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‘Soft Law in a Hard Shell’: India, International Rulemaking and the International Solar Alliance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2021

Vyoma Jha
Vyoma Jha*
Affiliation:
Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA (United States (US)). Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

This article examines the creation of the International Solar Alliance (ISA), a new international organization led by India and backed primarily by developing countries. Official documents and wide-ranging interviews offer insights into the treaty-making process. Using a political economy approach to the study of international law, the article analyzes politico-legal issues associated with the creation of the ISA. The legal form of the ISA is best described as ‘soft law in a hard shell’: it uses the legal infrastructure of a treaty while relying on the social structure of participating actors for its future implementation. Empirical evidence suggests that three factors explain the treaty structure of the ISA: India's leadership role in the treaty-making process, the early involvement of non-state actors, and the preference of developing countries for legal form. Ultimately, the case illustrates India's shift towards a leadership role in climate change governance, and the steady emergence of non-state actors in driving climate action.

Keywords

Climate changeSolar energyInternational Solar AllianceTreaty makingPolitical economyIndia
Type
Article
Information
Transnational Environmental Law , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , November 2021 , pp. 517 - 541
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

The author would like to thank the two anonymous TEL reviewers for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this article. The author also wishes to thank Deborah Hensler, Janet Martinez, Saumitra Jha, and Gregory Shaffer for helpful comments and conversations. The author is grateful to the several interviewees for generously giving their time and insights to this research. However, all findings and opinions are the responsibility of the author alone.

References

1 Paris (France), 12 Dec. 2015, in force 4 Nov. 2016 available at: http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.

2 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.

3 UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘International Solar Energy Alliance Launched at COP21’, 30 Nov. 2015, available at: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/clean-energy/international-solar-energy-alliance-launched-at-cop21.

4 Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Nov. 2016, in force 6 Dec. 2017, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/framework-agreement.

5 ISA, ‘Working Paper on International Solar Alliance and List of Prospective Members’, 2015, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/media/press-release.

6 Ibid.

7 Compare this with similarly situated international organizations: the UNFCCC took 655 days to enter into force and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) took 528 days to become operational.

8 Cane, P. & Kritzer, H.M. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Ginsburg, T. & Shaffer, G., ‘How Does International Law Work?’, in Cane, P. & Kritzer, H.M. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 753–84, at 756Google Scholar. Ginsberg and Shaffer stress the importance of qualitative research in international law, especially to uncover the mechanisms and key actors involved, and identify three overarching questions for empirical legal research: (i) why international law is produced and invoked, focusing on the role of law in facilitating international cooperation; (ii) how international law is produced, focusing on the actors, institutions, mechanisms and processes involved in such production; (iii) how and under what conditions international law matters, in terms of affecting domestic law, the behaviour of states and other relevant actors.

10 Ibid., p. 781.

11 Ibid., p. 756; see also Simmons, B., Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Recent scholarship on India's foreign policy suggests that India is moving from being a ‘rule taker’ to a ‘rule maker’, especially in the context of global climate change, energy, and trade governance. See generally Sidhu, W.P.S., Mehta, P.B. & Jones, B. (eds), Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order (Brookings Institution Press, 2013)Google Scholar; Debiel, T. & Wulf, H., ‘More than a Rule Taker: The Indian Way of Multilateralism’, in Hansel, M., Khan, R. & Levaillant, M. (eds), Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2017), pp. 49–68Google Scholar; N.K. Dubash, ‘From Norm Taker to Norm Maker? Indian Energy Governance in Global Context’ (2011) 2(s1) Global Policy, pp. 66–79; Hopewell, K., ‘Recalcitrant Spoiler? Contesting Dominant Accounts of India's Role in Global Trade Governance’ (2018) 39(3) Third World Quarterly, pp. 577–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 N. 4 above.

