¹ On this question, see Egon, Ranshofen-Wertheimer, “Geneva and the Evolution of a New Diplomacy,” World Organization: A Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment, Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, pp. 14–29.Google Scholar

² In an article by Ducher, see below p. 37. Ducher's political and literary activity has been described and analyzed by Nussbaum, F. L., Commercial Policy in the French Revolution, Washington, D.C., 1923.Google Scholar Every reader of Nussbaum's book could have found the expression there, but since this book was written before the postwar interest in the concept of a “new diplomacy” had arisen, the author naturally gave no special attention to Ducher's importance for the history of this concept.

³ In the following, the terms “radicals” and “philosophes” are used rather loosely for all those writers who were concerned with plans of political and social reform in the eighteenth century. Since this article is interested in working out certain basic ideas which they all had in common, such rather general and indiscriminate use of these terms seemed justified. For the same reason, no special attention will be given to differences and nuances in the ideas of the various writers, though I am quite aware that, from identical basic premises, they frequently arrived at very different recommendations about practical measures and details.

⁴ See such standard works as Sée, Henri, Les Idées Politiques en France au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, 1920Google Scholar; Martin, Kingsley, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Boston, 1929Google Scholar (which has only a rather brief and spotty chapter on “Peace, Fraternity and Nationalism”); Salwyn Schapiro, J., Condorcet and the Rise of Liberalism, New York, 1934Google Scholar; or the brief treatment of these issues in Weulersse, George, Le Mouvement Physiocratique en France de 1756 à 1770, 2 vols., Paris, 1910.Google Scholar A number of special studies have touched upon the problems with which this article is concerned; two recent ones are Silberner, Edmond, La Guerre dans la Pensée Economique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle (Etudes sur l'histoire des théories économiques, Vol. VII), Paris, 1939Google Scholar, and Souleyman, Elizabeth V., The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century France, New York, 1941Google Scholar; this article is obligated to these two studies in various ways, and their bibliographies make a detailed bibliographical apparatus superfluous, but the approach used in these studies is different from the approach of this article; they follow the development of the ideas on peace and war through the centuries, while this article will attempt to place these ideas into the system of eighteenth-century thought.

⁵ Trosne, Le, De l'Ordre Social, Paris, 1777, p. 367Google Scholar: “En effet, le système de l'Europe a pris une consistence qui semble devoir en maintenir la durée et conserver à peu près chaque puissance dans l'état où elle se trouve;” also the remarks by Diderot on the new situation in Europe in “Fragments Politiques,” Oeuvres Complètes, Paris, 1875, IV, 41–42Google Scholar, or by Mably in his “Droit Public,” Collection Complète des Oeuvres, ed. by Guillaume Arnoux, Paris, 1794–1795, VII 128Google Scholar

⁶ Although the Abbé de Saint-Pierre wrote his project for an eternal peace prior to Utrecht, its publication at the time of the conclusion of the Peace certainly strengthened its influence; see Drouet, Joseph, L'Abbé de Saint-Pierre, L'homme et l'oeuvre, Paris, 1912, pp. 107Google Scholar ff.

⁷ Turgot, , “Plan d'un ouvrage sur la géographie politique,” Oeuvres, ed. by Schelle, G., Paris, 1913, Vol. I, particularly pp. 262–63Google Scholar: “Réflexions générales sur la manière dont les nations, d'abord isolées, ont porté leurs regards autour d'elles … qu'il s'est formé plusieurs de ces mondes dans toute l'étendue du globe, indépendants les uns des autres et inconnus réciproquement; qu'en s'étendant sans cesse autour d'eux, ils se sont rencontrés et confondus, jusqu'à ce qu'enfin la connaissance de tout l'univers, dont la politique saura combiner toutes les parties, ne formera plus qu'un seul monde politique, dont les limites sont confondues avec celle du monde physique.” See also Turgot's speech in the Sorbonne of December 11, 1750, ibid., pp. 214 ff.

⁸ Sedaine, , Le philosophe sans le scavoir, crit. ed. by Oliver, Th. E. (University of Illinois Studies, Vol. IV), Urbana, 1913, pp. 105–6Google Scholar: “Ce n'est pas un peuple, ce n'est pas une seule nation qu'il sert; il les sert toutes, et en est servi; c'est l'homme de l'univers. … La guerre s'allume; tout s'embrace; l'Europe est divisée; mais ce Négociant Anglois, Hollandois, Russe ou Chinois, n'en est pas moins l'ami de mon coeur; nous sommes sur la superficie de la terre autant de fils de soie qui lient ensemble les nations et les ramènent à la paix par la nécessité du commerce.”

⁹ For instance, Le Mercier de la Rivière, L'ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques, 1767, publié avec une notice par Edgard Depitre (Collection des Economistes et des Réformateurs Sociaux de la France), Paris, 1910, pp. 251, 249, 354; Trosne, Le, op. cit., pp. 355Google Scholar, 393; Gaillard, , Mélanges, Paris, 1806, p. 66Google Scholar, etc.

