¹ As such, the study of immigration and integration is what Mattei Dogan has termed a “hybrid specialty,” which includes enclaves of political scientists and their counterparts in many other social science disciplines. Dogan, Mattei, “Political Science and the Other Disciplines,” in Goodin, Robert E. and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, eds., A New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)Google Scholar. A comprehensive attempt to review literature from multiple related fields has been undertaken in Brettell, Caroline B. and Hollifield, James F., eds., Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines (New York: Routledge, 2000)Google Scholar. This essay therefore focuses on recent contributions from political science and sociology where research questions have overlapped to a great degree.

² Goodin and Klingemann (fn. 1); Lichbach, Mark Irving and Zuckerman, Alan S., eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Katznelson, Ira and Milner, Helen V., eds., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: W. W. Norton &. Company, 2002)Google Scholar; and Boix, Carles and Stokes, Susan C., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)Google Scholar.

³ For the exchange to be productive, outreach by immigration and integration specialists has to be matched by other political scientists' increased attention to the subfield. While there are reasons to fault the discipline for ignoring existing immigration and integration scholarship, in this essay I focus on what scholars of immigration and integration can do to bridge the gap.

⁴ For one recent move in this direction see Abdelal, Rawi, Herrera, Yoshiko M., Johnston, Alastair Iain and McDermott, Rose, “Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 4 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Robert Putnam's two-level games analysis or Albert Hirschman's reflections on exit and voice are classic examples of type 1 contributions; they do not aim to predict outcomes, but rather offer a general framework for understanding important political dynamics. Putnam, Robert D., “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Levef Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

⁶ Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

⁷ Kastoryano, Riva, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002)Google Scholar.

⁸ Favell, Adrian, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (London: MacMillan, 1998)Google Scholar. A second core aspect of his study is a type 3 endeavor, namely applying the concept of path dependency to explain pathologies in the application of the public philosophies.

⁹ Joppke, Christian, Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Brubaker (fn. 6); Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Joppke (fn. 9), 4.

¹² Anthony Messina makes a parallel contribution to this debate by reviewing multiple perspectives on states' ability to control immigration and manage integration, before ultimately concluding that immigration responds most centrally to the political interests of immigrant-receiving countries. Messina, Anthony M., The Logic and Politics of Post—WWII Migration to Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Fetzer, Joel S. and Soper, J. Christopher, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Eatwell, Roger, “Ten Theories of the Extreme Right,” in Merkl, Peter and Weinberg, Leonard, eds., Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Applications of evolutionary biology's theory of punctuated equilibrium to the study of politics are prototypical examples of type 3 scholarship. See Krasner, Stephen D., “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Baumgartner, Frank R. and Jones, Bryan D., Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Hansen, Randall, Citizenship and Immigration in Postwar Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Hollifield's own book, richly laced with multilayered insights and observations, can also be seen at core as a type 3 endeavor that draws on liberal theory (in its market- and rights-based variants) to provide a better explanation of immigration policy than prevailing economic “push-pull,” Marxist, or statist/realist theories. Hollifield, James F., Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Sassen, Saskia, Losing Control (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Freeman, Gary P., “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,” International Migration Review 29, no. 4 (1995)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Hansen demonstrates how the 1948 British Nationality Act established a web of rules that interacted with subsequent developments to generate periodic crises. For his further developments and applications of path dependence theory, see Hansen, Randall, “Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrants to Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 3 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Ireland, Patrick, The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Soysal (fn. 10), 65–118.

²² Garbaye, Romain, Getting into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ Guiraudon, Virginie, “Citizenship Rights for Non-Citizens: France, Germany, and the Netherlands,” in Joppke, Christian, ed., Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)Google Scholar. See also Guiraudon, Virginie, Les Politiques d'Immigration en Europe:Allemagne, France, Pays-Bas (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000)Google Scholar.

²⁴ Norris, Pippa, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Race relations studies in Europe fall more cleanly into the immigration and integration subfield tVian they do in the United States, where racial diversity is more often seen as divorced from (recent) immigration than linked to it.

²⁶ McAdam, Doug, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 3Google Scholar.

²⁷ Ibid., 1. McAdam also identifies two other goals: a discussion of power in America and an assessment of the fit between the theories he tests and the historical facts of the black movement (pp. 1–4).

