¹ For a recent account of the security implications of the illegal wildlife trade, see Ratchford, M., Allgood, B. & Todd, P., Criminal Nature: The Global Security Implications of the Illegal Wildlife Trade (International Fund for Animal Welfare, 2013), available at: http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/IFAW-Criminal-Nature-global-security-illegal-wildlife-trade.pdf.Google Scholar

² Many environmental products are CRAVED – Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable – making them an attractive prospect for criminals: Clarke, R.V., Hot Products: Understanding, Anticipating and Reducing Demand for Stolen Goods, Police Research Series Paper 112 (UK Home Office, 1999)Google Scholar, available at: http://tna.europarchive.org/20071206133532/homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fprs112.pdf. See also Pires, S.F. & Clarke, R.V., ‘Are Parrots CRAVED? An Analysis of Parrot Poaching in Mexico’ (2012) 49(1) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, pp. 122–46Google Scholar, at 139, who suggest that in relation to some items (specifically in that case Mexican parrots) ‘available’ might be broken down into two measures, ‘abundant’ and ‘accessible’, making the mnemonic CRAAVED.

³ Beccaria, C., On Crimes and Punishments, and Other Writings, Bellamy, R. (ed), Davies, R. with Cox, V. & Bellamy, R. (tr) (Cambridge University Press, 1764/1995)Google Scholar; Williams, K. & Hawkins, R., ‘Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Overview’ (1986) 20 Law and Society Review, pp. 545–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nagin, D.S., ‘Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century’, in Tonry, M. (ed), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research (University of Chicago Press, 1998)Google Scholar, pp. 1–42. For a nuanced examination of the relationship between deterrence, certainty of punishment and perceived seriousness of crimes, see Erickson, M.L., Gibbs, J.P. & Jensen, G.F., ‘The Deterrence Doctrine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments’ (1977) 42 American Sociological Review, pp. 305–17Google Scholar. For an analysis of the economic disincentives for the commission of particular environmental crimes and of the effectiveness of enforcement, see Akella, A.S. & Cannon, J.B., Strengthening the Weakest Links: Strategies for Improving the Enforcement of Environmental Laws Globally, Center for Conservation and Government Report (Conservation International, 2004)Google Scholar, available at: http://www.oecd.org/environment/outreach/33947741.pdf.

⁴ V. Wright, ‘Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment’, The Sentencing Project, Nov. 2010, at p. 2, available at: http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/Deterrence%20Briefing%20.pdf.

⁵ Wright, G., ‘Conceptualising and Combating Transnational Environmental Crime’ (2011) 14(4) Trends in Organized Crime, pp. 332–46Google Scholar, at 334; see also White, R., Transnational Environmental Crime: Toward an Eco-Global Criminology (Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar; White, R., ‘NGO Engagement in Environmental Law Enforcement: Critical Reflections’ (2012) 4(1) Australasian Policing: A Journal of Professional Practice and Research, pp. 7–11.Google Scholar

⁶ Wellsmith has argued that punishment is in any event ineffective as a deterrent; in other words, even if punishment is certain and severe, it is unlikely to result in significant reductions in offending: see Wellsmith, M., ‘The Applicability of Crime Prevention to Problems of Environmental Harm: A Consideration of Illicit Trade in Endangered Species’, in White, R. (ed), Global Environmental Harm: Criminological Perspectives (Willan, 2010), pp. 132–49Google Scholar; Wellsmith, M., ‘Preventing Wildlife Crime’ (2012) 90(1) Criminal Justice Matters, pp. 18–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ Akella & Cannon, n. 3 above; White (2012), n. 5 above. This is a problem for criminal justice systems across the world. As Kleiman notes in the context of the United States (US), ‘[t]he resources of the current criminal justice system, matched against the volume of crime, simply do not allow it to punish, even modestly, all offenses or all offenders. Trying to control everything and everyone … leads to sporadic and delayed punishments as the system overloads’: M.A.R. Kleiman, When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton University Press, 2009), at p. 3.

⁸ Available at: http://www.unodc.org/toc.