¹⁰ See Lefebvre, Georges, “La Révolution Française et le Rationalisme,” Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, XVIII (1946), 18Google Scholar ff.

¹¹ See Gerhard, Dietrich, “Kontinentalpolitik und Kolonialpolitik im Frankreich des Ausgehenden Ancien Regime,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXXXXVII (1932), 21–31.Google Scholar

¹² Trosne, Le, op. cit., pp. 430–31Google Scholar: “Ô France! Ô ma patrie! Voilà le rôle qu'il te convient de remplir en Europe. … Il ne faudroit pour opérer cette révolution si heureuse, que l'exemple d'une grande nation.…”

¹³ D'Argenson, , Considérations sur le Gouvernement Ancien et Présent de la France, Amsterdam, 1765, p. 18Google Scholar: “Tel est cependant le véritable objet de la science qu'on appelle Politique, perfectionner le dedans d'un Etat de tous les degrés de perfection dont il est susceptible. … Les flatteurs persuadent aux Princes que le dedans ne doit servir qu'aux affaires du dehors; le devoir leur dit le contraire.” Also Trosne, Le, op cit., p. 420Google Scholar; Mercier, Le, op. cit., p. 252Google Scholar; Rousseau, , Political Writings, ed. by Vaughan, C. E., Cambridge, Mass., 1915, I, 381–82Google Scholar, etc.

¹⁴ D'Argenson, , op. cit., pp. 19–20Google Scholar: “A-t-on toujours exactement calculé, combien il en coûtoit à l'abondance des anciennes Provinces pour en acquérir une nouvelle? … Voilà pourtant les grand objets qu'on attribue ordinairement à la Politique; voilà l'éclat des Règnes et le sujet des monuments Historiques: fâcheux préjugés! reste de Barbarie! vestiges de l'ancien chaos.”

¹⁵ Condillac, , Le Commerce et le Gouvernement, Amsterdam, 1776, pp. 407–8Google Scholar: “…cette gloire que les peuples, dans leur stupidité, attachent aux conquêtes, et que les historiens, plus stupides encore, aiment à célébrer jusqu'au point d'ennuyer le lecteur; quel sera leur avantage?” Or Trosne, Le, op. cit., pp. 377Google Scholar, 387–89; Mirabeau, , L'Ami des Hommes ou Traité de la Population, 3me partie, Avignon, 1756, pp. 399–400Google Scholar; and, of course, the third chapter of Voltaire's Candide.

¹⁶ Condorcet, , “Discours de réception à l'Académie Française,” Oeuvres, Paris, O'Connor and Arago, 1847–1849, I, 396Google Scholar: “…cette fureur des conquêtes si longtemps décorée du nom d'héroisme.”

¹⁷ Mirabeau, , op. cit., p. 404Google Scholar: “Idée favorite des gazettes et des caffés politiques …”; or Mercier, Le, op. cit., p. 244Google Scholar; Trosne, Le, op. cit., p. 394Google Scholar; Mirabeau, , op. cit., p. 116Google Scholar; and the particularly detailed, somewhat later analysis of Godwin, , Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, facsimile ed. by Priestley, F. E. L., Toronto, 1946, pp. 155–57.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Mably, , “Principes des Négociations,” Oeuvres, V, 66Google Scholar: “…réduisant toute la science de la politique à ne savoir qu'un mot, elle flattoit également l'ignorance et la paresse des ministres, des ambassadeurs et de leurs commis.”

¹⁹ Gaillard, , op. cit., I, 79Google Scholar: “Le système de l'équilibre est un système de résistance, par conséquent d'agitation, de choc et d'explosion.”

²⁰ Rousseau, , op. cit., I, 369Google Scholar; also Trosne, Le, op. cit., p. 374Google Scholar, etc.

²¹ Raynal, , Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Etablissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes, Genève, 1781, VI, 284Google Scholar: “trahisons préparées. …”

²² D'Argenson, , op. cit., p. 327Google Scholar: “Les ligues défensives qu'ils contractent sont toujours offensives au fond.”

²³ Trosne, Le, op. cit., p. 395Google Scholar: “Cet art obscur qui s'enveloppe dans les plis et les replis de la dissimulation, qui craint de se laisser entrevoir, et croit ne pouvoir réunir qu'à l'ombre du mystère.” Also p. 421; or Mably, , Oeuvres, V, 182.Google Scholar

²⁴ This is an extract of Diderot's “Principes de Politique des Souverains,” as given in Oestreicher, J., La Pensée Politique et Economique de Diderot, Vincennes, 1936, p. 70Google Scholar: “Ne former des alliances que pour semer des haines.—Allumer et faire durer la guerre entre mes voisins.—Point des ministres au loin, mais des espions.— … Etre neutre, ou profiter de l'embarras des autres pour arranger ses affaires, c'est la même chose.” The whole will be found in Diderot, , Oeuvres Complètes, Paris, 1875–1877, II, 461Google Scholar ff.