²⁸ Bleich, Erik, Race Politics in Britain andFrance: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Similarly, David Art's work focuses on explaining the differential r success of the far right in Germany and Austria, but he also makes a type 4 contribution to theories of [ideas by identifying public debates as key loci of ideational change that can influence political culture I and political behavior. Art, David, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Messina, Anthony M., Race and Party Competition in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 182–83Google Scholar.

³⁰ Comparativists have included the United States in their single-authored or edited studies with relative frequency. For selected contributions in addition to those referenced above, see Brubaker, William Rogers, ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989)Google Scholar; Kepel, Gilles, Allah in the West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Zolberg, Aristide and Long, Lift Woon, “Why Islam is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation n i Europe and the United States,” Politics and Society 27, no. 1 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fetzer, Joel, Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; and Hansen, Randall and Weil, Patrick, eds., Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and Europe (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002)Google Scholar. By contrast, it has been much less common for Americanists to include international comparisons in their studies, though for a notable exception see Alba, Richard, “Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second-Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In addition, Foner's injunction to compare integration structures across time and to look to different sub-national (city or regional) differences meshes well with some of the most interesting comparative work of recent years. See Body-Gendrot, Sophie and Martiniello, Marco, eds., Minorities in European Cities: The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighbourhood Level (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weil, Patrick, Qu'est-ce qu'un Frangais? Histoire de la Nationalite Francaise depuis la Revolution (Paris: Grasset, 2002)Google Scholar; Ireland, Patrick, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Penninx, Rinus, Kraal, Karen, Martiniello, Marco, and Vertovec, Steven, eds., Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies (London: Ashgate, 2004)Google Scholar; Lucassen, Leo, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850 (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 2005)Google Scholar, and Garbaye (fn. 22).

³¹ Kitschelt, Herbert, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995)Google Scholar.

³² For a skeptical view of the effects of unemployment and immigration, see Norris (fn. 25).

³³ Cox, Gary, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁴ For an analysis that emphasizes mainstream party behavior on the fortunes of niche parties, see Meguid, Bonnie, “Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ In Denmark, a case used to understand whether the analysis can be extended, Terri Givens finds that a series of minority governments served the same role as the grand coalition in Austria—namely to decrease the impact of a vote for the far right on the ability of a least-favored party to govern, especially given that the mainstream right signaled that it was willing to govern with far-right support.

³⁶ This is a term that both Lieberman and I use. It is not without drawbacks, however, especially in European countries that deny the existence of “race.”

³⁷ For other contributions in this vein, see Bleich (fn. 29); Bleich, Erik, “Integrating Ideas Into Policy-Making Analysis: Frames and Race Policies in Britain and France,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 9 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Geddes, Andrew and Gutraudon, Virgime, “Britain, France, and EU Anti-Discrimination Policy: The Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm,” West European Politics 27, no. 2 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Korpi, Walter and Shalev, Michael, “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies,” British Journal of Sociology 30 (June 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Korpi, Walter, The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983)Google Scholar.

³⁹ Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Rogowski, Ronald, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Thought advocacy coalitions operate at an elite rather than a mass level. See Sabatier, Paul A., “Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework,” Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 8, no. 4 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ Lieberman also makes this point when comparing U.S. Social Security to France's Social Insurance, saying “The key distinction that emerges from these cases is an institutional one: centralization” (p. 117).

⁴² For discussions of ideas, interests, and institutions in the fields of political economy and public policy and administration, see Peter A. Hall, “The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations,” in Lichbach and Zuckerman (fn. 2); and Giandomenico Majone, “Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, Interests and Institutions,” in Goodin and Klingemann (fn. 1).

⁴³ Marshall, T. H., “Citizenship and Social Class,” in Marshall, T. H., ed., Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ As the authors point out, these are the five most important immigrant-receiving countries in Western Europe, accounting for about four-fifths of its total immigrant population (p. 5).

⁴⁵ Koopmans et al.'s framework also demonstrates that (in 2002) Germany was a much weaker case of assimilationism than Switzerland and that the Netherlands was closer to the extreme end of the multiculturalist spectrum than Britain.

