^{page 48 note 1} Seeley, , Expansion of England. London, 1883, p. 105Google Scholar.

^{page 49 note 1} Secret Intelligence, Paris, January 20. Received February 11, 1800 (Lord Minto, F. O. Austria). ‘However much the First Consul may talk of the basis of Campo Formio,’ his ‘real secret intention’ was ‘rapporter l'Empereur dans ses anciennes limites.’

^{page 49 note 2} F. O. Hamburg, February 12, 1800.

^{page 49 note 3} Pitt's Speech, February 3, 1800, vol. 34.

^{page 50 note 1} Secret Intelligence, Paris, July 24. F. O. Various, 322.

^{page 50 note 2} Secret Intelligence, Paris, June 20. F. O. Various, 322.

^{page 50 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 50 note 4} Talleyrand, , Mhnoires (Translation, London, 1891, i. 212)Google Scholar.

^{page 50 note 5} According to intelligence sent to Mr. Garlike (F.O. Hamburg, February 22,1800) the army before that campaign was not to be relied on. The soldiers were discontented, and declared it had not been worth while to spill so much blood only ‘to make “the Corsican” a king.’

^{page 50 note 6} Lodge, Modem Europe, ch. xxiv. § 2.

^{page 51 note 1} ‘Le principe du Gouvernement est: Négocier et se battre.’ Bonaparte to Camot, Corresp. vi. 5099.

^{page 51 note 2} Du Casse, pp. 13, 14.

^{page 51 note 3} F. O. France, June 20, 1800.

^{page 51 note 4} Ibid. ‘Nulle confiance, nul crédit public, nulle opinion en faveur du Gouvernement.’

^{page 51 note 5} Seeley, , Life and Times of Stein, i. 201, Camb. 1878Google Scholar, points out how the career of Napoleon is not merely the triumph of genius, but of ‘genius controlling infinite resources.’

^{page 52 note 1} Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of Ceo. III., iii. 4. Lond. 1855Google Scholar.

^{page 52 note 2} Stanhope's Life, iii. 207. Lond. 1862Google Scholar.

^{page 52 note 3} Dumas, , Evénemens Militaires, tom, iv. p. 305Google Scholar.

^{page 53 note 1} General Stamford's enumeration of the way in which France has treated the countries who have made separate peaces with her closely resembles Pitt's dreadful catalogue of all the breaches of treaty, all the acts of perfidy, committed by the French Republic since the beginning of the war.

‘II a fait la paix avec le Due de Modène et il a envahi ses états.

‘II a fait la paix avec le Roi de Sardaigne et lui a déclaré la guerre et l'a chassé de Piémont.

‘II a fait la paix avec le Pape et a envahi ses états.’ And so forth.

^{page 53 note 2} Pitt purposely misquoted the Seventh Philippic.

^{page 53 note 3} England and Napoleon in 1803. Preface.

^{page 53 note 4} Rosebery, , Life of Pitt, p. 145. Lond. 1891Google Scholar.

^{page 53 note 5} Wilberforce, Diary, January 24 and 27.

^{page 54 note 1} ‘His Majesty saw no reason to depart from the customary forms,’ &c. Parl. Hist. vol. xxxiv.

^{page 54 note 2} Talleyrand to Lord Grenville, January 14. Annual Register, pp. 206–208.

^{page 54 note 3} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, February 22, 1800. F. O. Austria.

^{page 54 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 54 note 5} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, ibid. January 6, 1800: ‘The real distress of the Emperor's finances.’ And ibid. December 10, 1799: ‘It has been a matter of wonder that they have been able to hold out so long.’

^{page 54 note 6} Ibid.February 22.

^{page 54 note 7} Ibid.

^{page 55 note 1} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, May 2.

^{page 55 note 2} Ibid. May 13.

^{page 55 note 3} Lord Minto to Sir Charles Whitworth, ibid. September 24, 1799: ‘I cannot help perceiving that the mind of Austria is so entirely absorbed in the pursuit of its own personal interests, and has suffered this narrow policy, perfectly unfit for the extraordinary period we are living in, to grow by indulgence into such a settled habit [this is an excellent example of Lord Minto's didactic manner], that any views of general security, any enlarged notion of taking one's part handsomely and honourably in a cause which is common to the whole human ratie, that any purpose in short more enlarged than the mere acquisition of territory, does really appear to them enthusiasm and romance.’

^{page 55 note 4} Hist, des Cabinets de l'Europe pendant le Consulat et l'Empire, torn. i. ch. ii.

^{page 56 note 1} Thugut to Talleyrand, March 24. Du Casse, p. 8.

^{page 56 note 2} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, May 10.

^{page 56 note 3} Grenville to Buckingham (Memoirs): ‘The Government at Vienna seems well disposed to push the Great Consul to the wall. But one has always to dread the effect of any tempting offers. At Petersburg my friend Paul is in a passion and all the fat is in the fire.’ (Vol. iii. p. 63.)

^{page 56 note 4} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, December 1.

^{page 56 note 5} Ibid. March 11.

^{page 56 note 6} Ibid. March 24.

^{page 56 note 7} Ibid. April 10.

^{page 57 note 1} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, September 7. Lord Minto's report of the whole negotiation.

^{page 57 note 2} Ibid. September 7 and May 1.

^{page 57 note 3} Ibid. May 1.

^{page 57 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 57 note 5} Ibid. May 13 and September 7.

^{page 57 note 6} Ibid. September 7. A notable utterance in favour of the temporal power.

^{page 57 note 7} Ibid. May 13.

^{page 57 note 8} Ibid. September 7; and Lord Minto's Instructions, June 1799.

^{page 57 note 9} Ibid. May 2.

^{page 58 note 1} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F.O. Austria, September 7.

^{page 58 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 58 note 3} Ibid. February 22. He speaks of his having experienced ‘the success of a mixture of pertinacity and patience in conducting business with Baron Thugut.’

