¹ For a more general discussion of unilateralism in international environmental law, see Bodansky, D., ‘What’s So Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law, pp. 339–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Cf. G. Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Process and State Change’, (forthcoming 2011) 36 Law & Social Inquiry, working paper version available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1901952 (from which this definition is taken); T.C. Halliday, ‘Recursivity of Global Lawmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda’ (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science, pp. 263–90 (‘norms in this article refer to formalized codifications of behavioral prescriptions that are accepted by subjects as legitimate and authoritative’); and Bodansky, D., The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press, 2010)Google Scholar, at Ch. 5 (categorizing environmental norms in terms of five dimensions: purposiveness, consent, mandatory quality, precision, and implementation and compliance mechanism).

³ Downs, G., Rocke, D.M. & Barsoom, P.N., ‘Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?’ (1996) 50(3) International Organization, pp. 379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Sand, P.H., ‘Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance’ (1991) 18(2) Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, pp. 213–77, at 251–4.Google Scholar

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⁶ Braithwaite, J. & Drahos, P., Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000), at pp. 285–92.Google Scholar

⁷ Sand, n. 4 above, at p. 256.

⁸ Frank, D.J., Hironka, A. & Schofer, E., ‘The Nation-State and the Natural Environment over the Twentieth Century’ (2000) 65(1) American Sociological Review, pp. 96–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 101–5. See generally Friedman, L.M., ‘Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order’ (2001) 37(1) Stanford Journal of International Law, pp. 347–64Google Scholar, at 348–9 (describing the effect of global culture on international business and human capital).

⁹ Yang, T. & Percival, R.V., ‘The Emergence of Global Environmental Law’ (2009) 36 Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 615–64Google Scholar, at 626. See also Holzinger, K., Knill, C. & Sommerer, T., ‘Environmental Policy Convergence: The Impact of International Harmonization, Transnational Communication and Regulatory Competition’ (2008) 62(4) International Organization, pp. 553–87, at 556–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (reach) and establishing a European Chemicals Agency [2007] OJ L136/3, (reach Regulation).

¹¹ See Scott, J., ‘From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction’ (2009) 57(4) American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 897–942, at 898–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Cf. Heyvaert, V., ‘Globalizing Regulation: Reaching Beyond the Borders of Chemical Safety’ (2009) 36(1) Journal of Law and Society, pp. 110–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 112 (noting EU promotion of the global adoption of reach); and Naiki, Y., ‘Assessing Policy Reach: Japan’s Chemical Policy Reform in Response to the EU’s reach Regulation’ (2010) 22(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 171–95, at 172–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Pollack, M. & Shaffer, G., When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford University Press, 2009), at pp. 262–6 and 296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ See Knox, J.H., ‘The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts between Trade and the Environment’ (2004) 28(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review, pp. 1–78, at 33–4Google Scholar; Parker, R.W., ‘The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict’ (1999) 12(1) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, pp. 1–122Google Scholar, at 6 (describing the US’ unilateral action to reduce dolphin mortality from tuna fishing); and G. Shaffer, ‘Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach’, in Barnett, M. & Duvall, B. (eds.) Power in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 130–60, at 130 and 152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Caracas (Venezuela), 1 Dec. 1996, in force 2 May 2001, available at: http://www.iacseaturtle.org.

¹⁶ An Indian Ocean–South-East Asian Marine Turtle Memorandum of Understanding (iosea–mou) was signed, under the auspices of the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (cms), but it has yet to lead to a treaty with legal commitments. The MoU text is available at: http://www.cms.int/species/iosea/IOSEAturtle_mou.htm. See further Shaffer, n. 14 above; and L. de La Fayette & B.H. Oxman, ‘United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia’ (2002) 96(3) American Journal of International Law, pp. 685–92, at 688 at n. 25.

¹⁷ Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (idcp), Washington, DC (US), 15 May 1998, in force 15 Feb. 1999, available at: http://www.iattc.org/IDCPENG.htm.

