¹ Hoffman, Stanley, The State of War (New York 1965), 5Google Scholar.

² Reviewers in the New York Times Book Review and the New York Review of Booths, in the latter case economist Robert Heilbroner, were quite lavish in their praise of Pentagon Capitalism as a definitive study of the subject.

³ See especially Melman's Our Depleted Society (New York 1965Google Scholar).

⁴ That Melman views deterrence doctrine as a means to the end of greater Defense Department control over societal resources and extended political power is made clear in his chapter, “The Science Fiction of Defense and Its Consequences” (pp. 107–38). As he puts it, “The responsibility for shielding the United States against external attack has been turned into a means by which the scope and intensity of decision-power of the state-management has been enlarged” (p. 107).

⁵ Melman acknowledges explicitly the difference between traditional defense and deterrence concepts: deterrence “does not refer to the ability to shield a society from attack in a physical sense, but to a threat-to-retaliate system which, it is hoped, would constrain a potential opponent from making the first move” (p. 110). But the implications of this acknowledgment for his more general arguments are misunderstood. To Melman, this specific inadequacy of deterrence as compared to traditional defense, for physical security and protection, is sufficient grounds to impeach deterrence generally as a mode of policy (and, by implication, the motives of defense officials who believe in deterrence). Even more disconcerting are the clinching lines of this argument, in which he confuses the distinction he acknowledged earlier, in order to prove the point: “In the name of defense, the state-management based in the Pentagon has been deploying an increasing array of strategic weapons systems. Analysis of the characteristics of these systems does not reveal them to be serviceable shields for protecting the United States from external attack” (p. 136). The existence of a condition caused by modern weapons technology is blamed by implication on the choice of deterrence as an arms policy, despite Melman's own clear statements revealing the absurdity of such criticism.

⁶ The most noted balance-of-power theorist whose analysis has been criticized on this point is Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York 1967Google Scholar). Notice that Melman's view of deterrence as a means to the end of greater DOD decision power is different from the more restricted argument that any particular deterrence doctrine, such as massive retaliation or flexible response, rationalizes the state of American preparedness which happens to exist. Melman goes beyond that in arguing that both preparedness and deterrence in general are rationalizations for other ambitions in domestic politics.

⁷ Allison, Graham T., “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review, LXIII (September 1969), 689–718CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ For example, see Hoopes, Townsend, The Limits of Intervention (New York 1969), 20–23Google Scholar and passim.

⁹ Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), 8–10. Etzioni notes that when an organization's goals are unlimited or difficult to measure, its emphasis may turn to the measurement of those efficiency variables that are quantifiable. He suggests that “the distortion consequences of over-measuring are larger when it is impossible or impractical to quantify the more central, substantive output of an organization, and when at the same time some exterior aspects of the product, which are superficially related to its substance, are readily measurable” (ibid., 9–10). National defense, as a state or condition never fully realized, creates this tendency for goal distortion through measurement of the measurables, as the surfeit of body counts, missile counts, and hamlet counts has demonstrated.

¹⁰ Flexible response strategic doctrine as defined and implemented in the Kennedy administration is set forth in William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York 1964). A more recent case for flexible response in defense policy is made by Warnke, Paul C. and Gelb, Leslie H., “Security or Confrontation: The Case for a Defense Policy,” Foreign Policy, No. 1 (Winter 1970–71), 6–30Google Scholar.

¹¹ On the first two points see Art, Robert J. and Waltz, Kenneth N., “Technology, Strategy, and the Uses of Force,” in Art, Robert J. and Waltz, Kenneth N., eds., The Uses of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy (Boston 1971), 24Google Scholar; on the third point, see Halperin, Morton H., Defense Strategies for the Seventies (Boston 1971. 47–51Google Scholar.

¹² The importance of the Draft Presidential Memoranda in decision-making in the McNamara Pentagon is emphasized by Enthoven and Smith, 53–58, and by Hoag, Malcolm W., “What New Look in Defense?” World Politics, xxii (October 1969), 4Google Scholar.

¹³ In the useful distinction made by William A. Gamson, the secretary's role as a systemic authority has been emphasized to the exclusion of consideration of his role as a potential partisan. See Gamson, , Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois 1968), 21–37Google Scholar. A related distinction has been made by Glenn H. Snyder with respect to the “neutral expert” and “policy advocate” roles for participants in the policy-making process. See Snyder's “The New Look of 1953” in Schilling, Warner R., Hammond, Paul Y. and Snyder, Glenn H., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York 1962), 504Google Scholar. Snyder notes that the “neutral expert” and “policy advocate” roles pertain to the range of discretion of a decision-maker rather than to his range of competence, two dimensions which are crucially interrelated for systems analysts as policy advocates.