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Response to Carlson and Qizilbash

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

Frances Howard-Snyder
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Abstract

In ‘The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism’ I argued against objective consequentialism on the grounds that it requires us to do what we cannot do and hence violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Erik Carlson and Mozaffar Qizilbash have raised objections to my arguments, chiefly by distinguishing different senses of ‘can’ and ‘ought’. I here attempt to rebut those challenges.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 106 - 111
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999

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References

1 Utilitas, ix (July 1997).

2 It does not matter, I think, whether or not we say that under such circumstances A is identical with B.

3 ‘Bananas Enough for Time Travel?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, xlviii (1997), 379Google Scholar.

4 Theists, of course, believe that they do have access to such a being: God. Let's suppose that they are correct. In that case, we should obey God's commands. It does not follow that we will produce the best consequences in so doing. Even if God is a consequentialist – which we have no reason to believe – He would presumably attempt to produce the best consequences Himself, in part by issuing commands that would produce the best results. But presumably, He would have to factor in human disobedience, human error, etc. and would not simply tell us to do the things which are such that if we did them the best consequences would result.