¹ D. Miller, Moral Education and Rule Consequentialism, Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming).

² Miller, T., Solving Rule Consequentialism's Acceptance Rate Problem, Utilitas, 28 (2016), 41–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Tobia, K., Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions, Utilitas 30 (2018), 458–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar (p. 458).

⁴ In order to account for the possibility that two or more codes might tie for best, formulations of RC often identify an ideal code as one that would have consequences at least as good as any of its rivals. I am glossing such issues for ease of exposition.

⁵ The theory can be formulated in terms of either actual or expected consequences. Most formulations follow Hooker's lead and state the theory in terms of expected consequences. See Hooker, B., Ideal Code, Real World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 72–75Google Scholar.

⁶ For a helpful introduction to the role of embedding conditions in formulations of RC, see Kagan, S., Normative Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 227–39Google Scholar.

⁷ Ideal Code, Real World, pp. 75–80. Many of the points Hooker makes are also made in various places by Richard Brandt, who often refers to a moral code's “prevalence” or “currency” in a society. See, e.g., Brandt, Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism, in Morality and the Language of Conduct, ed. by H.-N. Castañeda and G. Nakhnikian (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963), pp. 107–43; Some Merits of One Form of Rule-Utilitarianism, in Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 111–36; Fairness to Indirect Optimific Theories in Ethics, also in Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights, pp. 137–57; Problems of Contemporary Utilitarianism: Real and Alleged, in Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century, ed. by N. Bowie (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), pp. 81–105; and A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

⁸ Hooker makes this point using the example of accepting a rule that endorses retaliation if one is attacked. See Ideal Code, Real World, p. 77.

⁹ Brandt, Some Merits of One Form of Rule Utilitarianism, p. 126; and A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 166–67.

¹⁰ I am grateful to Dale Miller for calling this sort of example to my attention.

¹¹ One might contend that acceptance formulations would limit RC to the consideration of rules that it is possible for humans to internalize, and thus would place an upper limit on the complexity of the rules. However, even if that is right, it would not give acceptance formulations what they need. If RC is to avoid selecting rules that are too complex, it cannot merely ask whether a rule's internalization is a psychological possibility; rather, it must ask whether the effort needed to achieve its internalization would be cost-effective. I am grateful to Dale Miller for pressing me to clarify this point.

¹² Ideal Code, Real World, p. 32.

¹³ Mulgan claims that “Hooker's focus on the cost of inculcation clearly suggests that we are evaluating our attempts to inculcate potential codes, rather than assuming that inculcation will succeed.” See T. Mulgan, Future People (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 146, fn. 26. However, Hooker explicitly separates the calculation of a code's value on the assumption that it has been successfully internalized and the calculation of the costs that would be involved in getting it internalized as two distinct, and apparently independent, parts of the process of calculating a code's overall value (Ideal Code, Real World, p. 79). Moreover, Mulgan's teaching-centered interpretation of Hooker's theory cannot explain why Hooker goes on to ask what rate of acceptance we should assume to have been achieved in our evaluation of a code's value, since, as Mulgan himself observes, that question does not arise on teaching-centered formulations (Future People, p. 147). Mulgan's misinterpretation of Hooker's theory on this point leads him to underestimate the extent of his own departure from Hooker; although he claims to “follow Hooker in formulating Rule Consequentialism in terms of acceptance (or internalization) rather than compliance” (Future People, p. 141), he in fact formulates his theory in terms of a teaching-centered approach to the embedding conditions.

¹⁴ Sometimes enforcement methods can lead people to comply with rules in spite of the fact that they do not accept them, or in spite of the fact that they accept them but are tempted to violate them anyway. Compliance costs would include both the teaching costs needed to achieve compliance through acceptance and the enforcement costs that may be needed to motivate compliance among the non-acceptant and weak-willed. See T. Miller, Solving Rule Consequentialism's Acceptance Rate Problem, p. 51.

¹⁵ Whether Mill's utilitarianism is best understood as a version of act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, or some other type has been the subject of much debate; I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to the fact that some interpretations of Mill bear noticeable similarities to the teaching formulations of RC discussed below. For example, although he denies that Mill's view can be neatly characterized as either act or rule utilitarian, Gray's interpretation is certainly closer to the latter, and its emphasis on “the inculcation of sentiments and attitudes and the instilling of dispositions and inclinations” invites comparison with the teaching-centered approaches discussed below; Gray, J., Mill on Liberty: A Defence (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 31–32Google Scholar. See also, Miller, D., John Stuart Mill: Moral, Social, and Political Thought (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), pp. 88–101Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Mulgan, T., How Should Utilitarians Think About the Future?, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47 (2017), 290–312 (p. 291)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Mulgan, How Should Utilitarians Think About the Future?, p. 291; IMOU pulls together various ideas Mulgan has defended previously, e.g., in Future People and in The Demands of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).