²⁵ Mably, , “Entretiens de Phocion,” Oeuvres, X, 172Google Scholar: “Mon cher Aristias, poursuivit Phocion, j'ai tâché de ramener à des principes fixes et certains cette science qu'on nomme politique, et dont les sophistes nous avoient donné une idée bien fausse. Ils la regardent comme l'esclave ou l'instrument de nos passions; de-là l'incertitude et l'instabilité de ses maximes; de-là ses erreurs, et les révolutions qui en sont le fruit. Pour moi, je fais de la politique le ministre de notre raison, et j'en vois résulter le bonheur des sociétés.” Also D'Argenson, , op. cit., p. 20Google Scholar; or Rousseau, , op. cit., pp. 510–11.Google Scholar

²⁶ art, Diderot. “Paix” in “Encyclopédie,” Oeuvres, XVI, 188Google Scholar: “Les passions aveugles des princes les portent à étendre les bornes de leurs états.…”

²⁷ Characterized as “anecdote connue” in the debates of May 16, 1790, of the Nationale, Assemblée, Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série, ed. by Maridal, et Laurent, , Paris, 1883, XV, 188.Google Scholar

²⁸ Mably, , Oeuvres, V, 17.Google Scholar

²⁹ For instance, Mably, , Oeuvres, V, 19–20Google Scholar: “Chaque état tient de ses lois, de ses moeurs et de sa position topographique, une manière d'être qui lui est propre et qui décide seule de ses intérêts.”

³⁰ For instance, Mirabeau, , op. cit., p. 427Google Scholar: “…le seul arbitre des ses desseins.” Or Mably, , Oeuvres, V, 17Google Scholar: “Maîtresse de la fortune.”

³¹ Mirabeau, , op. cit., p. 84Google Scholar: “…malheureux principe renfermé dans ce proverbe: Nul ne perd que l'autre ne gagne, principe barbare autant que faux; et moi je dis, soit dans le physique, soit dans le moral: Nul ne perd qu'un autre ne perde.…” Or Trosne, Le, op. cit., p. 393.Google Scholar

³² For instance, Condorcet, , “Eloge de Franklin,” Oeuvres, III, 420Google Scholar: “Sa politique était celle d'un homme qui croit au pouvoir de la raison et à la réalité de la virtue.…” Or Mably, , Oeuvres, XIII, 139Google Scholar; Turgot, , op. cit., III, 683–86.Google Scholar

³³ For instance, Mercier, Le, op. cit., p. 252Google Scholar, or Mirabeau, , op. cit., pp. 82Google Scholar ff.

³⁴ For instance, Condorcet, , Oeuvres, IX, 93Google Scholar: “Vieille Politique;” Mercier, Le, op. cit., p. 244Google Scholar: “fausse politique.”

³⁵ Baudeau, , Première Introduction à la Philosophie Economique, 1767, publié avec notice et table analytique par A. Dubois, Paris, 1910, p. 99Google Scholar: “L'opposition des intérêts fait l'essence de la politique usurpatrice. L'unité d'intérêt fait l'essence de la politique économique. Les relations de l'une sont de guerre, d'empêchement, de destruction. Les relations de l'autre sont de société, de combinaisons des travaux, de partage amical et paisible des fruits de ces travaux.”

³⁶ For this and the following, see Trosne, Le, op. cit., pp. 417–29Google Scholar; Mercier, Le, op. cit., pp. 243–53Google Scholar; Baudeau, , op. cit., pp. 97–99.Google Scholar

³⁷ Mirabeau, , op. cit., p. 31Google Scholar: “Oh! quand les deux arlequins se rencontrent, c'est à qui surpassera son compétiteur en grimaces, et voilà la politique des prétendus hommes d'Etat qui ont voulu bannir de leur science l'équité.”

³⁸ See Holldack, Heinz, “Der Physiokratismus und die absolute Monarchie,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXXXXV (1931/2), 517–49.Google Scholar

³⁹ See Condorcet, , “Lettres d'un Bourgeois de New Haven à un citoyen de Virginie,” Oeuvres, IX, 41–42Google Scholar, 45–46; and, in general, Schapiro, , op. cit., pp. 145–47.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Condorcet in the work quoted in the previous note, p. 45: “Les traités d'alliance me paraissent si dangereux et si peu utiles, que je vois qu'il vaut mieux y renoncer en temps de paix. … Ce n'est qu'un moyen donné aux chefs des nations de les précipiter dans des guerres dont ils profitent pour couvrir leurs fautes, ou pour porter à la liberté des atteintes sourdes, et aux quelles la nécessité sert alors de prétexte.” It is likely that Condorcet's distrust of entangling alliances was somewhat influenced by the unpopularity of the Austrian Alliance in France.

