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Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

John Broome
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Utilitas , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , November 1995 , pp. 315 - 317
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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Footnotes

1

I have had useful correspondence with Jamie Dreier and John Skorupski on the subject of this note.

References

2 Skorupski, John, ‘Agent-neutrality, consequentialism, utilitarianism …: a terminological note’, Utilitas, vii (1995), 49–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton, 1970, p. 90Google Scholar. Nagel, uses the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ for ‘agent-neutral’ and ‘agent-relative’.Google Scholar

4 In ‘Agent-relativity and the doing-happening distinction’, Philosophical Studies, lxiii (1991), pp. 167–85Google Scholar, David McNaughton and Piers Rawling formulate moral rules as injunctions to ensure the truth of a proposition, rather than as injunctions to act. This has the same effect.

5 See Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1984, p. 104.Google Scholar