⁹ ‘Transnational Organized Crime – The Globalized Illegal Economy: Facts’ , available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/factsheets/TOC12_fs_general_EN_HIRES.pdf.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Gunningham, N. & Grabosky, P., Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Clarendon Press, 1998); White (2012), n. 5 above.Google Scholar

¹¹ Clarke, R.V., ‘Situational Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice’ (1980) 20(2) British Journal of Criminology, pp. 136–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Graycar, A. & Felson, M., ‘Situational Prevention of Organised Timber Theft and Related Corruption’, in Bullock, K., Clarke, R.V. & Tilley, N. (eds), Situational Prevention of Organised Crimes (Willan, 2010), pp. 81–92.Google Scholar

¹³ M. Wellsmith (2010), n. 6 above.

¹⁴ Schneider, J., Sold into Extinction: The Global Trade in Endangered Species (Praeger, 2012).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ For an example, see Pires, S.F. & Moreto, W.D., ‘Preventing Wildlife Crime: Solutions that Can Overcome the “Tragedy of the Commons”’ (2011) 17(2) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, pp. 101–23.Google Scholar

¹⁶ The role of third parties and how they can be harnessed by the state for crime control has been considered in relation to other areas of illegal activity, such as the trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs. See, e.g., Cherney, A., O’Reilly, J. & Grabosky, P., ‘Networks and Meta-Regulation: Strategies Aimed at Governing Illicit Synthetic Drugs’ (2006) 16(4) Policing and Society, pp. 370–85.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Braithwaite, J., ‘The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology’ (2000) 40(2) British Journal of Criminology, pp. 222–38, at 222.Google Scholar

¹⁸ It has been noted by various authors that the public police never had a complete monopoly on policing: see, e.g., Zedner, L., ‘Policing Before and After the Police: The Historical Antecedents of Contemporary Crime Control’ (2006) 46(1) British Journal of Criminology, pp. 78–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ayling, J., Grabosky, P. & Shearing, C., Lengthening the Arm of the Law: Enhancing Police Resources in the 21^st Century (Cambridge University Press, 2009)Google Scholar. Be that as it may, there is a considerable body of literature that traces the burgeoning of policing providers over the last two decades, beginning with the seminal work of Bayley, D.H. & Shearing, C., ‘The Future of Policing’ (1996) 30(3) Law and Society Review, pp. 585–606.Google Scholar

¹⁹ D.H. Bayley & C. Shearing, The New Structure of Policing: Description, Conceptualization, and Research Agenda (National Institute of Justice, 2001).

²⁰ Loader, I., ‘Plural Policing and Democratic Governance’ (2000) 9(3) Social and Legal Studies, pp. 323–45.Google Scholar

²¹ Garland, D., ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society’ (1996) 36(4) British Journal of Criminology, pp. 445–71Google Scholar; O’Malley, P. & Palmer, D., ‘Post-Keynesian Policing’ (1996) 25(2) Economy and Society, pp. 137–55.Google Scholar

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²³ Ayling, Grabosky & Shearing, n. 18 above, at p. 5.

²⁴ Ayling, J., ‘Force Multiplier: People as a Policing Resource’ (2007) 31(1) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, pp. 73–100.Google Scholar

²⁵ H.R. Clinton, ‘Remarks at the Partnership Meeting on Wildlife Trafficking’, US Dept. of State, 8 Nov. 2012, available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/11/200294.htm.

²⁶ Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (RAND, 2001)Google Scholar; Slaughter, A.-M., ‘Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks’ (2004) 39(2) Government and Opposition, pp. 159–90.Google Scholar

²⁷ At the national and regional levels, the Australasian Environmental Law Enforcement and Regulators neTwork (AELERT) provides a good example. Internationally, INTERPOL’s National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST) initiative has recently been launched. Such task forces bring together police, customs, environmental agencies, other specialized agencies, prosecutors, non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental agencies into national multi-agency cooperatives to control TEC.

²⁸ See, e.g., ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference (ASEANAPOL) and its partnership with INTERPOL, available at: http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2011/PR047.

