¹ Greengarten, I. M., Thomas Hill Green and the Development of Liberal-Democratic Thought, Toronto, 1981CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hansen, P., ‘T. H. Green and the Moralization of the Market”, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, i (1977), 91–117.Google Scholar

² His utilitarian interpretation of Green is put forward in two articles which I critically review in this essay. Weinstein, D., ‘The Discourse of Freedom, Rights and Good in Nineteenth-Century English Liberalism”, Utilitas, iii (1991), 245–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (Hereafter ‘The Discourse of Freedom, Rights and Good”), and ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism in T. H. Green's Moral Philosophy”, Political Studies, xli (1993), 618–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (Hereafter ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”.)

³ ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 634–5Google Scholar, emphasis in the original and 618–19; see also his ‘The Discourse of Freedom, Rights and Good”, 252–62.Google Scholar

⁴ ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 634–5.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., 619, 625–7.

⁶ See in particular, ibid., 628, n. 1 and ‘The Discourse of Freedom, Rights and Good”, 246Google Scholar including n. 1.

⁷ Rawls, , A Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1971, p. 30Google Scholar. See also Frankena, William K., Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1973 2nd edn., p. 44.Google Scholar

⁸ Frankena, , pp. 15–16Google Scholar; Pettit, Philip, ed., ‘Introduction”, Consequentialism, Dartmouth, 1993, pp. xiii–xixGoogle Scholar; Kymlicka, , Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, 1990, pp. 12–18.Google Scholar

⁹ Foot, Philipa, ‘Utilitarianism and the Virtues”, Consequentialism, pp. 407–8.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Nicholson, Peter P., The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists. Selected Studies, Cambridge, 1990, p. 190.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 188–90.

¹² Ibid., p. 189.

¹³ Ibid., p. 190.

¹⁴ Ibid., emphasis added.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 191.

¹⁶ See my ‘Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom”, Political Theory, xxi (1993), 39–40Google Scholar and ‘Idealist Organicism: Beyond Holism and Individualism”, History of Political Thought, xii (1991), 515–35.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Rawls, , p. 30.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 24.

²⁰ Frankena, , p. 44.Google Scholar

²¹ Green, T. H., Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. Bradley, A. C., Oxford, 1899, 4th edn., § 113, (Hereafter PE).Google Scholar

²² Green, T. H., ‘Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation”, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings, ed. Harris, Paul and Morrow, John, Cambridge, 1986, § 23Google Scholar (Hereafter PO). He also shares the utilitarians' repudiation of natural rights. See also my ‘T. H. Green: The Common Good Society”, History of Political Thought, xiv (1993), 235–6.Google Scholar

²³ See, e.g. PE, §§ 2–3, 7–8, 135, 158–61, 164, 168–9, 221–7, 230–1, 359, 364Google Scholar. See also Lewis, H. D., ‘Was Green a Hedonist?”, Mind, xlv (1936), 193–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, where he both explains Green's rejection of hedonism and rejects hedonistic and selfish interpretations of his moral theory.

²⁴ ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 628 and 625Google Scholar, respectively. In n. 35 on p. 628 Weinstein claims that ‘since Green's Consequentialism mimics Mill's utilitarianism by embracing similar kinds of stringent moral rights … it is also a form of … indirect Consequentialism … In other words, as in Mill's indirect utilitarianism, good in Green's Consequentialism merely serves as a standard for evaluating individual actions and public policies. It never serves as a source of direct obligation as it does in crude utilitarianism. As with Mill, fundamental moral rights are the only sources of direct obligation.” (Emphasis in the original.) See also ‘The Discourse of Freedom, Rights and Good”, 246Google Scholar including n. 1. Yet again this interpretation, I believe, cannot be sustained. In the first place, by definition Green cannot be an indirect consequentialist unless he is a consequentialist which he is not as is abundantly clear from his rejection of utilitarian rightness. His basic principle for evaluating actions and institutions is not the principle of utility but, what may be called, the principle of the common good of which justice is internal and which is clearly anti-utilitarian (PE, § 354 and see below)Google Scholar. Moreover, and contrary to Weinstein's claim, good in Green's theory does serve as a source of direct obligation. As we shall see, virtues which make up the good ‘plainly point out the direction” in which self-realization should proceed (PE, § 353)Google Scholar. It is foundational to Green's purposive view of the person that one's conception of oneself as a certain kind of person is the source of what is obligatory.

