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¹¹ Waltz, , Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 175Google Scholar–76.

¹² Chan, Steve, International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare and Justice (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 88–89Google Scholar. Britain and Czechoslovakia were not allies.

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¹⁵ See, e.g., Thorne, Christopher, The Approach of War 1938–9 (London: Macmillan, 1967CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and Robertson, Esmonde M., ed., The Origins of the Second World War: Historical Interpretations (London: Macmillan, 1971CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

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¹⁹ Kennedy, , “The Study of Appeasement: Methodological Crossroads or Meeting-Place?” British Journal of International Studies 6 (October 1980), 185CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 187.

²⁰ Theda Skocpol makes a similar point in discussing structural explanations of revolutions: “Any valid explanation of revolution depends upon the analyst's ‘rising above’ the viewpoints of participants to find important regularities across given historical instances.” States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 18Google Scholar.

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²² E.g., Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966Google Scholar).

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²⁶ In addition to the writings of Kennedy, above, see Gottfried Niedhart, “Appeasement: Die britische Antwort auf die Krise des Weltreichs und des internationalen Systems vor dem zweiten Weltkrieg” [Appeasement: The British answer to the crisis of the world empire and the international system before World War II], Historische Zeitschrift, 226 (No. 1, 1978), 67–88, and Reinhard Meyers, Britische Sicherheitspolitik 1934–1938: Studien zum aussen-und sich-erheitspolitischen Entscheidungsprozess [British security policy 1934–1938: Studies of the decision-making process on foreign and security policy] (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1976).

²⁷ In 1933, the share of social services in British public expenditure was 46.6%, compared with 33% in 1913; the share of defense was 10.5% and 29.9%, respectively. Payment on the national debt had increased from 6.1% to 21.4%. Kennedy, Paul, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865–1980 (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981Google Scholar), 240.

²⁸ In Kennedy, Paul M., Strategy and Diplomacy 1870–1945 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 87–106Google Scholar.

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³⁰ Niedhart (fn. 26), 86, 88; Klaus Hildebrand, “‘British Interests’ und ‘Pax Britannica’: Grundfragen englischer Aussenpolitik im 19. and 20. Jahrhundert” | “British interests” and “Pax Britannica”: Basic questions on English foreign policy in the 19th and 20th century], Historische Zeitschrift 221 (No. 3, 1975), 637–38.

³¹ Northedge (fn. 17), 628.

³² Northedge (fn. 21), 3–4.

³³ Schroeder (fn. 25), 242.

³⁴ Shay, , British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 277Google Scholar–78, 287–88.

³⁵ Kennedy, Paul M., “‘Appeasement’ and British Defence Policy in the Inter-war Years,” British Journal of International Studies 4 (July 1978), 161CrossRefGoogle Scholar–77; Peden, G. C., British Rearmament and the Treasury: 1932–1939 (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979Google Scholar); Parker, R.A.C., “Economics, Rearmament and Foreign Policy: The United Kingdom before 1939—A Preliminary Study,” Journal of Contemporary History 10 (October 1975), 637CrossRefGoogle Scholar–47, and “British Rearmament 1936–9: Treasury, Trade Unions and Skilled Labour,” English Historical Review 96 (April 1981), 306Google Scholar–43; Dunbabin, J.P.D., “British Rearmament in the 1930s: A Chronology and Review,” The Historical Journal 18 (No. 3, 1975), 587–609CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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³⁷ Peden (fn. 35), 89.

³⁸ Ibid., 92. One aspect of appeasement that has not been discussed above, but that also throws light on the complexities of the nexus between economics and politics in the late 1930s, is “economic appeasement”—the attempt to use economic leverage and incentives to induce Germany to move back from its autarchic policies and, by way of particular agreements, move; toward liberal trade relations. This topic has been explored in depth by Bernd-Jiirgen Wendt. For a summary of his book, Economic Appeasement: Handel und Finanz in der britischen Deutschland-Politik, 1933–1939 [Economic appeasement: Trade and finance in British policy toward Germany, 1933–1939] (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1971), see Wendt, “‘Economic Appeasement’—A Crisis Strategy,” in Mommsen and Kettenacker (fn. 36), 157–72. See also C. A. MacDonald, “Economic Appeasement and the German ‘Moderates,’ 1937–39,” Past and Present, No. 56 (1972), 105–35. For a view that draws attention to British reluctance to favor political considerations over market forces, see Kaiser, David E., Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 1930–1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980Google Scholar).

³⁹ Peden (fn. 35), 59 and passim; Watt (fn. 16), 103.

⁴⁰ Peden (fn. 35), 152–60; Smith, Malcolm, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 210Google Scholar–26.

⁴¹ Dunbabin (fn. 35), 590–91; Howard, Michael, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 104Google Scholar–12.

⁴² Peden (fn. 35), 205; Shay (fn. 34), 297.

⁴³ Shay (fn. 34), 92–133, 246–63; Parker (fn. 35, 1981), passim; Middlemas, Keith, Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911 (London: Deutsch, 1979), 244Google Scholar–65.

⁴⁴ Smith (fn. 40), 140–226; Meyers (fn. 26), 303–32.

⁴⁵ Peden (fn. 35), 113–17, 160–167; Gibbs, Norman H., Grand Strategy, J: Rearmament Policy (London: H.M.S.O., 1976), 323Google Scholar–74.

⁴⁶ Peden (fn. 35), 160–67.

