¹ Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Gregor, Mary (Cambridge, 1997), 4:429Google Scholar.

² Korsgaard, Christine, ‘Kant's Formula of Humanity’, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 106–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 114.

³ Kant, Groundwork, 4: 434.

⁴ Wood, Allen W., ‘The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself’, Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 111–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 153 (my emphasis).

⁵ O'Neill, Onora, ‘Between Consenting Adults’, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 105–25Google Scholar, at 110.

⁶ Kerstein, Samuel, ‘Treating Others Merely as Means’, Utilitas 21 (2009), pp. 163–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 167 (my emphasis). Kerstein explains that two agents share a particular end, if they are both trying, or have chosen to try, to realize this end.

⁷ Wood himself does not take it that the inability to share another's end is, for Kant, a sufficient condition for treating an individual merely as a means. Wood mentions that there are actions that restrict or frustrate someone's agency through deception or coercion, whose end cannot be shared by the agent, but which nevertheless do not fail to respect the agent's humanity. Just punishment is an example of this. According to Kant, Wood explains, it is impossible to will one's own punishment, and yet he regards it as respecting the dignity of the criminal (Wood, ‘The Formula of Humanity’, p. 153). I take it that it is open to interpretation whether Wood takes the inability of end-sharing to be a necessary condition for treating someone merely as a means. I am inclined to think that this could be the case. To say that one is treated merely as a means, if one cannot share the other's end in treating her in some way, is so wide-ranging that it is hard to think of a case of being treated as a mere means which cannot be subsumed by this condition.

⁸ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 172 (my emphasis).

⁹ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 176.

¹⁰ Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429–30.

¹¹ Wood, ‘The Formula of Humanity’, p. 153.

¹² Jr.Hill, Thomas E., ‘Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism’, Human Welfare and Moral Worth (Oxford, 2002), pp. 61–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 69–70.

¹³ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, pp. 167–8.

¹⁴ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 168.

¹⁵ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 168.

¹⁶ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 168.

¹⁷ One of the reviewers for Utilitas has suggested that the mugger is not a sadist, but a mercenary. He wants money and so he would not object to a willing victim turning it over to him. Thus, they argue, it is not obvious that the concept of mugging contains the idea that the victim does not share the mugger's end. It is my belief that, even in the case of the individual who willingly turns over her money to the mugger, the victim cannot be seen as sharing the mugger's end of getting her money.

¹⁸ Korsgaard, Christine, ‘The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil’, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 133–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 139.

¹⁹ Korsgaard, ‘The Right to Lie’, p. 138.

²⁰ Korsgaard, ‘The Right to Lie’, p. 139.

²¹ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 169.

²² Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 169.

²³ This is not to say that we cannot think of a case in which a customer's treatment of a waiter seems morally inappropriate, even in cases in which the waiter is able to share the customer's end of serving her. For example, one of the reviewers for Utilitas has pointed out that if I go to a restaurant simply because I enjoy ordering others around and I know that, for a price, I can order the waiter around all evening, there is something morally problematic with my behaviour. I believe this is right. We do, however, need further argumentation, which is well beyond the scope of this article, to support the conclusion that in this case I treat the waiter merely as a means.

²⁴ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 170.

²⁵ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, pp. 169–70.

²⁶ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 171.

²⁷ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 171.

²⁸ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 172.

²⁹ O'Neill, ‘Between Consenting Adults’, p. 110.

³⁰ O'Neill, ‘Between Consenting Adults’, p. 111.

³¹ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 174.

³² Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 174. Kerstein gives more examples to illustrate the problems with the possible consent account: the example of the hypnotized cab driver and the example of the unconscious jogger. However, he explains how O'Neill's account could overcome the difficulties highlighted in these examples. This is the reason I only focus my attention on the examples of the spouse's surprise party and the tipsy friend, which, according to Kerstein, show that the possible consent account suffers from unacceptable implications.

³³ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 175.

³⁴ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 174.

³⁵ Those surprise parties that rely on deception.

³⁶ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 176.

³⁷ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 177.

³⁸ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, pp. 178–9.

³⁹ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 179.

⁴⁰ Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 179.

⁴¹ Kant, Immanuel, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Heath, Peter (Cambridge, 1997), 27:386CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴² In his discussion of prostitution, Kant blames the prostitute for her objectification and degradation. One might be led to think from this that it is the prostitute who turns her own person into an object, not the clients. On this reading, the clients are not to blame for the loss of her humanity. There are complications with the view, however. According to Kant, sexual use occurring in prostitution is natural, that is, use of one person's sexual attributes by another person. If the prostitute already was an object by the time she was sexually used by the clients, then the latter would be using a thing, something that, in Kant's own theory, would make the sexual use in question unnatural (Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:390–2; Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:277). Even though the clients are the ones who make the prostitute into an object, Kant primarily blames the prostitute for her objectification. It is she, after all, who allows others to harm her humanity. It seems, then, that there are, for Kant, two wrongs involved in prostitution: what the prostitute does (voluntarily allowing others to use her sexually in exchange for profit), and what the clients do (using the prostitute for sexual gratification, and so reducing her to an object). In this article, my focus is primarily on the latter wrongdoing. That is, I explore the Kantian position that the clients use the prostitute merely as a means.

