¹ For an account of what is known of Newcome and references to the available sources see Connolly, Patrick J., Susanna Newcome's Cosmological Argument, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 27 (2019), 842–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² In addition to the reviews of the Enquiry noted by Connolly, there was also a positive review of the first part of the Plain Account. See The History of the Works of the Learned, August 1737, Art. 15, pp. 145–53.

³ That being said, the views expressed in the Plain Account are amenable to the positions Newcome takes in the Enquiry and, relevant to the concerns of this article, there are echoes of the Enquiry's moral theory in the Plain Account. For example, at a number of places in the Plain Account Newcome insists that the happiness of humankind is the reason that God instituted the sacraments. See Newcome, Susanna, The Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament, 2 parts (Cambridge: Innys and Manby, 1737–38)Google Scholar, i (1737), pp. 13, 24, 30, 87.

⁴ Republick of Letters, October 1728, Art. 24, p. 278.

⁵ The definition of utilitarianism offered here closely maps those offered by, for example, Quinton, Anthony, Utilitarian Ethics (London: Duckworth, 1989), p. 1 and Julia Driver, Consequentialism (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 40–41Google Scholar, 44.

⁶ Newcome, Susanna, An Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion (Cambridge: W. and J. Innys, 1728)Google Scholar, first unnumbered page in Preface.

⁷ Intriguingly, in the first edition of the Enquiry Newcome does offer a definition of pleasure as “an agreeable Consciousness” (Enquiry (1st edn), p. 3). She may have been following William Wollaston on this point. See William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated ([London?]: [n.pub], 1722), p. 23. More generally, some of Newcome's definitions in Sections II and III show an affinity with some of the propositions in Wollaston's section “Of Happiness”. See Wollaston, pp. 22–29. It is unclear why Newcome elected to drop the definition of happiness in the second edition, but she may have been worried that including agreeability in the definition of pleasure would render circular her key proposition about the preferability of pleasure.

⁸ Newcome, Susanna, An Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion, 2nd edn (London: Innys, 1732), p. 3Google Scholar. Further references to the Enquiry, except where otherwise specified, will be to this second edition. Note, however, that while the title page of the 1732 edition advertises itself as the “The Second Edition, with Additions” there had been another printing of the Enquiry in 1729: Susanna Newcome, An Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion (Cambridge: W. & J. Innys, 1729).

⁹ See also p. 24, where the claim is articulated in more detail. Newcome does seem to leave somewhat open the question of whether pain and pleasure entirely determine the will. At first glance, the texts suggest that they do. But the seemingly libertarian account of human freedom Newcome develops on p. 31 might push toward a reading according to which Newcome merely thinks pleasure is involved in all acts of willing.

¹⁰ It was suggested above that Wollaston may have been one source for Newcome's thinking in this section. If correct, this can add further support to the idea that Newcome saw pleasures and pains as quantifiable and capable of being aggregated and weighed against one another. Wollaston is explicit on this point, see Wollaston 1722, pp. 23–26.

¹¹ See also p. 26: “We find then, the Attribute of Goodness, in the Author of this System, connected with his Happiness; and particularly we find, that his End in making sensible Beings, was to communicate Happiness to them.”

¹² Happiness, as discussed above, is straightforwardly defined in terms of pleasure (p. 3). Virtue is identified with the practice of natural religion, which consists of that which leads to happiness (p. 43). Justice is associated with respect for rights and rendering to others what is due to them (p. 35). But as discussed below, Newcome offers a broadly utilitarian justification for these practices.

¹³ For rationality see p. 6, for true belief see pp. 2, 5, and for wisdom see p. 19.

¹⁴ See the related claim at p. 29 and also Enquiry (1st edn), 5th unnumbered page in Preface, where she argues that we cannot form an idea of any of God's perfections without making reference to happiness.

¹⁵ Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Payne & Son, 1789), p. ivCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Republick of Letters, February 1732, Art. 10, p. 129.

¹⁷ There is evidence that, at least by 1737, Newcome was familiar with some of Clarke's works. Her Plain Account cites a 1731 multi-volume edition of Clarke's Sermons. See Newcome, Plain Account, i, p. 102.

¹⁸ Clarke, Samuel, The Works of Samuel Clarke, 4 vols (London: J. & P. Knapton, 1738)Google Scholar, ii, p. 627.

