¹ For an overview of the literature written prior to 1966, see Dale, Richard, “South Africa and the International Community,” World Politics, xviii (January 1966), 297–313CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² A comprehensive attempt to delineate the areas of sufficient and insufficient data is to be found in Dale, Richard, “Southern Africa: Research Frontiers in Political Science,” in Potholm, C. P. and Dale, Richard, eds., Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics (New York, forthcoming 1972)Google Scholar.

³ This has taken place despite the fact that there have never been enough Whites to fill the skilled positions in the economy and despite the fact that the supply of African labor has never equaled the European demand for it.

⁴ For an analysis of the Rhodesian situation which provides some interesting similarities and contrasts, see Arrighi, G., The Political Economy of Rhodesia (The Hague 1967)Google Scholar. Some of Arrighi's Marxian interpretations, however, seem strained to the point of being precious. For example, he maintains (p. 41) that it was the national bourgeoisie and white workers who “seized” power in tie South African elections of 1948. For a more systematic and illuminating study of the Rhodesian political system, see Murray, D. J., The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia (London 1970)Google Scholar.

⁵ Thompson, Leonard, Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Boston 1966)Google Scholar, and Wilson, Monica and Thompson, Leonard, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa: Volume II, 1870–1966 (London 1971)Google Scholar. For an analysis of the forces acting for cohesion in South Africa, see Trapido, Stanley, “Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa,” American Political Science Review, lvii (March 1963), 75–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Potholm, C. P., “The South African Political System,” in Potholm, C. P., Four African Political Systems (Englewood Cliffs 1970), 91–137Google Scholar.

⁶ The much-heralded split between the verligte (”enlightened”) and verkrampte (”narrow-minded”) wings of the National Party is an outstanding example of this pattern. See Orlick, Peter B., “Divided Against Itself: South Africa's White Polity,” Journal of Modern African Studies, viii (July 1970), 199–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ At this stage at least, the South African government intends to maintain control over the foreign policy, defense, currency, and communications of the Bantustans.

⁸ Hill, Christopher, Bantustans: The Fragmentation of South Africa (London 1964)Google Scholar, and Carter, Gwendolen M., Karis, Thomas, and Stultz, Newell M., South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism (Evanston 1967)Google Scholar.

⁹ Interestingly enough, very little has been written or said about what the terminal community will look like under apartheid, although there is a sketch of it in Rhoodie, Eschel, The Third Africa (New York 1968)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ If one takes the total area of those Bantustans scheduled for development in South Africa and Namibia (South West Africa) together with that of the three former High Commission Territories of Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana, the African “share” of Southern Africa south of the Limpopo is nearly 50%. In the early 1960's, it was widely assumed that South Africa would try to incorporate Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana into the Republic. Now it seems far more likely that the Bantustans will evolve toward their status as “independent” entities rather than the reverse.

¹¹ In fact, this assumption is given as one of the bases for current United States policy toward South Africa: “United States Options in Southern Africa,” speech by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David D. Newsom at Northwestern University, December 8, 1970, subsequently printed in the Department of State Bulletin, lxrv (January 18, 1971), 80–84Google Scholar; Giardina, Richard, “Southern Africa and the United Nations: The State Department Responds,” paper prepared for delivery at the joint Midwest Political Science Association Convention and the Midwest International Studies Association Convention, April 29-May 1, 1971Google Scholar. See also Seiler, John, “Models and Realities in Foreign Policy Formulation: The Southern African Case,” paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Convention, September 1971Google Scholar.

¹² Based on a projected growth rate of 5.5% annually over the next five years, there will be over a million new jobs, including 232,000 that are currently reserved for Europeans. There is no possibility of there being enough Europeans to fill those positions. For a contemporary overview of the South African economy, see D. Hobart Houghton, “Economic Development, 1865–1965” in Wilson and Thompson (fn. 5), 1–48.

¹³ Adam, Heribert, “Political Implications of Socioeconomic Change in South Africa,” paper prepared for delivery at the African Studies Association meeting, October 21–24, 1970Google Scholar. Adam cites a number of important insights provided by Blumer, Herbert in his “Industrialization and Race Relations,” in Hunter, Guy, ed., Industrialization and Race Relations (London 1965), 220–53Google Scholar. For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Adam's, Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics (Berkeley 1971)Google Scholar, and my review of it in African Studies Review, xiv (September 1971), 341–42Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Adam (fn. 13), 13.

¹⁵ Paton, Alan, The Long View (New York 1968)Google Scholar. These essays, edited by Edward Callan, graphically illustrate the insurmountable problems faced by those who would bridge the chasms.