^{page 58 note 4} Given by Fournier, A., Historische Studien, p. 185Google Scholar: ‘The enemy are crossing the Scrivia. I have placed the troops, reduced through the Riviera expedition both in strength and numbers, behind the Bormida, to await a decisive battle. I hope to advance along the R. bank of the Po and to recover communication with the Hereditary States. Should, however, the approach of two armies shake the courage of the troops, and the battle have an unexpected issue, there is reason to fear the complete overthrow of our army, as we have but provisions for six days.’

^{page 58 note 5} For the text of the convention see Annual Register, 1800, p. 234.

^{page 59 note 1} Two sets of instructions for Duroc are in the Paris archives. On the second set is written: ‘Cette pièce est une deuxième dictée du Premier Consul.’ Fournier (Historische Stttdien) gives it in full. There was also a letter of Napoleon's which did not go. The reason is plain: it contains the words: ‘En moins de jours que l'on n'a fait les préliminaires on peut aujourd'hui rédiger le traitédéfinitif’ (Corresp. vi. pièce 5038). This would have been to give Duroc power to conclude. Thus the second set of instructions says: ‘Il pourra dire que l'opinion à Paris était que le traité de paix définitif pourrait être conclu en huit ou dix jours et que le Gouvernement auroit désiré qu'on traitât à Paris.’

^{page 60 note 1} Thugut subsequently said he ought never to have been permitted to pass the outposts; Lord Minto that he had better have come on to Vienna. Both thought that Bonaparte's eagerness to renew hostilities in September was largely due to Duroc's observation of the condition of the Austrian army during his residence at Kray's headquarters (F. O. Austria, Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, September 2).

^{page 60 note 2} Ibid. Vienna, September 2, 1800.

^{page 60 note 3} Corresp. vi. pièce 4922.

^{page 60 note 4} Vivenot, Vertrauliche Briefe, ii.

^{page 60 note 5} Melas, Berichte, Wiener Archiv, quoted by Fournier: ‘Sobald dessen Bruder’ (i.e. Joseph St. Julien) ‘uns Genua cingetroffen sein wird werde ich ihm die Geschäftsleitung übergeben,’ i.e. agreement with Berthier over additional articles.

^{page 61 note 1} Corresp.vi. 4922, June 17, 1800. Napoleon adds that a distinguished Austrian general at headquarters had said: ‘We shall never have peace or happiness on the Continent till we join in shutting out from it that venal shop-keeping nation which calculates on our blood for the extension of her commerce.’

^{page 61 note 2} Corresp. vi. 4941, 22 Juin; 4942, 23 Juin.

^{page 62 note 1} Schlosser says St. Julien was the bearer of the news, and arrived before the subsidy treaty with England was signed.

Hausser says St. Julien was the bearer of the news, and arrived the day the subsidy treaty with England was signed.

Von Sybel says the same.

Thiers says St. Julien only brought the letter, but that the treaty was signed under the impression of the news of the disaster.

^{page 62 note 2} Vivenot, ii, Letter mxxxvii. The Emperor to Melas: ‘General Joseph St. Julien, however (he had previously been speaking about Franz), have I chosen to order to Vienna.’

^{page 62 note 3} F. O. Hamburg, July 8, Mr. Glennie to Lord Grenville. St. Julien's arrival is mentioned by Thugut in a letter dated June 30. (Vivenot, mxxxviii.)

^{page 62 note 4} Hamburg. Mr. Glennie to Lord Grenville, July 8.

^{page 62 note 5} Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of Geo. III. iii. 85.

^{page 62 note 6} Thugut to Colloredo, July 26, 1800. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 62 note 7} Grenville to Buckingham (Memoirs). June 24, iii. 85.

^{page 62 note 8} Thugut to Colloredo, July 2, 1800, and other places. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 62 note 9} Vivenot, ii.

^{page 62 note 10} See the letter in Du Casse, pp. 19–23, orCorresp. vi.

^{page 62 note 11} Colloredo to Thugut, July 3, 1800. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 63 note 1} See Reiseparticulare, Fournier, Historische Studien.

^{page 63 note 2} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, September 2.

^{page 63 note 3} Corresp. vi. 4951. Von Sybel(Revolutionszeit, v. 627), 'seine ziemlich larjge Reise.'

^{page 64 note 1} Thugut was very much alive to this danger. On August 8 he urges that his Majesty's resolution, ‘quelle qu'elle puisse être,’ should be sent to London before France presents a garbled version of the incident. F. O. France, 56. Vivenot, ii. mlxviii.

^{page 64 note 2} And on July 24: ‘Si la paix ne se fait pas, Dieu sait les maux qui menacent ce pals. Point d'industrie, point de commerce, point de crédit; un agiotage usuraire et sans frein et sans pudeur; si la paix ne se fait pas, il est impossible de s'en tirer. L'Etat est épuisé par cette campagne.’… ‘Hier le general St. Julien a paru a l'Opera. II a ete applaud! a tout rompre.’

^{page 65 note 1} Letter from the agent Dutheil (Foreign Various, 322).

^{page 65 note 2} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, October 16, 1800: ‘Th e army in Germany is so wedded to the Archduke, and so tinctured with faction connected with his person,’ that only his return to the army can make it effectual. Yet is a general who chiefly desires peace to be wished ?

^{page 65 note 3} Thugut to Talleyrand, September 5, 1800. Du Casse.

^{page 65 note 4} Lefebre and Bignon. Hausse calls St. Julien the ‘Spielball’ of an intrigue.

^{page 65 note 5} Du Casse, p. 35.

^{page 65 note 6} Thiers, Paris, 1878, livre vi. p. 186.

^{page 66 note 1} ‘Denn die Ursachen wegen welcher Se. Majestät den Herrn Generalen Kevelsburg zu seinem Aufenthalte bis auf weitere Allerhöchsten Befehl anweisen zu lassen befunden habe sind nicht so beschaffen dass fur ihn um die Erlaubnissertheilung zu was immer für eine Art von Unterhaltungen eingeschritten werden konnte.’ (Note September 28. Quoted by Fournier.

^{page 66 note 2} Lefevre, dclxxviii.

^{page 66 note 3} Vivenot, ii.

