¹ The pioneering study is Singer, J. David, Bremer, Stuart, and Stuckey, John, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty and Major Power War,” in Russett, Bruce, ed., Peace, War and Numbers (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972)Google Scholar. Their findings supported the equality-equals-peace proposition for the 19th century, but the preponderance-equals-peace proposition for the 20th. Ferris, Wayne H., in The Power Capabilities of National-States (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath 1973)Google Scholar, covered a similar time span; his findings supported the equality proposition for both centuries. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, “Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of W'ar,” International Studies Quarterly 25 (December 1981), 541–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar, found no relation between power distribution and the likelihood of war over the same period. See also Sabrosky, Alan Ned, Polarity and War (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985)Google Scholar, and, for a good review of the literature, Siverson, Randolph and Sullivan, Michael, “The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (September 1983), 473–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Holsti, K. J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 158Google Scholar.

³ See the attachés' dispatches from 1905/6 cited by Towle, P., “The European Balance of Power in 1914,” Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 104 (April 1974), 334, 335Google Scholar.

⁴ Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, gen. eds., British Documents on Foreign Affairs (hereafter cited as BD), Pt. 1, Ser. A (Russia), V, 177, 178. Wyndham to Foreign Office, 11.19.08.

⁵ Cited by Neilson, Keith, “Watching the ‘Steamroller’: British Observers and the Russian Army before 1914,” Journal of Strategic Studies 8 (June 1985), 212CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Naval observers were sceptical of Russian naval capabilities, but this had little influence on the overall assessment because Russia was judged not to be vulnerable to blockade. For representative memoranda, see BD (fn. 4), III, 172; V, 84; VI, 247, 261, 281, 282. German assessments may be found in Lambi, Ivo N., The Navy and German Power Politics (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984)Google Scholar.

⁶ See Cecil Spring-Rice's dispatches to Salisbury, BD (fn. 4), III, 107.

⁷ Ibid., V, 177; to Grey, 19.11.08.

⁸ Ropponen, Risto, Die Kraft Rusdands [Russia's power] (Helsinki: Historiallisia tutkimiksia, 1968), 113Google Scholar. This work by a Finnish historian, based on extensive archival research, is the most extensive treatment of perceptions of Russian power during this period.

⁹ BD (fn. 4), V, 282; to Grey, 07.05.09.

¹⁰ Ibid., 332.

¹¹ Gooch, G. P. and Temperly, Harold, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War (London, 1927–1938), X, Pt. 2, 767Google Scholar; to Grey, 18.03.14.

¹² See Wilson, Keith, “British Power in the European Balance,” in Dilks, David, ed., Retreat from Power (London: Macmillan, 1981), Vol. 1, 22Google Scholar.

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¹⁴ Quoted by Kennedy, ibid.

¹⁵ Ropponen (fn. 8), 287.

¹⁶ See incidents of Wilson's dismissive view of the Russians as recounted by Kennedy (fn. 13), 427, and Ropponen (fn. 8), 246, n. 126.

¹⁷ See the incidents reported by Kennedy (fn. 13), and Höltze, Erwin, Die Selbstentmachtung Europas [The self-enfeeblement of Europe] (Frankfurt-Zürich: Musterschmidt Göttingen, 1975). 235, 300Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Cited by Collins, D. N., “The Franco-Russian Alliance and Russian Railways,” Historical Journal 16 (December 1973), 785Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Quoted by Ignat'ev, A. V. in Russho-angliskie otnosheniia nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny [Russian-English relations before the First World War] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'noekonomicheskoi literatury, 1962), 116Google Scholar. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by the present author.

²⁰ Quoted by Turner, L.F.C., “The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” in Kennedy, Paul, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 253Google Scholar.

²¹ French attaché in Petersburg, quoted by Bovykin, V. I. in Iz istorii vozniknoveniia pervoi mirovoi voiny: Otnosheniia Rossii i Frantsii v 1912–1914gg. [From the history of the onset of the First World War: Russian-French relations 1912–1914] (Moscow: Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1961), 148Google Scholar.

²² Ropponen (fn. 8), 96, 231.

²³ Snyder, Jack, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Maying and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 157Google Scholar.

²⁴ Ropponen (fn. 8), 168.

²⁵ Ibid., 281.

²⁶ Ibid., 167.

²⁷ Quoted by Bovykin (fn. 21), 35, 191.

