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Punishment and Discretion in Mill's Utilitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2015

PIERS NORRIS TURNER
PIERS NORRIS TURNER*
Affiliation:
Ohio State [email protected]
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Abstract

I argue that a notorious passage from Utilitarianism concerning the relationship between morality and blameworthiness need not be an obstacle to a consistent act-utilitarian interpretation of Mill's moral theory. First, the Art of Life provides a framework for reconciling Mill's evaluation of conduct in terms of both expediency and blameworthiness. Like contemporary sophisticated act-utilitarians, Mill treats expediency as the more fundamental category of evaluation. Second, textual evidence suggests that, on Mill's view, evaluations of blameworthiness are not strictly bound by rules, despite rule-ish considerations about punishment and discretion. Third, Mill's own jurisdictional account in terms of competent decision-making remains consistent with the act-utilitarian interpretation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 165 - 178
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

1 For the canonical statement of sophisticated act-consequentialism, see Railton, Peter, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984), pp. 134–71, at 153Google Scholar.

2 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, CW X, 246. Citations of Mill marked by ‘CW volume number, page number’ refer to the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto, 1963–91).

3 Brink, David, Mill's Progressive Principles (Oxford, 2013), pp. 102–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 With Brink, I believe that the evidence overwhelmingly favours an act utilitarian interpretation of Mill's moral theory. See also Berger, Fred, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom (Berkeley, CA, 1994), pp. 62–73, 82–109Google Scholar, and Crisp, Roger, Mill on Utilitarianism (New York, 1997), pp. 102–33Google Scholar.

5 Lyons, David, ‘Mill's Theory of Morality’, in Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory (New York, 1994), pp. 47–66Google Scholar.

6 See Lyons, ‘Mill's Theory of Morality’, p. 52.

7 Lyons, ‘Mill's Theory of Morality’, p. 53. See Fuchs, Alan, ‘Mill's Theory of Morally Correct Action’, The Blackwell Guide to Mill's ‘Utilitarianism’, ed. West, Henry R. (Malden, MA, 2006), pp. 139–58Google Scholar, esp. 144–50, and Miller, Dale, J. S. Mill (Malden, MA, 2010), pp. 85–97Google Scholar.

8 Lyons, ‘Mill's Theory of Morality’, p. 55.

9 See Utilitarianism, CW X, 221.

10 Miller, J.S. Mill, p. 81.

11 CW X, 210 (also CW X, 214 for clarification); diary of 1854, CW XXVII, 663.

12 Railton, Peter, ‘How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1988), pp. 398–416, at 409CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 At least in so far as we limit the discussion to forms of utilitarianism. Railton's consequentialism is more pluralistic: it ‘extends beyond welfare, and includes all the forms of intrinsic value realized in and through our lives’. See Railton, Peter, ‘Reply to Ben Eggleston’, Philosophical Studies 126 (2005), pp. 491–99, at 491CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Railton, ‘Reply to Ben Eggleston’, p. 495.

15 Railton, ‘Reply to Ben Eggleston’, p. 496.

16 August Comte and Positivism, CW X, 338.

17 ‘Taylor's Statesman’ (co-authored with George Grote), CW XIX, 640.

18 Railton presents his view as a competitor to both act- and rule-utilitarianism.

19 I here mention only those aspects of Railton's valoric consequentialism that are relevant to the present discussion. For full elaboration, see his two articles cited above.

20 Rawls, John, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, The Philosophical Review 64 (1955), pp. 3–32, at 24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 A basic problem for this interpretation is that it seems to tie right action to the psychological limitations of the general public even when a particular individual is more discriminating or otherwise mentally capable than most people. If I am capable of internalizing a set of rules that do better promoting the good than those the typical society member may be capable of internalizing, should I not do so?

22 Miller, J. S. Mill, p. 94.

23 ‘Thornton on Labour and its Claims’ (1869), CW V, 659.

24 See Turner, Piers Norris, ‘The Absolutism Problem in On Liberty’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2013), pp. 322–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 See e.g. Considerations on Representative Government, CW XIX, 392.

26 For a full discussion, see Piers Norris Turner, ‘Institutional Design and the Arguments of On Liberty’, manuscript.

27 Mill, ‘Pledges [2]’, CW XXIII, 497.

28 This is from ‘Rationale of Representation’ (1835), reprinted as part of ‘Appendix B’ to Dissertations and Discussions (1859). See also e.g. Principles of Political Economy, CW III, 764–5. Mill is clear that deference need not be conceived of as ‘the blind submission of dunces to men of knowledge, but the intelligent deference of those who know much, to those who know still more’ (Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865), CW X, 314).

29 Utilitarianism, CW X, 220.

30 Letter to Grote, CW XV, 762.

31 System of Logic, CW VIII, 946.

32 For comments on earlier drafts of this article I am grateful to Gerald Gaus, Don Hubin, and two anonymous referees for this journal.