¹⁸ The idcp (ibid.), adopted in 1998 by the US and a number of Latin American states, made binding the previously voluntary arrangements to limit dolphin mortality in the tuna purse seine fishery in the etp. The US, however, still applies a ‘dolphin safe’ labelling regime that prohibits tuna fished with purse seine nets in the etp from being sold with the label ‘dolphin safe’, even if the tuna was caught in compliance with the idcp Agreement, despite a US undertaking to revise its labelling regulations. Mexico brought a claim against the US before the wto on account of the impact on Mexican-caught tuna, which it won at the panel stage. See Pruzin, D., ‘WTO Panel Issues Final Ruling on U.S. Rules for Tuna Labeling’ (2011) 28International Trade Reporter, p. 1182.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Vogel, D., Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Harvard University Press, 1995), at pp. 5–8.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Keck, M.E. & Sikkink, K., Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press 1998), at pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

²¹ Cashore, B., Egan, E., Auld, G. & Newsom, D., ‘Revising Theories of Nonstate Market-Driven (nmsd) Governance: Lessons from the Finnish Forest Certification Experience’ (2007) 7(1) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 1–44, at 3–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Long, A., ‘Global Climate Governance to Enhance Biodiversity and Well-Being: Integrating Non-State Networks and Public International Law in Tropical Forests’ (2011) 41(1) Environmental Law, pp. 95–164, at 113–14.Google Scholar

²² Geneva (Switzerland), 26 Jan. 1994, in force 1 Jan. 1997. The itta of 1994 superseded the itta of 1983, and will in turn be superseded by the itta of 2006 as soon as this enters into force. All agreements available at: http://www.itto.int.

²³ See, e.g., Meidinger, E., ‘The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law, pp. 47–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at pp. 59–60. See generally Cashore, B., Gale, F., Meidinger, E. & Newsom, D. (eds.), Confronting Sustainability: Forest Certification in Developing and Transitioning Countries (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 2006)Google Scholar, at pp. 203, 235, 303, 363 (providing case studies of governmental adoption of private certification requirements in Latvia, Poland, Bolivia and Guatemala, respectively).

²⁴ See Vandenbergh, M.P., ‘The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance’ (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review, pp. 913–70Google Scholar, at 927–8 (describing Wal-Mart’s pledge to source fish from msc-certified suppliers).

²⁵ See Dingwerth, K., ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of Public–Private Rule Making: What Can We Learn from the World Commission on Dams?’ (2005) 11(1) Global Governance, pp. 65–83Google Scholar, at 66 (describing the formation of the wcd as a case study ‘for learning about the legitimacy of global rule making’).

²⁶ 16 U.S.C. 1361. See K.L. Stewart, ‘Dolphin-Safe Tuna: The Tide is Changing’ (1998), 4 Animal Law, pp. 111–36, at 117–8; and Parker, n. 14 above, at pp. 32–3.

²⁷ Büthe, T. & Mattli, W., The New Global Rules: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton University Press, 2011), at p. 28.Google Scholar

²⁸ See, e.g., ‘Protest over Iceland’s Whaling Plans’, BBC News, 15 August 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3152489.stm; Campaign Whale, ‘Stop Iceland’s Whale Killers’, available at: http://www.campaign-whale.org/campaigns/stop-icelands-whale-killers (last visited 25 Aug. 2011). Greenpeace also organized consumer boycotts against Norway: see McIvor, G., ‘Boycott of Norwegian Fish Products Starts in Australia’, Agence France Presse, 16 Aug. 1993Google Scholar; ‘Economic Sanctions Needed to Halt Norwegian Whaling, Environmentalists Say’, International Environmental Reporter, BNA, 19 Nov. 1992. For other examples of transnational product boycotts (or threatened ones) that spurred industry to tighten environmental self-regulation, see Keck & Sikkink, n. 20 above, at p. 133; Osofsky, H.M. & Levin, J.K., ‘The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions’ (2008) 8 Chicago Journal of International Law, pp. 409–36Google Scholar, at 412–3; Mertus, J., ‘From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of Transnational Society’ (1999) 14 American University International Law Review, pp. 1335–89Google Scholar, at 1353–54; and Shaffer, G., ‘The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters’ (2001) 25 Harvard Environmental Law Review, pp. 1–93, at 57.Google Scholar

²⁹ Montreal (Canada), 16 Sept. 1987, in force 1 Jan. 1989, available at: http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_protocol.php.

³⁰ Sunstein, C.R., ‘Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols’ (2007) 31(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review, pp. 1–65, at 14–5.Google Scholar

³¹ See, e.g., Vogel, n. 19 above, at p. 112; Shaffer, n. 28 above, at pp. 83–4.

