¹ Smilansky, Saul, ‘The Paradox of Moral Complaint’, Utilitas 18 (2006), pp. 284–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The page numbers in the text refer to this article.

² I do not claim that silencing a wrongdoer should be regarded as a punishment in the classical sense. However, I do believe that it amounts to a moral sanction. The expression of such a sanction could range from a mere disregard of the legitimacy of one's moral complaint to a vitriolic expression of social disapprobation of the sort that Mill suggested is used to limit the freedom of speech (Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty (Indianapolis, 1978), p. 58Google Scholar).

³ For such wrongdoers, in a sense, this would be the third harm they suffer. Thus, for example, the violent, incarcerated criminal we previously considered would, first of all, endure the just punishment administered by the state, then the wrongful beating by the prison guards, and, finally, his complaint about being wronged would also be blocked by the moral community.

⁴ Note that the claim regarding the excessive severity of the second sanction relies on the other two claims. For, if it were standing on its own, technically it would have been possible to take into account that the wrongdoer would be silenced in the future while determining the level of severity of the first sanction, thus reducing it accordingly. I thank David Enoch for that point.

⁵ See, for example, John Rawls with respect to the right of liberty (Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), p. 179Google Scholar): ‘The inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally is sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty . . . these things . . . effecting the worth of liberty, the value to individuals of the rights that the first principle defines.’ It is my view, that just as the difficulties one encounters in taking advantage of one's right might compromise the value of such a right (as pointed out by Rawls with respect to liberty rights), the total annulment of one's option to complain about a violation of a certain right (as prescribed by the Silencing view) might significantly harm the practical importance of this right.

⁶ The exact advantages that a moral complainer would acquire via a moral complaint are yet to be determined, as the meaning of ‘moral complaint’ has not yet been fully explored in the philosophical discourse. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the claim made above I believe it is sufficient to assume that some such advantages do exist.

⁷ The moral problems described above with reference to the case of silencing a transgressor-turned-victim as a form of ‘poetic justice’ are best represented in the analogous case of the vigilante by the basic norm nulla poena sine lege.

⁸ This conclusion is based on the claim that silencing a complainer undermines his ability to advance his rights which were violated by the wrongdoing he is complaining about, as discussed in reference to the Argument from Unjust Double Punishment. And, therefore, silencing a complainer ultimately impairs the values and principles which underline that right.

⁹ I am particularly indebted to Saul Smilansky, who went far beyond the call of duty and provided me with much support and very helpful comments. I also wish to thank Amihud Gilead, Iddo Landau, Hanna Lerner, Bilha Rubinstein and Daniel Statman for their helpful comments. The article was presented as a paper at the University of Haifa Philosophy Department Annual Conference (2009) and at the Israeli Philosophical Association Annual Conference (2010), and I wish to thank participants in both of these conferences for their comments.