⁴¹ This analysis of Rousseau's views is based on his “Extrait du Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de M. l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre;” see Rousseau, , op. cit., I, 364–96.Google Scholar It should be kept in mind that Rousseau had some reservations about the project of the Abbé; see Lassadru-Duchêne, Georges, Jean Jacques Rousseau et le Droit des Gens, Paris, 1906.Google Scholar

⁴² Bentham's “Principles of International Law,” written 1786–1789, published in his Works (ed. by John Bowring, Edinburgh, 1843, II, 535 ff.), can be considered as a summation of the reformist program.

⁴³ For instance, see Mercier, Le, op. cit., p. 250Google Scholar, or Trosne, Le, op. cit., p. 353.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Trosne, Le, op. cit., p. 421Google Scholar: “Sa politique sera aussi franche et aussi ouverte que sa conduite avec ses sujets”; also p, 419. Against secret diplomacy in general, Mably, , Oeuvres, VII, 89Google Scholar ff., and Bentham, , op. cit., pp. 554–60, etc.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Trosne, Le, op. cit., pp. 428–29Google Scholar: “II ne cherchera point à se faire des alliés; sa politique fraternelle le rendra nécessairement l'ami de toutes les nations. … Et que pourroient lui servir des alliances? …”

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 426: “Aucune nation n'aura chez lui de privilège ni de faveur par le commerce, et les Négocians domiciliés chez lui n'en auront pas davantage. Son code, à cet égard, sera aussi simple et aussi court que ses principes. … On entrera chez lui, on en sortira de même: on traversera son territoire sans y rencontrer ni tarif, ni préposés, ni barrières.” Mably, Oeuvres, V, 194–95: “Jamais elles n'auroient parlé, dans leur traités de commerce, que des conventions générales propres à assurer la liberté des mers et de la navigation.”

⁴⁷ Rousseau, , “Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne,” op. cit., II, 510Google Scholar: “Ne vous ruinez pas en ambassadeurs et ministres dans d'autre cours.”

⁴⁸ For instance, concerning Venice, see Mably, , Oeuvres, V, 34Google Scholar, or Voltaire's article in the Dictionnaire Philosophique: “Venise, et, par occasion, de la liberté;” concerning the Netherlands, see Diderot, , “Voyage de Hollande,” Oeuvres, XVII, 390–91.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Witt, John de (the real author was Pierre de la Court), Political Maxims of the State of Holland, London, 1743, pp. 214–15.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The admiration for Walpole and Fleury as ministers of peace is interesting in Gaillard, , op. cit., I, 63Google Scholar, or in Raynal, , op. cit., V, 202.Google Scholar

⁵¹ On the “quixotic policy of d'Argenson,” see Dorn, Walter L., Competition for Empire (The Rise of Modern Europe series, Vol. IX), New York, pp. 159Google Scholar ff.

⁵² See Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, New York, London, 1935, pp. 26 ff.Google Scholar

⁵³ See Holldack, Heinz, “Die Neutralitaetspolitik Leopolds von Toskana,” Historische Vierteljahrsschrift, XXX (1935/6), 732–56.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Journals of the Continental Congress, ed. by W. C. Ford, Washington, 1906, V, 425 (in the future quoted as Journals).

⁵⁵ See Burnett, Edmund Cody, The Continental Congress, New York, 1941, pp. 170–71.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Schlesinger, Arthur M., The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763–1776 (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. LXXVIII), New York, 1918Google Scholar, especially chapter XV.

⁵⁷ See Burnett, , op. cit., p. 141Google Scholar; although some “feared to burn the bridges behind them without having made sure of European aid,” cf. Miller, John C., Origins of the American Revolution, Boston, 1943, p. 483.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Letter to Secretary Livingston, Paris, 5 February 1783, The Works of John Adams, ed. by Charles Francis Adams, Boston, 1850–1856, VIII, 35.

⁵⁹ These names are quite cursorily picked from the relevant volumes of Dumont, Baron Jean, Corps Universel Diplomatique de Droit des Gens, Amsterdam, 1726–1731.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See the “notes of debates,” published in Journals, III, 471 ff.

⁶¹ To Priestley, 7 July 1715: “We have not yet applied to any foreign power for assistance, nor offered our commerce for their friendship,” in Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, ed. by E. C. Burnett, Washington, 1981–1936 (hereafter cited as Letters), I, 156; see also Franklin to Dumas, 19 December 1775, in Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, ed. by Francis Wharton, Washington, 1889, II, 65.