²⁹ Dupont, B., Grabosky, P. & Shearing, C., ‘The Governance of Security in Weak and Failing States’ (2003) 3(4) Criminal Justice, pp. 331–49.Google Scholar

³⁰ Cornish, D.B., ‘The Procedural Analysis of Offending and its Relevance to Situational Prevention’, in Clarke, R.V. (ed), Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 3 (Criminal Justice Press, 1994), pp. 151–96.Google Scholar

³¹ Bullock, K., Clarke, R.V. & Tilley, N., ‘Introduction’, in Bullock, K., Clarke, R.V. & Tilley, N. (eds), Situational Prevention of Organised Crime (Willan, 2010), pp. 1–16, at 2.Google Scholar

³² Ibid.

³³ Milliken, T. & Shaw, J., The South Africa-Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A Deadly Combination of Institutional Lapses, Corrupt Wildlife Industry Professionals and Asian Crime Syndicates (TRAFFIC, 2012), available at: http://www.traffic.org/speciesreports/traffic_species_mammals66.pdf.Google Scholar

³⁴ Wellsmith provides a detailed explanation of each of these theories, so I will not do so here: see Wellsmith (2010), n. 6 above.

³⁵ Cohen, L. & Felson, M., ‘Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach’ (1979) 44(4) American Sociological Review, pp. 588–608.Google Scholar

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³⁸ World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: A Consultation with Governments, (WWF/Dalberg, 2012), available at: http://www.dalberg.com/documents/WWF_Wildlife_Trafficking.pdf.Google Scholar

³⁹ von Lampe, K., ‘The Application of the Framework of Situational Crime Prevention to “Organized Crime”’ (2011) 11(2) Criminology and Criminal Justice, pp. 145–63.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Kahler and Gore note that there are several possible motivations for wildlife crime and, in their empirical study of poaching in the Caprivi region of north-east Namibia, they identify nine motivational categories that include but go beyond ‘cooking pot and pocket book’ explanations. They note that diverse motivations should elicit different approaches to reducing poaching: Kahler, J.S. & Gore, M.L., ‘Beyond the Cooking Pot and Pocket Book: Factors Influencing Noncompliance with Wildlife Poaching Rules’ (2012) 36(2) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, pp. 103–20Google Scholar. See also Nurse, A., Animal Harm: Perspectives on Why People Harm and Kill Animals (Ashgate, 2013)Google Scholar, highlighting the need to take account of motives in crafting regulatory responses to animal cruelty.

⁴¹ Parker, C. & Braithwaite, J., ‘Regulation’, in Cane, P. & Tushnet, M. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 119–45.Google Scholar

⁴² Ayres, I. & Braithwaite, J., Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

⁴³ There is no need to go further in this article into the complexities of responsive regulation and the concomitant well-known enforcement pyramid.

⁴⁴ Grabosky, P., ‘Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance’ (1995) 8(4) Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, pp. 527–50Google Scholar; Cherney, O’Reilly & Grabosky, n. 16 above.

⁴⁵ R. Brewer, ‘Policing the Waterfront: The Social Structure of Collaborative Crime Control’ (PhD thesis, Australian National University, Jan. 2012), at p. 54.

⁴⁶ Rademeyer, J., Killing for Profit: Exposing the Illegal Rhino Horn Trade (Zebra Press, 2012), pp. 168–93.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Smillie, S., ‘Joy as Rhino Smuggler Gets 40 Years’, IOL News, 10 Nov. 2012, available at: http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/joy-as-rhino-smuggler-gets-40-years-1.1420788.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Humane Society International, ‘Rhinoceros Horn Stockpiles: A Serious Threat to Rhinos’, 2011, available at: http://www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/rhino_horn_stockpiles_report.pdf.

⁴⁹ Grabosky, n. 44 above, at p. 530.

⁵⁰ Cherney, O’Reilly & Grabosky, n. 16 above, at p. 376.

⁵¹ Available at: http://www.interpol.int/en/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Projects/Project-Scale.

⁵² See http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work.aspx.

⁵³ See http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/PR060.

⁵⁴ See http://content.met.police.uk/Site/wildlifecrime, and the Operation Charm fact sheet at http://www.davidshepherd.org/project/operation-charm.