¹⁸ T. Miller, Solving Rule Consequentialism's Acceptance Rate Problem, p. 50.

¹⁹ D. Miller, Moral Education and Rule Consequentialism.

²⁰ The uniformity in question is only to be understood as uniformity within whatever group the code is intended to be taught to. Later in his essay, Miller discusses the question of a code's scope and distinguishes between those theories that aim to identify a single universal code that applies to everyone everywhere and those that aim to identify an optimal code for a particular social group; he indicates his preference for the latter sort of theory.

²¹ D. Miller, Moral Education and Rule Consequentialism.

²² Tobia, Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions, p. 458.

²³ Tobia, Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions, p. 463.

²⁴ Teemu Toppinen has recently attempted to show that universal acceptance formulations have the resources to overcome this difficulty if they include “robustly demanding goods” in their value theory. Toppinen, T., Rule Consequentialism (and Kantian Contractualism) at Top Rates, Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (2016), 122–35Google Scholar.

²⁵ Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, p. 80.

²⁶ Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, pp. 80–85. Brandt also sometimes mentions 90% as a targeted acceptance rate; see, e.g., Brandt, Some Merits of One Form of Rule Utilitarianism, p. 120; and A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 192–93, although there Brandt explicitly cautions that “[i]t would be a mistake to press too hard for an exact answer to the question just what a rational person is aiming at when he supports the ‘currency’ of a certain moral code.”

²⁷ Smith, H., Measuring the Consequences of Rules, Utilitas, 22 (2010), 413–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar (p. 418). This and several of the other theories discussed in this paragraph are formulated as versions of rule utilitarianism rather than rule consequentialism. Since the differences between rule utilitarianism and rule consequentialism are not relevant to the issues discussed here, I will refer to them all as versions of rule consequentialism.

²⁸ Ridge, M., Introducing Variable-Rate Rule Utilitarianism, Philosophical Quarterly, 56 (2006), 242–53 (pp. 244–6)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁹ Tobia, K., Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16 (2013), 643–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar (p. 645).

³⁰ For such criticisms, see the sources from the prior three notes, as well as Hooker, B. and Fletcher, G., Variable Versus Fixed Rate Rule Utilitarianism, Philosophical Quarterly, 58 (2008), 344–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; T. Miller, Solving Rule Consequentialism's Acceptance Rate Problem, pp. 42–48; and D. Miller, Moral Education and Rule Consequentialism.

³¹ Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions, p. 464.

³² Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions, p. 464.

³³ This is a merely a rough gloss for various reasons, including the fact that it ignores the added complications of accounting for the benefits of acceptance that go beyond those of compliance.

³⁴ Although the most recent literature has devoted much attention to the issue of how widely a code is internalized within a social group, it has paid comparatively little attention to the depth or intensity of internalization. Brandt raised the issue fairly consistently; see, e.g., Brandt, Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism, pp. 177–78; Some Merits of One Form of Rule-Utilitarianism, p. 126; Fairness to Indirect Optimific Theories in Ethics, pp. 142–47; Problems of Contemporary Utilitarianism: Real and Alleged, p. 98; A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 291–92; and, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, in Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 215–34 (pp. 228–32). Hooker, following Brandt, appeals to the differing levels of motivation and aversion that the consciences of “morally well-trained people” would attach to different rules when he addresses the problem of how RC should handle conflicts among the rules (see Ideal Code, Real World, pp. 88–92, 131–34). However, Eggleston has argued that Hooker's theory does not allow for this appeal to conscience to add anything that isn't already included within the ideal code itself, since his theory equates conscience formation with code internalization; see Eggleston, B., Conflicts of Rules in Hooker's Rule-Consequentialism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007), 329–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Hooker's and Brandt's repeated references to proper moral training and education suggest that a teaching formulation of RC would offer a more natural framework for incorporating their approach to conflicts of rules. Since teaching formulations focus primarily on the best approaches to inculcating codes, and they identify the ideal code as whatever code that ideal approach to moral education would attempt to inculcate, they allow for the possibility that an ideal approach to moral education would involve more nuanced conscience formation than is captured within the content of the rules themselves.