^{page 66 note 4} Ibid. mlxv.

^{page 66 note 5} Ibid. mlxvii.

^{page 66 note 6} August 8, Vivenot, ii.

^{page 67 note 1} Lord Grenville to Lord Minto, F. O. Austria, August 20.

^{page 67 note 2} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, ibid. September 2.

^{page 67 note 3} Ibid. May 2.

^{page 67 note 4} Lefevre and other writers unquestioningly received this assertion of Napoleon's.

^{page 69 note 1} Talleyrand's declaration. Printed as Appendix, Fournier's Historische Studien und Skizzen. Foumier says that Talleyrand wrote in the margin of this note: ‘Cette déclaration a été verbale et a produit son effet.’

^{page 69 note 2} ‘Handbillet des Kaisers an den Interimspräsidenten des Hofkriegsrathes,’ August 28. Printed by Fournier, Historische Studien.

‘Dass er sich alien Gespräches uber Geschafte enthalte; vorzuglich aber dass er von den durch ihn besorgten besonderen Aufträgen, bei welchen er nichts weniger als meine Zufriedenheit verdient hat, nicht das geringste eröffne und sich verlauten lasse; da er widrigenfalls zur strengsten Verantwortung unnachsichtlich zu ziehen wird.’ Fournier suggests that his imprisonment was largely due to a desire to keep him out of the way and prevent him from making undesirable revelations.

^{page 69 note 3} Vivenot, ii. mlxii.

^{page 70 note 1} It was actually reported in the Frankfort newspapers that the Archduke was about to join General Kray and take the command of the army. (F. O. Hamburg, July 1.)

^{page 71 note 1} Vivenot, ii. mxl.

^{page 71 note 2} The Archduke to Duke Albert of Sachsen Teschen, July 24, 1798: ‘Paix ou guerre, je vois dans l'avenir aussi noir qu'on peut; noir, plus noir que quand j'étais cet hiver à Vienne, ou vous me taxiez déjà a voir trop noir.’ (Given by E. Wertheimer, Archiv für öesterreickischen Geschichtsquellen.)

^{page 71 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 71 note 4} July 3, Vivenot, mxlii.

^{page 71 note 5} ‘At parting all the officers shed tears,’ wrote Mr. Glennie, describing the Archduke's resignation of his command (F. O. Hamburg, March 28, 1800).

^{page 72 note 1} And again, Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, May 17, 1800. Thugut has mentioned with uneasiness that the Queen of Naples is coming. She ‘is personally indisposed to Baron Thugut, and as I apprehend that party begins to run pretty high, I can conceive that he should be unwilling to leave so formidable an adversary in a situation to influence very strongly the mind of the Empress, and through her possibly the Emperor.’

Again, on September 17, in report of negotiations which terminated June 20: ‘Having to struggle with the peace faction and clamour, and fight a battle for every measure which relates to war and to England.’

^{page 72 note 2} The French commissary for the exchange of prisoners.

^{page 72 note 3} Head of the Transport Office.

^{page 72 note 4} From 1705 to 1806 Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Appointed on September 24 to confer with M. Otto, who had requested an interview with some one in the confidence of the Government.

^{page 73 note 1} Sir James Crauford to Lord Grenville, F. O. Hamburg, January 20, 1801.

^{page 73 note 2} F.O. Austria, September 7.

^{page 74 note 1} Bonaparte's speech to his troops before the battle on the Tagliamento.

^{page 74 note 2} Talleyrand to Thugut, June 6. Vivenot, ii., Anmerkungen.

^{page 74 note 3} February 17, 1801. ‘Respecting advances to the Emperor of Germany,’ Part. Hist. 35.

^{page 74 note 4} ‘La puissance anglaise est tellement emparée du commerce du monde et de l'empire des mers qu'elle peut seule résister à la marine des Russes, des Danois. des Suéclois, des Francais, des Espagnols et des Bataves.’ (Letter to the Emperor June 16, 1800. Corresp. vi. 4914.)

^{page 74 note 5} Thugut to Talleyrand, August 11. Vivenot, ii. mlxx.

^{page 75 note 1} ‘The separation of England and Austria is, we have already frequently said, the aim of Bonaparte's policy. He dreams of nothing but the overthrow and annihilation of Great Britain. He works incessantly to this end.’ (November 22, 1800, Stamford's Paris agent, For. Various, 322.)

^{page 75 note 2} Lord Grenville asked on August 24, ‘Had the First Consul intended to apply the principle of the armistice in Germany to the naval warfare?’ On September 4 M. Otto presented his project, by which Malta, Alexandria, and Belle-Ile were to be assimilated to Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingolstadt, so that neutral or French vessels should have free access to them and furnish them with provisions. (Part. Hist. 35.)

^{page 76 note 1} Lord Grenville admitted the assimilation: ‘nothing shall be admitted by sea which can give additional means of defence,’ and provisions only for fourteen days at a time. (September 7.) (Part. Hist. 35.)

^{page 76 note 2} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, October 2, 1800.

^{page 76 note 3} Moreau to the Archduke John: ‘Je recois á l'instant par le télégraphe la réponse du Gouvernement aux dépêches,’ &c.: ‘Annoncez au Général commandant l'armée autrichienne que l'Empereur ne veut pas ratifier les préliminaires de paix, et que vous êtes oblige de recommencer hostilités. Cependant vous pouvez convenir d'un armistice d'un mois si on vous donne sur le champ des places de sûreté.’

Cp. ‘Au Citoyen Carnot,’ Paris, September 13 (Corresp. vi. 5099): ‘Ecrivez par le télégraphe a Strasbourg qu'on envoie un courrier au Général Moreau pour lui porter la dépêche ci-apres;’ which, with a few unimportant verbal changes, is as Moreau reported it to the Archduke John.

^{page 76 note 4} Lord Minto acknowledges in the above-mentioned despatch that a courier from Paris took five days.

^{page 76 note 5} M. Otto, September 22. (Parl. Hist. 35.)

^{page 77 note 1} M. Otto to Lord Grenville. (Parl. Hist. 35.)