⁶² Bonvouloir's report of December 28, 1775: “…qu'ils ignoraient si, en cas que cela en vint aux propositions, la France se contenterait d'avoir chez eux pendant un temps limité un commerce exclusif pour l'indemniser des frais que lui occasionnerait leur cause …,” in Doniol, Henri, Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'Etablissement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Paris, 1886, I, 290.Google Scholar

⁶³ Deane's, “Memoir on the Commerce of America”: “The importance of improving the present for possessing this single branch of commerce of the United Colonies is very great, but to have a preference of the whole, is an offer which may not ever be made again,” in Deane Papers (New York Historical Society Collections, Vol. XIX), New York, 1887, I, 184.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ speaks, Thomas Paine in Common Sense of “alliance” (Complete Writings, ed. by Foner, P. S., New York, 1945, I, 20)Google Scholar; John Adams writes in “Novanglus”: “The colonies were considered formerly … as allies rather than subjects” and, also in “Novanglus,” characterizes the bond existing between England and the American colonies as “a treaty of commerce, by which distinct states have been cemented together in perpetual league and amity” (Works, IV, 110, 114). Of course, this is the chief idea in Franklin's, “Vindication” of the summer of 1775 (Writings, ed. by Smyth, A. H., New York, 1905–1907, IV, 412–19).Google Scholar Interesting also is the frequent use of the expression “commercial alliance,” in, for instance, Letters, I, 368, or Force, Peter, American Archives, 4th series, Washington, 1844, V, 1209.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Cato's, “Letter to the People of Pennsylvania,” March 1776Google Scholar, in Force, , op. cit., V, 542–43.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ R. H. Lee to Landon Carter, 2 June 1776: “Supplies of Military Stores and Soldiers, clothing, Ships of War to cover our Trade and open our Ports, which would be an external assistance altogether, could never endanger our freedom by putting it in the Power of our Ally to Master us” (Letters, I, 469); or see, in the letter by Cato mentioned in the previous note, p. 544: “Nor let it be said that the wished-for assistance is not that of armies, but of fleets for trade, and commercial protection.…”

⁶⁷ In future, the draft treaty will be called “model treaty,” but it should not be confused with the famous model treaty of 1784.

⁶⁸ Journals, V, 575 ff., 696, 709–10, 718, 768 ff., 813 ff., 837; in general, see Bemis, Samuel Flagg, op. cit., pp. 45–48Google Scholar, and Burnett, , op. cit., pp. 206–10Google Scholar, though my interpretation of the facts differs somewhat from that given in these two studies.

⁶⁹ The following analysis omits John Adams' claim to have advocated as early as the fall of 1775, in a speech on a motion by Chase for sending ambassadors to France, that “we should make no treaties of alliance with any European power; that we should consent to none but treaties of commerce; that we should separate ourselves, as far as possible, from all European politics and wars” (Works, I, 200, Letter to Benjamin Rush, 30 September 1805); this claim was repeated in his Letters, published in the Boston Patriot in 1809, and in his Autobiography (Works, IX, 243, and II, 505). This would have made Adams an advocate of a complete system of isolationist foreign policy as early as 1775. Chinard, G. (Honest John Adams, Boston, 1933, p. 88)Google Scholar writes that “it is very doubtful that this principle appeared so clearly at the time to the mind of Adams, and unfortunately all traces of the deliberations of Congress on the matter seem to have disappeared.” A confirmation of the existence of Chase's motion can be found, however, in Adams' letter to Chase of 9 July 1776: “Your motion last fall for sending ambassadors to France with conditional instructions, was murdered; terminating in a committee of secret correspondence, which came to nothing” (Works, IX, 421). The casual manner in which Adams mentions the outcome of Chase's motion confirms rather than invalidates Chinard's suggestion that, in his later years, Adams deceived himself about what happened to Chase's motion; he would have hardly needed to remind Chase of what happened to this motion if a long and important debate had taken place, as he later maintained. Moreover, such detailed suggestions about the future system of foreign policy would have been entirely inappropriate in the fall of 1775, when independence still seemed far off. Such views do not even correspond to Adams' ideas at that time; as the following discussion shows, he then still had great hopes for a complete change of the foreign policy of all powers, to be achieved by a “reformation” of the commercial system. Adams' views hardened into a rigid isolationism only during his stay in Europe. Adams' efforts in his later years to appear as the originator and inventor of all the important ideas determining the course of American policy have done great injustice to himself; he now strikes us as a rather doctrinaire and arid thinker, while actually, he had a great gift for absorbing experience and learning from it, and he underwent an interesting development in his thinking—a development which probably was representative of a whole generation.

⁷⁰ Adams, John, Works, II, 488–89Google Scholar; characterized as “notes for speeches,” dated 1 March 1776, but in Letters (I, 371, No. 6), it is suggested that they are personal memoranda because no discussion of the subject indicated took place on March 1st and 4. Just at this time, however, Deane received his instructions for his mission to France; a connection of Adams' notes with this event seems possible.

⁷¹ John Adams to W. Cushing, 9 June 1776, Letters, I, 478.

⁷² John Adams to J. Winthrop, 23 June 1776, Letters, I, 502.

⁷³ This passage comes from Adams' Autobiography, Works, II, 516; since this statement is confirmed by external evidence, I felt entitled to use this passage, though, in general, Adams' Autobiography must be considered a most questionable historical source.

