¹ For a clear discussion of the bipolar model, see Waltz, Kenneth, “The Stability of a Bipolar System,” Daedalus (Summer 1964), 881–909Google Scholar. A somewhat parallel effort to develop the multipolar model is Deutsch, Karl W. and Singer, J. David, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, xvi (April 1964), 390–406CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² For various conceptions of the range of mixed types, see Burns, Arthur Lee, “From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics, ix (July 1957), 494–529CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Zoppo, Ciro Elliott, “Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, and International Stability,” World Politics, xviii (July 1966), 579–606CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ This notion of a layered system has been developed by Richard Rosecrance in his article “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, x (September 1966), 314–27Google Scholar.

⁴ Perhaps the single most important statement of abstract models of the international system remains Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Politics (New York 1957)Google Scholar.

⁵ In its intellectual origins, the multipolar model of the international system really stems from the conceptions of the American group theorists concerning domestic politics. For the original and in some ways clearest statement of these conceptions, see Bentley, Arthur F., The Process of Government (Chicago 1908)Google Scholar.

⁶ For conceptualizations of models along these lines, see Masters, Roger, “A Multi-Bloc Model of the International System,” American Political Science Review, LV (December 1961), 780–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hanrieder, Wolfram, “The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, ix (September 1965), 299–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Another form of direct opposition to fragmentation would be the development of genuine political integration among the units of the international system.

⁸ The concept of “limited adversary” relationships is introduced and developed in Shulman, Marshall D., Beyond the Cold War (New Haven 1966)Google Scholar.

⁹ This particular possibility has always been a major source of American concern with regard to East-West problems in the postwar period.

¹⁰ Interdependence refers here to the extent to which actions in one part of the system affect the other parts of the system. It is therefore not a measure of common or overlapping interests. Interdependencies may be either positive or negative.

¹¹ It may be appropriate to take the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 as an important turning point. But the expansion of Japanese influence throughout the Asian subsystem continued on a fairly gradual basis until the actual beginning of the war.

¹² At the present time, some form of communism is dominant in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. There are, in addition, Communist movements of some significance in a number of the other Asian states.

¹³ The models debated range from the pure forms of a free market economy to the pure forms of socialism. At the present time, many of the developing countries are becoming increasingly interested in various mixed forms.

¹⁴ The most obvious cases of testing include (i) the attack on South Korea in 1950, (2) the probes in the Taiwan Strait in 1954–1955 and in 1958, (3) Laos, at least until the Geneva agreement of 1962, and (4) Vietnam from 1959 until the present.

¹⁵ Even at the outset in 1954, the SEATO alliance was notable for its failure to include many of the significant Asian states. In the intervening years, the alliance has occasionally been an instrument of American foreign policy, but has seldom functioned in any other way.

¹⁶ Even in 1950 there were several aspects of the relationships between the Soviet Union and China that were obvious sources of potential disagreement. At the time, however, the weakness of China served to camouflage these problems. As a direct function of the emergence of China as a power of significance at least in the Asian subsystem, the basic political difficulties in the Sino-Soviet relationship have become increasingly prominent. In this sense, the relationship is essentially reverting to the patterns that predominated in the early years of die twentieth century.

¹⁷ There are several alternative lines of thinking in this area at the present time. Some of these ideas have been discussed in a particularly interesting way by Richard Lowenthal. See his “China's Impact on the Evolution of the Alliances in Europe,” in Western and Eastern Europe: The Changing Relationship, Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 33 (London, March 1967), 20–29Google Scholar.

¹⁸ This point is especially interesting because of the fact that it is generally true despite the complexities and difficulties of the current struggle over Vietnam.

¹⁹ These concrete efforts at coordination in the Asian subsystem are particularly interesting in contrast to the continuing strength of rigidities impeding the realization of common interests between the superpowers in the European subsystem.

²⁰ The temporal juxtaposition of this situation with the Cuban missile crisis makes the efforts at tacit coordination between the superpowers with regard to the Sino-Indian conflict even more significant

²¹ It was during this period that guarantees, and especially a tacit coordination of guarantees by both superpowers, began to become prominent in discussions of Indian security problems.

²² In this connection, the de facto, though publicly denied, coordination of the superpowers in the United Nations Security Council was a prominent feature of the efforts to stop the overt hostilities between India and Pakistan during September 1965. During January 1966, the Soviet Union took the lead in playing the role of intermediary at Tashkent, but the United States operated in the background in a manner diat indicated de facto approval and support of the Soviet initiative.

²³ The fundamental problem for the Soviet Union and the United States in this area is that there is every reason to suppose that the development of new patterns of outside dominance in Indochina would effectively mean Chinese dominance. The geopolitical features of the area are such that it is much more plausible to foresee a situation in which a Chinese sphere of influence has reemerged than a situation characterized by the predominance of either superpower.

²⁴ The classic formulation of this doctrine is the famous article by “X” (Kennan, George), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, xxv (July 1947), 566–82Google Scholar.

²⁵ For some interesting additional points in this area see Mozingo, David, “Containment in Asia Reconsidered,” World Politics, xix (April 1967), 361–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ These secondary effects range from the costs of a continuing commitment to support a shaky or unpopular regime to detrimental consequences for the reputation of the intervening state in the other subsystems of the overall international system.

²⁷ During the 1958 crisis, activities along these lines were particularly evident in relationships between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union on the one hand and between the Nationalists and the United States on the other.

²⁸ For some interesting points concerning this problem in the Vietnam context, consult McAlister, John T. Jr., “The Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” World Politics, xix (January 1967), 258–305CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁹ The possibilities of catalytic actions on the part of the local powers are particularly important These dangers of catalytic actions do not refer, in the first instance, to nuclear exchanges, but rather to the possibilities of touching off escalatory sequences that are difficult to control.

³⁰ Many of the Asian states emerged from colonialism with regimes that were highly successful in revolutionary activities but ill-suited to the requirements of creating viable political structures on a long-term basis. Adaptation problems of this kind are, in fact, relatively common in revolutionary situations. And they are an important cause of the continued political ferment that often follows the successful termination of a struggle for independence. In the Asian context, however, independence was gained by a number of states at a time when the bipolar conflict in the overall system placed artificial impediments in the way of this shakedown process. The current political ferment in several Asian states is actually a kind of delayed shakedown process that never occurred in the late forties and early fifties.

³¹ For an exploration of the concepts of neutralization see “Neutralization in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects,” A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington 1966). This study was prepared by Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran Young.

³² Ideas of this kind have already been tried to a certain extent. Laos, for example, was formally neutralized by international agreement under the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1962. And Cambodia is presently a self-neutralized state whose act of neutralization has been received favorably by most of the relevant outside states.