²⁵ ‘The Discourse of Freedom, Rights and Good”, 258Google Scholar. See also the whole section on Green, , 252–60.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ibid., 254.

²⁷ Kymlicka, , pp. 203–4Google Scholar; Rawls, , p. 426.Google Scholar

²⁸ Hobhouse, , Liberalism, [1911], Oxford, 1974, p. 76.Google Scholar

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ E.g. PO, § 132Google Scholar; PE, § 167Google Scholar and my ‘Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom”, 36–42.Google Scholar

³¹ In further supporting his claim that the practical differences between Green and improved utilitarianism ‘may be rather small”, Weinstein also claims that Green ‘readily admits” the ‘greater simplicity, definiteness and appeal of utilitarianism … particularly with respect to defining goodness”. This is simply wrong. What Green admits is that ‘the definiteness of the one [the utilitarian good of pleasure] and the vagueness of the other [Green's idea of the good as self-realization] … is, no doubt, generally accepted”; (emphasis added), and he adds: ‘For the moment we will suppose this contrast between the two ways of conceiving the chief good – between the definiteness of the one and the vague ness of the other – to be valid” (PE, § 338). Accordingly he acknowledges this definiteness to be ‘the chief attraction” of hedonist utilitarianism especially in ‘cultivated circles” (PE, § 335)Google Scholar. So much admission by Green the moral sociologist. As a moral philosopher, however, Green disagrees with what is ‘generally accepted”, regarding it as an urgent philosophical task to expose the mere ‘apparent definiteness” (PE, § 358)Google Scholar of utilitarian goodness because as an action-guide hedonist utilitarianism is bound to weaken the moral initiative for self- and social improvement (PE, § 356)Google Scholar. The inseparability of theory and practice is never far from Green's thought. In rejecting the greater definiteness of the utilitarian good, Green does not indeed argue that his view of the good is fully defined and clear; rather he defends the ‘definiteness of direction” (PE, § 362Google Scholar; see also §§ 172, 176–8, 353) which embraces the guidance of conventional morality; when this guidance is unavailable, the Principle of the Common Good is an ‘available criterion” (PE, § 354Google Scholar; see also §§ 198, 352–3, 381) for guiding action.

³² PE, § 356.Google Scholar

³³ Ibid., § 355–6.

³⁴ Ibid., § 355; emphasis added.

³⁵ Gray, John and Smith, G. W., eds. J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus, London, 1991, p. 11.Google Scholar

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ PE, § 331.Google Scholar

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., § 357, emphasis added. See also §§ 213, 286, 330: ‘an ideal of good, consisting in the greatest happiness of the greatest number, as Une end by reference to which the claim of all laws and powers and rules of action on our obedience is to be tested”; §§ 331, 356, 349: ‘the moral good and criterion, viz. the greatest net sum of pleasures for the greatest number”.

⁴⁰ Ibid., § 354.

⁴¹ Ibid., § 357.

⁴² ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 627 ffGoogle Scholar

⁴³ See note 21.

⁴⁴ PE, § 214Google Scholar (italics added); see also §§ 176, 347–9.

⁴⁵ Ibid., § 347.

⁴⁶ Ibid., § 380.

⁴⁷ Ibid., § 217 and §§ 211–17.

⁴⁸ Ibid., § 214.

⁴⁹ Ibid., § 217; see also §§ 214–15.

⁵⁰ Ibid., § 215.

⁵¹ Ibid., § 245; PO, § 189Google Scholar. That principle clearly underpins Green's following claim about the justice of punishment: ‘The justice of the punishment depends on the justice of the general system of rights … on the question whether the social organization in which a criminal has lived and acted is one that has given him a fair chance of not being a criminal” (PO, § 189)Google Scholar. Politically, it requires that ‘the general system of rights” should maintain ‘the rights of its members … in such a way that no one gains at the expense of another (no one has any power guaranteed to him through another's being deprived of that power” (PO, § 132)Google Scholar. For the two principles, see my ‘T. H. Green's Theory of the Morally Justified Society”, History of Political Thought, x (1989), 489–494.Google Scholar

⁵² Weinstein, , ‘The New Liberalism and the Rejection of Utilitarianism”, paper presented to The Fourth Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, 08 27–29, 1994, Chuo University Surugadai Memorial Hall, Tokyo, p. 14.Google Scholar

⁵³ Green, T. H., ‘Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant”, Works of T. H. Green, ed. Nettleship, R. L., 3 vols., London, 1891–1894, ii. § 107Google Scholar, (Hereafter ‘Kant”). See also my ‘T. H. Green: The Common Good Society”, 226–47.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See my ‘T. H. Green: The Common Good Society”.