⁴³ Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:386. Kant also expresses the view that body and self are inseparable in this way in Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:279.

⁴⁴ Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:387.

⁴⁵ For an analysis of Kant's views on sexuality and prostitution, see Papadaki, Lina, ‘Sexual Objectification: From Kant to Contemporary Feminism’, Contemporary Political Theory 6 (2007), pp. 330–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 331–3.

⁴⁶ Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:384.

⁴⁷ I would like to thank Paul Sludds for coming up with these examples.

⁴⁸ Munzer, Stephen, ‘An Uneasy Case against Property Rights in Body Parts’, Social Philosophy and Policy 11.2 (1994), pp. 259–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 275.

⁴⁹ Kerstein's reinforced hybrid account also fails to entail that the prostitute is treated merely as a means by the clients. This is because it is indeed reasonable for the clients to believe that she can consent to their use of her, as well as share the end they are pursuing in using her (the attainment of sexual gratification).

⁵⁰ Jr.Hill, Thomas, ‘Servility and Self-Respect’, Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 4–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 6.

⁵¹ Following Kant's idea that servility is contrary to a perfect non-juridical duty to oneself (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:434–7).

⁵² Hill, ‘Servility and Self-Respect’, p. 16.

⁵³ Although one might worry (like my friend, Paul Sludds) that the deferential wife example is paradoxical, or at least less easy to understand than it first appears. Deference is an action or attitude only to the extent that the person is indeed autonomous. The deferential wife and her husband have a compact which shapes their behaviour. Were this not the case she would not be a deferential wife, but a victim of domestic abuse. We may still think that this is the case depending on how we understand the source of her deference, but it seems that on the face of it we would wish to keep the two issues separate. So, the fact that it is appropriate to see her as deferential indicates that we see her as not under the control of her husband. The deferential wife, in virtue of her deference, is an agent and retains her autonomy. Once we assume that she is no longer autonomous, then we must also assume that she is not showing her husband deference, but is merely acting as if doing so rather like an automaton might act as if it is deferentially bowing. In sum, if she is not free, then she is not deferential; and if she is deferential, then she is free.

⁵⁴ In the case of the deferential wife, again, Kerstein's reinforced hybrid account is in no position to explain how it is that the wife is treated merely as a means by her husband. This is because she can share his end, as well as give her consent, to the way he treats her.

⁵⁵ In another article of his, Kerstein appeals to a version of the reconstructed end-sharing account, in order to explain what it means for an agent to treat her own person merely as a means. An agent would act irrationally if she willed an end, while at the same time willing another end, the attainment of which, as she is aware, would make it impossible for her to promote her original end. The latter is an end that she is rationally compelled to have. An end of this kind is, for instance, the preservation of one's own humanity. Kerstein explains that the kind of practical irrationality he describes takes place when a person acts contrary to the hypothetical imperative. The latter instructs that if an agent wills an end, then she should also will, to the extent that she can, the means that are necessary for its achievement. Alternatively, she should abandon the end. In the case of the person who commits suicide, his end of taking his life would render himself unable to promote an end he is rationally compelled to have: that of protecting his own humanity. This is how we can explain that suicide is morally impermissible (Samuel Kerstein, ‘Treating Oneself Merely as a Means’, Kant's Ethics of Virtue, ed. Monica Betzlerr (Berlin and New York, 2008), pp. 201–18, at 210–12).

⁵⁶ Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:423.

⁵⁷ Of course, there is bound to be disagreement whether the prostitute is indeed reduced to an object (her humanity disrespected) in being sexually used in exchange for profit. As I argue in section IV, there are various ways one might object to Kant's idea that prostitution inevitably involves objectification. My aim, in this article, is to explain how it is possible to support Kant's own conclusion that prostitution involves the treatment of the woman merely as a means. It is my belief that the end-sharing and possible consent accounts can do this.

⁵⁸ Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:443.

⁵⁹ I am grateful to Paul Sludds for urging me to explore this idea.

⁶⁰ Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 434–7.

⁶¹ Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:434–5.

⁶² Kerstein, ‘Treating Others’, p. 176.

⁶³ I am very grateful to the editor of Utilitas, Professor Brad Hooker, for his time and help with my article. I would also like to express my gratitude to the three anonymous reviewers of this journal whose constructive criticism has helped me improve this article. To Paul Sludds, my special thanks for his invaluable comments on an earlier draft. Furthermore, I have very much benefited from discussions with audiences at the University of Crete and the 7th Annual Bioethics Meeting – Retreat at Tsoutsouros in 2011.