¹ Le Monde, January 30, 1958.

² For background on the Young Turk influence in early Tunisian nationalism, see Ziadeh, Nicola A., Origins of Nationalism in Tunisia (Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1962), 82–92Google Scholar; and Pellegrin, A., Histoire de la Tunisie (Tunis, Librairie Namura, 1948), 186ff.Google Scholar

³ There have been several articles dealing with one-party states in sub-Saharan Africa. See, e.g., Schacter, Ruth, “Single-Party Systems in West Africa,” American Political Science Review, LV (June 1961), 294–307CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kilson, Martin L., “Authoritarian and Single-Party Tendencies in African Politics,” World Politics, XV (January 1962), 262–93Google Scholar; and Wallerstein, Immanuel, “What Happened to the Opposition?” West Africa, November 21, 1961.Google Scholar

⁴ West Africa, February 23, 1962.

⁵ Over the past few years a respectable amount of monographic literature has appeared on the Neo-Destour. See Debbasch, Charles, La République Tunisienne (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1962)Google Scholar, Gallagher, Charles F. Jr., “Tunisia,” in Carter, Gwendolen, ed., African One-Party Systems (Ithaca 1962), 11–83Google Scholar; Micaud, CharlesCarl Brown, Leon, and Henry Moore, Clement, Modernization in Tunisia (New York 1964)Google Scholar; and Henry Moore, Clement, “The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?” World Politics, XIV (April 1962), 461–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ The meeting of left and right seems to be easier in Arab countries than in most parts of the world, a dramatic example being Nasser's acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood. See the treatment of Neo-Islamic and Communist totalitarianism in Halpern, Manfred, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton 1963).Google Scholar

⁷ Although the nature of the conflict varies from country to country, Ben Youssef's demise reminds one of the conflict between the equally persuasive personalities of Al-Fassi and Wazzani in Morocco and between Ben Bella and Boudiaf in Algeria. The heavily ideological position won out only before independence—i.e., in Morocco, where the split occurred in 1937 in favor of Al-Fassi—while the more nimble tacticians, Ben Bella and Bourguiba, won out in the two post-independence cases.

⁸ Indiscriminate plundering and murdering were a French colonial technique long before the Algerian revolution. The Cap Bon affair was the prelude to a hardening of French policy throughout North Africa. The most explicit background to the Tunisian resistance movement is in Garas, Félix, Bourguiba et la naissance d'une nation (Paris 1956), 239–45.Google Scholar

⁹ New York Times, January 6 and 9, 1955. There was a short-lived resurgence of the original Destour Party, supported by the Bey and aristocratic elements.

¹⁰ One manifestation of the “hard-line” political views, to be discussed below, was the series of trials in 1958 and 1959 to discredit completely remnants of conservative opposition to the party. In addition to two trials of Youssefists involving (80 persons, there were trials of Baccouche and M'Zali, both ex-premiers under the French. See New York Times, February 24 and April 6, 1959.

¹¹ For details, see Jeune-Afrique, December 13, 1962-January 5, 1963, and January 21–28, 1963. See also Bourguiba, Habib, Analysis of the Plot, speech of January 18, 1963 (Tunis, Secretary of State for Information, 1963).Google Scholar

¹² The complete breakdown of the colonial regime in Morocco dates from the bloody repression of the sympathy strike in Casablanca following Hached's assassination. See Ashford, Douglas E., Political Change in Morocco (Princeton 1961), 272–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Early indications of the difference appear in Petit Matin, June 3 and 8, and August 21, 1956. In one humorous incident Ben Salah kept referring in a proprietary fashion to the new Maisons de Travail, built with government funds, as UGTT labor exchanges. Bourguiba continued to insist they were Bourses de Travail, stressing the relation of labor benefits to the government at the dedication ceremonies as well.

¹⁴ The program appeared as “Rapport Economique,” 6ème Congrés National de I'U.G.T.T., Tunis, September 20–23, 1956.Google Scholar The basic aims and proposals are repeated in Salah's, BenPerspectives Décennales (Tunis, Ministry of Planning and Finance, 1962).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Petit Matin, November 10 and December 25, 1956; also New York Times, December 31, 1956.

¹⁶ Garas, 241. Masmoudi's career is remarkably similar to that of the capable intermediary in Moroccan politics, Bouabid, who was also a key figure in negotiating with the French.

¹⁷ The government has had to keep on reasonably friendly terms with the business community, and the UTIC (Union Tunisienne des Industriels et Commerçants) is regarded as an auxiliary party organization. As the country was mobilized for development, one of the early controversies concerned olive oil marketing and processing controls. See Petit Matin, February 7, 1961.

¹⁸ L'Action Tunisienne, October 3, 1958. The paper was suspended that month and reappeared without the party slogan in its title as Afrique Action, later to become Jeune-Afrique.

¹⁹ Afrique Action, October 7–18, 1961.

²⁰ Ibid., November 21–27, 1961; and also Le Monde, November 18, 1961.