²⁸ See Ropponen (fn. 8), 222, 270 for the attaché's and Moltke's 1908 reports. The British attaché noticed “the exceedingly unfavorable opinion that my German colleague holds of the Russian army.” BD (fn. 4), V, 177; Wyndham to Foreign Office, 19.11.08.

²⁹ Bitter, Ludwig et al., eds., Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosmschen Krise 1908 biszum Kriegsausbruch 1914 [Austria-Hungary's foreign policy from the Bosnian crisis in 1908 to the outbreak of war in 1914] (hereafter cited as Ö-UA) (Vienna and Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1930), 1, p. 15Google Scholar; 23.07.08.

³⁰ Cited by Herwig, Holger H., “Imperial Germany,” in May, Ernest, ed., Knowing One's, Enemies: Intelligence Assessments before the Two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 80Google Scholar.

³¹ Ropponen (fn. 8), 249–50.

³² Quoted by Ropponen, ibid., 249. Naval assessments in this period paralleled Moltke's, with huge increases in Russian naval capabilities envisaged for the future. Lambi (fn. 5), 395–96.

³³ Röhl, John C. G., “An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: Eine Dokumentation über den ‘Kriegsrat' vom 8 Dez. 1912” [On the brink of world war: documentation of the “War Council” of 8 Dec. 1912] Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 21 (No. 1, 1977), 77Google Scholar.

³⁴ Ö-UA (fn. 29). VII, p. 515, report to Foreign Office, 26.10.13.

³⁵ Cited by Fischer, Fritz, War of Illusions (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975), 400Google Scholar.

³⁶ Quoted in Fischer, ibid., 402.

³⁷ Cited by Berghahn, Volker R., Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 191–92Google Scholar.

³⁸ Quoted by Fischer, Fritz in Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967), 159Google Scholar.

³⁹ Quoted in Berghahn (fn. 37), 189.

⁴⁰ Cited in Höltze (fn. 17), 238.

⁴¹ Ö-UA (fn. 29), VIII, pp. 306–7, 319; to Foreign Office, 5.07.14 and 6.07.14.

⁴² Ibid., I, pp. 8, 12.06.08, and 856, 20.02.09.

⁴³ Ibid., II, p. 389, 2.07.09.

⁴⁴ The Austrian military attaché's views are reported by the German ambassador: Lespius, Johannes et al., eds., Die Grosse Politic der Europäischen Kabinette [Grand policy of the European cabinets] (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927–1932), XXXVI, 379Google Scholar; Pourtales to Bethman Hollweg, 19.11.12. Chief of Staff von Auffenburg (temporarily replacing Conrad) asserted that “our chances of success would be in no way unfavorable even in a war which we fought out alone against Russia.” General Staff Report cited by Ropponen (fn. 8), 243. Auffenburg also believed that the two central powers “would remain victorious even against a coalition consisting of Britain, France, Italy and Russia.” Quoted by Fischer (fn. 35), 144.

⁴⁵ See Ambassador Thurn's memos to the Foreign Office, Ö-UA (fn. 29), IV, 794, 822.

⁴⁶ Ibid, VI, 333–34; Council of Ministers (COM) minutes, 05.02.13.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 403; COM minutes, 3.10.13.

⁴⁸ Ropponen (fn. 8), 11.

⁴⁹ Ö-UA (fn. 29), VIII, 254.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 269; to Berchtold, 02.07.14.

⁵¹ Ibid., 343 (COM minutes, 7.07.14); and 371.

⁵² Ibid., 348.

⁵³ von Hötzendorf, Baron Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit [From my service days], IV (Vienna: Rikoln Verlag, 1923), 571Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Quoted by Holsti, Ole, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), 124CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁵⁷ Bing, Edward J., The Secret Letters of the Last Tsar (London: Longmans, Green, 1938), 240, 03.19.09Google Scholar.

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⁵⁹ Ignat'ev (fn. 19), 116.

⁶⁰ Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia v Epofyhy Imperializma [International relations in the age of imperialism] Kommissiia po Izdanii Dokumentov Epokhi Imperializma (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1935): Ser. 2, Vol. 28, p. 378Google Scholar; Neratov to Izvol'skii, 30.08.11 (new style).

⁶¹ Quoted by Snyder (fn. 23), 248, n. 98.

⁶² Cited by Bovykin (fn. 21), 153.