^{page 77 note 2} This again was in accordance with the expressed determination to conclude only a separate peace with Austria, and consequently with England, if a naval armistice were not concluded by September 11.

^{page 77 note 3} September 11, M. Otto. (Part. Hist. 35.)

^{page 77 note 4} Lefevre.

^{page 78 note 1} Mr. Hammond to Lord Grenville, September 25. (Part. Hist. 35.)

^{page 78 note 2} Ibid. 35.

^{page 78 note 3} Lord Grenville, September 24.

^{page 78 note 4} 1,800 men had been released by the surrender of the three fortresses.

^{page 79 note 1} Bonaparte to Talleyrand, October 27, 1800. Talleyrand is to inform Menou of ‘celles entamées avec l'Angleterre, et le beau rôle que joue 1'armée d'Egypte en conservant avec courage cette précieuse colonie.’ (Corresp. vi. 5149.)

^{page 79 note 2} M. Otto to Mr. Hammond, October 8. (Parl. Hist. 35.)

^{page 79 note 3} Reported speech of Bonaparte, Paris, July 15.

^{page 79 note 4} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, October 16, 1800.

^{page 79 note 5} Ibid. October 20, 1800.

^{page 80 note 1} M. Otto's words, October 8. (Par/. Hist. 35.)

^{page 80 note 2} Thugut resigned on September 25, immediately after the Emperor's return to Vienna. There was an ‘äusserst heftige Scene’ on this occasion. (Von Sybel, Revolutionszeit, E. iv. C. 4.)

^{page 80 note 3} Intelligence from Paris, October 7, 1800. (Foreign Various, 322.)

^{page 80 note 4} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, September 29.

^{page 80 note 5} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, ibid. October 2, 1800.

^{page 81 note 1} Moreau, from Salzburg, to Joseph Bonaparte, February 16. Du Casse, PP. 337, 338.

^{page 81 note 1} ‘While Bonaparte makes war on Austria, negotiates with her at Lunéville, and administers soporifics to Prussia, he negotiates secretly with Russia, holding out as a bait the throne of Constantinople, the possession of Malta, a commerce shared exclusively between himself and France: in brief, the establishment of an order of things in Europe which should place all the other Powers between two fires.’ (Stamford's Agent, Berlin: Foreign Various, 322.)

^{page 82 note 2} Mr. Garlike to Lord Grenville, F. O. Prussia, March 22, 1800.

^{page 82 note 3} Vivenot, ii. mcxxx.

^{page 83 note 1} Grenville to Buckingham, October 8, 1800: ‘I do not in the least expect any summons for the present to Lunéville or Paris; any suspicions of that event happening would make me impatient to see you before so great a misfortune shall befall me as that of being called upon formally to register the overbearing power of the French Republic and the disgraceful confession of the folly and weakness of all the humbled States and Powers of Europe.’ (Memoirs, iii. 96.)

^{page 84 note 1} Talleyrand to Joseph, November 13. Du Casse, p. 76. ‘M. de Cobenzl en venant à Lunéville connaissait par Lord Minto notre position vis-à-vis de l'Angleterre. II ne pouvait ignorer qu'il serait dans le cas de traiter particulierement avec nouset indépendamment des Anglais.’

^{page 84 note 2} Vivenot, ii. Appendix.

^{page 84 note 3} Cobenzl to Colloredo, Nov. 10. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 85 note 1} See Cobenzl to the Emperor, October 10, 1800. Vivenot.

^{page 86 note 1} Cobenzl to Colloredo, October 25, 1800. Vivenot.

^{page 86 note 2} Count Starhemberg to Cobenzl, F. O. Austria, November I, 1800.

^{page 86 note 3} Starhemberg to Cobenzl, F. O. Austria, November 1.

^{page 86 note 4} Intelligence, Paris, December 4. (Foreign Various, 322.)

^{page 86 note 5} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, November 14.

^{page 86 note 6} Cobenzl to Colloredo, November 10. Vivenot.

^{page 87 note 1} Cobenzl to Colloredo, November 15. Vivenot.

^{page 87 note 2} Intelligence, Paris, November 29. (Foreign Various, 322.)

^{page 87 note 3} It is commonly said that France is ‘au bout de moyens,’ and that if defeated she would be compelled to make arrangements (‘faire notre marché’) with two legitimate Sovereigns. (Letter from Paris, November 22. Foreign Various, 322.

^{page 87 note 4} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, November 14.

^{page 87 note 5} Joseph to Talleyrand, February 9, 1801. Du Casse, p. 320.

^{page 87 note 6} Joseph to Talleyrand, December 3, 1800. Du Casse, p. 152.

^{page 88 note 1} Talleyrand, , Memoires (Translation, 1891, i. 212)Google Scholar.

^{page 89 note 1} Intelligence, Paris, September 30, 1800. (Foreign Various, 322.)

^{page 89 note 2} Corresp. vi. 5131. ‘II aura soin de ne rien exprimer, soit en conversation, soit par écrit, au-delà de ce qui lui aura été recommandé.

^{page 89 note 3} Notably Cobenzl to Colloredo, November 10; Cobenzl to Thugut, November 10; Colloredo to Thugut, November 15; Cobenzl to Colloredo, November 15 (Pièce mclxxxi.); Cobenzl to Thugut, November 15; Thugut to Colloredo, November 15; Thugut to Colloredo, November 16; Thugut to Colloredo, November 21, November 22, November 23 (Pièce mcxiv.); Cobenzl to Colloredo, December 5; Cobenzl to Thugut, December 11; Cobenzl to Colloredo, December 12. (Vivenot, ii.)

^{page 89 note 4} Cobenzl to Thugut, October 25. Vivenot.

^{page 90 note 1} Cobenzl to Thugut, November 10. Vivenot.

^{page 90 note 2} I greatly regret that I have not been able to see Cobenzl's despatches. Researches in the K.u.K. Staats Archiv at Vienna would undoubtedly throw fresh light on this negotiation. Meanwhile, by carefully comparing the letters published by Vivenot with the documents published by Du Casse, it is possible to gain a tolerably clear idea of what took place.

