Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2011
A burgeoning literature in comparative politics has sought to incorporate ideas into political analysis. In this article the authors categorize the main ways in which this incorporation has occurred—ideas as culture, ideas as expert knowledge, ideas as solutions to collective action problems, and ideas as programmatic beliefs—and explicate the different assumptions about causality and the permanence of ideas implied by these different frameworks. This theoretical exercise is then applied to an empirical examination of eugenic ideas about sterilization and immigration and their influence on public policy in Britain and the United States between the world wars. Given that ideational ideas were (broadly) equally powerful in both countries, the cases provide a basis for shedding light on when and how extant ideational frameworks influence public policy. Employing primary sources the authors conclude that ideas remain powerful expressions of societal interests but depend upon key carriers to realize such expressions.
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74 Peter Gourevitch put this point well: “To become policy, ideas must link up with politics—the mobilization of consent for policy. Politics involves power. Even a good idea cannot become policy if it meets certain kinds of opposition, and a bad idea can become policy if it is able to obtain support.” Gourevitch, “Keynesian Politics: The Political Sources of Economic Policy Choices,” in Hall (fn. 5), 87–88.
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81 One could think of other examples. The idea of “Europe” has been used (and abused) many times by politicians who embedded their preferred policies in it. Crudely, German and (especially) French politicians have argued that common agricultural policy (which ensures above-market prices for farm products, resulting in oversupply and the exclusion of imports from developing countries), is essential to the construction of Europe; British politicians, governing a country where agriculture is a small concern, have not seen it that way. Less crudely, international relations theorists have argued that politicians invoked the idea of Europe in the late 1980s to overcome “Eurosclerosis” when European integration stalled. In doing so, they overcame the problem of multiple equilibria; that is, if there are many ways in which integration can go forward, and each is Pareto optimal, then how do states agree among them? Ideas—in this case the idea of mutual recognition of goods and services as the foundation of further European integration—overcome the problem by selecting one as “the best.” See Garrett, Geoffrey and Weingast, Barry R., “Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the European Communities' Internal Market,” in Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993)Google Scholar. See Blyth (fn. 75), 241–44.
82 Pierson, “Not Just What, but When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics” (Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Boston, September 1998).
83 We thank Kathleen Thelen for drawing our attention to this issue.
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87 The point relates to recent work on struggles over issue definition; politics is about defining issues in the way that serves an actor's ends. Taking the gun control example, if the NRA succeeds in denning gun control as a matter of protecting the American constitution, it is highly likely to check gun control efforts; if its opponents define it as an issue of saving children, the opposite will obtain. See Baumgartner, Frank R., Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policymaking (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989)Google Scholar. The eugenic cases highlight how this process of issue definition will be buffeted by exogenous developments; those who wished to define eugenics as an issue of the rights of the individual against oppressive state power saw their argument carried by developments in Nazi Germany.
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89 Naturally, the whole process can go in reverse: ideas viewed as disreputable can discredit the actors proposing them, while ideas that might otherwise have support become discredited when associated with disreputable characters. A good example of the former would be socialist ideas in the postwar U.S.: discredited by association with the Soviet Union, they brought down any brave soul who publicly advocated them. An example of latter would be appeasement: it has been wholly delegitimized by Neville Chamberlain's naive and clumsy policy toward Adolf Hitler.
90 Walsh (fn. 77).