¹ Classic studies of such collapses include Valenzuela, Arturo, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Collier, David, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and O'Donnell, Guillermo, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of Internationa Studies Press, 1973)Google Scholar.

² The following have focused on the importance of pacts and elite political bargains in stabilizing democratic regimes: Gunther, Richard, Puhle, Hans-Jürgen, and Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos, “Introduction,” in Gunther, Richard, Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos, and Puhle, Hans-Jürgen, eds., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; and Encarnacion, Omar, “Labor and Pacted Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 33 (April 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Others have emphasized institutional design and its effect of the structure of political conflict and the efficacy of representation; see, for example, Siavelis, Peter, The President and Congress in Postauthoritarian Chile: Institutional Constraints to Democratic Consolidation (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Mainwaring, Scott and Valenzuela, Arturo, Politics, Society, and Democracy: Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998)Google Scholar; and Linz, Juan and Valenzuela, Arturo, The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994)Google Scholar. And yet others investigate the role that the structure of political institutions have in driving severe ethnic conflict in democratic contexts; see Saideman, Stephen, Lanoue, David, Campenni, Michael, and Stanton, Samuel, “Democratization, Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985–1998,” Comparative Political Studies 35 (February 2002)Google Scholar. For an investigation of the possibility that particular electoral systems may contribute to regime instability through the incentives they create for parties, see Siavelis, Peter and Valenzuela, Arturo, “Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile,” in Lijphart, Arend and Waisman, Carlos, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996)Google Scholar. Mitchell Seligson and Ana Carrion emphasize instead the role of mass attitudes in making democratic breakdowns likely; see , Seligson and , Carrion, “Political Support, Political Skepticism, and Political Stability in New Democracies: An Examination of Mass Support for Coups D'Etat in Peru,” Comparative Political Studies 35 (February 2002)Google Scholar. Finally, for Adam Przeworski, the institutionalization of economic conflict—that is, its containment within moderate and predictable boundaries—is a key issue for the consolidation of democracy; see , Przeworski, “The Games of Transition,” in Mainwaring, Scott, O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Valenzuela, J. Samuel, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 126–27Google Scholar.

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⁴ The point here is not that there is no response by society but, rather, that it is far weaker than might be anticipated based on past experience and that in general it does not threaten the democratic regime. Protest is, however, occasionally threatening to the political fortunes of particular incumbent officials or political parties. The recent turmoil in Argentina is a case in point: while living standards have been reduced to their lowest levels in fifty years, the resultant political protests have not shaken the democratic regime, even if they have shaken incumbent presidents. During the statist era, by contrast, far less severe economic downturns repeatedly sparked political conflicts that destroyed democracy.

⁵ Others have noted this same surprising outcome. See Weyland, Kurt, “The Political Fate of Market Reform in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 42 (December 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stokes, Susan, ed., Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁴³ Lustig(fn.26).

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⁴⁶ The “before” period is defined as the five years prior to the achievement of a level of liberalization equivalent to the midpoint for the population of countries (0.587). Consolidation is measured as the five years after the reform index passes the level of 0.7 (on a [0,1] interval). In no case did a country rum away from liberalization once this level was achieved. Data on liberalization are from Morley, Samuel, Machado, Roberto, and Pettinato, Stefano, “Indexes of Structural Reform in Latin America,” Serie Reformas Económicas 12 (Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999)Google Scholar.

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⁵⁴ Ibid., chap. 10.

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⁵⁸ I do not contend that these data are perfect measures of the actual incidence of strikes. At least in Mexico the requirements for the initiation of a strike are complex, and legal approval is frequently blocked by the authorities. Nevertheless, I see no reason why underreporting or strike repression would be correlated with time period or level of economic liberalization. Given this, the trends in measured strike activity across time provide useful information.

⁵⁹ Chile is the exception here, since most liberalization was undertaken principally between 1975 and 1979, a period during which all labor movement activity was illegal and savagely repressed.

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⁶² Long, J. Scott, Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables (Thousand Oaks Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997)Google Scholar. All the results in Table 5 were generated using Stata 8's cross-sectional, time-series negative binomial estimator (xtnbreg). In the estimation, the dispersion parameter was allowed to vary randomly across countries, and country dummy variables were included to account for potential unmeasured characteristics of each country that could affect the parameter estimates. As a check on the robustness of the results, parallel models were estimated without the inclusion country dummy variables. These analyses made clear that the results in Table 5 are not driven by the presence of the dummy variables; the same patterns emerge in both sets of analyses, and indeed the robustness check was often more supportive of the liberalization-quiescence hypothesis. The data used in this analysis will be available at the ICPSR website.

⁶³ The control for size of the urban sector is included in model 1b since the measure of protest—demonstrations—is likely to be urban biased. This is true because reporting of urban protests is more likely and because the organization of collective action is in general much less difficult in such settings.

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