^{page 91 note 1} Cobenzl to Colloredo, November 15. Vivenot.

^{page 91 note 2} Colloredo's letter is undated. (Vivenot, mclxxxvi.)

^{page 92 note 1} Thugut to Colloredo, November 16. Vivenot.

^{page 92 note 2} November 21.

^{page 92 note 3} November 22.

^{page 92 note 4} November 23.

^{page 92 note 5} ‘J'étais à rédiger le projet de lettre que S.M. m'avait ordonne de preparer pour M. le Comte de Cobenzl lorsqu'on m'a remis de la part de V.E. l'expédition telle qu'elle doit partir par le courrier, lequel cependant ne pourra guere se mettre en route quedemain vers les neuf heures’ (November 23). See also another note of November 23: ‘Je n'aurai pas la présomption de croire que le projet fut preferable au premier, que j'ignorais d'ailleurs avoir été rédigé par V.E.’ (Vivenot.)

^{page 93 note 1} Thugut to Colloredo, November 23, 1800. Vivenot.

^{page 93 note 2} Cobenzl to Thugut, December n, 1800. Vivenot.

^{page 94 note 1} ‘He has, for instance,’ writes Joseph, ‘made me make an observation really made by the First Consul the evening of his [i.e. Cobenzl's] arrival. “It is to M. de Cobenzl, not to his Imperial Majesty, I speak when I say that if the Emperor Francis II. were always guided, by his own intelligence, as was Frederick the Great, Catherine, or Maria Theresa, one would be able to treat with him with less circumspection.” I told him I could not acknowledge all he put into my mouth. He replied by reading the Emperor's letter, which showed he was not offended, and was mil of confidence and friendliness.’ (Joseph to Talleyrand. Du Casse, Dec. 3, pp. 151–155.)

^{page 95 note 1} Qui viennent de m'être faites d'une manière indirecte.’ (Cobenzl to Colloredo, November 10. Vivenot.)

^{page 95 note 2} ‘Les propositions qui m'avaient été faites dèjà par Talleyrand a Paris annoncaient les vues du Premier Consul, et si les discours familiers de Joseph Bonaparte ont pu faire esperer des conditions plus tolérables, la série de nos revers,’ &c. (Cobenzl to Colloredo, January 1, 1801. Vivenot.) ‘Il faut compter pour rien les propos en l'air de Joseph Bonaparte, qui n'auraient pu devenir quelque chose que si nous avions eu quelques succes, ou du moins que nous eussions résisté au premier choc’ (Cobenzl to Thugut, January 1, 1801. Vivenot.)

^{page 95 note 3} December 18, Joseph to Talleyrand. Du Casse, pp. 175, 176. Cobenzl is still demanding, as compensation for separating from England, the three Legation and the line of the Adda.

^{page 96 note 1} Cobenzl to Colloredo, December 12, 1800. Vivenot, ii. The italics are mine.

^{page 96 note 2} ‘Ayant mis Joseph Bonaparte au pied du mur pour n'expliquer comment il était possible que ce qui m'avait été proposé par lui à l'instant même de notre retour commun de Paris lorsqu'il venait de quitter son frère, et qu'il avait été témoin de tout ce qui s'était passé entre le Premier Consul et moi, pût avoir une telle incohérence avec les réponses qui lui etaient parvenues, le plenipotentiaire francais ne pût y donner d'autre solution que le rapprochement qui s'etait opere dans Pintervalle entre la France et Paul I^er, et peut-être les liaisons déjà formées ou pr̂etes à l'̂etre.’ (Cobenzl to Colloredo, December 12. Vivenot, ii.)

^{page 96 note 3} Talleyrand to Joseph, December 13. Du Casse, p. 174.

^{page 97 note 1} Cobenzl to Colloredo, December 12. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 97 note 2} December 23, Cobenzl to Colloredo. Vivenot, ii. December 27, Cobenzl to Colloredo. Vivenot.

^{page 97 note 3} December 23, Cobenzl to Colloredo. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 97 note 4} December 18, Joseph to Talleyrand. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 97 note 5} Dec. 9, Joseph to Talleyrand. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 97 note 6} Ibid. and Dec. 23.

^{page 98 note 1} December 23, Joseph to Talleyrand. Du Casse, p. 179.

^{page 98 note 2} December 10, Joseph to Talleyrand. Du Casse, p. 165.

^{page 98 note 3} December 27, Cobenzl to Colloredo. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 98 note 4} December 23, Cobenzl to Colloredo. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 98 note 5} December II, Cobenzl to Thugut. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 98 note 6} This letter was enclosed by Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, December 16. (F. O. Austria.)

^{page 98 note 7} Lord Grenville to Lord Minto, ibid. December 16.

^{page 99 note 1} I.e. December 9.

^{page 99 note 2} Cobenzl to Colloredo, November 15 (Vivenot, mclxxxi. ), while the instructions despatched on November 23, and received December 3, gave him, as he said, ‘une latitude de pouvoir qui m'avait effrayé.’

^{page 99 note 3} Mr. Thomas Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham.

^{page 99 note 4} On the 13th Mr. Wickham wrote from Salzburg: ‘The want of courage and confidence in all ranks of the army is beyond anything that ever existed before. The infantry, with the exception of one or two regiments, is totally unfit for service, having everywhere in these last three days thrown away their arms on the approach of the enemy.’ On the 16th Lord Minto enclosed the extract to Lord Grenville, with the comment: ‘Mr. Wickham draws a lamentable, but as it appears faithful, picture of the state of the army.’ On the 17th Lord Minto announces the arrival in Vienna of Prince John of Lichtenstein, who represents that the state of the army is such that it is ‘impossible to again make it stand before the enemy.’ (F. O. Austria.)

^{page 99 note 5} Cobenzl to Colloredo, December 12, December 23. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 100 note 1} Joseph to Talleyrand, December 23. Du Casse, pp. 179–183.

