¹ Current studies on rapid and continuing environmental degradation abound. See, e.g., the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report, available at: http://www.maweb.org/en/Index.aspx.

² These successes would be difficult to determine since ‘success’ is relative, it is difficult to quantify, and ultimately a determination of ‘success’ depends on a value judgment. Nevertheless, one possible example of a global environmental governance regime that is often considered a success is the international ozone layer protection regime. It is perceived to be successful because it has secured a good level of global adherence; it operates in a dynamic and flexible way; the level of compliance in developed states is apparently very high; and there has been a measurable reduction in ozone-depleting substances: Birnie, P., Boyle, A. & Redgwell, C., International Law and the Environment (3^rd edn., Oxford University Press, 2009), at pp. 354–5.Google Scholar

³ Constitutionalism can be no panacea because there is a range of other functional and theoretical approaches to attend to law and governance woes, and, as Douglas Kysar states in his latest book and elsewhere in this volume, constitutionalism is ‘a work in progress, asymptomatically striving towards an unattainable but undeniable goal of universal recognition and respect’: Kysar, A.D., Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity (Yale University Press, 2010), at p. 245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ See generally Beyerlin, U. & Marauhn, T., International Environmental Law (Hart, 2011), at pp. 241–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gunningham, N., ‘Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 179–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ See generally Hurrell, A. & Kingsbury, B. (eds.), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon Press, 1992).Google Scholar

⁶ A selection of literature on global environmental governance includes: Chambers, B.W. & Green, J.F. (eds.), Reforming International Environmental Governance: From Institutional Limits to Innovative Reforms (United Nations University Press, 2005)Google Scholar; DeSombre, E.R., Global Environmental Institutions (Routledge, 2006)Google Scholar; Esty, D.C., ‘Global Environmental Governance’, in Bradford, C.I. & Linn, J.F. (eds.), Global Governance Reform: Breaking the Stalemate (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 108–14Google Scholar; Kanie, N. & Haas, P.M. (eds.), Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance (United Nations University Press, 2004).Google Scholar

⁷ Haas, P.M., ‘Global Environmental Governance’, in Commission on Global Governance, Issues in Global Governance (Kluwer Law International, 1995), pp. 333–70Google Scholar, at 351.

⁸ Young’s broad view of institutions suggests that they are ‘sets of rules of the game or codes of conduct that serve to define social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide the interactions among occupants of these roles ... all institutions are social artifacts created by human beings – consciously or unconsciously – to cope with problems of coordination and cooperation that arise as a result of interdependencies among the activities of distinct individuals or social groups’: Young, O.R., International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Cornell University Press, 1994), at p. 3.Google Scholar

⁹ Engel, R.J., ‘Introduction’, in Engel, R.J., Westra, L. & Bosselmann, K. (eds.), Democracy, Ecological Integrity and International Law (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), pp. 2–7Google Scholar, at 2.

¹⁰ Perez, O., ‘The Many Faces of the Trade–Environment Conflict: Some Lessons for the Constitutionalisation Project’, in Joerges, C., Sand, I. & Teubner, G. (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart, 2004), pp. 233–56.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid., at pp. 236–7.

¹² See, among others, the authorities listed in nn. 4 and 6 above.

¹³ Young, n. 8 above, at p. 30.

¹⁴ Peters, A., The Constitutionalist Reconstruction of International Law: Pros and Cons (NCCR International Trade Working Paper No. 11(07–2006), at p. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Kirchhof points out that, even today, the constitutional concept is still not used uniformly: ‘[D]er Verfassungsbegriff wird auch heute noch immer nicht einheitlich verwendent’: Kirchhof, P., ‘Verfassunggebung jenseits des Verfassungsstaates?’, in Trute, H. et al. . (eds.), Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht: zur Tragfähigkeit eines Konzepts (Mohr Siebeck, 2008)Google Scholar, pp. 769–93, at 770.

¹⁶ Allen, M.H., ‘Globalization and Peremptory Norms in International Law: From Westphalian to Global Constitutionalism’ (2004) (41) International Politics, pp. 341–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 342.

