¹ Lake, David A. and Morgan, Patrick M., “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs,” in Lake, and Morgan, , eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pannsylvania State University Press, 1997), 7Google Scholar.

² Despite agreement on these basic points, the two books differ in significant ways. R&P covers all the major regions of the world, while AWR focuses on Europe and Asia, with a concluding chapter that discusses how its framework applies to other regions—South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. But AWR's thematic scope is wider, incorporating the economics-security nexus and the role of culture and identity in shaping regional interactions. R&P concentrates on security dynamics.

³ Katzenstein uses the terms “imperium” (that is, the combination of America's territorial and nonterritorial power) and “core states” (Japan and Germany), while Buzan and Wsever stick to more traditional categories such as superpower, great power, and regional power.

⁴ I disagree with the characterization of the South Pacific as an “unstructured region.” It has a fairly active regional institution, the South Pacific Forum, and the relatively small size of most of its member states creates a shared vulnerability and engenders a sense of security interdependence.

⁵ The notion of regional security complex has evolved since Buzan first proposed it in 1983. Then, RSCs designated only areas of intense rivalry (for example, India-Pakistan; Arab states-Israel, North and South Korea), while ignoring regions where the main pattern of relationship is cooperative; Buzan, Barry, “A Framework for Regional Security Analysis,” in Buzan, Barry and Rizvi, Gowher, eds., South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 8Google Scholar. In the new formulation they may vary from anarchy (“conflict formations”) to “security communities,” where war has been rendered unthinkable.

⁶ There are other types of complexes. Supercomplexes are a number of RSCs bound together by one or more great powers that generate “relatively high and consistent levels of interregional security dynamics.” Subcomplexes are similar to an RSC but are firmly embedded within a larger RSC. Precomplexes are potential RSCs or RSCs in the making, but the bilateral relationships have not yet reached the level of interdependence to qualify as a full-fledged RSC. Protocomplexes occur when the degree of security interdependence within a region is sufficient to differentiate it from its neighbours, but the overall regional security dynamics remains thinner and weaker than a fully fledged RSC (Buzan and Wasver, 490–92). Finally, a “mini-complex” is an RSC on a small scale, composed at least partly of substate actors.

⁷ Hemmer, Christopher and Katzenstein, Peter J., “Why Is There No NATO in Asia: Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56 (Summer 2002), 575Google Scholar.

⁸ Beyond the U.S. role, AWR identifies state power, regime type, and state structures as the factors that make Asian regionalism different from Europe's (Katzenstein, 220). European regionalism is a regional]sm of relatively equal neighbors of similar regime types with well-functioning bureaucracies. Intra-Asian relations are more hierarchical, Asian political regimes differ widely, and Asian states are “non-Weberian” in the sense that “rule by law” rather than “rule of law” prevails.

⁹ On the various ways of defining regions, see Cantori, Louis J. and Spiegel, Steven L., eds., The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970)Google Scholar; Thompson, William R., “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Prepositional Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly 17 (March 1973)Google Scholar; Hurrell, Andrew, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,” in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)Google Scholar; Neumann, Iver, “A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe,” Review of International Studies 20 (1994)Google Scholar; Jayasurya, Kanishka, “Singapore: The Politics of Regional Definition,” Pacific Review 7, no. 4 (1994)Google Scholar; Bernard, Mitchell, “Regions in the Global Political Economy: Beyond the Local-Global Divide in the Formation of the Eastern Asian Region,” New Political Economy 1 (November 1996)Google Scholar; Singh, Hari, “Hegemonic Construction of Regions: Southeast Asia as a Case Study,” in Owen, Sarah, ed., The State and Identity Construction in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1999)Google Scholar; Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Murphy, Alexander, “Regions as Social Constructs: The Gap between Theory and Practice,” Progress in Human Geography 15, no. 1 (1991)Google Scholar; Varynen, Raimo, “Regionalism: Old and New,” International Studies Review 5, no. 1 (2003)Google Scholar; Hurrell, Andrew, “One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society,” International Affairs 83 (2007)Google Scholar.

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¹⁶ Security complexes may merge to become “supercomplexes” or may split. They may become conflict prone or peaceful through “securitization and desecuritization.” Securitization involves taking extraordinary measures to address challenges that have been labeled/constructed as existential threats to a state or other international actors (including regions) (Buzan and Wasver, 71). Desecuritization refers to the reverse process whereby issues already labeled as such are taken out of the emergency mode and put back into normal political sphere (Buzan and Waever, 71).

¹⁷ R&P discusses material security linkages between the neighboring RSCs, such as South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia; the Middle East and Africa; North and South America; and the links between Russia and Europe and Asia (Buzan and Waever, chap. 6 and pp. 258–60, 333–37, 429–33).

¹⁸ Acharya, Amitav, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization 58 (Spring 2004)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Alagappa, Muthiah, “The Study of International Order,” in Alagappa, , ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 34Google Scholar. For a discussion of regional orders produced by internationalist coalitions, see Solingen, Etel, Regional Orders at Century's Daivn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

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²² Ibid., 16–19.

²³ Morgan, “Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders,” in Lake and Morgan (fn. 1), 32.

²⁴ Alagappa (fn. 19), 39.

²⁵ Of these, the definitions of three types of regional security orders are noteworthy. Conflict formation: “a pattern of security interdependence shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations”; security regime: “a pattern of security interdependence still shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations, but where those fears are restrained by an agreed set of rules and expectations that those rules will be observed”; security community: “a pattern of security interdependence in which the units do not expect or prepare for the use of force in their political relations with each other” (Buzan and Wtever, 489, 491).

²⁶ Lake and Morgan (fn. 1), 12.

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²⁹ Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Conclusion: Institutional Features, Cooperation Effects, and the Agenda for Further Research on Comparative Regionalism,” in Acharya and Johnston (fn. 28)

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⁴⁴ Quoted in Gordon, Bernard, “The FTA Fetish,” Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2005, A16.Google Scholar

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⁶⁰ Neumann (fn. 9), 57.

⁶¹ Murphy (fn. 9), 30.

⁶² Acharya (fn. 9). See also Adler's notion of “cognitive” regions; Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 26, no. 2 (1997)Google Scholar.