⁵⁵ Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 5 June 1992, in force 29 Dec. 1993, available at: http://www.cbd.int/convention/text.

⁵⁶ Washington, DC (US), 3 Mar. 1973, in force 1 July 1975, available at: http//:www.cites.org.

⁵⁷ See http://www.traffic.org/overview.

⁵⁸ See http://www.iucn.org/about.

⁵⁹ Grabosky, n. 44 above, at p. 534.

⁶⁰ Cherney, O’Reilly & Grabosky, n. 16 above, at p. 376.

⁶¹ Mazerolle, L. & Ransley, J., Third Party Policing (Cambridge University Press, 2005).Google Scholar

⁶² 16 U.S.C. §1531 et seq., 1973.

⁶³ 16 U.S.C. §1540 (g). Relevant non-discretionary government duties are provided for in 16 U.S.C. §1533.

⁶⁴ An often cited application of this provision is the Flying Fox case, Booth v. Bosworth [2001] FCA 1453. The applicant for the injunction in question was employed by the Worldwide Fund for Nature (Australia), and also did voluntary work for the North Queensland Conservation Council and the Magnetic Island Nature Care Association. She had also cared for orphaned flying foxes. Her standing was accepted by the court with little debate.

⁶⁵ S. Burbank, S. Farhang & H.M. Kritzer, ‘Private Enforcement of Statutory and Administrative Law in the United States (and Other Common Law Countries)’, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-08, 16 Nov. 2011, University of Pennsylvania Law School, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781047.

⁶⁶ Grabosky, P., ‘Regulation by Reward: On the Use of Incentives as Regulatory Instruments’ (1995) 17(3) Law and Policy, pp. 257–82, at 262.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Pires & Moreto, n. 15 above, at p. 112.

⁶⁸ In South Africa, poaching activities can be reported through the general Crimestop number provided by the government. Third parties often provide hotlines too. For example, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (a statutory entity which reports to the relevant minister through its board) provides several contact numbers for the reporting of different kinds of poaching. Similarly, the Kenya Wildlife Conservation Forum (KWCF), part of the NGO, East African Wild Life Society (EAWLS), has recently established a hotline for reporting wildlife crimes in response to the upsurge in elephant and rhinoceros poaching: see http://www.eawildlife.org/the-news/eawlsnews/184-wildlife-crime-hotline-goes-live.

⁶⁹ Since Dec. 2012, Kruger National Park in South Africa has been using a Seeker II unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, loaned to the SANParks by its South African manufacturer, to patrol for poachers, particularly of rhinoceros. The Ol Pejeta Conservancy in Kenya used an internet campaign to raise money for its own drone and currently has the parts on order: see Kariuki, J., ‘Ol Pejeta Deploys Drone against Rhino Poachers’, Business Daily, 23 Jan. 2013, available at: http://www.businessdailyafrica.com.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Investigation of TEC by NGOs has often been helpful for the police in bringing prosecutions: see White (2011), n. 5 above.

⁷¹ Carnie, T., ‘Plan to Sell Rhino Horns to China’, IOL News, 13 July 2012, available at: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/plan-to-sell-rhino-horns-to-china-1.1340599.Google Scholar

⁷² See https://ic.fsc.org.

⁷³ However, states often provide support for private initiatives such as certification schemes. For instance, Austria provided funding that was key to laying the foundations for the FSC: Bartley, T., ‘Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions’ (2007) 113(2) American Journal of Sociology, pp. 297–351Google Scholar. States may also facilitate discussion about environmental standards, provide auditing mechanisms or incorporate certification requirements into their own regulatory schemes: Meidinger, E.E., ‘Forest Certification as Environmental Law Making by Global Civil Society’, in Meidinger, E.E., Elliott, C. & Oesten, G. (eds), Social and Political Dimensions of Forest Certification (Remangen Oberwinter, 2003), pp. 293–329Google Scholar; Vogel, D., ‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: Achievements and Limitations’ (2010) 49(1) Business & Society, pp. 68–87Google Scholar. Relationships between private environmental initiatives and government regulation are complex and raise interesting issues about complementarity and conflict that need further research: Bartley, T., ‘Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation’, in Levi-Faur, D. (ed), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2011), pp. 441–52.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification: see http://www.pefc.org.