¹⁶ That the system is profoundly inequitable is documented in the extensive literature on the subject To list but the most prominent: Luthuli, Albert, Let My People Go (New York 1962)Google Scholar; Mandela, Nelson, No Easy Walk to Freedom (London 1965)Google Scholar; Mbeki, Govan, South Africa: The Peasants’ Revolt (Baltimore 1964)Google Scholar; Ngubane, Jordan K., An African Explains Apartheid (New York 1963)Google Scholar; Modisane, Bloke, Blame Me on History (London 1963)Google Scholar; and H. J., and Simons, R. E., Class and Colour in South Africa 1850–1950 (Baltimore 1969)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Organski, A. F. K., The Stages of Political Development (New York 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Ibid., 122–56.

¹⁹ Organski qualifies the Argentina case, however: ibid., 150–55.

²⁰ In addition to the works cited in fn. 5, see Spence, J. E. and Thomas, Elizabeth, South Africa's Defense (Los Angeles 1966)Google Scholar. Since that study was written, the South African defense budget has risen to over $500 million annually.

²¹ Alan Paton, for example, believes that the career of Jan Hofmeyr and his decisions during November 1946 concerning Non-White participation was a critical turning point. Most other writers have concentrated on the coming to power of the National Party in 1948. Carter, Gwendolen M., The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948 (New York 1959)Google Scholar, remains the definitive study of the period.

²² Landis, Elizabeth, “South African Apartheid Legislation II: Extension, En forcement, an d Perpetuations,” Yale Law Journal, lxxi (January 1962), 466–67Google Scholar.

²³ Most of the Liberal Party's support, for example, came from Non-Whites. It has now disbanded under a government ban on multiracial political organizations. For an interesting review of this subject, see Robertson, Janet, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948–1963 (Oxford 1971)Google Scholar.

²⁴ It should also be noted that even those Europeans bent on liberalizing the body politic in South Africa have often adopted stances that many Africans and other Non-Whites must have found paternalistic. Ballinger, for example, writes: “In the course of the years, I found nothing to modify my belief that a broad-based democratic system progressively embracing politically all the elements in our complex society is not only the way to peace; it is the only way in which we can fulfill our essential destiny which is, at whatever price of pride or privilege, to help carry the torch of Western Christian civilization, with its emphasis on the value of the individual irrespective of race or colour, to the uttermost ends of the earth” (2).

²⁵ Roux, Edward, Time Longer Than Rope (Madison 1966)Google Scholar; Benson, Mary, South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright (New York 1966)Google Scholar; and Kuper, Leo, Passive Resistance in South Africa (New Haven 1960)Google Scholar.

²⁶ Among the most important of these are Sechaba, a monthly journal published by the African National Congress, and the Namibia News, published by the Southwest Africa People's Organization.

²⁷ Feit, Edward, South Africa: The Dynamics of the African National Congress (London 1962)Google Scholar, and African Opposition in South Africa: The Failure of Passive Resistance (Stanford 1967)Google Scholar; see also Walshe, Peter, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912–1952 (Berkeley 1971)Google Scholar.

²⁸ Feit, Edward, “Urban Revolt in South Africa: A Case Study,” Journal of Modem African Studies, viii (April 1970), 55–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960–1964 (Evanston 1971)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Feit, South Africa (fn. 27), 62–72, and Leo Kuper, “African Nationalism in South Africa, 1910–1964,” in Wilson and Thompson (fn. 5), 459–75.

³⁰ According to Martin Legassick, the AN C leadership felt that the revolutionary situation “essential for an insurrection” simply did not exist in South Africa: Legassick, Martin, “The Consequences of African Guerrilla Activity for South Africa's Relations with He r Neighbors,” paper prepared for delivery at the African Studies Association meeting, November 1967, 4Google Scholar. Legassick's somewhat hopeful prognosis for African revolutionary activity in Southern Africa has yet to be borne out by events. Other works in this optimistic vein include Howe, Russell Warren, “War in Southern Africa,” Foreign Affairs, xlviii (October 1969), 150–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Davis, John A. and Baker, James K., eds., Southern Africa in Transition (New York 1966)Google Scholar.

³¹ For a most perceptive account of this aspect, see John Marcum, “The Exile Condition and Revolutionary Effectiveness: Southern Africa in Perspective,” in Potholm and Dale (fn. 2).

³² Feit, for example, finds it “astonishing that recruitment by the underground ANC went so slowly in light of the Africans’ unhappy situation.” South Africa (fn. 27), 61.