^{page 100 note 2} Joseph to Talleyrand, December 11, 1800. Du Casse, p. 169. Cobenzl, he says, refuses to treat without the admission of an English envoy, but the English envoy need not arrive till a month after the secret separate negotiations had begun. The secret treaty must give the line of the Oglio and the three Legations.

^{page 100 note 3} Cobenil to Thugut, December 25 (Vivenot, ii.): ‘Entrer en negotiation sur des points tels que Ton indique [that is the line of the Mincio without the Legations, and the cession of Mantua] et sans les Anglais aurait été faire le St. Julien.’

^{page 100 note 4} Cobenzl to Thugut, December 23 (Vivenot, ii.): ‘Je me borne a insister sur l'admission d'une négociateur anglais, à presser la réponse qu'on me doit à ma dernière note et à assurer que je pars sans aucun délai si elle est négative.

Cobenzl to Colloredo, December 12 (Vivenot, ii.): ‘Quoique jesache jusqu'où va leur exagération dans les succès, si cependant l'état des choses était tel qu'il dû en résulter quelque changement dans les instructions que S.M. m'a données, il pourrait y avoir de l'inconvenient a me separer trop tot du plnipotentiaire francais.’

^{page 100 note 5} December 17, Talleyrand to Joseph. Du Casse, p. 175. On the 21st (p. 178) Joseph writes naively that he is trying to keep Cobenzl distracted and amused by taking him for excursions in the neighbourhood, and that he hopes an indemnity will be given to the Préfet of the Department of the Meurthe, who has spent 2,000 francs in entertaining the Austrian plenipotentiary suitably.

^{page 100 note 6} It is curious that though both Cobenzl and Thugut perceived this, they failed to grasp Bonaparte's object. ‘Ce n'est sans doute pas sans motif que le Premier Consul apporte à cette réponse un delai inutile,’ writes Cobenzl on December 23. (Vivenot, ii.) On December 31 Thugut writes to Colloredo: ‘Je suis fort aise que les Francais aient retenu Cobenzl a Luneville en different la reponse a sa note. II est a remarquer que le 24, jour oil Le Fevre en est parti, Ton savait deja en France, non seulement le passage de l'Inn, mais meme celui de la Salza et la malheureuse affaire de Salsbourg, et'que cependant Bonaparte a cru devoir retarder encore sa reponse, pour oser refuser ouvertement l'admission d'un plenipotentiaire anglais, de sorte que pour peu que notre armee eut voulu encore de pas perdre toute contenance, il est de la plus grande probability que nous aurions eu une paix encore tres tolerable pour nous.’

^{page 101 note 1} As Cobenzl himself perceived. ‘Je ne puis rester encore sans donner l'ombrage au seul allie que nous avons encore.’ (December 12, to Colloredo. Vivenot, ii.)

^{page 101 note 2} Talleyrand to Joseph, December 17. Du Casse, p. 175.

^{page 101 note 3} Thugut to Colloredo, December 17, and Instructions of the 23rd, which refer to the orders of ‘18 de ce mois.’ Vivenot, ii.

^{page 101 note 4} Cobenzl to Thugut, December 23. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 101 note 5} Joseph to Talleyrand, December 26 (Du Casse, p. 183), and Thugut to Collo-redo, December 31 (Vivenot, ii.): ‘Le courrier parti d'ici le 18 a du arriver a Luneville le 25 au soir.’

^{page 101 note 5} On December 22 Lord Minto informed Lord Grenville that ‘under the pressure of the present difficulties’ the Emperor had authorised Cobenzl to sign preliminaries to obtain an armistice, or ‘even to sign a peace if an armistice cannot otherwise be obtained.’ He adds that, ‘knowing Cobenzl's character, we may expect that he will make use of this permission and at once sign a separate peace.’ According to Lord Minto, Thugut's notion was that the preliminaries woald subsequently be treated by a general congress—‘a measure so dilatory in its nature and so sure of producing difficulty and confusion that just occasion could hardly fail to be given of breaking at a subsequent period.’ Thugut's own letters do not reveal this ulterior design. But the phrase supplies a commentary on Austrian policy, and on Bonaparte's determination to leave nothing to the decision of a general congress. Thugut's own letters do not bear out Lord Minto's assertion; but Cobenzl's instructions of the 23rd order him to ‘de ne faire entrer dans le traite de paix que des bases générales, en renvoyant le reste à des négotiations et discussions ultérieures.’ (F. O. Austria.)

^{page 102 note 1} Cobenzl to Colloredo, January 1, 1801. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 102 note 2} Cobenzl to Colloredo, June 6, 1801. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 102 note 3} Note 72 (Vivenot, i.): ‘Diese merkwürdige Grabschrift der Thugutschen Politik, die sich so ehrenvoll lange gegen die Annahme der Basis des Friedens von Campo Formio und gegen eine Separavterhandlung ohne England gesträubt hatte, ist ein Rescript des Kaisers an den Grafen Cobenzl.’ The entire text is given.

^{page 102 note 4} ‘J'ai tracé en tremblant le malheureux projet d'structions que j'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à V.E. et que jeregarde comme l'epitaphe de la monarchie et de la gloire de l'Autriche; mais S. M. l'ordonne absolument, et Ton ne saurait lui contester le droit de disposer de l'héritage de ses ancêtres.’ (Thugut to Colloredo, December 23. Vivenot, ii.)

^{page 103 note 1} F. O. Austria, December 27, 1800.

^{page 103 note 2} Not, however, without a last desperate effort of four hours on December 30 to extract a promise of the Legations, the line of the Oglio, and indemnity in Italy for the Duke of Modena.

^{page 103 note 3} Made public in the Gazette Nationale, 12 and 13 Nivôse.

^{page 104 note 1} Thugut to Talleyrand, March 24, 1800. Du Casse and Vivenot, ii., Anmerkungen.

^{page 104 note 2} Talleyrand to Joseph, January 9, 1801: ‘Qu'elle renonce aux preventions qui ne conviennent plus a sa position, et qui d'ailleurs sont repoussées par l'interet general de PEurope.’ (Du Casse, pp. 217, 218.)

^{page 104 note 3} Vivenot, ii., mccxxxiii.

