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Context, Character and Consequentialist Friendships

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2008

CANDACE L. UPTON
CANDACE L. UPTON*
Affiliation:
University of [email protected]
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Abstract

One prevailing objection to consequentialism holds that the consequentialist cannot promote both agent-neutral value and her own personal friendships: the consequentialist cannot be a genuine friend. Several versions of this objection have been advanced, but an even more sophisticated version of the charge is available. However, even this more sophisticated version fails, as it assumes a traditional, context-insensitive, account of character traits. In this article, I develop and defend a novel account of character traits that is context-sensitive and also supports a novel account of what friendship consists in. Application of the more plausible, contextual, account of character traits resolves the debate in favor of the friendly consequentialist.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2008 , pp. 334 - 347
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

1 Williams, Bernard, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, Bernard (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 75–150Google Scholar; Stocker, Michael, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’, Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 453–66Google Scholar.

2 Cocking, Dean and Oakley, Justin, ‘Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation’, Ethics 106 (1995), pp. 86–111CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 This new version of the argument is based on Elinor Mason's objections to Cocking and Oakley's version. See her ‘Can an Indirect Consequentialist be a Real Friend?’, Ethics 108 (1998), pp. 386–93.

4 Williams, ‘Critique’; Stocker, ‘Schizophrenia’.

5 Railton, Peter, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Consequentialism and its Critics, ed. Scheffler, Samuel (Oxford, 1988), pp. 93–133Google Scholar.

6 Cocking and Oakley, ‘Indirect Consequentialism’.

7 Cocking and Oakley, ‘Indirect Consequentialism’, p. 109.

8 Presumably, terminating one's friendly character is different from terminating the friendships that it governs, though Mason does not defend this crucial claim. Someone could stop liking and caring about an individual without putting an end to her general liking and concern for others.

9 Mason holds that the indirect consequentialist should endorse a ‘pro-friendship disposition’, not a friendly character. My representation of Mason's friendly disposition as a friendly character in no way relevantly distorts her position.

10 Mason, ‘Real Friend’, pp. 392–3.

11 A second line of defense in favor of the claim that the indirect consequentialist cannot possess a friendly character is available to Cocking and Oakley. See Appendix B.

12 For someone's context-insensitive character trait to be wedded to action, it need be true only that she would behave in a trait-characteristic way, provided the opportunity, not that she actually has so behaved.

13 An alternative, equally plausible, view holds that a non-normal circumstance mitigates someone's failure to be compassionate. However we construe the mitigating function of non-normal circumstances is irrelevant to the ultimate success or failure of the traditional account.

14 Railton, ‘Alienation’, p. 121.

15 Railton, ‘Alienation’, pp. 120–1.