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Laboratory, Law, and Anecdote: Negotiations and the Integration of Data

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Wesley L. Gould
Wesley L. Gould
Affiliation:
Association of American Law Schools
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Extract

International bargaining and negotiation are subjects about which there has long been much speculation and the offering of much advice. Accounts of bargaining experiences, as well as the assembly and ordering of real-world data and inferences drawn therefrom (particularly when they lead to the maxims of a Callières, a Nicolson, or a Lippmann) raise questions that require investigation by all available means, including experimentation in laboratories when feasible. Laboratory investigation can be confined to overt behavior—proposals, arguments, threats, outcomes, and so on—or the laboratory can be employed to seek data on attitudes, intentions, expectations, and perceptions, and thereby to probe where historical data seldom penetrate. Computer technology adds flexibility, control, and efficiency to laboratory data collection. It permits, during the course of an experiment, questions that probe the subjective aspects of a negotiation without the distortion that results from the presence of an interrogator.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , October 1965 , pp. 92 - 104
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1965

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References

1 E.g., Robinson, Richard D., Cases in International Business (New York 1962)Google Scholar, especially the negotiation between Merck & Co. and the Government of India, 100–117.

2 Cooper, Joseph B., in “Psychological Literature on the Prevention of War,” Bulletin of the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War, III (January 1965), 2–15Google Scholar, found that between 1941 and 1953 there were 68 abstracted psychological articles dealing explicitly with peace compared with 1,048 dealing with war.

3 Triepel, Heinrich, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Leipzig 1899), 35–63, 66–103Google Scholar. See also, on the distinction between traité-loi and traité-contrat, Delbez, Louis, Les principes généraux du droit international public—Droit de la paix—Droit préventif de la guerre—Droit de la guerre (3rd ed., Paris 1964), 46–47Google Scholar.

4 Djilas, Milovan, Conversations with Stalin, trans, by Petrovich, Michael B. (New York 1962), 178–80Google Scholar. See also Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 104–24, 395–400, 469–71Google Scholar.

5 On the adjustment of problem-solving mechanisms to differing rates of change of variables, a matter of consequence to the issue of whether or not to prolong negotiations, see Starbuck, William H., The Aspiration Mechanism, Institute for Quantitative Research in Economics and Management, Herman C. Krannert School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University, Institute Paper No. 50 (Lafayette, Ind., June, 1963)Google Scholar.

6 Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 19Google Scholar.

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8 Robert J. Meeker, Gerald H. Shure, and William H. Moore, Jr., “Real-Time Computer Studies of Bargaining Behavior: The Effects of Threat upon Bargaining,” American Federation of Information Processing Societies Conference Proceedings, 1964 Spring Joint Computer Conference, xxv, 115–23.

9 Shure, and Meeker, , “The Effectiveness of Pacifist Strategies in Bargaining Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, IX (March 1965), 106–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A recently proposed model of the bargaining process includes the propositions that a very high rate of learning during bargaining and/or a low rate of time cost can lead one bargainer to raise his demands (Cross, John C., “A Theory of the Bargaining Process,” The American Economic Review, LV [March 1965], 67–94Google Scholar).

10 Intraorganizational aspects of bargaining are developed in Walton, Richard E. and McKersie, Robert B., A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York 1965)Google Scholar, chap. 9 and, with extension to international relations, chap. 11.

11 Blake, Robert R. and Mouton, Jane S., “Comprehension of Own and Outgroup Positions under Intergroup Competition,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, V (September 1961), 304–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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14 Webster, C. K., ed., British Diplomacy, 1813–1815: Select Documents dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe (London 1921), 210, 226. CfGoogle Scholar. the Russian Memoranda of October 30 and November 21, 1814, ibid., 224, 243.

15 Castlereagh to Liverpool, November 2, 1818, in Webster, , The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815–1822 (London 1925), 157, 158Google Scholar. See also in this volume, Cabinet Memorandum of May 5, 1820, 238–39; Lieven to Nesselrode, October 25, 1820, 282–83; Esterházy to Metternich, January 10, 1821, Appendix, 556; circular to British ambassadors, January 19, 1821, 321–23.

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17 Baumol, W. J. and Quandt, R. E., “Rules of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect Decisions,” The American Economic Review, LIV (March 1964), 23–46Google Scholar, a report on generation of rules of thumb through simple algebraic functions and simulation with plausible expectation of fair approximations to true maxims.

18 Crow, Wayman J. and Raser, John R., A Cross-Cultural Simulation Study, A Report to Project Michelson, U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California (La Jolla, Calif., Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, November 20, 1964)Google Scholar.

19 Blix, Hans, Treaty-Making Power (London and New York 1960), 71–73Google Scholar.

20 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, Permanent Court of International Justice (1927), Series B, No. 14, p. 28; Lighthouse Case (1934), Series A/B, No. 62, pp. 13, 16; Interpretation of the 1919 Convention Concerning Employment of Women During the Night (1932), Series A/B, No. 50, pp. 372–81; Georges Pinson Case, Franco-Mexican Claims Commission (1928), Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1927–1928, No. 292. See also McNair, Lord, The Law of Treaties, 1961 (Oxford 1961), 411–23Google Scholar.