14 ISA, ‘Steering Committees’, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees.

15 There were 6 meetings of the ISC between Dec. 2015 and Feb. 2018, and 8 meetings of the IAC between Feb. 2016 and Mar. 2017. I coded the documents using keywords ‘motivation’, ‘objectives’, ‘activities’, ‘partners’, and ‘treaty text’. More information is on file with the author.

16 The interview questions were based on a protocol prepared in advance and focused on four main frames: ‘Initiation’, ‘Membership’, ‘Treaty Form’, and ‘Location’. The interviews were conducted after approval of Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol by Stanford University's Research Compliance Office.

17 I interviewed a French diplomat and a former US official for this research.

18 All interviewees were promised anonymity. To quote them, I identify them by a general description of their role. Of the total interviews, 14 interviews were conducted face to face in New Delhi (India), while the remaining were conducted over phone or Skype. More information is on file with the author.

19 See ‘Declaration on the Occasion to Launch the International Solar Alliance of Countries Dedicated to the Promotion of Solar Energy’, in UNFCCC Secretariat, n. 3 above.

20 ISA, n. 5 above.

21 UNFCCC Secretariat, n. 3 above.

22 ISA, ‘Report of the First Meeting of the International Steering Committee’, 1 Dec. 2015, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (First ISC Meeting).

23 There were 6 ISC meetings, each attended by representatives from participant countries and observer organizations. The work of the ISC was completed at its final meeting on 20 Feb. 2018, a few weeks prior to the ISA's Founding Conference in Mar. 2018.

24 Government of India, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), 1/1/2015-EFM, ‘Office Memorandum, Constitution of the Interim Administrative Cell of the International Solar Alliance to Facilitate Establishment of ISA from de facto to de jure Status’, 29 Jan. 2016, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/uploads/docs/651071a266b65ee1828313b7f009c4.pdf.

25 Ibid.

26 ISA, ‘Report of the First Meeting of the Interim Administrative Cell of the International Solar Alliance’, 10 Feb. 2016, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (First IAC Meeting).

27 The IAC was re-designated as the Interim Secretariat of the ISA in the 6th IAC meeting; see ISA, ‘Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Interim Administrative Cell of the International Solar Alliance’, 14 June 2016, p. 4, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (Sixth IAC Meeting); Government of India, n. 24 above.

28 The core membership of the IAC consisted of the Chairman (Secretary, MNRE) and the Convener (P.C. Maithani, Director, MNRE). Other members of the IAC were the nominated representatives from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MEFCC), Ministry of Finance, Solar Energy Corporation of India Ltd (SECI), National Institute of Solar Energy, National Institute of Wind Energy, National Institute of Bio-Energy, and the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd (IREDA).

29 Press Information Bureau, ‘ISA to Become a Treaty-based International Intergovernmental Organization Tomorrow’, 5 Dec. 2017, available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=174097.

30 ISA, ‘ISA Prospective Member Countries’, available at: http://isolaralliance.org/MemberCont.aspx. Currently, the Framework Agreement has been ratified by 68 countries including Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, the Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, St Lucia, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.

31 Framework Agreement, Art. II, ‘Guiding Principles’.

32 Framework Agreement, Art. VII, ‘Member and Partner Country Status’.

33 Framework Agreement, Art. VIII, ‘Partner Organization’.

34 Ibid.

35 The ISA is currently headquartered in Gurugram (India): Framework Agreement, Art. XII, ‘Seat of the ISA’.

36 ISA, ‘Governance’, available at: http://isolaralliance.org/Governance.aspx; also Framework Agreement, Art. IV, ‘Secretariat’ and Art. V, ‘Assembly’.

37 Framework Agreement, Art. VI, ‘Budget and Financial Resources’.

38 The Assembly was attended by representatives of 38 countries that have ratified the Framework Agreement, 41 observer countries that have either signed or are yet to sign the Framework Agreement, and 57 partner organizations and special invitees: ISA, ‘Report of the First Assembly of the International Solar Alliance’, 14 Jan. 2019, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/governance/first-assembly (First Assembly).

