalry: Designing strategies around military weakness.
Security Studies,
Vol. 6,
Issue. 2,
p.
91.
Copeland, Dale C.
1997.
Do reputations matter?.
Security Studies,
Vol. 7,
Issue. 1,
p.
33.
Goldgeier, James M.
1997.
Psychology and security.
Security Studies,
Vol. 6,
Issue. 4,
p.
137.
de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno
Morrow, James D.
and
Zorick, Ethan R.
1997.
Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation.
American Political Science Review,
Vol. 91,
Issue. 1,
p.
15.
Gelpi, Christopher
1997.
Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining.
American Political Science Review,
Vol. 91,
Issue. 2,
p.
339.