⁶³ One of these meetings is recounted by Kokovstov, in his memoirs, Out of My Past, trans. Laura Matveev (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1935), 345Google Scholar. It forms part of Turner's argument (“Russian Mobilization,” in Kennedy, fn. 20) stressing the importance of the Russian mobilization in the origins of the war. See the rebuttals by May (fn. 30), 23, and Avetian (fn. 58), 186.

⁶⁴ See Snyder (fn. 23), 164–66, 175; Stone, Norman, The Eastern Front (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1975), 33–34Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Quoted by Lieven (fn. 55), 48.

⁶⁶ Bovykin (fn. 21), 176; Avetian (fn. 58), 231.

⁶⁷ Lieven (fn. 55), 142.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 143.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 186, n. 125. Sukhomlinov later told an aide to Sazonov that, “even with the support of France, we would find ourselves until 1917, and perhaps even until 1918, in a position of indisputable inferiority with respect to the combined forces of Germany and Austria.” Bazilii, N. A., Memoirs (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1973), 91Google Scholar.

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⁷¹ Ferris (fn. 1); Doran, Charles F. and Parsons, Wes, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” American Political Science Review 74 (December 1980), 947–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² Sabrosky, Ned, “From Bosnia to Sarajevo,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 19 (March 1975), 7Google Scholar.

⁷³ Organski, A.F.K. and Kugler, Jacek, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Stone (fn. 64), 93

⁷⁵ Ibid., 12.

⁷⁶ One article, for example, notes that, based on the Correlates of War estimators, “in 1905, the major power subsystem was still in a general state of equilibrium. By 1910, that equilibrium had been upset and the balance altered in favor of the Entente coalition.” Sabrosky (fn. 72), 18. Actually, the perceived balance was most disturbed in 1905, with equilibrium only beginning to be restored in 1910.

⁷⁷ For example, Singer et al. (fn. 1) code “war” as “nation-months of war underway,” thus accounting for the magnitude of conflicts. Their finding that low concentration (CON) of power (equal distribution) was associated with peace in the 19th century but with war in the 20th century has been widely discussed. This finding is heavily influenced by the fact that three very large wars (World Wars I and II and the Korean War) occurred in the 20th century during periods of low CON. In the instance of the First World War, if Russia is assigned 10% (rather than 18%) of world power (the difference going to Germany), the CON figure changes from. 208 (close to the lowest value) to. 244 (above the median and near the mean CON value of. 250). Assigning percentages is of course somewhat arbitrary, but a relatively weaker Russia and a greater concentration of capabilities in Germany are clearly implied by the evidence on perceptions. Thus, the significance of this finding is greatly reduced. If the estimators are similarly off the mark in the case of World War II, the conclusion will vanish entirely.

⁷⁸ This factor, of course, has further implications for Germany's power in comparison with England's. See Kennedy, Paul, “Mahan vs MacKinder” in his Strategy and Diplomacy: 1870–1945 (London: Fontana, 1983)Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 1) 566–67.

⁸⁰ Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Organski and Kugler (fn. 73); Doran and Parsons (fn. 71).

⁸¹ This is the approach taken by Doran and Parsons, ibid.

⁸² Organski and Kugler (fn. 73), 51.

⁸³ Doran and Parsons (fn. 71) have the Russian low point in 1894, when by most accounts it rose steadily after the reforms begun in the wake of the Russo-Turkish war of 1879 until 1904. See Laguiche Memo in Ropponen (fn. 8). Doran and Parsons set the German high at 1902, when the evidence presented here would suggest the period from 1906 to 1909 as more likely.

⁸⁴ Ropponen (fn. 8).

⁸⁵ Blainey, , The Causes of Wars (New York: Free Press, 1973), 114CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Gilpin (fn. 80).

⁸⁸ Lebow, Richard Ned, “Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump through Them?” in Miller, Stephen, ed., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 162–63Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ See ibid.; Holsti (fn. 54); Snyder (fn. 21).

⁹⁰ Fischer (fn. 35).

⁹¹ Evera, Van, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” World Politics 38 (October 1985), 80–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 116. See also Snyder, Jack, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914,” in Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 153–79Google Scholar.

⁹² Ibid., 81.

⁹³ The consensus among those who study the war may now be considered to rest here, after decades of acrimonious controversy, debate, and copious research sparked by the so-called “Fischer School.” See Moses, John A., The Policy of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography (London: George Prior, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ Gilpin (fn. 80), 202.

⁹⁵ Kennedy, “The First World War and the International Power System,” in Miller (fn. 88), 30.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ The Struggle for Mastery of Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 528Google Scholar.