⁵⁵ ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 631.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ ‘Kant”, § 84; PE, § 262.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ ‘Kant”, § 118; PE, § 199.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ PE, § 240.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ E.g. ibid., § 279.

⁶⁰ Rawls, , p. 30.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Thomas, Geoffrey, The Moral Philosophy of T. H. Green, Oxford, 1987, pp. 233–4Google Scholar. Thomas's excellent discussion of Green and utilitarian consequentialism shows con vincingly that Green could not endorse that doctrine. See pp. 113–21, 231–5.

⁶² Foot, , p. 407.Google Scholar

⁶³ Thomas, , pp. 231–2.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 632.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ibid., 633.

⁶⁶ Frankena, , p. 14Google Scholar. See also Rawls who subscribes to Frankena, 's position here, p. 24.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 634Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Green, T. H., ‘Lectures on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract”, Works of T. H. Green, iii. 371–3, 376–7, 382Google Scholar; PE, §§ 245, 270.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ PE, §§ 360, 377Google Scholar; see also my ‘T. H. Green: The Common Good Society”, 233–4.Google Scholar

⁷¹ PE, § 107.Google Scholar

⁷² PO, § 124.Google Scholar

⁷³ PE, § 154–5.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Ibid., § 293, and see §§ 155 and 193, including note 1, where he responds in the same vein to Mill. See also §§ 293–5 where he approves of Kant's position.

⁷⁵ Ibid., §§ 293–5.

⁷⁶ Similarly, he claims that reason and desire are incapable of the sheer separation that Kant and Hume suggest. See my ‘On Forcing Individuals to be Free: Green, T. H.'s Liberal Theory of Positive Freedom”, Political Studies, xxxix (1991), 309–12.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Quoted in ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 626Google Scholar; but this quotation, far from supporting his consequentialist case, clearly indicates why Green could not sustain such a position. See also PE, § 294Google Scholar. Crucially, it is ‘good character” – being ‘person[s] of a certain kind” (PE, § 243)Google Scholar — which is basic to Green's morality. It is only with reference to ‘good character” that actions and their consequences are morally evaluated. That is the nub of the said quotation.

⁷⁸ See my ‘On Forcing Individuals to be Free”, 306–8.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ ‘Between Kantianism and Consequentialism”, 626Google Scholar: ‘moral self-realization or good will are, for Green, dispositional qualities”.

⁸⁰ PE, §§ 243–4, 354.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Ibid., § 255; see also § 254.

⁸² Ibid., § 243.

⁸³ Frankena, , p. 64.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ PE, § 294Google Scholar; see also § 295.

⁸⁵ These two points are inspired by Rawls's reasons for denying that the idea of a maximum applies ‘to specifying and adjusting the scheme of basic liberties (Political Liberalism, New York, 1993, pp. 333–4)Google Scholar. I am indebted to Abisi Sharakiya for pointing out their relevance. Without in any way rendering Green Rawlsian, Rawls's rejection of the idea of a maximum helps highlight Green's own refusal to apply that idea to his idea of self-realization and its circumstances. Green would agree that it ‘would be absurd” to try to maximize all of a person's capacities at once or only one at a time. He would also agree that ‘it would be madness to maximize” virtuous actions” by maximizing the occasions which require them‘, namely what he describes as that complex of social conditions which for each individual is necessary to enable him to realize his capacity for contributing to social good” (PO, § 186, n. 1).

⁸⁶ This is the case with Frankena, 's deontological theory, pp. 65–7.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Irwin claims that Green's interpretation of Aristotle on the role of the good in guiding action is more adequate than Sidgwick's rival interpretation. Irwin, T. H., ‘Eminent Victorians and Greek Ethics: Sidgwick, Green and Aristotle”, Essays on Henry Sidgwick, ed. Shultz, Bart, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 279–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁸ PE, § 354.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Ibid., § 353.

⁹⁰ Ibid., § 354. The numbers in the following quotations are added for clarity.

⁹¹ PO, § 186, n. 1Google Scholar