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Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2011
Abstract
The debt crisis has raised serious concerns about the future of democratic governance in Latin America. The prevailing assumption is not merely that economic decline undercuts prospects for democratic consolidation; because of their vulnerability to popular political pressures, democracies—particularly new democracies—have been seen as incapable of mounting effective policy responses to critical economic challenges. A comparative study of policy outcomes in Latin America since the outbreak of the debt crisis challenges this assumption. If we control for the magnitude of the debt burden at the outbreak of the crisis, no statistically significant differences emerge between democratic and authoritarian regimes, or between new democracies and more established regimes. The findings suggest that the conventional wisdom about democracy and economic crisis exaggerates the relationship between political regime characteristics and policy choice, and fundamentally misconstrues the strengths and weaknesses of liberal democratic forms of governance.
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References
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