^{page 104 note 4} Cobenzl to Colloredo, January 1, 1801. Vivenot, ii., mccxxv.

^{page 104 note 5} On January 5.

^{page 104 note 6} On January 9.

^{page 105 note 1} On January 15.

^{page 105 note 2} Cobenzl to Colloredo, January 16. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 105 note 3} The Emperor to Cobenzl, January 23–24, 1801. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 105 note 4} Cobenzl to Colloredo, January 16. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 105 note 5} Cobenzl to Colloredo, January 22 (Vivenot, iii): ‘J e le talonne (i.e. Joseph Bonaparte) chaque jour; mais sa marche actuelle est de demander des ordres a. son gouvernement, lesquels ordres n'arrivent jamais.’

Thugut and Colloredo believed that the aim of Bonaparte was to exhaust Austria by keeping the French troops in the imperial dominions (Vivenot, ii., mccli. and mcclxxxvii.); ‘chaque jour que l'ennemi reste dans nos provinces le mal est augmenté;’ and thus, always ‘holding the knife to her throat,’ to force her to accept harder conditions. Cobenzl told Joseph (Joseph to Talleyrand, January 19, Du Casse, p. 233) that he suspected that the First Consul wanted the time of the German armistice to expire before concluding the treaty. How little Cobenzl suspected the true cause of the delay or anticipated the news which he received on the 22nd is shown by his letter to Thugut of January 16 (Vivenot, ii., mccxxxv.), in which he says: ‘II paraît que Paul I^er ne sait s'accorder avec personne; il serait cependant bien bon de profiter de la premiére oirconstance quelconque pour le faire revenir à nous.’

^{page 106 note 1} Agent of General Stamford, Paris, January 1801. (Foreign Various, 322.) Bonaparte has said in the presence of several people ‘qu'il tenait la paix dans ses mains.’

^{page 106 note 2} The suggestion impressed Joseph, but was characteristically dismissed by his brother: ‘Les allies si tenaces de l'Angleterre ne peuvent etre si tot nos amis.’ (Du Casse, p. 218.)

^{page 106 note 3} Talleyrand to Joseph, January 24. Du Casse, p. 241.

^{page 106 note 4} Since his Reply of December 7.

^{page 106 note 5} Cobenzl to Colloredo, December 23 (Vivenot, ii.): ‘II serait trop absurde d'imaginer qu'on veuille nous faire abandonner Mantoue.’

^{page 106 note 6} Cobenzl to Colloredo, January 6 |(Vivenot, ii.): ‘Voila. notre armee en Italie e'galement battue et Mantoue bloque.’ Talleyrand to Joseph, January 9 (Du Casse, p. 218), encloses a letter from Brune, with the remark that Brune will not be likely to grant an armistice unless Mantua, Peschiera, and Porto Legnano are placed in his hands.

^{page 107 note 1} Joseph to Talleyrand, January 15. Du Casse, pp. 226, 227.

^{page 107 note 2} Joseph was far from happy at this period of the negotiations. From the 15th to the 22nd he appears to have been left without instructions. He complains that it is very disagreeable to be less well informed than Cobenzl, who is so much further from his government, and that his situation daily becomes more embarrassing. (Letters of the 18th and 19th.) When instructions at length arrived, he was clearly ashamed of them. Cobenzl made him feel he was acting dishonour-ably. (Letter of the 26th and Talleyrand's reply of the 27th. Du Casse, pp. 232–235.)

^{page 107 note 3} Cobenzl to Colloredo, January 27. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 107 note 4} The thirty days of the armistice of Steyer had almost expired.

^{page 108 note 1} ‘V.E. may imagine the awkward situation in which I am placed by reason of being left in ignorance of the true state of things in Italy. I know nothing but what the French tell me.’ (To Colloredo, January 27. Vivenot, ii., mcclxviii.)

^{page 108 note 2} Joseph to Talleyrand, January 31 (Du Casse, p. 293): ‘Cobenzl has just received from Vienna copy of the armistice concluded between the respective generals. He is filled with consternation at having put his name to the act which procures Mantua.’ The Emperor's letter was written on January 22, and is given by Vivenot, ii., mcclvi.

^{page 108 note 3} ‘I would sooner be shut up in these fortresses for life than have yielded them,’ he had written toThugut and Colloredo on January 27 (Vivenot, ii., mcclxviii.); ‘but had I refused them, would they have stayed the progress which the French are making every day in Italy ? Would they have prevented Moreau, when he had denounced the armistice which has already expired, from recommencing hostilities at the gates of the capital? And in that case should I obtain even the Adige ?“

^{page 108 note 4} July 31; that the French should not march on Rome or Naples during the armistice.

^{page 108 note 5} ‘Le plénipotentiaire autrichien,’ wrote Joseph on the 26th (Du Casse, pp. 259, 260), ‘sent bien qu'il livre S.M. Sicilienne a notre discretion; mais encore ai-je cru devoir lui en épargner l'aveu formel et absolu.’

^{page 108 note 6} Written January 22. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 109 note 1} On January 26. Du Casse, p. 265.

^{page 109 note 2} Talleyrand to Joseph, January 9. Du Casse, p. 218.

^{page 110 note 1} January 29. Du Casse, p. 288.

^{page 110 note 2} Talleyrand to Thugut, September 26. Du Casse, p. 49.

^{page 110 note 3} Cobenzl to Talleyrand, October 14. Vivenot.

^{page 110 note 4} December 4, Paris Intelligence. Foreign Various, 322.

^{page 110 note 5} Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, F. O. Austria, October 27 and 29.

^{page 111 note 1} Lord Minto's comment is that ‘the Emperor's mind seems soured by the disgraces and misfortunes which have resulted from measures which have been peculiarly his own’— i.e. the Convention of Hohenlinden.

^{page 111 note 2} November 16, Joseph to Talleyrand. Du Casse, pp. 87, 88.