⁴⁷ Howard (fn. 41), 97–122; Bond, Brian, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980Google Scholar). Dennis, Peter, Decision by Default: Peacetime Conscription and British Defense, 1919–1939 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1972Google Scholar).

⁴⁸ Bond (fn. 47), 337–38, suggests that there is a case for the contrary view; but he also shows that the senior officers who favored an Expeditionary Force for the Continent held highly conservative opinions on mechanized warfare, while advocates of the latter (such as Liddell Hart) were opposed to creating an Expeditionary Force.

⁴⁹ Howard (fn. 41), 95.

⁵⁰ Murray, , The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 62–64Google Scholar.

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⁵⁵ Ibid., 78–79; see also Wark (fn. 51, 1984), 81–82.

⁵⁶ Meyers (fn. 26), 19, 23; translation by the present author.

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⁶⁰ See ibid., 31.

⁶¹ Feiling (fn. 7), 350, 354, 357, 360.

⁶² The assumptions behind British policy in 1938 are discussed in Middlemas (fn. 57), 184–88, and in Taylor, Telford, Munich: The Price of Peace (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 618Google Scholar–33. Taylor's work offers the fullest account of the Munich crisis. Chamberlain's uncertainty concerning Hitler was expressed frequently. His comment to his private secretary on the Anglo-German declaration signed after the Munich Conference provides a striking example: “If Hitler signed it and kept the bargain, well and good; alternatively, if he broke it, he would demonstrate to all the world that he was totally cynical and untrustworthy” (p. 60).

⁶³ Cowling (fn. 57), 190–206, 293–352.

⁶⁴ Taylor (fn. 4), 203.

⁶⁵ For a recent discussion of Butler's views, see Stafford, Paul, “Political Autobiography and the Art of the Plausible: R. A. Butler at the Foreign Office, 1938–39,” The Historical Journal 28 (No. 4, 1985), 901CrossRefGoogle Scholar–22.

⁶⁶ John P.D. Dunbabin, “The British Military Establishment and the Policy of Appeasement,” in Mommsen and Kettenacker (fn. 36), 186. Wark makes similar observations (fn. 51, 1984), 87–89, 99–100.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Aster, Sidney, 1939: The Making of the Second World War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973Google Scholar) for the most satisfactory general account of British policy in 1939, which, however, does not fully resolve this question.

⁶⁸ Cowling (fn. 57), 257–352.

⁶⁹ Medlicott (fn. 18), 32.

⁷⁰ Thompson, , The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 43–44Google Scholar.

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⁷² Reynolds, David, “Churchill and the British ‘Decision’ to Fight On in 1940: Right Policy, Wrong Reason,” in Langhorne, Richard, ed., Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War: Essays in Honour of F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 166Google Scholar.

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⁷⁴ Ibid., 89–90.

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⁷⁶ Churchill (fn. 5), 150. For critical comments on The Gathering Storm, see James (fn. 75), 221–22.

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⁷⁸ Ibid., 106–10; James (fn. 75), 261–64.

⁷⁹ Earl of Avon, , The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), 346Google Scholar, 366–67.

⁸⁰ Cf. Ernest R. May: “‘Anti-appeasers’ had their own illusions which were almost equally distant from reality. They believed that Hitler could be deterred from aggression by the threat of war. Few suspected that Hitler wanted war.” May (fn. 51), 520.

⁸¹ This school of thought, as well as that which focuses on Hitler's goals and program, is discussed in Hiden, John and Farquharson, John, Explaining Hitler's Germany: Historians and the Third Reich (London: Batsford, 1983), 110Google Scholar–29.

⁸² Hildebrand, Klaus, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (London: Batsford, 1973Google Scholar; published in German, 1970); also “Hitlers ‘Programm’ und seine Realisierung 1939–1942” [Hitler's program and its realization, 1939–1942], in Manfred Funke, ed., Hitler, Deutschland und die Ma'chte: Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reichs [Hitler, Germany and the powers: Materials on the foreign policy of the Third Reich| (Kronberg: Athenaum, 1978), 63–93; Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategic: Politikund Kriegführung, 1940–41 |Hitler's strategy: Politics and the conduct of war] (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1965); Bullock, “Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War,” in Robertson (fn. 15), 189–224.

⁸³ Andreas Hillgruber, “England in Hitlers Aussenpolitischer Konzeption” [England in Hitler's foreign policy thinking], Historische Zeitschrift 218 (No. 1, 1974), 65–84; Henke, Josef, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 1935–1939 [England in Hitler's political calculations, 1935–1939] (Boppard: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1973Google Scholar); Henke, “Hitlers England-Konzeption—Formulierung und Realisierungsversuche” [Hitler's conception of England: Formulation and attempts at realization], in Funke (fn. 82), 584–603.

⁸⁴ Thorne, , The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933 (New York: Capricorn, 1973Google Scholar); Meyers (fn. 26).

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⁸⁶ In a recent article, Meyers suggests that Thomas Kuhn's concept of the paradigm might be adapted to throw new light on appeasement by viewing it as illustrating a tradition of international political thought—the “Grotian” tradition discussed by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. See Meyers, Reinhard, “International Paradigms, Concepts of Peace, and the Policy of Appeasement,” War and Society 1 (May 1983), 43–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁷ The special issue, British Journal of International Studies 6 (October 1980), edited by Paul Kennedy and John E. Spence, includes Kennedy (fn. 19), Gruner (fn. 24), and contributions by Stephen G. Walker, Aaron L. Goldman, and Naomi Black.

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