¹⁷ Wiener, A., ‘Editorial: Evolving Norms of Constitutionalism’ (2003) 9(1) European Law Journal, pp. 1–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at pp. 1–2, 5.

¹⁸ Wiener, ibid., at p. 5. Bodansky proposes that constitutions set the fundamental rules of a polity: Bodansky, D., ‘Is There an International Environmental Constitution?’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, pp. 565–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 570.

¹⁹ Bryde, B., ‘International Democratic Constitutionalism’, in Macdonald, R. & Johnston, D.M., (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005)Google Scholar, pp. 103–25, at 105.

²⁰ Peters, n. 14 above, at p. 5.

²¹ Peters, A. & Armingeon, K., ‘Introduction: Global Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, pp. 385–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 387.

²² Ibid., at p. 389.

²³ As Ackerman states: ‘The English had never indulged the Enlightenment conceit that a formal constitution was necessary for modern government. It was their culture of self-government, their common sense and decency, that distinguished their evolving commitment to democratic principles – not paper constitutions and institutional gimmicks like judicial review’: Ackerman, B., ‘The Rise of World Constitutionalism’ (1996) Yale Law School: Occasional Papers, Paper 4, available at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=ylsop_papers&sei-redir=1#search=%22yale%20law%20school%20occasional%20papers%20ackerman%22.Google Scholar

²⁴ Bodansky, n. 18 above, at p. 569.

²⁵ Maduro, M.P., ‘The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism’ (2005) 3(2/3) International Journal of Constitutional Law, pp. 332–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 333.

²⁶ Johnston, D.M., ‘World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law’ in St. John Macdonald, R. & Johnston, D.M. (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005)Google Scholar, pp. 3–29, at 17–18; Venter, F., ‘Die Staat, Staatsreg en Globalisering’ (2008) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, pp. 412–24Google Scholar, at 416.

²⁷ Summers, R.S., ‘The Principles of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 74(5) Notre Dame Law Review, pp. 1691–712Google Scholar, at 1692.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ In the words of Bosselmann: ‘Unbestritten ist die Verfassungsebene das zentrale Feld der Auseinandersetzung um gesellschaftliche Wertorientierungen. Nirgendwo sonst bietet sich eine vergleichbare Ebene, auf der sich Werte und Leitprinzipien einer Gesellschaftsordung so deutlich zeigen wie auf der Ebene der Verfassung. Dies liegt vorallem daran, daß die Verfassung den größtmöglichen Konsens einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft verkörpern soll’: Bosselmann, K., Im Namen der Natur: Der Weg zum ökologischen Rechtsstaat (Scherz, 1992), at p. 190.Google Scholar Bosselmann explains that a constitution provides the clearest manifestation and evidence of a social order's values and guiding principles. This is because a constitution most comprehensively embodies the shared consensus of a pluralistic society.

³⁰ Peters & Armingeon, n. 21 above, at p. 385.

³¹ Rechtsstaat refers to ‘the authenticity of the polity, the formal legality of the power of the state to act, and the conformity of the actions of the state (legislature, executive, and courts) to the requirements of law (protection against arbitrary action)’: Backer, L.C., ‘Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering’ (2009) 16(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, pp. 85–172CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 86–7.

³² The duties to respect, protect, promote and fulfil were first articulated and universally accepted in the context of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN GA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 Dec. 1966, in force 23 Mar. 1976, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN GA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 Dec. 1966, in force 3 Jan. 1976, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm; and the General Comments to these, details of which are available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm.

³³ See, e.g., s. 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and Kotzé, L.J., ‘The Judiciary, the Environmental Right and the Quest for Sustainability in South Africa: A Critical Reflection’ (2007) 16(3) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, pp. 298–311CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Brinktrine, R., ‘The Horizontal Effect of Human Rights in German Constitutional Law: The British Debate on Horizontality and the Possible Role Model of the German Doctrine of ‘mittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte’ (2001) 4 European Human Rights Law Review, pp. 421–32.Google Scholar

³⁴ Emmerich-Fritsche, A., ‘Zur Verbindlichkeit der Menschenrechte für transnationale Unternehmen’ (2007) 45 Archiv des Völkerrechts, pp. 541–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁵ As Bosselmann states: ‘[n]iemand würde heute bezweifeln, daß dem Umweltschutz Verfassungsrang gebührt und in den Katalog moderner Staatsziele und Staatsaufgaben gehört’: Bosselmann, K., Ökologische Grundrechte: Zum Verhältnis zwischen individueller Freiheit und Natur (Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, 1998), at p. 49.Google Scholar Bosselmann states that there is little doubt today that environmental protection demands protection at the constitutional level and that environmental protection resorts under the range of modern state objectives and state tasks.

