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Problems in the Management and Resolution of International Conflicts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Abstract
Discussion of the independent nature of four problems in the management and resolution of international conflicts fills a gap, since these distinct problems are often considered to be a single undifferentiated subject area. The first problem is the existence of multiple conflict structures (patterns of capabilities and interests): different structures follow differing patterns of development. The second problem concerns difficulties in statesmen's abilities to discern accurately the structure and thus the dynamics of the conflict episodes they confront. The third problem involves the strategy requirements of different conflict structures, and the fourth the discrepancies between statesmen's strategy preferences and the requirements of different conflict structures. Increased intellectual recognition of these distinct issues might help to reduce the severity of international conflicts by reducing misperception and inappropriate actions based on misperception. But statesmen would still face problems in gaining domestic political support for their intellectual understanding of international conflicts.
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- Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1977
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1 Illustrations will be drawn from these as well as from other conflicts throughout the essay. Since these three conflicts occurred many years ago, brief summaries may be useful.
The Fashoda conflict began with the British discovery of a small French expeditionary force in the British-claimed Sudan. The British demanded the removal of the French force. Some French leaders wished to press for a French foothold in the Sudan. Through negotiations, the British eventually won removal of the French force (which was extremely vulnerable, given British military superiority on the seas and in Northeast Africa). However, the British cooperated in reducing French humiliation through a variety of procedural concessions.
The Algeciras crisis was the first of several Franco-German conflicts arising from questions surrounding the status of Morocco. This particular episode was precipitated by a public speech the Kaiser made in Tangier, in which he refused to recognize any special position for the French in Morocco. The French Government, led by Rouvier, was initially conciliatory. The French Cabinet even dismissed the Germanophobe Foreign Minister, Delcasse, in response to German pressure. But the Germans continued to insist on an international conference to decide the status of Morocco. They were probably more concerned with using the Moroccan question to drive a wedge between France and Britain than with a German foothold in Morocco. If the British did not support France at an international conference on Morocco, the Entente Cordiale would be broken. The French finally relented, and an international conference was held in Algeciras. The French received support from the British as well as from other nations while the Germans stood alone. And the French drove a hard bargain which recognized a special position for the French in Morocco.
The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by Serbian nationalists at Sarajevo led to Austria's ultimatum and subsequent declaration of war on Serbia. These actions triggered a complex series of interlocking events which culminated in the First World War.
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3 The Chicken game in Figure I is adapted from Daniel Ellsberg, “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail” (Santa Monica: RAND 1968). Chicken is a game in which each of the players prefers having his own cooperation exploited (the upper, right-hand payoff for “Defender”; the lower, left-hand payoff for “Aggressor”) to the costs of mutual noncooperation (the lower, right-hand payoff for both players). The crux of Chicken is that each player will give in if he perceives the other will stand fast.
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27 Schelling (fn. 4).
28 Snyder and Diesing (fn. 16).
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30 Bringing these limits to light ties in with the distinction, discussed above, between initial images and subsequent expectations which develop as a conflict unfolds. Th e discovery of limits on objectives creates the basis for developing expectations about the immediate conflict which differ from the image.
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41 Some of the conflict episodes discussed in this essay can, on the basis of the preferences of the dominant decision makers of the nations involved, be categorized as to structure. Berlin, 1948–49, is Chicken; Fashoda is Prisoner's Dilemma (Great Britain)-Chicken (France), as are the Austrian (Prisoner's Dilemma)-Russian (Chicken) Balkan conflicts of 1908–09 (the Bosnian crisis) and 1912–13 (the Balkan wars); Sarajevo is Prisoner's Dilemma. Other conflicts are more difficult to categorize for one or more of several reasons. For example, important leaders in one or both nations may differ in their preferences. Agadir was Prisoner's Dilemma for the French, but on the German side it was Prisoner's Dilemma for Kiderlen and Chicken for the Kaiser. Each of these men dominated German policy at different times during the conflict. Also, conflict structure may change as capabilities vary. Algeciras was Chicken for the Germans; but for the French, structure hinged on British support. Without British support, the French were in Chicken, but with it, they were in Prisoner's Dilemma. In other instances, statesmen's preferences may change as conflicts build across time, threatening new interests or raising new costs. Hitler's conflicts with the British and the French in the 1930's started out as Chicken (Rhineland andAnschluss), then became Prisoner's Dilemma (Germany)-Chicken (Great Britain and France) in the case of Munich, and finally reached Prisoner's Dilemma with the invasion of Poland. The United States-Vietnamese aspect of the recent conflict in Southeast Asia started out as Prisoner's Dilemma on both sides and gradually shifted to Prisoner's Dilemma (Vietnam)-Chicken (United States). Finally, interests and thus conflict structure may change with escalation. The 1958–62 Berlin conflict had a Chicken structure which might well have changed to Prisoner's Dilemma if the violence threshold had been breached. The Cuban conflict of 1962 was Prisoner's Dilemma (United States)-Chicken (Soviet Union) as it occurred. However, a United States attack on Soviet positions in Cuba or an invasion of Cuba might have produced a Prisoner's Dilemma structure. And the 1973 Yom Kippur War was Chicken from the standpoint of the United States and the Soviet Union. But acts of escalation such as the introduction of the forces of either great power could have changed this structure to Prisoner's Dilemma.
42 This corresponds with what Zartman terms the mutual acceptance of a solution formula. Zartman, I. William, “Reality, Image, and Detail,” in Zartman, , ed., The 50% Solution (Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday 1976Google Scholar).
43 Some Chicken structures result in prolonged stalling. The Berlin conflicts from 1948 to 1962 contain examples of this activity. It is conceivable that Chicken conflicts might, through miscalculation, result in violent struggle. No clear-cut cases of this scenario come to mind, although the actions of German civilian leaders in 1914 after they realized Britain would support France could be interpreted that way.
44 Snyder and Diesing (fn. 16).
45 See George, Alexander L., “The Case For Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 66 (September 1972), 751CrossRefGoogle Scholar–95, for a discussion of multiple advocacy. Janis, Irving L., Victims of Groupthink (Boston:Houghton Mifflin 1972Google Scholar) offers a more informal version of the concept.
46 Kohl, Wilfrid L., “The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations,” World Politics, xxvii (October 1975), 1–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar, develops and contrasts these various models of policy formulation.
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