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The Rejection of Scalar Consequentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2009

ROB LAWLOR
ROB LAWLOR*
Affiliation:
University of [email protected]
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Abstract

In ‘The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism’ Alastair Norcross argues that scalar consequentialism is the most plausible form of consequentialism, but his arguments are flawed: he is simply mistaken when he suggests that there is a problem with deriving absolutes like right and wrong from gradable properties such as goodness; he cannot justify his claim that the choice of a threshold will always be arbitrary; and his ‘no significant difference’ argument only shows that the consequentialist doesn't care about permissibility. Furthermore, I argue that, although Norcross was right to claim that a scalar theory can be action-guiding (to an extent), he was mistaken to think that ‘Abolishing the notion of “ought” will not seriously undermine the action-guiding nature of morality.’ If anything can be said in favour of scalar consequentialism, it is only that it is the most honest form of consequentialism, because it doesn't pretend to care about permissibility.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 100 - 116
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

1 Norcross, Alastair, ‘The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism’, The Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism, ed. West, Henry (Oxford, 2005), p. 228Google Scholar.

2 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, pp. 230–1.

3 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 217.

4 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 217.

5 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 217.

6 Without stepping over the board, or taking drugs, etc.

7 Note that I am taking ‘winner’ to mean the person who got first place. Of course, there is another sense in which we might say that everyone is a winner, meaning everyone benefits, but this is merely metaphorical and can be ignored here.

8 Here, Norcross is referring to Feinberg's example of a doctor who hears of an epidemic in a nearby town. He could go to the assistance of those in the town, but to do so would be to put himself at great risk. See Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 219.

9 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 219.

10 Norcross, ‘the Scalar Approach’, p. 226.

11 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 221.

12 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 221. Also see Slote, Michael, From Morality to Virtue (New York and Oxford, 1992), p. 79Google Scholar.

13 Remember what Norcross says in relation to the doctor and the epidemic: Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 219.

14 Indeed, Norcross seems to be committed to this claim. For example, when Norcross considers the case of the doctor and the epidemic, Norcross does compare the benefit to others with the cost for the agent. Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 219.

15 In Shades of Goodness (Basingstoke, 2009) I consider the link between incomparability and scalar theories in more detail. In sections 7.5 and 7.6 I argue that, if we have reason to take incomparability seriously, we may have to take seriously a theory very similar to Norcross's, even if it does seem very implausible. In section 13.7, I argue that John Finnis has problems similar to Norcross's, because of his commitment to incommensurability/incomparability.

16 Consider this in relation to Mulgan's Magic Game, considered in section III, and also in relation to Norcross's own example of the choice between helping an old lady across the street or killing her and eating her, also considered in section III.

17 See Slote, From Morality to Virtue, p. 79.

18 Slote, From Morality to Virtue, p. 80, my italics.

19 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 228.

20 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 228.

21 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 228.

22 Williams, Bernard, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, Bernard (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 97–8Google Scholar.

23 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 228. My italics.

24 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 228.

25 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 229.

26 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 229.

27 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 229.

28 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 229.

29 I thank Andrew Williams for urging me to look at scalar consequentialism from this perspective, and to really explore what a scalar consequentialist would say about reasons. To a large extent, the main insight at the core of the arguments in this section was Andrew Williams'. That insight was to recognize that, in cases where there are no competing reasons (prudential reasons for example), Norcross cannot plausibly deny that we ought to do what we have most moral reason to do.

30 See Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 229. Norcross does not write this up as an argument, but rather just lists the premises of the argument. Thus, I have added the conclusion. Also, Norcross writes ‘utilitarianism, as I have described it’ where I have written ‘scalar utilitarianism’. I have not changed anything else. Apart from the change noted, the premises are quoted directly from Norcross.

31 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, pp. 230–1.

32 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, p. 230.

33 Mulgan, Tim, The Demands of Consequentialism (Oxford, 2001), p. 131Google Scholar.

34 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, pp. 230–1.

35 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, pp. 224.

36 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, pp. 230–1.

37 Norcross, ‘The Scalar Approach’, pp. 230–1.

38 I am grateful to the AHRC for funding my PhD Gradability in Ethics: this article is based on a chapter of my PhD thesis. I am also grateful to Brad Hooker and Andrew Williams for extremely helpful comments on previous drafts of this work, and also to anonymous referees at Utilitas for suggesting further revisions.