³⁶ For a survey of these, generally, see Boyd, D.R., The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and the Environment (UBC Press, 2011).Google Scholar

³⁷ Some authors have dealt conceptually with environmental constitutionalism. See, among others, Kiss, A., ‘The Legal Ordering of Environmental Protection’, in John Macdonald, St. & Johnston, , above n. 26, at pp. 567–84Google Scholar; Kysar, n. 3 above, at pp. 229–54; Boyd, ibid.

³⁸ In the context of the EU, see Becker, T., ‘Die zukünftige EU-Verfassung: Ein Chance für die Umwelt?’ (2004) 5 Ökologisches Wirtschaften, pp. 6–7Google Scholar, at 6.

³⁹ Brown Weiss, E., In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony; and Intergenerational Equity (Transnational, 1989), at pp. 50–86.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ E.g., s. 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (n. 33 above) states that public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution.

⁴¹ Kotzé, L.J. & Paterson, A.R. (eds.), The Role of the Judiciary in Environmental Governance: Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 2009).Google Scholar

⁴² Stephens, T., International Courts and Environmental Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2009), at p. 8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴³ E.g., s. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (n. 33 above) states that ‘[t]his Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled’.

⁴⁴ These issues are provided for by many national constitutions and internationally (albeit mostly in the EU) by the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), Aarhus (Denmark), 25 June 1998, in force 30 Oct. 2001, available at: http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/treaties/public-participation/aarhus-convention.html.

⁴⁵ Kysar, n. 3 above, at p. 231.

⁴⁶ Boyd, n. 36 above, at pp. 33–43.

⁴⁷ C. Bruch, W. Coker & C. Van Arsdale, ‘Breathing Life into Fundamental Principles: Implementing Constitutional Environmental Protections in Africa’, World Resources Institute, Working Paper Series, WP No. 2, Apr. 2001, available at: http://pdf.wri.org/eaa_bruch.pdf.

⁴⁸ Boyd, n. 36 above, at p. 3.

⁴⁹ Koskenniemi, M., ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization’ (2007) 8(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law, pp. 9–36.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Peters, n. 14 above, at p. 6. Kirchhof adds that the constitutional concept has been manifestly grounded in the idea of the singular nation state, but that this is changing: see Kirchhof, n. 15 above, at p. 770.

⁵¹ Also termed ‘transnational constitutionalism’, ‘international constitutionalism’ and ‘world constitutionalism’. See, e.g., Backer, n. 31 above, at p. 91; Joerges, C., Sand, I. & Teubner, G. (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart, 2004)Google Scholar; Macdonald, St. John & Johnston, Google Scholar, above n. 26.

⁵² Schwöbel, C.E.J., Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), at p. 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵³ In addition to those already listed elsewhere in this article, some authorities include, among others, De Búrca, G. & Gerstenberg, O., ‘The Denationalization of Constitutional Law’ (2006) 47(1) Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 243–62Google Scholar; Dobner, P. & Loughlin, M., The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dupuy, P., ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, pp. 1–33Google Scholar; Fischer-Lescano, A., Globalverfassung: Die Geltungsbegründung der Menschenrechte (Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2005)Google Scholar; Habermas, J., ‘Eine politische Verfassung für die pluralistische Weltgesellschaft?’ (2005) 38(3) Kritische Justiz, pp. 222–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Klabbers, J., Peters, A. & Ulfstein, G., The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Verdross, A., Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (Springer, 1926)Google Scholar; Von Bogdandy, A., ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany’ (2006) 47(1) Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 223–42.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ The EU is a clear, and arguably the only, example of an instance where a regional treaty has been transformed into a constitution-like document. See, among the many authorities on EU constitutionalism, Walker, N., ‘Reframing EU Constitutionalism’, in Dunoff, J.L. & Trachtman, J.P. (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 149–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁵ De Wet, E., ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 51–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 52–3; M.W. Doyle, ‘The UN Charter – A Global Constitution?’, in Dunoff & Trachtman, ibid., pp. 113–32; Fassbender, B., The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; J.L. Dunoff, ‘The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious Case of the World Trade Organization’, in Dunoff & Trachtman, ibid., pp. 178–205.