39 There were 6 meetings of the ISC between Dec. 2015 and Feb. 2018 and 8 meetings of the IAC between Feb. 2016 and Mar. 2017.

40 The Paris Declaration announcing the launch of the ISA states that countries ‘[s]hare the collective ambition to undertake innovative and concerted efforts with a view to reducing the cost of finance and cost of technology for immediate deployment of competitive solar generation assets in all our countries and to pave the way for future solar generation, storage and good technologies adapted to our countries’ individual needs’: UNFCCC Secretariat, n. 3 above.

41 ISA, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, available at: http://isolaralliance.org/docs/ISA%20FAQs.pdf.

42 Framework Agreement, Art. II, ‘Guiding Principles’.

43 For a discussion of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law, see Snidal, K.W. Abbott & D., ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization, pp. 421–56Google Scholar; see also Guzman, A.T., ‘The Design of International Agreements’ (2005) 16(4) European Journal of International Law, pp. 579–612CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 A. Florini & N.K Dubash, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: Governing Energy in a Fragmented World’ (2011) 2(Special issue) Global Policy, pp. 1–5; A. Florini & N.K Dubash, ‘Mapping Global Energy Governance’ (2011) 2(Special issue) Global Policy, pp. 6–18; Leal-Arcas, R. & Filis, A., ‘The Fragmented Governance of the Global Energy Economy: A Legal-Institutional Analysis’ (2013) 6(4) The Journal of World Energy Law & Business, pp. 348–405CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Van de Graaf, T. & Colgan, J., ‘Global Energy Governance: A Review and Research Agenda’ (2016) 2(15047) Palgrave Communications, pp. 1–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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46 Keohane, R.O., ‘International Agencies and the Art of the Possible: The Case of the IEA’ (1982) 1(4) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, pp. 469–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Keohane argues that while several international organizations are rule-making and rule-enforcing bodies, the most important function of others is to serve as facilitators of agreement between governments: for example, the true value of the IEA was as a participant in elite networks and a mobilizer of transnational coalitions.

47 L. Hughes & P.Y. Lipscy, ‘The Politics of Energy’ (2013) 16 Annual Review of Political Science, pp. 449–69.

48 For a discussion of the concept of ‘regime shifting’ see L.R. Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2004) 29(1) Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 1–83; A. Ghosh, ‘Seeking Coherence in Complexity? The Governance of Energy by Trade and Investment Institutions’ (2011) 2(Special issue) Global Policy, pp. 106–19

49 A. Fabbricotti (ed.), The Political Economy of International Law: A European Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2016); A. van Aaken & J.P. Trachtman, ‘Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behaviour’, in Fabbricotti, ibid., pp. 9–43; T. Van de Graaf et al., ‘States, Markets and Institutions: Integrating International Political Economy and Global Energy Politics’, in T. Van de Graaf et al. (eds), Handbook on the International Political Economy of Energy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 3–44; Van de Graaf & Colgan, n. 44 above; McNollgast, ‘The Political Economy of Law’, in A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell (eds), Handbook of Law and Economics: Vol. 1 (Elsevier, 2007), pp. 1651–738, at 1654.

50 Van Aaken & Trachtman, ibid., p. 22.

51 Guzman, n. 43 above.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., p. 597. See also Lipson, C., ‘Why are Some International Agreements Informal?’ (1991) 45(4) International Organization, pp. 495–538CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54 Authority in world politics is diffused across multiple levels and diverse actors, and non-state actors are increasingly shaping the global response to the most pressing environmental problems; see Green, J., Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance (Princeton University Press, 2014)Google Scholar.

55 Victor, D.G., Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet (Cambridge University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56 Sprinz, D.F. et al. , ‘The Effectiveness of Climate Clubs under Donald Trump’ (2018) 18(7) Climate Policy, pp. 828–38, at 829CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 D.G. Victor, The Case for Climate Clubs (E15 Initiative, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2015).

