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Value Conservatism and its Challenge to Consequentialism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 April 2021
Abstract
G. A. Cohen's value conservatism entails that we ought to preserve some existing sources of value in lieu of more valuable replacements, thereby repudiating maximizing consequentialism. Cohen motivates value conservatism through illustrative cases. The consequentialist, however, can explain many Cohen-style cases by taking extrinsic properties, such as historical significance, to be sources of final value. Nevertheless, it may be intuitive that there's stronger reason to preserve than to promote certain sources of value, especially historically significant things. This motivates an argument that the weights of our reasons to preserve such things are especially strong relative to the amounts of value they bear. The value conservative can then explain these intuitions in non-consequentialist terms. There may be reason to preserve historically significant things as a matter of recognition respect for a cultural and historical heritage, or because it is virtuous to cultivate the right kind of connection with such a heritage.
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References
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17 There are interesting questions about the weight and agent-relativity of our reasons to preserve historically significant things created by long-gone cultures, or cultures other than our own. Something's degree of historical significance may correlate somewhat with the strength of agent-neutral reasons to preserve it: the Pyramids were built by a long-gone civilization, but are very historically significant. It would likely be widely regarded as a great tragedy if the Pyramids were destroyed. But relevance to the lives and practices of current cultures might also strengthen our reasons to preserve things. Consider sacred burial sites; we might have stronger reason to preserve sites out of respect for a current indigenous culture than one that has long since passed. The weight of our reasons to preserve such sites might in turn determine whether it's permissible to redevelop certain lands, or whether certain artifacts ought to remain in place instead of being relocated. On the other hand, ancient artifacts may be more historically significant because they are so old, even if they are less relevant to current cultural practices. These are important issues, but I can't explore them further here.
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23 The author thanks Uriah Kriegel, Gwen Bradford, two anonymous reviewers, and the editor of this journal for incisive and thorough comments on previous drafts.