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Civil-Naval Politics in World War I*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Warner R. Schilling
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Extract

The determination of military policy can be generally conceived as a matter of answering, in order, two questions: for what purposes is military power required, and how much is required? Unfortunately, these questions are more easily asked than answered. The first—military power for what and against whom?—is complicated by the fact that the government is usually confronted with a variety of foreign policy contingencies, many of which seem to call for different kinds of military establishments. The second question—how much military power?—is complicated by the fact that the government must usually allocate its resources among many national values, of which military security is only one. These complicating factors, one a condition of international politics and the other a condition of domestic politics, appear to be as inescapable as the two questions themselves. Consequently, some insight into present and future problems of civil-military relations may be gained by examining the influence of these conditions in the past.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , July 1955 , pp. 572 - 591
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1955

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References

1 National Archives, State Dept., 110.7/56. However, Admiral Yarnell now has no recollection of this letter (personal communication).

2 Memorandum, n.d., by Capts. H. S. Knapp and J. H. Oliver, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 10:143. The General Board was organized in 1900 and until 1917 was the only planning body in the Department.

3 Cdr. Knox, D. W., “The General Problem of Naval Warfare,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, XLII, NO. I (January-February 1916), p. 26.Google Scholar

4 Capt. J. S. McKean, “War and Policy,” ibid., XL, NO. I (January 1914), pp. 8–9.

5 House Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, 1914, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1915, pp. 594–98Google Scholar; cited hereafter as Hearings.

The Council of National Defense established in 1916 was designed to advise on industrial mobilization. There were no members from die armed services, the State Department, or Congress.

6 “The Ideals of the Navy,” May 17, 1915, in Baker, R. S. and Dodd, W. E., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, New York, 1926, I, p. 331.Google Scholar

7 Letter, n.d., Capt. W. V. Pratt (Asst. CNO) to F. L. Polk (Counselor of the State Department), Polk Papers, Yale University. Pratt noted that “a closer relationship may be built up if you had a similar man” and that he had protested the forthcoming move of the Navy Department from die State-Army-Navy Building because it would bring about “an additional physical separation.”

8 In December 1921, the Secretaries for Navy and War asked the Secretary of State to assign an official to sit with the Joint Army-Navy Board when “matters affecting national policy” were under consultation. The Secretary of State replied that only the Secretary and Under Secretary could speak “with authority on questions of national policy,” and added diat “it is impossible, in the existing circumstances, for eidier of them to undertake this additional duty. Should a crisis arise in our national affairs where it may seem to this Department advisable to consult and cooperate … I shall cordially avail myself of the opportunity to do so.” National Archives, Navy Dept., RG80:202–4.

9 June 26, 1915, Daniels Papers, Library of Congress, 412–15.

10 The Office of Naval Operations was formed in 1915 and was assigned one officer (Commander Schofield) for war plans in 1916. After 1917, the number of planning officers in Opnav multiplied. Most of them were sent to London in December 1917. After July 1918, there were two planning groups in Opnav: die Washington Planning Committee and the London Planning Section (later the Naval Advisory Staff, Paris).

11 Lecture to Army General Staff College, “Strategy of the Pacific,” September 8, 1919, National Archives, Navy Dept., RG80:115–2.

12 Lecture to Naval War College, “The General Board and the Building Programs,” October 14, 1922Google Scholar, ibid., RG45:580. Captain Schofield was then a member of the General Board. The author is authoritatively informed that the Navy was still performing this exercise in 1935.

13 Naval Investigation, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1921, p. 1176.

14 April II, 1917, Daniels Papers, Library of Congress.

15 Personal memorandum, n.d., ibid., 256; and Naval Investigation, p. 1968.

16 Letter, Daniels to Wilson, August 20, 1915; Wilson Date Book, Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

17 Knox, , op.cit., pp. 27–28.Google Scholar Formerly on the staff of the War College, then in the ONI, Commander Knox was later a member of the London Planning Section.

18 Aside from the hypothesis that these contrasts between naval and civilian views reflected the intellectual needs of the two groups, a supplementary explanation can be offered. Civilian views are recorded in diaries, letters, speeches and, occasionally, memoranda. Nearly all naval views are recorded in formal memoranda. Expository writing can be a powerful stimulus to the characteristics ascribed to naval views.