⁷⁴ The “Plan of Treaties” will be found in Journals, V, 768–79; the “instructions,” ibid., 813–17. Of the thirty articles of the “Plan of Treaties,” eighteen are concerned with the rules of trade, navigation, etc. The remaining twelve articles (Nos. 1–5, 7–9, 11–14) are of a somewhat different character; some of them (Articles 1 and 2) deal with the most basic principles of commerce (see below, p. 26), one (Article 14) with the French droit d'aubaine, others (Articles 3, 4, 5 and 7) with special problems arising out of the independence of the United States: fishery in Newfoundland, conveying of American ships, protection against Barbary States; others with consequences of France's participation in the war (Articles 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, see below, p. 26). Because these twelve articles refer to specific issues arising out of the relations of France to the United States, only the remaining eighteen articles can have had direct models in previous treaties. Of these eighteen articles, twelve are derived from the Treaty of 1713 (Article 15 of the “Plan of Treaties” corresponds to Article 25 of the Treaty of 1713, 16 to 26, 17 to 27, 18 to 28, 19 to 35, 20 to 36, 25 to 15, 26 to 17, 27 to 18–20, 28 to 81, 29 to 22–23, 30 to 24–25); four are derived from the Treaty of 1686 (Article 10 of the “Plan of Treaties” corresponds to Article 5 of the Treaty of 1686, 21 to 7, 22 to 6, 24 to 15); the remaining two (Articles 6 and 23) seem to have been taken from other treaties (I found a pattern of Article 6 in the Treaty between England and the Netherlands of 21 July 1667); in general, see the statement of Bemis (op. cit., p. 46) that “the general principles of the model ‘Plan of 1776’ were picked by the committee out of eighteenth-century practice, as reflected in the treaty of Utrecht and generally in the treaties of the small-navy powers …”; but the treaties of the small-navy powers can have played only a very subordinate role, if any role at all. Aside from the tendency towards commercial toleration, the motif of placing the American merchants into the position which English merchants had seems to have determined the choice of the models.

⁷⁵ Articles 26 and 27, corresponding to Articles 17–20 of the Treaty of Utrecht.

⁷⁶ Articles 1 and 2, and the instructions concerning these articles (see below, p. 27).

⁷⁷ Articles 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13; see above, note 74.

⁷⁸ Journals, V, 814–15.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 817.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 815.

⁸¹ In emphasizing this point, this article deviates from the prevailing view about the approach of the colonists to foreign affairs. This does not mean that the article is not obligated to studies examining the origin of American isolationism; for instance, the material assembled in a study such as Fred Rippy, J. and Debo, Angie, The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation (Smith College Studies in History, Vol. IX, Nos. 3 and 4), Northampton, Mass., 1924Google Scholar, has been invaluable. Nor is it the author's intention to deny the existence of an isolationist outlook in the United States at the end of the eighteenth century, as can be seen from his article “The English Background of American Isolationism in the Eighteenth Century,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d series, I (1944), 138–60. But I maintain that the isolationist features of early American foreign policy have been overemphasized, and that, in the years of the beginnings of American independence, isolationist and internationalist elements are by no means clearly separated, but are mixed, and the course which American foreign policy would take was by no means fixed. These two contradictory trends could go hand in hand, because both placed decisive importance on commerce.

⁸² Journals, V, 769.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 813.

⁸⁴ In modern terms, the original suggestion of the model treaty would be named a Reciprocity Clause. See Haberler, Gottfried von, The Theory of International Trade, London, 1936, pp. 361 ff.Google Scholar While the most-favored-nation clause had come into use in the seventeenth century, the reciprocity clause was not usual (among European states, I found it in the Pacte de Famille between France and Spain of 1761, where its aim seems to have been to create a solid bloc against the outside world). Because, in modern times, reciprocity is attached to persons and not to goods, reciprocity and most-favored-nation clauses are not mutually exclusive, but can exist side by side in the same treaty. This was not the view of the Americans. The fact that the Americans considered a reciprocity clause and most-favored-nation clause as alternative, and that they considered reciprocity more difficult to obtain than most-favored-nation treatment, is proof that they regarded the articles, in which they suggested reciprocity, as of extreme significance; they must have expected thereby to secure complete equality for the merchants of different nations, a real emancipation of trade from all shackles of customs, tariffs, etc.

⁸⁵ John Adams to Secretary Jay, 10 August 1785, Works, VIII, 298.

⁸⁶ John Adams to Secretary Jay, 23 September 1787, ibid., p. 454.

⁸⁷ John Adams to Franklin, 17 August 1780, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, IV, 35.

⁸⁸ In the letter quoted in note 85, p. 299.

