¹ Huntington, Samuel P. and Nelson, Joan M., No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 17–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Schnitzer, Martin, Income Distribution: A Comparative Study of the United States, Sweden, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan (New York: Praeger, 1974), 232.Google Scholar

³ Adelman, Irma and Morris, Cynthia Taft, Economic Growth and Social Equality in Developing Countries (Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973)Google Scholar; Jackman, Robert W., Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1975).Google Scholar

⁴ Jackman (fn. 3), 68–89.

⁵ Verba, Sidney and Nie, Norman H., Participation in America: Social Equality and Political Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid., 335.

⁷ For the nature of the program and sampling design, see Verba, Sidney, Nie, Norman H., and Kim, Jae-On, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), xi–xxi, 349–75.Google Scholar

⁸ Ibid., 340–48.

⁹ I learned a great deal from Feldstein, Martin S., “Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education,” American Economic Review 65 (March 1975), 75–89Google Scholar, for constructing the following model. For purposes of estimation, it is convenient to replace equation (3) by the more explicit system of equations lnS_jt = α_j + λlnI_t + u_jt, j = 2, … k, where error terms u_jt, are assumed to be mutually independent and each independent of ε_t, in equation (2). By differentiating each of these equations with respect to income, one may readily verify that each λ_i, is precisely the elasticity of S_jt with respect to I_t. Hence these equations together with (2) are equivalent to (1), (2), (3), and are seen to define a recursive system of linear equations within which the parameters β₁, β₂, … β_k and λ₂, … λ_k can be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares. See Dhrymes, Phoebus J., Econometrics: Statistical Foundation and Application (New York: Springer Verlay, 1974), 307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Verba and Nie (fn. 5), Part II.

¹¹ We included age and gender variables in equation (2), but excluded them from equation (3) because they were assumed to be unrelated to family income. Empirical estimation of the correlation between age and family income was —0.04, and that between gender and family income was —0.05, respectively. Neither was statistically significant at an 0.01 level.

¹² See Milbrath, Lester W. and Goel, M. L., Political Participation, 2d ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), 98–102Google Scholar, for a summary of literature on this subject.

¹³ Kabashima, Ikuo, “Political Participation and Income Distribution in Growing Economies,” Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, 1979).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Milbrath and Goel (fn. 12), 101.

¹⁵ Verba and Nie (fn. 5), 208.

¹⁶ Richardson, Bradley M., “Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan,” American Political Science Review 67 (June 1973), 433–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Watanuki, Joji, Politics in Postwar Japanese Society (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), 65–76.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Kuznets, Simon, “Quantitative Aspects of Economic Growth of Nations: Part VII, The Distribution of Income by Size,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 11 (January 1963), Part 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid.; also see Cromwell, Jerry, “Income Inequality, Discrimination, and Uneven Capitalist Development,” Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, 1974)Google Scholar; Adelman and Morris (fn. 3).

¹⁹ Adelman and Morris (fn. 3), 165.

²⁰ Schultz, T. Paul, “Secular Trends and Cyclical Behavior of Income Distribution in the United States: 1944–1965,” in Soltow, Lee, ed., Six Papers on the Size Distribution of Wealth and Income (New York: N.B.E.R., 1969)Google Scholar; Chiswick, Barry R. and Mincer, Jacob, “Time-Series Changes in Personal Income Inequality in the United States from 1939, with Projections to 1985,” Journal of Political Economy 80 (May/June 1972), 34–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ The income distribution data and GNP compiled by Jain, Shail, Size Distribution of Income (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1975)Google Scholar, include a relatively large number of countries in both the communist and noncommunist countries. We used income distribution data based on distribution of family income sampled from the national population between 1960 and 1970.

²² ” The Japanese income distribution data used here are from Mizoguchi, Toshiyuki, “Sengo Nihon no Shotoku-bunpu to Shisan-bunpu” [The Distribution of Income and Wealth in Postwar Japan], Keizai-Kenkyu 25 (October 1974), 360.Google Scholar

²³ Adelman and Morris (fn. 3); Jackman (fn. 3).

²⁴ Mizoguchi (fn. 22), 355.

²⁵ Kyokai, Norin Tokei, Nogyo Hakuso [Agricultural White Paper] (Tokyo, 1978), 29.Google Scholar

²⁶ Donnelly, Michael W., “Setting the Price of Rice: A Study of Political Decisionmaking,” in Pempel, T. J., ed., Policymaking in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 146.Google Scholar

²⁷ Huntington and Nelson (fn. 1), 23.

²⁸ Ibid., 24.

²⁹ Ibid., 23.

³⁰ Ibid., 25.

³¹ Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, paperback ed., 1965), 1–35, 337–74.Google Scholar

³² Ibid., 344.

³³ Watanuki (fn. 16), 82.

³⁴ To please these supportive groups, the LDP government often uses the policy of giving subsidies to them. As a result, the share of governmental subsidies in the national budget is much larger in Japan than in other countries. For example, the subsidies in Japan's budget amount to around 32 percent whereas in England and France, they are 4 to 6 percent, in the United States 8 to 10 percent, and in West Germany 18 to 20 percent. Approximately 14 percent of the total is allocated to the agricultural sector in Japan; of 1,500 items, 474 go to the agricultural sector. See Hirose, Michisada, Hojokin to Seikento [Subsidy and the Party in Power] (Tokyo: The Asahi, 1981), 76, 98.Google Scholar Hirose also discusses the mechanisms by which subsidies are apportioned.

³⁵ The triumvirate model is popular among political scientists in Japan. See Fukui, Haruhiro, “Studies in Policymaking: A Review of the Literature,” in Pempel (fn. 26), 23–59.Google Scholar See also Watanuki, Joji, “Kodo Seicho to Keizai Taikokuka no Seiji Katei” [Political Process of Japan's High Economic Growth and her Emergence as an Economic Giant 1955–1977] Nihon Seijigakkai Nenpo [Annuals of the Japanese Political Science Association] (1977), 141–92.Google Scholar

³⁶ Campbell, John Creighton, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 3.Google Scholar