¹⁹ For a discussion of some of the difficulties and vagueness in Clarke's account of fitness see James Edward Le Rossignol, The Ethical Theory of Samuel Clarke (Leipzig: Kreysing, 1892), pp. 39–48. For more on Clarke's moral theory and concept of fitness see Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers (London: Macmillan, 1886), pp. 176–77; James P. Ferguson, The Philosophy of Dr. Samuel Clarke and its Critics (New York: Vantage Press, 1974), ch. 5; and Sarah Hutton, British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 213.

²⁰ See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 294–95.

²¹ Newcome might well be incorrect about this. It does seem as if there could be particular instances of, for example, theft that do promote overall happiness. So we might be tempted to take this as evidence that Newcome endorses a form of rule utilitarianism. I think, however, this would be a mistake. Newcome's view seems to be that God, given his concern with justice, must have constituted things such that “Happiness must be the effect of Righteousness, and Misery of Unrighteousness” (p. 36). Whether this claim about the divine nature squares with the empirical facts is, of course, open to debate.

²² Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1972), 229–43.

²³ Admittedly, Newcome formulates this claim in terms of what humans must do to be acceptable to God. But the context of the passage makes it clear that she sees these actions as part of our moral duty.

²⁴ More generally, Newcome holds the view that we should reject any part of revealed religion that does not align with what we can deduce naturally by thinking about God and his attributes. From this it follows that she might believe all of Christian ethics must be compatible with utilitarianism broadly construed. See pp. 33–34, 63.

²⁵ Aaron Garrett traces the Anglophone history of thinking about animal rights back to Francis Hutcheson. Aaron Garrett, Francis Hutcheson and the Origin of Animal Rights, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 42 (2007): 243–65. Newcome, whose discussion of animals was published prior to Hutcheson's, should be seen as a proponent of the same line of thought that Garrett argues is developing in Hutcheson and reaches full fruition in authors like Humphrey Primatt and Bentham.

²⁶ For discussions of these figures and an analysis of the sense in which they should or should not be considered utilitarians see, respectively, Terrence Irwin, The Development of Ethics, 3 vols (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), ii, pp. 227–29; A. P. Brogan, John Locke and Utilitarianism, Ethics, 69 (1959): 79–93; Paul J. Olscamp, The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970); and Maria A. Carrasco, Hutcheson, Smith, and Utilitarianism, The Review of Metaphysics, 64 (2011): 515–53. Hutcheson is particularly notable in this group given his influential formulation of the greatest happiness principle. But on this point see Joachim Hruschka, The Greatest Happiness Principle and Other Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory, Utilitas, 3 (1991): 165–77.

²⁷ See Colin Heydt, Utilitarianism Before Bentham, in The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, ed. by Ben Eggleston and Dale E. Miller (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 16–37. See also the Introduction to James E. Crimmins, Utilitarians and Religion (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1998).

²⁸ John Stephens, Edmund Law and his Circle at Cambridge: Some Philosophical Activity of the 1730's, in The Philosophical Canon in the 17th and 18th Centuries, ed. by G. A. J. Rogers and Sylvia Tomaselli (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1996), pp. 163–73. For more general background on the university in this period see John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

²⁹ This position has been taken most recently in an excellent article by Getty Lustila. See Getty Lustila, John Gay and the Birth of Utilitarianism, Utilitas, 30 (2017): 86–106. For earlier versions of the view see Ernest Albee, A History of English Utilitarianism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), p. 83; Brogan, pp. 79–80; Gerald R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 279–80; Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, trans. by Mary Morris (New York: Kelley, 1965), p. 7; and Jonathan Harris, Gay, John (1699–1745), Writer on Philosophy, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2008). Even when not explicitly mentioned as the “first” utilitarian, Gay is very often given a central role in the origins of the theory. See, for example, James E. Crimmins, Secular Utilitarianism (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1990), pp. 68–72; Jerome B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 405–06; Julia Driver, Ethics: The Fundamentals (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2012), pp. 7–8; Heydt; and Roger Crisp, Sacrifice Regained: Morality and Self-Interest in British Ethics from Hobbes to Bentham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 189. It should also be noted that a case might be made for Mo-Tzu (Mozi) as the first utilitarian. For discussion and relevant literature see Kristopher Duda, Reconsidering Mo Tzu on the Foundations of Morality, Asian Philosophy, 11 (2001): 23–31. So the relevant claims here can be restricted to “western” utilitarianism or “modern” utilitarianism.