³⁵ Smith, Measuring the Consequences of Rules, p. 427.

³⁶ This response is recommended by Yeo, Shang Long, Measuring the Consequences of Rules: A Response to Smith, Utilitas, 29 (2017), 125–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar (p. 130).

³⁷ However, its success in avoiding them has been questioned; see Mulgan, T., Ruling out Rule Consequentialism, in Morality, Rules, and Consequences, ed. by Hooker, B., Mason, E., and Miller, D. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 212–21Google Scholar.

³⁸ These costs are only “relatively” fixed because under certain future contingencies, such as those involving genetic engineering, they might turn out to be more flexible. See Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, p. 32, fn. 1; cf. Arneson, R., Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections, Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005), 235–51 (pp. 248–49)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hooker, B., Reply to Arneson and McIntyre, Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005), 264–81 (pp. 268–9)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, pp. 79–80. Mulgan endorses Hooker's strategy and incorporates it in his teaching-centered formulation of RC; see Mulgan, How Should Utilitarians Think about the Future?, p. 291; and Mulgan, Future People, pp. 140–41, 146–47.

⁴⁰ Cf. Hooker's charge that if we assume complete acceptance of a code “we have simply imagined out of existence unmitigated amoralists and those who are conscientious but misguided” (Ideal Code, Real World, pp. 82, 84).

⁴¹ For more on this point, see T. Miller, Solving Rule Consequentialism's Acceptance Rate Problem, p. 51.

⁴² Mulgan, Future People, p. 147.

⁴³ See Mulgan, Future People, p. 147; and T. Miller, Solving Rule Consequentialism's Acceptance Rate Problem, p. 50. Cf. Sidgwick's observation that “the difference between the moralities of any two societies is often more strikingly exhibited in the different emphasis attached to various portions of the moral code in each, than in disagreement as to the rules which the code should include” (The Methods of Ethics, p. 484).

⁴⁴ D. Miller, Moral Education and Rule Consequentialism.

⁴⁵ Proponents of teaching formulations have not suggested otherwise. See, e.g., Mulgan, How Should Utilitarians Think About the Future?, p. 292; and T. Miller, Solving Rule Consequentialism's Acceptance Rate Problem, p. 52.

⁴⁶ Tobia does entertain the possibility that different criteria might be appropriate to different questions RC faces; e.g. he suggests that RC might employ one method of comparison with respect to the partial compliance problem, and a different one when considering possibilities concerning how similar the future will be to the present; see Tobia, Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions, p. 468. However, his discussion of these issues seems to assume that for each particular question RC faces, there will be a single “best” approach to making such comparisons, and that is the assumption I am questioning here. Even if we limit our focus to a single type of question, such as how we should compare rules given uncertainty concerning the levels of acceptance and compliance they would achieve, it is not obvious that a single criterion will apply to all of the various choices that fall under the question.

⁴⁷ Tobia, Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance, p. 650.

⁴⁸ Tobia, Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions, p. 468; cf. Yeo, Measuring the Consequences of Rules: A Response to Smith, p. 130.

⁴⁹ Cf. Yeo, Measuring the Consequences of Rules: A Response to Smith, p. 128.

⁵⁰ Other proponents of teaching-focused RC have already devoted some attention to these questions. Mulgan's IMOU endorses a temporally relativized approach; see Mulgan, How Should Utilitarians Think About the Future?, pp. 292–97. Likewise, Dale Miller endorses an understanding of UMERC that is relativized on both temporal and cultural dimensions; see D. Miller, Moral Education and Rule Consequentialism.

⁵¹ In fact, they already have. Hooker makes allowance within his acceptance formulation for a limited degree of temporal relativism conditioned on changes that would fundamentally alter the fixed internalization costs of codes (see fn. 38 above). Moreover, in response to epistemic concerns regarding our ability to identify a truly ideal code, he has embraced an incrementalist approach to improving moral codes, introducing a further degree of temporal relativism into his account; see Hooker, Reply to Arneson and Macintyre, p. 278. Finally, Leonard Kahn has defended a culturally relativized version of RC within the context of Hooker's acceptance formulation; see Kahn, L., Rule Consequentialism and Scope, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15 (2012), 631–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵² I am grateful to the Appalachian College Association for its generous funding of a faculty fellowship and to Lee University for a sabbatical leave that has afforded me the time to work on this article. I am also indebted to Dale Miller and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.