19 Daniels was once asked if it was not necessary to know the expected enemy in order to devise a proper building program. He replied: “I do not think that we should consider war with any particular country. I think we ought not to prepare against any country; mat we ought to prepare for our defense from whatever quarter war may come.” Hearings [1914 Estimates], p. 648.

It should be remembered that in 1914 there were diree quarters from which war could come. In 1954, the proposition could read: prepare for whatever kind of war may come.

20 Memorandum 21, National Archives, Navy Dept, RG45:580.

21 These were a war against Great Britain or against a German-Japanese-Austrian-Turkish-Russian combination. Memorandum to CNO, ibid., RG80:137-I.

22 This conception of “security” is paraphrased from Brodie, Bernard, “Strategy as a Science,” World Politics, 1, No. 4 (July 1949), p. 477.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 Hearings [1914 Estimates], pp. 585–86.

24 Ibid., p. 540.

25 General Board to Secnav, February 19, 1913, National Archives, Navy Dept., 8557–124.

26 Interview in the New York Times, August 20, 1916, in Fiske, Bradley A., From Midshipman to Rear-Admiral, New York, 1919, pp. 621–22.Google Scholar Fiske had been Daniels* Aide for Operations during 1913–1915 and, as such, a member of the General Board. The office of Aide preceded die Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

27 Hearings [1914 Estimates], p. 625.

28 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C, GPO, 1913, p. II.

29 See Hearings [1914 Estimates], pp. 609, 630; and ibid. [1915 Estimates], pp. 586, 591, 648.

30 Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Boston, 1926, II, pp. 35–36.Google Scholar

31 The following exchange took place between Representative Williams and Secretary Daniels: “Mr. Secretary, the number of battleships is a question of policy, merely a question of policy, what is wisest and best?mdash;Yes.—Is not the greatest question that we have to deal with the business management of our naval yards and stations?—That is a very big question. —Is not that one which will give your department the most concern in reaching correct results and conclusions?—Undoubtedly.” Hearings [1914 Estimates], p. 766.

32 The 1915 building program changed the Navy's standard from “equality” with Germany to “equality” with England. When Franklin Roosevelt was asked, “What is the reason for this sudden reversal of policy?”, he replied: “I do not know.” Hearings [1916 Estimates], III, pp. 3527–28.

33 ibid., II, pp. 1937, 1956–57.

34 See Hearings [1915 Estimates], p. 594; and ibid. [1916 Estimates], II, p. 1898.

35 Hearings [1915 Estimates], p. 1021.

36 Minutes of the General Board, June 30, 1914, Office of Naval History.

37 Hearings [1916 Estimates], II, p. 2031. Admiral Knight was then President of the Naval War College and, as such, a member of the General Board.

38 Ibid., III, p. 3194. Admiral Blue, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, testified: “It has always been an axiom that we have to cut the cloth according to what we are likely to get. That is the principle upon which the Navy has been run ever since I have known it.” Ibid., I, p. 922.

39 Letter, Daniels to Wilson, March 5, 1920 (noted: contents delivered verbally), National Archives, Navy Dept., RG80:138–19.

40 General Board to Secnav, July 15, 1921, ibid.

41 See Minutes of the General Board, November 6–16, 1914, Office of Naval History; Fiske, , op.cit., pp. 561–62Google Scholar; Annual Report [1914], pp. 68–74; and Hearings [1915 Estimates], pp. 721–22. For Daniels’ later explanation, stressing the greater need for capital ships and the difficulties he expected and experienced in securing Congressional authori zation for them, see Naval Investigation, pp. 3052–58.

42 May 17, 1913, Daniels Diary, Library of Congress. The Joint Board existed by Executive Order, and Wilson did not permit it to meet again until the fall of 1915.

43 Wilson's paraphrase to House, Seymour, , op.cit., in, p. 176.Google Scholar

44 When he testified on behalf of the 1955 defense budget, Admiral Radford declared: “Without any reservation, I subscribe to the theory that as military men … we must take economic factors into consideration.” His description of this calculation is worth noting: “From figures that we obtained on prospective national income over the long pull, we eliminated the more or less fixed expenses and within the remaining estimated amount, we did feel … that we came up with a military program which was adequate for the security of the United States.” He and General Ridgway differed, however, as to whedier “we did that voluntarily or under a directive.” Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriation for 1955, Washington, D.C, GPO, 1954, p. 83.