58 Raustiala, K., ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’ (2005) 99(3) American Journal of International Law, pp. 581–614, at 614CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Raustiala argues that widespread preference for contracts in designing agreements weakens the substance and structure of multilateral agreements, particularly when states are uncertain about compliance costs. Thus, states might water down their commitments or weaken monitoring systems in order to avoid non-compliance. In other words, the legality of the international agreement is achieved at the cost of weaker substantive obligations.

59 Bodansky, D., ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25(2) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law, pp. 142–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rajamani, L., ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 493–514CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60 Rajamani, L., ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay between Hard, Soft, and Non-Obligations’ (2016) 28(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 337–58Google Scholar.

61 Rajamani, L., ‘Understanding the 2015 Paris Agreement’, in Dubash, N.K. (ed.), India in a Warming World: Integrating Climate Change and Development (Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 205–21, at 206CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 Rajamani, n. 60 above.

63 The Working Paper on the ISA prepared by the MNRE for the Paris Conference of the Parties (COP) also captured this with a quote from PM Modi: ‘There are several countries blessed with high solar radiation. We are making efforts to bring these countries together for enhanced solar energy utilization through research and technology upgradation. These countries have immense strength and capabilities to find solutions for their energy needs through solar energy’: ISA, n. 5 above, p. 7.

64 Dubash, N.K. & Rajamani, L., ‘Multilateral Diplomacy on Climate Change’, in Malone, D.M., Mohan, C. Raja & Raghavan, S. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 2015) pp. 663–77Google Scholar; Dubash, N.K., ‘Of Maps and Compasses: India in Multilateral Climate Negotiations’, in Sidhu, W.P.S., Mehta, P.B. & Jones, B. (eds), Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), pp. 261–79Google Scholar; Vihma, A., ‘India and the Global Climate Governance: Between Principles and Pragmatism’ (2011) 20(1) The Journal of Environment & Development, pp. 69–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

65 Sengupta, S., ‘International Climate Negotiations and India's Role’, in Dubash, N.K. (ed.), Handbook of Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 101–17Google Scholar.

66 Sengupta, ibid. See also Mohan, A., ‘From Rio to Paris: India in Global Climate Politics’ (2017) 2(3) Rising Powers Quarterly, pp. 39–61Google Scholar.

67 In-person interview, Former Senior Official, MEFCC, Participant 14, 25 July 2018, New Delhi (India); In-person interview, Former Secretary, MEFCC, Participant 4, 26 July 2018, New Delhi (India); In-person interview, Senior Official, MEFCC, Participant 10, 17 July 2018, New Delhi (India).

68 In-person interview, Senior Official, MNRE, Participant 8, 17 July 2018, New Delhi (India); In-person interview, Former Secretary, MEA, Participant 11, 6 Aug. 2018, New Delhi (India); Interview, Participant 10, ibid.

69 Narlikar, A., ‘India's Role in Global Governance: A Modification?’ (2017) 93(1) International Affairs, pp. 93–111CrossRefGoogle Scholar; S. Saran, ‘India's Contemporary Plurilateralism’, in Malone, Raja Mohan & Raghavan, n. 64 above, pp. 623–35.

70 N.K. Dubash, ‘An Introduction to India's Evolving Climate Change Debate: From Diplomatic Insulation to Policy Integration’, in Dubash, n. 61 above, pp. 1–28, at 3.

71 Interview, Participant 11, n. 68 above.

72 Interview, Participant 4, n. 67 above.

73 Some domestic programmes with climate change connotations include: Skill India Mission (to provide skills-based training for 400 million people); Make in India (to encourage greater manufacturing and investment in India); Swachch Bharat Abhiyan (also known as the Clean India Mission); Smart Cities Mission (an urban renewal programme to develop 100 citizen-friendly and sustainable cities across India); National Solar Mission (an initiative to promote solar power).

74 Government of India, MNRE, Resolution No. 5/14/2008-P&C, ‘Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission’, 11 Jan. 2010, available at: https://mnre.gov.in/resolution.