³⁰ Even the case under consideration here presents complicating factors. Gay is a rather shadowy figure and almost nothing is known about his life or about the composition of the Dissertation. Indeed, what Law actually tells us is that the Dissertation “was composed chiefly by the late Reverend Mr. Gay”, leaving open the possibility that others made contributions. There is some evidence that manuscript copies of the Dissertation were circulated before its publication. A letter from Law to Catharine Trotter Cockburn dated 30 March 1747 reports in connection with Francis Hutcheson that “y^e Preliminary Disc to King [i.e., Gay's Dissertation] was at his request communicated to him [Hutcheson] in Ms & wch he promis'd to give his Opinion of but return'd it without a word” London, British Library, Add MS 4264, fols 278^v and 280^r. Were Gay and Newcome acquainted? Was he influenced by her in drafting the Dissertation? Had she seen a copy of the Dissertation in manuscript form and, if so, when? Did she offer feedback to Gay? Did it influence the views in her Enquiry? Pending the discovery of more historical evidence these questions remain unanswered and all we are left to work with are the publication dates of the authors’ works.

³¹ His Ordo Institutionum Physicarum (1742, 2nd edn 1756) was dedicated to John Newcome.

³² Baker, Thomas, History of the College of St. John the Evangelist, Cambridge, ed. by Mayor, John E. B., 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1869), ii, p. 1026Google Scholar.

³³ London, British Library, Add MS 4244, fols 21^r and 22^v.

³⁴ Grove, Henry, A System of Moral Philosophy, 3rd edn, 2 vols (London: Waugh and Fenner, 1755), ii, p. 74Google Scholar.

³⁵ For a sampling see John Whiston and Benjamin White, A Catalogue of Above Twelve Thousand Volumes ([London]: [n.pub.], 1754), p. 136; John Whiston and Benjamin White, A Catalogue of the Library of Edward Barker ([London]: [n.pub.], 1760), p. 137; Lockyer Davis, A Catalogue of the Library of Several Learned Persons ([London]: [n.pub.], 1773), p. 323; and Benjamin White, A Catalogue of the Genuine Library of the Late Sir Richard Jebb ([London]: [n.pub.], 1788), p. 251.

³⁶ In addition to the reports quoted at Connolly, p. 844 see Nichols, John, Biographical and Literary Anecdotes of William Bowyer (London: Nichols, 1782), pp. 17, 612Google Scholar and Masters, Robert, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Late Rev. Thomas Baker (Cambridge: Archdeacon, 1784), p. 115Google Scholar.

³⁷ Edmund Law, Considerations on the Theory of Religion, 7th edn (Carlisle: Milliken, 1784), p. 15.

³⁸ King, William, An Essay on the Origin of Evil, trans. Edmund, by Law (London: Thurlbourn, 1731), p. xviiiGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ In this respect Newcome's views are remarkably similar to those of Catharine Trotter Cockburn. For Cockburn's anti-voluntarism and account of fitnesses, see Sheridan, Patricia, Reflection, Nature, and Moral Law: The Extent of Catharine Cockburn's Lockeanism in her Defense of Mr. Locke's Essay, Hypatia, 22 (2007): 134–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Patricia Sheridan, On Catharine Trotter Cockburn's Metaphysics of Morality, in Early Modern Women on Metaphysics, ed. by Emily Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 247–65.

⁴⁰ Newcome develops a somewhat different line of thought to the effect that divine reward and punishment are motivationally irrelevant in the first edition of the Enquiry. See Enquiry (1st edn), pp. 33–34.

⁴¹ Much has been written about Gay's pioneering treatment of associationism and its influence on David Hartley. For some discussion see Allen, Richard C., David Hartley on Human Nature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 267–68Google Scholar; Lustila, section 3; and Crisp, ch. 15.1.

⁴² John Stuart Mill, for example, offers a well-known discussion of associationist mechanisms in Utilitarianism. See Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism (London: Parker, Son, & Bourn, 1863), pp. 54–55Google Scholar. It is striking that Mill's example, the desire for money, is the same as the one offered by Gay.

⁴³ See also pp. 22–23 where Newcome claims that for God as well, the production of happiness in others leads to the happiness of the producer.

⁴⁴ I am grateful to Ruth Boeker, David Cunning, Anna Matthews, Alan Nelson, Patricia Sheridan, Kathryn Tabb, and Timothy Yenter for help and discussion during the writing of this article. Earlier versions were given as papers at the 2019 Pacific APA in Vancouver, BC and at the 2019 BSHP conference at King's College, London. I am grateful to the audiences on both occasions for their questions and feedback. Finally, thanks to several anonymous referees for helpful suggestions that enabled me to improve the article a great deal.