²¹ Petit Matin, November 21, 1961. In this speech, and again in the speeches given after the assassination attempt, the President defended himself against charges of neglecting the economy in order to engage in international endeavors. In the later speeches he also spoke publicly in defense of an especially luxurious palace built for his own use.

²² Jeune-Afrique, October 29-November 9, 1962. An interesting commentary on how quickly fortunes change in a developing country is the fact that the president of the Sfax phosphate works had been a UGTT militant. About 6,000 miners struck against UGTT leadership when the government tried to place a levy on their wages to relieve unemployment in odier areas.

²³ Mestiri replaced Nouira as the Secretary of State for Finance in December 1958 and was later Ambassador to Moscow. Finance ministries modeled on the French system have been notoriously difficult to adapt to development purposes in North Africa. With Mehiri in the powerful position of Secretary of State for the Interior, the two “hard-line” officials may have become too efficient in advancing their views. Similar allegations are made about sending Mongi Slim to Washington, where his contacts with the liberal group were cut off.

²⁴ Mestiri, Ladgham, and Mehiri, were identified as the étatiste group by Le Monde, January 1, 1959.Google Scholar None of them joined the interim government of the fall of 1955, although the Neo-Destour officially participated and the liberal leadership group was fully represented.

²⁵ The most complete account of Ladgham's role in this critical period is in Hahn's, LornaNorth Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood (Washington 1960), 169–70.Google Scholar It is worth recalling that Ladgham had led the fight against similarly framed reforms in the Neo-Destour's compromise effort in 1951, which broke down completely. His position in the fall of 1955 was very similar to that of Ben Bella in the summer of 1962.

²⁶ “Development” is used here in the simple sense of more intensive government efforts to effect many economic and social changes in a short time. The Neo-Destour's performance during this period in many specialized areas of development is analyzed in the writer's “Local Reform and National Development: The Politics of Integration in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan” (manuscript).

²⁷ The 1959 changes are outlined in Moore, “The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia.”

²⁸ The National Council was defined in the 1959 party statutes as the Political Bureau, the Commissioners, and a cell delegate for every 5,000 members. It was seldom convened until difficulties were encountered in mobilizing support for the plan, and later when Bourguiba wanted to explain the coup. In convening the Council in 1963 to consider the party reorganization (before the party congress), youth and other “high Destourians” were co-opted. As the one-party system attempts to follow all the ramifications of a more complex society, the executive bodies take on more general functions. The National Council has become a kind of unofficial congress. In the new organization the Political Bureau will be expanded to some 50 members, and the President will have a “presidium” of five or six as the top executive body. See Jeune-Afrique, March 11–17, 1963.

²⁹ See, for example, the speeches in La Presse, January 19–20, 1963, and April 14, 1963.

³⁰ See New York Times, December 28, 1963. In effect, Bourguiba, Jr., was given all the sensitive troublespots—supervision of youth and sports, information, and the management of his father's office.

³¹ Tilili was important to the Neo-Destour as one of the few high officials originating in the south, where the Neo-Destour has had many difficulties. In addition to the strike of late 1961 and general resistance to new agrarian cooperatives, the party suffered a blow in the fall of 1962 when a major flood control project around Gabès failed to protect the city against unusually heavy rains.

³² Part of the 1963 reorganization involved separating militants from adherents in party cells. The militants will very likely be used for such committees and to arouse more popular support for other developmental needs. One of the major weaknesses of the earlier system of highly centralized control was that the party could not exploit its membership fully, although some weaker members were weeded out.

³³ See Accent on Planning, speech of March 28, 1963, to the UGTT Congress (Tunis, Secretary of State for Information, 1963).Google Scholar

³⁴ The continuing wariness of the labor movement was again revealed in October 1964, when the UGTT strongly opposed the government's proposal to devalue the dinaar. (See Jeune-Afrique, October 18, 1964.) This is a good example of how the diversification of interest through development begins to place more delicate demands on the political process, which in turn makes reconciliation of policy differences within a one-party regime more difficult.

³⁵ The one-party system's reputation for expeditious action has probably been exaggerated as a result of the sheer chaos that many new regimes emerge from. However, getting a policeman on every street corner is not the same as getting peasants to use fertilizer. Bourguiba himself came out strongly for planning and sacrifice on behalf of development in early 1961, but as individuals Tunisians are only today beginning to feel the impact. There was immediate resistance from shopkeepers, who refused to sell goods and foods under price controls, and difficulties in getting peasants to work on cooperative farms or join cooperative marketing agencies. For Bourguiba's, early commitment, see Neo-Destourian Socialism, speech of June 21, 1961 (Tunis, Secretary of State for Information, 1961).Google Scholar Another sign of the party's sensitivity to social change was alteration of its name to the Constitutional Socialist Party in the recent Congress. The old party label has been retained here to provide continuity.

³⁶ One of the most interesting common phenomena among one-party states in Africa is their antipathy to both the Communists and the tribesmen. Neither Marxist students nor paramount chiefs are permitted to disrupt party harmony.