75 Press Information Bureau, ‘Revision of Cumulative Targets under National Solar Mission’, 17 June 2015, available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=122566.

76 Government of India, Central Electricity Authority, ‘All India Installed Capacity (in MW) of Power Stations – July 2019’, 20 Aug. 2019, available at: http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/installedcapacity/2019/installed_capacity-07.pdf

77 FDI up to 100% is permitted in the renewable energy sector under the automatic route and no prior government approval is required; see Government of India, Make in India, ‘FDI Policy: Renewable Energy’, available at: http://www.makeinindia.com/sector/renewable-energy.

78 A. Mathur, ‘India and Paris: A Pragmatic Way Forward’, in Dubash, n. 61 above, pp. 222–9, at 225–7.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 In-person interview, Official, MEA, Participant 7, 19 July 2018, New Delhi (India); In-person interview, Head of Research Organization, Participant 1, 31 July 2018, New Delhi (India). These interviewees cited the successful example of the government scheme for distributing LED bulbs: by increasing the target size of the LED bulb market, LED manufacturing in India obtained a huge boost and, in turn, the economies of scale increased affordability.

84 First ISC Meeting, n. 22 above.

85 In-person interview, Former Secretary, MEA, Participant 12, 18 July 2018, New Delhi (India).

86 India is now producing the world's cheapest solar power: the costs of building large-scale solar installations in India fell by 27% in 2018, year on year, thanks to a combination of low-priced panel imports from China, abundant land and cheap labour; see IRENA, ‘Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2018’, available at: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/May/IRENA_Renewable-Power-Generations-Costs-in-2018.pdf.

87 Telephone interview, Former Official, US Department of State, Participant 21, 30 July 2019, Stanford, CA (US).

88 In-person interview, Head of Policy Think Tank, Participant 3, 3 Aug. 2018, New Delhi (India).

89 In-person interview, Former Secretary, MEA, Participant 13, 26 July 2018, New Delhi (India).

90 In particular, the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), and the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI).

91 Telephone interview, Senior Official, Exim Bank of India, Participant 20, 8 Aug. 2019, Stanford, CA (US). By 2016, in order to increase the availability of investment for solar energy in prospective ISA member countries in Africa, India had earmarked 15–20% of the USD 10 billion line of credit for solar projects over the next five years. See also Medium, ‘Multi-billion Dollar Africa-India Partnership Aims to Eradicate Electricity Poverty’, 13 June 2017, available at: https://medium.com/energy-access-india/multi-billion-dollar-afro-india-partnership-aims-to-eradicate-electricity-poverty-298ec3b95525.

92 Interview with Participant 8, n. 68 above.

93 Interview with Participant 13, n. 89 above.

94 The meetings with Resident Diplomatic Missions in New Delhi were held on 30 July 2015, 5 Nov. 2015, 24 Nov. 2015 and 6 Apr. 2016.

95 First ISC Meeting, n. 22 above, p. 1.

96 Interview with Participant 10, n. 67 above.

97 P5 refers to the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council: i.e., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US.

98 Interview with Participant 7, n. 83 above.

99 Interview with Participant 13, n. 89 above.

100 First ISC Meeting, n. 22 above, p. 1.

101 Interview with Participant 10, n. 67 above (‘The French counterparts were involved but were not a part of the decision making. As co-sponsors they lent support and were a part of the discussions, but all the agenda-setting, meetings etc. were orchestrated by the Government [of India], primarily the Prime Minister's Office’).

102 See remarks of the Chair during the various meetings of the ISC: ISA, ‘Report of the Second Meeting of the International Steering Committee’, 18 Jan. 2016, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (Second ISC Meeting) (‘thanked the Government of France for their continued support and cooperation’); ISA, Report of the Third Meeting of the International Steering Committee, 21 Apr. 2016, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (Third ISC Meeting) (‘expressed its deep appreciation of France's support and collaboration in developing the initial ideas for ISA programmes’); ISA, ‘Report of the Fifth Meeting of the International Steering Committee, 27 Sept. 2017, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (Fifth ISC Meeting) (‘thanked France for their continuous engagement in structuring the ISA process’); ISA, ‘Report of the Sixth Meeting of the International Steering Committee, 20 Feb. 2018, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (Sixth ISC Meeting) (‘put on record his deep appreciation to [the] Government of France for continued and profound support in shaping ISA vision’).