⁵⁶ Bodansky, n. 18 above. These are also called ‘parallel’ constitutions: Diggelmann, O. & Altwicker, T., ‘Is there Something like a Constitution of International Law: A Critical Analysis of the Debate on World Constitutionalism’ (2008) 68 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, pp. 623–50.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Diggelmann & Altwicker, ibid., at pp. 625–8.

⁵⁸ See generally on this issue Venter, F., Global Features of Constitutional Law (Wolf Legal, 2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Venter, F., ‘Die Staat, Staatsreg en Globalisering’ (2008) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, pp. 412–24Google Scholar, at 419.

⁶⁰ Schwöbel, n. 52 above, at pp. 1–2.

⁶¹ Peters & Armingeon, n. 21 above, at p. 390.

⁶² The simile of global constitutionalism as a lens is reminiscent of Pease’s like simile, in which she sees political theory frameworks as ‘a pair of glasses whose different lenses allow us to view the distinct political, economic, and social characteristics and processes that shape world politics’: Pease, K.S., International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century (3^rd edn, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008), at pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

⁶³ Schwöbel, n. 52 above, at pp. 11–49. Her synthesis is based on the views of some of the leading authorities on global constitutionalism cited throughout this article.

⁶⁴ Other authors use different perspectives or classifications to unpack global constitutionalism. Diggelmann and Altwicker, for example, identify and critique the semantic strategy, the correspondence strategy, the ethical-pragmatic strategy and the social-constructivist perspective. While they may be termed differently, these strategies are not dramatically different from those formulated by Schwöbel: Diggelmann & Altwicker, n. 56 above, at pp. 632–50.

⁶⁵ In the sense of making ‘thin’ constitutions ‘thick’.

⁶⁶ De Wet, n. 55 above, at pp. 51–76.

⁶⁷ Schwöbel, n. 52 above, at p. 49.

⁶⁸ Biermann et al. define ‘scale’ to include ‘the spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used to measure or rank any phenomenon’: Biermann, F. et al. ., ‘Earth System Governance: A Research Framework’ (2010) 10(4) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, pp. 277–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 290.

⁶⁹ This is so because global environmental law and governance would be the central concern of global environmental constitutionalism.

⁷⁰ Paterson, M., Humphreys, D. & Pettiford, L., ‘Conceptualizing Global Environmental Governance: From Interstate Regimes to Counter-hegemonic Struggles’ (2003) 3(2) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 1–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 4.

⁷¹ For a more elaborate survey of the Anthropocene, see Zalasiewicz, J. et al. ., ‘The Anthropocene: A New Epoch of Geological Time?’ (2011) 369 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, pp. 835–41.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

⁷² Lövbrand, E., Stripple, J. & Wiman, B., ‘Earth System Governmentality Reflections on Science in the Anthropocene‘ (2009) (19) Global Environmental Change, pp. 7–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 7, 8.

⁷³ Ibid., at p. 7.

⁷⁴ Semenyuk, E.P., ‘The Concept of the World Environmental Constitution and Information Science’ (2011) 38(1) Scientific and Technical Information Processing, pp. 1–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 4.

⁷⁵ Lövbrand, Stripple & Wiman, n. 72 above, at p. 12.

⁷⁶ Biermann et al., n. 68 above; Biermann, F. ‘“Earth System Governance” as a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change Research’ (2007) (17) Global Environmental Change, pp. 326–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁷ Zalasiewicz et al., n. 71 above, at p. 838.

⁷⁸ Biermann, n. 76 above, at p. 329.