⁸⁹ It is superfluous to give any detailed proof for the acquaintance of the leading American statesmen with the thoughts of the philosophes; for it is obvious. It may be mentioned, however, that, in 1782, John Adams had a meeting with Mably, in which they discussed “open diplomacy.” See Adams, J., Works, III, 350.Google Scholar The study of Kraus, Michael, The Atlantic Civilization: Eighteenth-Century Origins (Ithaca, 1949)Google Scholar, is chiefly concerned with a problem diametrically opposite to the one discussed in this article, namely, with “the impact of the New World upon the Old,” but the work bears upon our subject in pointing out the intimate intellectual connection between the two worlds.

⁹⁰ An early reflection of this appears in John Adams' letter to Jay, 13 April 1785, on the “supposition that we are independent of France, in point of moral and political obligation” (Works, VII, 235).

⁹¹ This is the famous statement of principle regarding the American attitude to Armed Neutrality, 12 June 1783, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, VI, 482.

⁹² See Jefferson's letter to William Short, 23 January 1804, American Historical Review, XXXIII (1927/8), 832–35: “I have ever considered diplomacy as the pest of the world, as the workshop in which nearly all the wars of Europe are manufactured. On coming into the administration I dismissed one half of our missions and was nearly ripe to do so by the other half. The public opinion called for it, and would now be gratified by it: and as we wish not to mix in the politics of Europe, but in her commerce only, Consuls would do all the business we ought to have there, quite as well as ministers.” And, for Jefferson's practice, see his Memorandum made to a Committee of the Senate on the subject of diplomatic nominations, 4 January 1792, Writings, ed. by P. L. Ford, New York, 1892, I, 170–73.

⁹³ This and the following quotation are from a statement of the Commissioners entrusted with negotiations of a Commerce Treaty with Prussia, 14 March 1785, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States from 1783 to 1789, Washington, 1832, I, 555.

⁹⁴ Outlined in the “Plan of 1784” and carried into practice in the Commercial Treaty with Prussia; see Bemis, S. F., A Diplomatic History of the United States, New York, 1936, pp. 66 ff.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Speech of Pétion de Villeneuve, 17 May 1790, Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série, ed. by L. Mavidal et Laurent, Paris, 1883, XV, 541: “C'est à cette marche ténébreuse de l'administration, à ces opérations clandestines du ministère que nous devons attribuer ces déprédations, ces iniquités et cette foule de maux enfin qui désolent le royaume”; and (p. 540): “Le secret, dit-on, est l'âme de la politique. … Et moi, je soutiens que ce mystère dont on fait tant de cas, auquel on attache de si précieux avantages, ne sait, au fond, qu'à cacher les passions, les fautes et les erreurs de ceux qui gouvernent.”

⁹⁶ Speech of Rewbell, 18 May 1790, ibid., p. 564: “Les traités d'alliance ne sont autre chose que le droit de lever des impôts et de ruiner le Trésor de l'Etat. … une grande nation ne doit avoir d'alliés que la providence, sa force et la justice.”

⁹⁷ Speech of Cazalès, 21 May 1790, ibid., p. 640: “Je ne réponds pas sérieusement à ceux qui ont dit que la France doit s'isoler du système politique de l'Europe.…”

⁹⁸ Speech of Mirabeau, 20 May 1790, ibid., p. 621: “Je me suis demandé d'abord à moi-même si nous devions renoncer à faire des traités, et cette question se réduit à savoir si, dans l'état actuel de notre commerce, et de celui de l'Europe, nous devons abandonner au hasard l'influence des autres puissances sur nous, et notre réaction sur l'Europe. … Le temps viendra sans doute où nous n'aurons que des amis et point d'alliés, où la liberté du commerce sera universelle, où l'Europe ne sera qu'une seule famille.”

⁹⁹ “Un grand peuple, un peuple libre et juste est allié naturel de tous les peuples, et ne doit point avoir d'alliances particulières qui le lient au sort, aux intérêts, aux passions de tel ou tel peuple” (quoted after Masson, Frédéric, Le Département des Affaires Étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787–1804, Paris, 1877, p. 151)Google Scholar; the memorandum was written in 1791, Dumouriez became Foreign Minister in March 1792.

¹⁰⁰ Morris, Gouverneur, A Diary of the French Revolution, ed. by Cary, Beatrix, Daven-port, , Boston, 1939, II, 439.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See Belin, Jean, La Logique d'une idée-force, L'Idée sociale et la Révolution Française (1789–1792), Paris, 1939, pp. 186–87Google Scholar: “Dumouriez écrit, par exemple, à un agent français à Berlin: ‘Comme le système politique que j'ai adopté en entrant dans le ministère est franc, loyal et constitutionnel, M. Bays communiquera cette instruction toute entière à M. Hertzberg, comme un hommagel’“

¹⁰² Talleyrand, “Mémoire sur les rapports actuels de la France avec les autres Etats de l'Europe,” 25 November 1792, published in Pallain, G., Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire (Correspondence Diplomatique de Talleyrand), Paris, 1891, pp. xlii–lvi.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. xlix: “La France formera entre elle et tous ces peuples des traités solennels de fraternité où les intérêts de la défense commune soient établis et déterminés d'une manière immuable, et où de nouvelles sources de commerce et d'industrie soient ouvertes avec libéralité aux besoins et à l'activité de l'espèce humaine.”