103 Second ISC Meeting, ibid., p. 4; see also Third ISC Meeting, ibid. (the French Co-Chair noted that the Alliance should be the driver of the ‘change of scale’ which is indispensable for deploying solar energy in line with needs and with the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change); see also Fifth ISC Meeting, ibid. (the French Co-chair praised the leadership of India, and stated that ‘the ISA is one of the most important initiatives and a central piece for the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement’).

104 Overland, I. & Reischl, G., ‘A Place in the Sun? IRENA's Position in the Global Energy Governance Landscape’ (2018) 18(3) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, pp. 335–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Urpelainen, J. & Van de Graaf, T., ‘The International Renewable Energy Agency: A Success Story in Institutional Innovation?’ (2015) 15(2) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, pp. 159–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105 Interview with Participant 8, n. 68 above.

106 First ISC Meeting, n. 22 above, p. 5.

107 Particularly institutions working in the renewable energy sector, such as the IEA, IRENA, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), UN bodies, bilateral organizations, and similar.

108 ISA, ‘About ISA’, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/background.

109 Interview with Participant 11, n. 68 above.

110 Interview with Participant 1, n. 83 above.

111 Interview with Participant 11, n. 68 above.

112 Interview with Participant 7, n. 83 above.

113 Several countries, such as Australia, Chile, France, Ethiopia, the Netherlands, and the United Arab Emirates, called for the ISA to undertake tangible, action-oriented projects and avoid duplication of efforts with other organizations working in the renewable energy sector; see First ISC Meeting, n. 22 above, pp. 2–4.

114 Many countries, such as Australia, France, Maldives, and the Netherlands, emphasized the need to leverage and promote private sector participation; see First ISC Meeting, n. 22 above, p. 6.

115 Ibid., p. 2.

116 Art. VIII Framework Agreement. The ISA has signed joint declarations with several partner organizations, such as Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Climate Parliament, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), R20 – Regions of Climate Action, International Energy Agency (IEA), IRENA, World Bank, New Development Bank, UN Development Programme (UNDP), and Green Climate Fund (GCF).

117 ADB, AfDB, AIIB, CAF – Development Bank of Latin America, Climate Parliament, Commonwealth Secretariat, Department for International Development (DFID), East African Centre for Excellence for Renewable Energy and Efficiency (EACREEE), EBRD, ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE), EIB, European Union (EU), GCF, Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), Global Off-Grid Lighting Association (GOGLA), Global Solar Council, IEA, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), IRENA, New Development Bank, R20 – Regions of Climate Action, Schneider Electric Foundation, Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL), UN Convention to Combat Desertification, UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), UNDP, UN Environment Programme, UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), World Associate of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA), World Bank, World Resources Institute (WRI).

118 China Light and Power Company Ltd (CLP), Coal India Ltd, India Trade Promotion Organisation (ITPO), IREDA, NTPC Ltd, Power Finance Corporation (PFC), Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd, Rural Electrification Corporation (REC), SoftBank Group, SECI.

119 ISA, ‘Partners and Collaborations’, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/partners/organisations.

120 ISA, ‘Report of the Third Meeting of the Interim Administrative Cell of the International Solar Alliance’, 11 Mar. 2016, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (Third IAC Meeting).

121 ENGIE is a French multinational electric utility company, which operates in the fields of energy transition, electricity generation and distribution, natural gas, nuclear, renewable energy, and petroleum.

122 The APCTT is a Regional Institute of UNESCAP (n. 117 above) with a geographic focus of the entire Asia-Pacific region. The mandate of the APCTT is to assist the members and associate members of UNESCAP through strengthening their capabilities to develop and manage national innovation systems; develop, transfer, adapt and apply technology; improve the terms of transfer of technology; and identify and promote the development and transfer of technologies relevant to the region.

