¹ See, for example, Mackie, J. L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, 1977, p. 129Google Scholar, where he says that even if problems concerning the calculation of utility were solved ‘there would still be a fatal objection to the resulting act utilitarian system. It would be wholly impracticable’.

² See Bales, R. Eugene, ‘Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, viii (1971), 257–65Google Scholar; Brink, David O., Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 256–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and GrifEn, James, Well-Being, Oxford, 1986, pp. 195–206.Google Scholar

³ Railton, Peter, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, xiii (1984), 117.Google Scholar

⁴ Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1903Google Scholar, is a utilitarian of the former kind, while, perhaps, Griffin is a utilitarian of the latter kind.

⁵ For an excellent discussion of this strategy and the costs associated with it see Broome, John, Weighing Goods, Oxford, 1991, ch. 5.Google Scholar

⁶ For an interesting discussion of the difficulties associated with specifying a unique set of alternatives see Bergström, Lars, ‘On the Formulation and Application of Utilitarianism’, Nous, x (1976), 121–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a discussion of the problem of determining utilities of acts whose consequences we know see Griffin, , Well-Being, ‘Part Two: Measurement’, pp. 73–124.Google Scholar

⁷ Throughout I am taking it that there is a distinction between an alternative and its consequences. If alternatives are characterized in terms of acts and their consequences, then my claim would be that it is practically impossible to determine our alternatives.

⁸ See Bennett, Jonathan, Events and Their Names, Indianapolis, 1988, p. 49Google Scholar. For a discussion of the transitivity of causation see pages 46–9 of the same work.

⁹ There is one kind of possible situation that represents an exception to my claim. It seems that there may be situations where we are justified in believing that an act and its alternatives will have no further consequences at all. For example, we might know that the end of the earth was imminent. This is not our ordinary situation.

¹⁰ Moore, , pp. 151–3.Google Scholar

¹¹ Moore, , p. 153.Google Scholar

¹² Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, Bernard, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge, 1973, p. 33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Smart, , p. 34Google Scholar. He concedes that there may be cases where the remote consequences do not diminish in significance. One such case would be Adam and Eve's production of offspring. It is not clear whether he thinks the principle actually is true, or whether he thinks that we should make our choices as if it were. He does say that he does not ‘know how to prove such a postulate, though it seems plausible enough’ (p. 34).

¹⁴ I am assuming that if you do not have good reason for believing that you are justified in believing a proposition, then you are not justified in believing the proposition. If this is not acceptable, then the argument can be modified.

¹⁵ I believe that forms of this argument have been suggested to me by various philosophers, including Alan Fuchs, Heidi Malm, and Roger Crisp. Crisp also suggested that this argument can be found in Moore. In my discussion of discounting I gave what I believe to be a correct account of Moore's argument. As I see it, Moore recognizes that our being justified in ignoring remote consequences is conditional on showing that over a period of time the consequences become less significant. He gives his reasons for believing that showing this is possible, but does not claim that he has shown it or that anyone else has. However, the rest of his discussion assumes that it has been shown. This, I believe, gives the false appearance that he is claiming that we can simply ignore remote consequences.

¹⁶ Utilitarianism, ed. Robson, John M., Toronto, 1965Google Scholar, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, x. 224.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Versions of this paper were presented at the 1990 meeting of the Virginia Philosophical Association, the 1991 Pacific Division meeting of the APA and the Wolfson Philosophical Society (Oxford). I thank the participants in those meetings for their comments, in particular Alan Fuchs, Tony Ellis, Roger Crisp and Heidi Malm (who served as commentator at the APA meeting). Also, I am grateful to others who have provided comments on various versions of this paper, especially Brad Hooker, Peter Vallentyne and Penelope Mackie.