⁷⁹ This is, however, not to say that increased spatial interdependence is not occurring and is as a result less important: ‘the anthropogenic transformation of the earth system creates new forms and degrees of (global) spatial interdependence. This relates to both natural (direct) and social (indirect) interdependencies’: Biermann, n. 76 above, at p. 330.

⁸⁰ Hempel, L.C., Environmental Governance: The Global Challenge (Island Press, 1996), at p. 154.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Ibid., at pp. 154–55.

⁸² The now well-established concepts of ‘future generations’ and ‘intergenerational equity’ embody the temporal aspects of the global environmental governance effort. See the standard work in this respect, Brown Weiss, n. 39 above, and more recently, Collins, L.M., ‘Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity in Global Environmental Governance’ (2007) 30(2) Dalhousie Law Journal, pp. 79–140.Google Scholar

⁸³ Cassese, S., ‘Is There a Global Administrative Law?’, in Von Bogdandy, A. et al. . (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law (Springer, 2009), pp. 761–76Google Scholar, at 768.

⁸⁴ This reciprocity is further illustrated by the dualism of norm creation and norm transplantation: Cortell, A.P. & Davis, J.W., ‘When Norms Clash: International Norms, Domestic Practices, and Japan’s Internalisation of the GATT/WTO’ (2005) (31) Review of International Studies, pp. 3–25Google Scholar, at 3.

⁸⁵ Strong, M.F., ‘One Year after Stockholm: An Ecological Approach to Management’ (1973) 51(4) Foreign Affairs, pp. 690–707CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 699–700.

⁸⁶ Keohane, R.O., Haas, P.M. & Levy, M.A., ‘The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions’, in Haas, P.M., Keohane, R.O. & Levy, M.A., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (MIT Press, 1993), pp. 3–25Google Scholar, at 7.

⁸⁷ Hempel, n. 80 above, at p. 6.

⁸⁸ Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S., ‘Governance in a Globalizing World’, in Keohane, R.O. (ed.), Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (Routledge, 2002), pp. 193–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 194.

⁸⁹ Ivanova, M.H., Partnerships, International Organizations, and Global Environmental Governance, available at http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Ivanova_Article.pdf, at p. 9.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Shams, H., ‘Law in the Context of ‘Globalisation’: a Framework of Analysis’ (2001) 35(4) The International Lawyer, pp. 1589–626Google Scholar, at 1626.

⁹¹ Biermann, n. 76 above, at p. 335.

⁹² E.g., constitutionalizing environmental rights and sustainable development in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (n. 33 above) might have global repercussions because it could contribute to provide the moral and ethical justification for the constitutionalization of similar rights and core environmental concepts in other countries or supranational legal instruments.

⁹³ An example is where directives of the EU must be translated into domestic legislation by its Member States, or where a multilateral environmental agreement requires domestic legislative and executive action in terms of the obligations it sets out for states.

⁹⁴ Peters, A., ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) (19) Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 579–610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹⁵ Biermann, n. 76 above, at p. 332.

⁹⁶ Marauhn, T., ‘Changing Role of the State’, in Bodansky, D., Brunnée, J. & Hey, E. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 728–48Google Scholar, at 728–9.

⁹⁷ T.M. Franck, ‘Preface: International Institutions: Why Constitutionalize?’, in Dunoff & Trachtman, n. 54 above, at p. xii.

⁹⁸ By extending the application of constitutionalism ‘horizontally’ to these corporations, it would be possible to impose on them directly the restrictions and dictates of constitutionalism in the same way that these would apply to a public authority or actor. See further, Dine, J., ‘Multinational Enterprises: International Codes and the Challenge of “Sustainable Development”’ (2001) 1 Non-state Actors and International Law, pp. 81–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Emmerich-Fritsche, n. 34 above.

⁹⁹ Alkoby, A., ‘Non-state Actors and the Legitimacy of International Environmental Law’ (2003) 3 Non-state Actors and International Law, pp. 23–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Harlow, C., ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ (2006) 17(1) European Journal of International Law, pp. 187–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kingsbury, B., ‘Global Governance as Administration: National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 1–13.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See further, Perez, n. 10 above, at p. 241.