123 Second ISC Meeting, n. 102 above, pp. 2–3.

124 Third ISC Meeting, n. 102 above, p. 1.

125 The TWI is a global non-profit organization designed to work together with the ISA and its member states in establishing the proper regulatory conditions for a massive deployment of competitive solar generation.

126 The CEEW is an India-based not-for-profit policy research institution.

127 The CII is an industry association in India.

128 The TCX is designed to mitigate currency and interest rate risks in order to attract and lock in long-term private equity and private debt in local currency. Through these risk mitigation instruments the TCX intends to enable and scale climate change mitigation investments.

129 Fifth ISC Meeting, n. 102 above, p. 11. By 2019 the CRMM had been officially taken over by the World Bank to mobilize USD 500 million of concessional finance to unlock the potential of renewables in developing countries by 2025. The Solar Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) – led by the World Bank-Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (WB-ESMAP), in partnership with Agence Française de Développement, IRENA, and the ISA – aims to support countries in developing sustainable solar programmes that will attract private investment and so reduce reliance on public finances; see World Bank, ‘Solar Risk Mitigation Initiative’, available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/energy/brief/srmi.

130 Two programmes, ‘Scaling Solar Applications for Agricultural Use’ and ‘Affordable Finance at Scale’, were launched on 22 Apr. 2016 on the margins of the signing of the Paris Agreement at the UN in New York (US). A third programme, ‘Scaling Solar Mini Grids’, was launched at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank Group on 24 May 2017, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India).

131 The fourth and fifth work programmes, ‘Scaling Rooftop Solar’ and ‘Scaling Solar E-Mobility and Storage’, were launched on the sidelines of the ISA Founding Conference, Mar. 2018.

132 Interview with Participant 3, n. 88 above.

133 First IAC Meeting, n. 26 above, p. 3.

134 ISA, ‘Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Interim Administrative Cell of the International Solar Alliance’, 18 Mar. 2016, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (Fourth IAC Meeting).

135 Third ISC Meeting, n. 102 above, p. 2.

136 Sixth IAC Meeting, n. 27 above.

137 Third IAC Meeting, n. 120 above, p. 1.

138 Remarks of George N. Sibley, Minister Counsellor, US Embassy: Sixth IAC Meeting, n. 27 above, p. 2.

139 ISA, ‘Report of the Fourth Meeting of the International Steering Committee’, 5 Oct. 2016, p. 7, available at: https://isolaralliance.org/about/steering-committees (Fourth ISC Meeting).

140 Ibid., p. 7.

141 Ibid.

142 Interview with Participant 4, n. 67 above.

143 Third IAC Meeting, n. 120 above.

144 Sixth IAC Meeting, n. 27 above.

145 Interview with Participant 7, n. 83 above

146 Interview with Participant 11, n. 68 above.

147 Interview with Participant 4, n. 67 above (‘treaty-based organization is assured of longevity’); Interview with Participant 10, n. 67 above (‘treaty-based organization has long-term value’); Interview with Participant 11, n. 68 above (‘treaty form makes it more serious otherwise it [the organization] could remain unstructured’).

148 S. Shidore & J.W. Busby, ‘One More Try: The International Solar Alliance and India's Search for Geopolitical Influence’ (2019) 26 Energy Strategy Reviews online articles, article 100385, available at: https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2211467X19300781?token=59D0B80F71F34B97F74EEF0253B8010E580CFFF89CC40FA1DAF661627E0B8F4CCF787A734C18DF3B548737A94007F23B.

149 Interview with Participant 13, n. 89 above.

150 Interview with Participant 7, n. 83 above

151 Interview with Participant 3, n. 88 above.

152 Interview with Participant 12, n. 85 above.

153 Interview with Participant 10, n. 67 above.

154 Interview with Participant 3, n. 88 above.