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The Paradox of Moral Complaint: A Reply to Shaham

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 April 2013

SAUL SMILANSKY
SAUL SMILANSKY*
Affiliation:
University of [email protected]
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Extract

In ‘The Paradox of Moral Complaint’ I took up the question whether a person who has wronged others in certain ways may morally complain if other people then harm him illegitimately in similar ways. I argued that there are strong grounds for saying both Yes and No here, and therefore that our considered moral views seem to be paradoxical. In her reply, Talia Shaham disagrees with the No part of my position. She presents two appealing philosophical arguments, and concludes that there is no ‘Paradox of Moral Complaint’, seeking in particular to defend the unconditional moral ‘right’ of wronged wrongdoers to complain, as against my claims. I attempt to defend my position against her arguments.

Type
Reply
Information
Utilitas , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , June 2013 , pp. 277 - 282
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

1 Smilansky, S., ‘The Paradox of Moral Complaint’, Utilitas 18 (2006), pp. 284–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A revised version of this piece appeared in Smilansky, S., ‘The Paradox of Moral Complaint’, in Ten Moral Paradoxes (Malden, MA, 2007), pp. 90–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The changes are comparatively small and do not affect Shaham's argument.

2 Shaham, T., ‘Is there a Paradox of Moral Complaint?’, Utilitas 23 (2011), pp. 344–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Shaham, ‘Is there . . .’, p. 345.

4 Shaham, ‘Is there . . .’, pp. 345–6.

5 An added move Shaham makes is to claim that because I emphasize the legislative nature of morality, I would be particularly vulnerable in cases where the wrongdoer has been already sanctioned, since the wrongdoer ‘would have a legitimate expectation that a similar sanction would be administered to the transgressor who has wronged her. Her legitimate expectations would establish a moral standing for her moral complaint based on the very same principles of fairness and equality implied by Smilansky's argument’ (Shaham, ‘Is there . . .’, p. 349).

6 Shaham, ‘Is there . . .’, p. 347.

7 Shaham, ‘Is there . . .’, p. 349.

8 Shaham, ‘Is there . . .’, p. 350.

9 Shaham, ‘Is there . . .’, p. 350.

10 I am very grateful to Iddo Landau, Ariel Meirav, Talia Shaham and Daniel Statman for helpful comments on drafts of this article.