⁴⁶ For a similar effort to develop an empirically grounded citizenship policy index that allows fluctuation over time, see Howard, Marc Morje, “Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 3 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁷ Koopmans et al. also devote a chapter to the interesting use of “Muslim” as a common identify marker among claims-making migrants in Britain, the Netherlands, and most unexpectedly, France, demonstrating and analyzing the limitations of their own model (chap. 4)

⁴⁸ It would also help overcome modest anachronisms such as their discussion of the Dutch treatment of minorities, which, as they admit, has shifted substantially since the late 1990s. See Entzinger, Han, “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands,” in Christian Joppke and Morawska, Ewa, eds., Toward Assimilation and Citizenship (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)Google Scholar; and Joppke, Christian, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” The British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ For two penetrating analyses of incorporation policies that highlight the complexity of the issue area, see Favell, Adrian, “Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe: A Review and Critique,” in Alienikoff, T. Alexander and Klusmeyer, Douglas, eds., Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001)Google Scholar; and Freeman, Gary, “Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies,” International Migration Review 38, no. 3 (2004)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ For an overview of recent contributions to this debate in the American context, see Waters, Mary C. and Jimenez, Tomas R., “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges,” Annual Revteiv of Sociology 31 (2005)Google Scholar. For an attempt to develop comparative integration measures in the European context, see the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index, published in 2005 by the British Council Brussels and available online at http://www.integrationindex.eu/ multiversions/2140/FileName/brussels-european-civic-citizenship-and-inclusion-index.pdf (accessed April 14,2008).

⁵¹ This is a point frequently made by James Hollifield.

⁵² Quoted in Rose, E. J. B., Colour and Citizenship (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1969), 229Google Scholar.

⁵³ Money, Jeannette, Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Sniderman, Paul, Peri, Pierangelo, Figueiredo, Rui J. P. de Jr., and Piazza, Thomas, The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)Google Scholar. Perhaps more importantly for political scientists, in this and subsequent work, Sniderman and colleagues have examined how these sentiments translate into political and policy action. Sniderman, Paul M., Hagendoorn, Louk, and Prior, Markus, “Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁵ Weldon, Steven A., “The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Compara tive, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ Lamont, Michele, The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000)Google Scholar; idem, “Immigration and the Salience of Racial Boundaries among French Workers,” French Politics, Culture & Society 19, no. 1 (2001)Google Scholar; and Christopher A. Bail, “Diverse Diversities: The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries toward Immigrants in Twenty-One European Countries,” American Sociological Review (forthcoming). On the construction of identities and hierarchies, see also the work of Hagendoorn, Louk, “Ethnic Categorization and Out- group Exclusion: Cultural Values and Social Sterotypes in the Construction of Ethnic Hierarchies,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16, no. 1 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zolberg and Long (fn. 31); and Alba (fn. 31).

⁵⁷ I draw a distinction here between the empirically grounded study of the comparative politics of identity and the normative study of the politics of identity, as exemplified in works such as Young, Ins Marion, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Taylor, Charles, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Gutmann, Amy, ed., Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Calhoun, Craig, ed., Social Theory and the Politics of Identity (Oxford: Black-well, 1994)Google Scholar; and Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship:A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar. While it will be fruitful for empirical social scientists to ground their studies in normative work, the comparative politics of identity does not focus centrally on normative debates.

⁵⁸ Studies of class consciousness and party identification—less in vogue now than in earlier eras—may also provide useful insights into these issues.

⁵⁹ Sides and Citrin have also presented evidence suggesting the relatively greater importance of cultural identities over material interests in shaping European public opinion about immigration. Sides, John and Citrin, Jack, “European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information,” British Journal of Political Science 37, no. 3 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁰ This draws on and adapts the framework I developed to analyze the origins of ideas in Bleich (fn. 29), 187–94.

⁶¹ In the realm of EU studies, Hooghe and Marks have connected identity to integration outcomes by arguing that shifting decision-making structures since the 1990s have given more power to the general public relative to elites, thereby creating an era of “constraining dissensus” that limits integration options. They term their perspective “postfunctionalist” because its emphasis on identity goes beyond the primary focus on economic interest underpinning both neofunctionalism and intergovernmen-talism. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctional Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” British Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).

⁶² Collier, Paul, “Ethnic Diversity: An Economic Analysis,” Economic Policy 32 (April 2001)Google Scholar; and Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ This last question lies at the heart of Anthony Messina's latest book (fn. 12).

⁶⁴ See Brubaker, Rogers and Laitin, David, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Horowitz, Donald, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 34–42Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ For a “brush clearing” effort designed to facilitate movement toward general propositions about identity, see Abdelal et al. (fn. 4).