¹⁰² Swart, L. & Perry, E. (eds.), Global Environmental Governance: Perspectives on the Current Debate (Centre for UN Reform Education, 2007).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Biermann et al., n. 68 above, at p. 287.

¹⁰⁴ Rosenau, J.N. & Czempiel, E. (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See Hempel, n. 80 above, at p. 66.

¹⁰⁶ S. Ratnapala, ‘Environmentalism versus Constitutionalism: A Contest without Winners’ (2007) University of Queensland Law Research Series 2; (2007) Resource Management Theory and Practice, pp. 110–64; available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UQLRS/2007/2.html. This duality of constitutionalism is evident in it both constituting and constraining power: Bodansky, n. 18 above, at p. 572.

¹⁰⁷ Brunette, B. ‘States, Global Environmental Governance and the Earth Charter’, in Bosselmann, K. & Engel, R.J. (eds.), The Earth Charter: A Framework for Global Governance (KIT Publishers, 2010)Google Scholar, pp. 117–42, at 119.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Such new perspectives of public authority have already been investigated by some authors. See, e.g., Hey, E., ‘Global Environmental Law: Common Interests and the (Re)Constitution of Public Space’ (2009) (1) Iustum Aequum Salutare, pp. 41–57.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Hempel, n. 80 above, at p. 160.

¹¹¹ Collins, n. 82 above.

¹¹² Kysar, n. 3 above, at p. 241.

¹¹³ Ibid., at p. 243. Kysar bases this statement on Ackerman’s idea that a constitution is essentially a conversation between generations: Ackerman, B., ‘The Living Constitution: 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures’ (2007) 120(7) Harvard Law Review, pp. 1793–812Google Scholar, at 1805.

¹¹⁴ Peters, n. 14 above, at pp. 4–9. See also, generally, Krisch, N., Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralistic Structure of Post-national Law (Oxford University Press, 2010).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹⁵ Bodansky, n. 18 above.

¹¹⁶ Maduro (n. 25 above) asks similar questions with relation to the EU and its constitutionalization processes.

¹¹⁷ Franck, n. 97 above, at p. xiii.

¹¹⁸ See generally Stephens, n. 42 above.

¹¹⁹ These could include, e.g., the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and dispute settlement mechanisms under the WTO.

¹²⁰ Ratnapala, n. 106 above.

¹²¹ This institutional response must not only endeavour to operationalize global environmental constitutionalism, it must also be perceived to be constitutional itself; in other words, it must be legitimate.

¹²² Semenyuk (n. 74 above, at p. 3) agrees: ‘Whether the WEC [world environment constitution] concept will be implemented in the foreseeable future depends ... on the level [sic] of ... ecological consciousness of the world community and on whether it wants to save itself.’

¹²³ In this way, domestic environmental constitutionalism could ‘level the playing field’ as it were and be driven primarily by nation-states which would arguably regard a bottom-up approach less threatening to their sovereignty than a once-off top-down approach.

¹²⁴ The ‘constitutional moment’ – or, as Peters puts it, ‘a pouvoir constituent in a kind of constitutional big bang’ – is a specific characteristic of domestic constitutions: Peters, n. 94 above, at pp. 584–5.

¹²⁵ Perez, n. 10 above, at p. 234.

¹²⁶ Bodansky, n. 18 above.

¹²⁷ Ibid., at p. 578.

¹²⁸ Ibid., at p. 579–80.

¹²⁹ Peters, n. 94 above, at p. 610.

¹³⁰ Peters & Armingeon, n. 21 above, at p. 387. It is doubtful that a single global constitution exists despite the arguments of some influential scholars to the contrary (especially insofar as they argue that the UN Charter is a global constitution): see, among others, Dupuy, n. 53 above; and Fassbender, n. 55 above.

¹³¹ From a methodological-analytical point of view, in fact, this seems to be the more acceptable approach and to hold out considerable promise.

¹³² Peters, n. 94 above, at p. 585.

¹³³ See, further, Woodward, B.K., Global Civil Society in International Lawmaking and Global Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³⁴ Peters, n. 94 above, at p. 593.