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 1: “Elle doit se lier à eux, non par des traités permanents d'alliance et de fraternité, mais par des conventions passagères sur les intérêts politiques et commerciaux qui naîtront des circonstances.”

¹⁰⁵ See Guyot, Raymond, Le Directoire et la Paix de l'Europe, Paris, 1911Google Scholar; in particular, chapter 6, “Le Grand Dessein du Directoire,” pp. 187–95, and the last section on the contrast between “la politique des frontières naturelles” and “la politique impériale, au sens romain du mot” (p. 902).

¹⁰⁶ On Ducher's relationship to the French Foreign Ministry, see Masson, , op.cit., pp.240 ff.Google Scholar; but for a real exhaustive analysis of his political views and influence, see Nussbaum, F. L., Commercial Policy in the French Revolution, Washington, D.C., 1923Google Scholar, which has the subtitle “A Study of the Career of G. J. A. Ducher,” and contains (pp. 322–28) a list of Ducher's articles in the Moniteur. Nussbaum's study shows the importance of Ducher for the development of a protectionist policy in the French Revolution, and this may seem to place him in contrast to those trends in diplomacy which this article has discussed. But he is connected with these trends because of his emphasis on the necessity of a commercial diplomacy in contrast to traditional power politics, and, perhaps for propagandistic reasons, he presents, in later years, the protectionist policy as a temporary weapon, through which England's “commercial monarchy” over the globe could be broken, and through which France could achieve “freedom of the seas, for herself, and for all other peoples, neutral and enemy” (pp. 295–98). This aspect of Ducher's views is particularly significant in our context and is exclusively emphasized here.

¹⁰⁷ Article, “Attribution de la régie des Douanes extérieures au ministre des affaires étrangères,” Moniteur, 7 May 1793: “Il n'est pas de la dignité ni des intérêts du peuple Français de conclure avec aucune puissance étrangère aucun traité particulier d'alliance ni de commerce. … La République Française existe par elle-même; elle n'a besoin d'aucune garantie, sa force naturelle la met au-dessus du secour d'un allié, quel qu'il soit. … Hors des atteintes des intrigues de tous les cabinets de l'Europe, elle ne sera jamais en guerre que pour elle-même; gardant une neutralité absolue dans toute guerre entre les rois, elle sera dans un avitre hémisphère; libre, paisible, amie de tous les peuples, sans être liée par aucun de ces traités insidieux dont l'ensemble est contradictoire, dont les clauses de secours offensif et défensif, et les conditions commerciales sont, à volonté, des prétextes de rupture et de guerre, où les rois regrettent peu le sang du peuple, s'il doit augmenter leur autorité.”

¹⁰⁸ Article, “Diplomatie Commerciale,” Moniteur, 5 December 1793Google Scholar: “La République Française se déshonorerait en naissant, si elle n'abjurait pas toute politique autre que celle du courage, toute autre diplomatie que celle du commerce, le lien naturel des peuples, la base la plus solide de leur prospérité, le plus puissant moyen pour maintenir ou recouvrer leur liberté politique.”

¹⁰⁹ Article, “De la Paix et des Traités de commerce,” Moniteur, 20 September 1795Google Scholar: “Il y aurait pusillanimité et déraison à rentrer dans nos anciennes limites commerciales. Les traités actuels de commerce sont le territoire de l'Angleterre; un traité général fondé sur l'égalité et l'indépendance des Nations sera une vraie conquête pour chacune d'elles sur l'insulaire ennemi de la paix et des manufactures des continentaux. … Vous qui avez conspiré contre la liberté du peuple français, voulez-vous sincèrement la paix du continent de l'Europe: unissez-vous à lui par un traité de commerce qui rende à chaque Nation égalité et indépendance. Qu'il n'y ait plus de distinction de nation; s'il y en a une plus favorisée, il y a jalousie, haine, cause de guerre. …”

¹¹⁰ His article in Moniteur, 9 June, 1793, is called “Nouvelle Diplomatie;” “new diplomacy” means a “Diplomatie Régénérée” (title of article in Moniteur, 24 October 1794) and is identical with a “Diplomatie Commerciale” (title of article in Moniteur, 5 December 1793); it is the opposite of the “vieille diplomatie” (title of article in Moniteur, 3 October 1793: “Déroute de la vieille diplomatie”).

¹¹¹ Though Wilson's interest was strengthened by British attempts to secure fuller parliamentary and popular control of foreign affairs, see Holborn, Hajo, The Political Collapse of Europe, New York, 1951, p. 105.Google Scholar