³² Bodansky, D., ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law’ (1999) 93(3) American Journal of International Law, pp. 596–624, at 605.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ See Shaffer, n. 28 above, at p. 24; and Shaffer, n. 14 above.

³⁴ Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto (Japan), 10 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.

³⁵ UNFCCC COP Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen (Denmark), 18 Dec. 2009, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4.

³⁶ Cf. Alvarez, J.E., ‘Contemporary International Law: An “Empire of Law” or the “Law of Empire”?’ (2009) 24(5) American University International Law Review, pp. 811–24Google Scholar, at 825–6 (UN Security Council as ‘legislating hegemony’); Helfer, L.R., ‘Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’ (2008) 102(1) University of Illinois Law Review, pp. 71–125Google Scholar, at 115; Jackson, J.H., ‘Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’ (2003) 97(4) American Journal of International Law, pp. 782–802CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 795–6; and Weiler, J.H.H., ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal, pp. 2403–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 2472–4 (on legitimacy issues in EU decision-making).

³⁷ See, e.g., Magliocca, G.N., ‘Reforming the Filibuster’ (2011) 105(1) Northwestern University Law Review, pp. 303–28Google Scholar (‘The most troubling countermajoritarian difficulty in modern constitutional law is Rule Twenty-Two of the United States Senate. Forty-one senators, who could represent less than forty-one percent of the population due to the malapportionment of the Senate, can veto most legislation and presidential nominations by refusing to invoke “cloture”. A vote against cloture by that Senate minority sustains debate indefinitely as a filibuster.’, at pp. 303–4).

³⁸ Cf. Sunstein, n. 30 above, at pp. 5–9 (contending that unilateral action was in the US interest in terms of ozone protection but not in terms of climate change policy); and Freeman, J. & Guzman, A., ‘Climate Change and U.S. Interests’ (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review, pp. 1531–1601Google Scholar, at 1542 (contending that unilateral action by the US is likely to be in the US interest despite the multilateral stalemate).

³⁹ See generally Komesar, N., Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press, 1997)Google Scholar; and Shaffer, G. & Trachtman, J., ‘Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO’ (2011) 52(1) Virginia Journal of International Law, pp. 103–53.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Directive 2008/101/EC of 19 Nov. 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community [2009] OJ L8/3.

⁴¹ Case C-366/10, The Air Transport Association of America and Others v. The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, judgment pending. Opinion by A-G Kokott delivered on 6 Oct. 2011.

⁴² Chicago, IL (US), 7 Dec. 1944, in force 4 Apr. 1947, available at: http://www.icao.int/icaonet/dcs/7300.html.

⁴³ Air Transport Agreement between the US and EU 2007 (‘Open Skies Agreement’), Washington, DC (US), 30 Apr. 2007, in force 30 Mar. 2008, available at: http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/tra/ata.

⁴⁴ Rosenthal, E., ‘U.S. and Europe Battle over Carbon Fees for Airlines’, New York Times, 27 July 2011Google Scholar; and Bisset, M. & Crowhurst, G., ‘Is the EU’s Application of its Emissions Trading Scheme to Aviation Illegal?’ (2011) 23(3) Air and Space Law, pp. 1–18Google Scholar, at 3. In addition, legislation was introduced in the US House of Representatives that would prohibit US airlines from participating in the EU emissions trading scheme: ‘European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011’ H.R. 2594, 112^th Congress (2011).

⁴⁵ See Shaffer & Trachtman, n. 39 above.

⁴⁶ World Trade Organization (wto) and United Nations Environment Programme (unep), Trade and Climate Change (WTO, 2009), at pp. 109–10; J. Pauwelyn, ‘U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law’, (2007) Working Paper 07/02, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University, pp. 1–44, at 34, available at: http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/u.s.-federal-climate-policy-and-competitiveness-concerns-the-limits-and-options-of-international-trade-law; G.C. Hufbauer, S. Charnovitz & J. Kim, Global Warming and the World Trading System (Peterson Institute, 2009).

⁴⁷ Halliday, n. 2 above.

⁴⁸ Shaffer, n. 2 above, at p. 3 (‘Where the transnational legal norms are relatively clear, coherent and accepted, the transnational legal order can be viewed in systematic terms. Where they are less so, the transnational legal order is more contingent and fragile.’).