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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
In February 1948 few people in Czechoslovakia could size up the full implications of the Communist coup. The bulk of non-Communist public opinion was, to say the least, bewildered by the rapidity of events and confused about the real issues involved. Its attitude reflected this state of mind. The political parties to which it traditionally owed allegiance collapsed overnight. Their duly elected leaders were immediately muzzled. President Benes, on whom in the final analysis the total burden of stopping the Communist onslaught rested, and from whom the nation would normally expect its cue, gave none, unless his passive acceptance of the fait accompli with which he was presented were to be construed as a sign for the people to do likewise.
1 For details, see Pruni Ceskoslovensky Petilety Plan (The First Czechoslovak Five Year Plan), Czechoslovak Ministry of Information, Prague, 1948.
2 Ibid., pp. 7 ff.
3 Rude Pravo, October 10, 1950.
4 Rude Pravo, September 17, 1950.
5 See comments by CP Secretary General Rudolf Slansky at the Communist Congress in May 1949 (Rude Pravo, May 27, 1949); also Rude Pravo, September 17, 1950.
6 Rude Pravo, October 19, 1950.
7 For an account of the Party Congress, see Protokol IX. Sjezdu KSC (Minutes of the IX Congress of the Czechoslovak CP), Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP, 1949.
8 Rude Pravo, September 16, 1950.
9 Rude Pravo, May 27, 1950.
10 Rude Pravo, May 25, 1950.
11 Rude Pravo, May 28, 1950.
12 Ibid.
13 Obrana Lidu, June 15, 1950.
14 Rude Pravo, May 24, 1950.
15 Frejka, L., 26, unor 1948 v Ceskoslovenskem hospodarstvi (The Meaning of February 26, 1948, for the Czechoslovak Economy), Prague-Orbis, 1948, p. 64.Google Scholar
16 Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin, No. 12, March 18, 1948.