⁷⁵ See http://www.fairtrade.net.

⁷⁶ Vandenburgh dubs this type of private regulation through contract ‘the new Wal-Mart effect’: Vandenburgh, M.P., ‘The New Wal-Mart Effect’ (2007) 54(4) UCLA Law Review, pp. 913–70Google Scholar. IKEA, for example, imposes minimum standards on its wood product suppliers and regularly audits them with the aim of ensuring that those products come from sustainably managed forests. Non-compliant suppliers are required to immediately implement corrective action. IKEA and the WWF also work together on projects to increase the availability of FSC certified wood and reduce illegal logging in countries such as Russia, Cambodia and Romania: see http://www.ikea.com/ms/img/newsroom/wlw/FACTSforestryFINAL20jan.pdf. This show of environmental concern on the part of large purchasers originated as a defensive response to targeted activist campaigns designed to embarrass and shame them and their suppliers. However, the acceptance of responsibility for the environmental practices of suppliers has now become a business norm: Vogel, n. 73 above, at p. 79.

⁷⁷ Grabosky, n. 44 above, at pp. 536–7.

⁷⁸ Vogel, n. 73 above, at pp. 76–8.

⁷⁹ Grabosky, P., ‘On the Interface of Criminal Justice and Regulation’, in Quirk, H., Seddon, T. & Smith, G. (eds), Regulation and Criminal Justice: Innovations in Policy and Research (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 72–100, at 96.Google Scholar

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⁸¹ Sometimes these ideas relate to the acceptability of breaking laws and causing collateral harm in pursuit of crime prevention and law enforcement objectives: see White (2012), n. 5 above.

⁸² Ayling, J., ‘What Sustains Wildlife Crime? Rhino Horn Trading and the Resilience of Criminal Networks’ (2013) 16(1) Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, pp. 57–80.Google Scholar

⁸³ V. Felbab-Brown, Indonesia Field Report III – The Orangutan’s Road: Illegal Logging and Mining in Indonesia, Foreign Policy Trip Reports No. 37, Brookings Institute, 7 Feb. 2013, at p. 7, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/02/07-indonesia-illegal-logging-mining-felbabbrown.

⁸⁴ See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whatwedo.

⁸⁵ Ayling, Grabosky & Shearing, n. 18 above.

⁸⁶ Grabosky, n. 44 above, at p. 538.

⁸⁷ Crawford, A., The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships (Clarendon Press, 1997).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ O’Flynn suggests that, in fact, few state/non-state working relationships can be described as truly collaborative. She cites the typology of Himmelmann, for whom collaboration is at the apex of four strategies of working together, the others (in order of degrees of linkage) being networking, coordination and cooperation: O’Flynn, J., ‘Elusive Appeal or Aspirational Ideal? The Rhetoric and Reality of the “Collaborative Turn” in Public Policy’, in O’Flynn, J. & Wanna, J. (eds), Collaborative Governance: A New Era of Public Policy in Australia? (The Australian National University (ANU) E Press, 2008), pp. 181–95, at 185–6.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Brewer, n. 45 above, at pp. 6, 229 (for example). Brewer is concerned with crime on the waterfront and the relations that exist between the various actors that have an input into the operations of ports, but his conclusions about social capital are relevant to any context where the state attempts to harness the capacities of non-state actors for crime control.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 228–54.

⁹¹ Trust is not essential for criminal cooperation, which can occur in the absence of initial trust or in the presence of outright mistrust: von Lampe, K. & Johansen, P.O., ‘Organized Crime and Trust: On the Conceptualization and Empirical Relevance of Trust in the Context of Criminal Networks’ (2003) 6(2) Global Crime, pp. 159–84, at 177–80.Google Scholar

⁹² Available at: http://www.cites.org/eng/resources/pub/Wildlife_Crime_Analytic_Toolkit.pdf.