³³ The interaction between the Republic of South Africa and the other states of Southern Africa is clearly beyond the scope of this essay. Those interested in this aspect should consult Bowman, Larry W., “The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa,” International Studies Quarterly, xii (September 1968), 231–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Robson, Peter, “Economic Integration in Southern Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies, v (December 1967), 469–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an in-depth examination of the situation in Portuguese-controlled Africa, see Wheeler, Douglas L. and Pelissier, Rene, Angola (New York 1971)Google Scholar; Abshire, David M. and Samuels, Michael A., eds., Portuguese Africa: A Handbook (New York 1969)Google Scholar; and Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution (Cambridge, Mass. 1969)Google Scholar. Some views by African nationalists are to be found in Mondlane, Eduardo, The Struggle for Mozambique (Baltimore 1969)Google Scholar; Davidson, Basil, The Liberation of Guine: Aspects of an African Revolution (Baltimore 1969)Google Scholar; and Cabral, Amilcar, Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle (London 1969)Google Scholar.

³⁴ Dale (fn. 1), 310–13. This premise, of course, is based on the assumption that the remaining powers would stay neutral rather than support South Africa.

³⁵ Hance, William, ed., Southern Africa and the United States (New York 1968)Google Scholar. Houghton (fn. 12) indicates that the South African economy is stronger now, however.

³⁶ See for example, Colin, and Legum, Margaret, South Africa: Crisis for the West (New York 1964)Google Scholar; Gross, Ernest A., “The Coalescing Problem of Southern Africa,” Foreign Affairs, xlvi (July 1968), 744Google Scholar; Nielsen, Waldemar A., African Battle Line: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa (New York 1965)Google Scholar, and “Southern Africa: Smoldering Catastrophe,” in his The Great Powers and Africa; and Segal, Ronald, ed., Sanctions Against South Africa (Baltimore 1964)Google Scholar.

³⁷ For an examination of these possibilities, including the configurations which surround each, the assumptions upon which each are based, and an assessment of the probabilities of their being actualized, see C. P. Potholm, “Soudiern Africa at Century's End: Nine Scenarios,” in Potholm and Dale (fn. 2).

³⁸ It has been pointed out that the United States has larger amounts of investment in, and trade with, the rest of Africa than with South Africa. This is true enough, but to date American investment in, an d trade with, South Africa have not jeopardized its commercial relations with Black Africa.

³⁹ This is not to say that the Soviet Union does not have a small stake in the training and equipping of various exile groups in Southern Africa, or that, in the event of considerable Chinese activity in the area, the Soviets would be unwilling to in-crease the level of their equipment; but there is little to suggest that the Soviets arc interested in pursuing such a policy. See Whitaker, Paul M., “The Revolutions in ‘Portuguese’ Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies, viii (April 1970), 15–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ Take, for example, the views expressed by Kennan, George F. in “Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa,” Foreign Affairs, xlix (January 1971), 218–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which have been widely hailed within the foreign policy establishment of the United States. A differing opinion has been offered by Bowman, Larry in his “South Africa's Southern Strategy and Its Implications for the United States,” International Affairs, xlvii (January 1971)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Would the overthrow of the system be worth ten thousand dead? A hundred thousand? A million? I find it instructive that while there has been some computation of the projected casualties of an invading force [Leiss, Amelia C., “Efforts to Alter the Future: Military Measures,” in Leiss, Amelia C., ed., Apartheid and United National Collective Measures (New York 1965), 131–53Google Scholar], there arc no publicly available statistics on the probable civilian costs of such intervention.

⁴² Some states, such as Tanzania, have been willing to bear considerable costs in order to support the liberation of Soumern Africa, but they arc conspicuous exceptions.

⁴³ Delegates of the East and Central African States, The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa (Dares Salaam 1969)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Information Service of South Africa, “S.A. Ready for Dialogue with Black Nations—Prime Minister,” News from South Africa, xi (April 2, 1971), 1Google Scholar. The ANC called it a betrayal for the African states to even think of a dialogue: “Dialogue is Betrayal,” Sechaba, v (February 1971), 2–3Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Although the suggestion of the Ivory Coast that the OA U consider such a course of action was defeated at the June, 1971, meeting of the OAU, six African states (Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, Gabon, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius) supported it; five (Swaziland, Dahomey, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta) abstained from the voting.

⁴⁶ For some relevant background material on the formation of South African foreign policy, see Vandenbosch, Amry, South Africa and the World (Lexington 1970)Google Scholar; Spence, Jack E., Republic Under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign Policy (London 1965)Google Scholar; and Munger, E. S., Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy (Pasadena 1965)Google Scholar.