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Risk Regulation and Transnationality: Institutional Accountability as a Driver of Innovation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2014

Robert Baldwin ,
Julia Black  and
Gerard O’Leary
Robert Baldwin
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Department of Law, London (United Kingdom). Email: [email protected].
Julia Black
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Department of Law, London (United Kingdom). Email: [email protected].
Gerard O’Leary
Affiliation:
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Dublin (Ireland). Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

This article describes the processes that led the Irish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop a National Inspection Plan for domestic waste water treatment systems, following intervention from European Union institutions. The discussion focuses on two issues: the role of transnational institutional settings in galvanizing innovation and regulatory reform, and the practical challenges of dealing with lower risks. It is argued that multi-level transnational regimes have considerable potential to stimulate high-level reviews of regulatory strategy. As a result, lower risks present challenges that cannot be ignored in favour of policies that focus on the most severe risks. Traditional risk regulation theories, it is contended, do not provide much assistance in selecting intervention strategies in the face of such pressures, but the example of the Irish EPA shows how regulators can address these issues.

Keywords

Risk RegulationTransnational LawEuropean LawRisk-Based RegulationEnvironmental Regulation
Type
Articles
Information
Transnational Environmental Law , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , October 2014 , pp. 373 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

1 Baldwin, R. & Black, J., ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71(1) The Modern Law Review, pp. 59–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Black, J. & Baldwin, R., ‘Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation’ (2010) 32(2) Law & Policy, pp. 181–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Black, J., ‘The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New Public Management in the UK’ (2005) Public Law, pp. 512–49.Google Scholar

4 For more details of the design process, see Black, J. & Baldwin, R., ‘When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: Approaches and Challenges’ (2012) 6(1) Regulation & Governance, pp. 2–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Black, J. & Baldwin, R., ‘When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: A Strategic Framework’ (2012) 6(1) Regulation & Governance, pp. 131–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 [1975] OJ L 194/39, last amended by Directive 2008/98/EC [2008] OJ L 312/3.

6 Case C-188/08, European Commission v. Ireland [2009] ECR I-172.

7 Case C-374/11, European Commission v. Ireland (not yet reported).

8 [2010] OJ C 83/47.

9 Judgment in Case C-374/11, n. 7 above, at para. 21.

10 See, e.g., ‘Septic Tank Inspections to Begin Within Weeks’, The Irish Times, 11 Nov. 2013; ‘Ireland Fined €2 Million over Failure to Impose Septic Tank Rules’, thejournal.ie, 11 Nov. 2013.

11 Council of the European Union, Implementing Decision on Granting Union Assistance to Ireland, 7 Dec. 2010, Art. 7(c); MOU on Specific Economic Conditionality, 3 Dec. 2010, para 4.iii, available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/content/int?lang=EN&typ=SMPL.

12 See, e.g., S. MacConnell, ‘Septic Tank Owners Face Stealth Fees’, The Irish Times, 4 Nov. 2011; T. Hogan, ‘Owners Face €100 Fee for Registering Septic Tanks’, The Independent, 7 Nov. 2011.

13 J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (HarperCollins, 1984).

14 Cohen, M.D., March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P., ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice’ (1972) 17(1) Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 On the role of policy entrepreneurs see, e.g., Mintrom, M., ‘Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation’ (1997) 42 American Journal of Political Science, pp. 738–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2000), at pp. 532–49. On different approaches to analyzing regulatory innovation see J. Black, M. Lodge & M. Thatcher, Regulatory Innovation (Edward Elgar, 2004).

16 R. Baldwin & J. Black, Assessing the Effectiveness of Regulatory Activities at ‘Low Risk’ Sites and Proposed Good Practice Framework – Final Report on Project ER13 (Scotland and Northern Ireland Forum for Environmental Research, 2011) (SNIFFER 2011).

17 The 22 potential tools for controlling low-risk sites/activities that were identified are set out in Black & Baldwin, ‘When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: Approaches and Challenges’, n. 4 above, at p. 17, Table 2.

18 See Baldwin & Black, n. 1 above, and Black & Baldwin, n. 2 above.

19 International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), White Paper on Risk Governance: Towards an Integrated Approach (by O. Renn with Annexes by P. Graham) (IRGC, 2005); WBGU (German Advisory Council on Global Change), World in Transition: Strategies for Managing Global Environmental Risks (WBGU, 2000); Black, n. 3 above.

20 IRGC, ibid.

21 A. Wildavksy, Searching for Safety (Transaction, 1998); Klinke, A. & Renn, O., ‘Precautionary Principle and Discursive Strategies: Classifying and Managing Risks’ (2002) 4(2) Journal of Risk Research, pp. 159–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; T. O’Riordan & J. Cameron, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan, 2002).

22 On capacity see R. Kagan & J. Scholz, ‘The Criminology of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies’, in K. Hawkins & J. Thomas (eds), Enforcing Regulation (Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1984); Haines, F., ‘Addressing the Risk, Reading the Landscape: The Role of Agency in Regulation’ (2011) 5(1) Regulation & Governance, pp. 118–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; R. Baldwin, ‘Why Rules Don’t Work’ (1990) 53(3) The Modern Law Review, pp. 321–37. On compliance motivations see Braithwaite, V., Murphy, K. & Reinhart, M., ‘Taxation Threat, Motivational Postures and Responsive Regulation’ (2007) 29(1) Law & Policy, pp. 137–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 See Black & Baldwin, ‘When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: Approaches and Challenges’, n. 4 above, at p. 17, Table 2.

24 See SNIFFER, n. 16 above.

25 C. Argyris & D. Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Addison Wesley, 1978).

26 The full GRAF is set out in SNIFFER, n. 16 above.

27 SNIFFER 2011, n. 16 above

28 Case C188/08, n. 6 above.

29 EPA, Inspection Plan for Domestic Waste Water Systems (EPA, 2013), available at: http://www.epa.ie/news/pr/2013/february/name,50894,en.html.

30 See, e.g., Dutch Ministry of Justice, The Table of Eleven: A Versatile Tool (The Hague, 2004).

31 Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy [2000] OJ L 327/1.

32 J. Black, M. Lodge & M. Thatcher, Regulatory Innovation (Edward Elgar, 2005), at pp. 9–11.