^{page 111 note 3} Thugut to Colloredo, December 15 (Vivenot, ii., mccviii.): ‘Minto m'a retenu ce soir deux bonnes heures. II se récrie beaucoup sur le sejour prolonge de Cobenzl a Luneville; je lui ai répondu dans le sens qu'il dit lui-meme, Cobenzl, d'avoir ecrit au comte de Starhemberg, c'est-a-dire qu'il e'tait reste la dans l'espérance de conclure un armistice avec l'évacuation de la Toscane.’

^{page 111 note 4} ‘The King of Spain has been faithful to our cause; he will receive a proper return: a prince of his blood is to sit on the Tuscan throne. His roadsteads and ports will be shut to our enemies.’ (Message to the Legislative Assembly announcing the peace, Corresp. vii. 5362, Feb. 13.)

^{page 111 note 5} The Grand Duke, Joseph declared on January 29 (Du Casse, 288), was prepared to pledge himself to receive in his ports only the number of armed vessels specified by France, and to acquiesce in the presence of a French garrison at Leghorn till the establishment of a maritime peace.

^{page 112 note 1} Talleyrand to Joseph, January 30. Du Casse, p. 292.

^{page 112 note 2} As Mr. Whitbread said in the debate on the Peace Proposals from the Consular Government, February 3, 1800 (Parl. Hist. vol. 34), ‘the Grand Duke had displayed a partiality to France not more disadvantageous to the cause in which England was engaged than it was manifestly prejudicial in its effects to the security of the Grand Duke's government.’

^{page 112 note 3} Joseph to the First Consul, January 29. Du Casse, p. 216.

^{page 112 note 4} Talleyrand to Joseph, January 9. Joseph to Talleyrand, January 15: ‘Dans le protocole du 11 Janvier je n'ai pas fait difficulté de stipuler la restitution de la Toscane au Grand Due si la cession de 1'Adige était consentie.’ January 29, Joseph to the First Consul: ‘J'en avais l'ordre précis; et je ne l'ai pas fait de ma tête.’ (Du Casse, p. 289.)

^{page 112 note 5} ‘M. de Cobenzl a mal fait de ne pas conclure sur-le-champ quand Bonaparte a parlé d'une partie du Ferrarais pour nous et le reste pour S.A.R. de Toscane.’ To Colloredo, January 18, 1801. Vivenot, mccxliv.

^{page 113 note 1} Talleyrand to Joseph, February I, 1801: ‘Austria must keep nothing in Italy right of the Adige.’ January 30: ‘Absolutely we will have no Austrian Prince right of the Adige.’ Du Casse, 292, 298.

^{page 113 note 2} Talleyrand to Joseph, January 27. Dictated by the First Consul. Du Casse, 274.

^{page 113 note 3} Joseph to the First Consul, January 29. Du Casse, 289.

^{page 113 note 4} Talleyrand to Joseph, February 1. Joseph to Talleyrand, February 4. Talleyrand to Joseph, February 6. Du Casse, 298, 309, 314.

^{page 114 note 1} Colloredo to Cobenzl, February 14, 1801. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 114 note 2} Cobenzl's Instructions of December 23, 1800 (Vivenot, ii. Anmerkungen, 72) declare: ‘II est Evident que je dois m'en tenir de meme a l'egard de l'AUemagne et de l'Empire a ce seul engagement pour toute la partie situee sur la rive droite du Rhin; en consequence de quoi, aussitot que l'affaire de ma paix avec la France sera re'glee, il sera indispensable qu'a fin de fixer pour le reste de PAllemagne un ordre de choses stable, il soit convoque un congres general.’

^{page 115 note 1} Message of the First Consul to the Legislative Body.

^{page 115 note 2} Cobenzl to Colloredo, February 9. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 115 note 3} Joseph to Talleyrand, February 9. Du Casse, 319.

^{page 115 note 4} February 3, 1801. Vivenot, mcclxxviii.

^{page 115 note 5} Joseph to Talleyrand, February 4. Du Casse, 311, 312.

^{page 115 note 6} Talleyrand to Joseph, February 1, 1801 (Du Casse, 297, 298), and Article VII. of the Treaty.

^{page 116 note 1} Talleyrand to Joseph, February 6. Du Casse, p. 315. ‘This despatch,’ says Du Casse, ‘was written under the immediate supervision of the First Consul.’

^{page 116 note 2} To Colloredo. Vivenot, mcccxi.

^{page 116 note 3} Thugut to Colloredo, January 27 (Vivenot, mcclxvi.): ‘Ceprincipe(i.e. que S.M. a le droit de faire la paix pour l'Empire) une fois admis, ils peuvent absolument obliger S. M. de se charger de cette malheureuse pacification, et comme il ne nous reste aucun moyen de resistance, de stipuler pour l'Empire tout ce qui leur passera par tête, en nous laissant en suite nous débattre avec l'Empire, la Russie, la Prusse, etc.' Cobenzl had just received despatches embodying these ideas when he made his three hours' resistance. ‘He tried,’ says Joseph, ‘to alter, by intercalations or verbal substitutions, the sense of essential articles.’ (Du Casse.) This conduct would certainly have been approved by Thugut, who was horrified at the ultimatum, pronounced it to be full of abominable pitfalls, some of which might be avoided through verbal changes. (To Colloredo, February 6. Vivenot, ii.) ‘Lorsqu'il s'agit d'objets incalculables pour l'avenir, il semble que c'est bien la peine de chercher à diminuer le mal s'il est possible, ou pour le moins des'expliquer clairement.’ (To Colloredo, February 5. Vivenot, ii.)

^{page 117 note 1} Joseph to Talleyrand, February 4. Du Casse, p. 312.

^{page 117 note 2} Cobenzl to Colloredo, February 3, and following letters. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 117 note 3} Joseph to Talleyrand, February 7. Du Casse, p. 318.

^{page 117 note 4} Joseph to Talleyrand, February 9 (Du Casse, p. 319): ‘La suppression des articles secrets proposés, le silence sur les ecclésiastiques et la mode d'exécution du traité, l'admission des articles 9 et 10 [see text of treaty], la rénonciation a la Toscane, tout jusqu'a la mention du consentement de l'Empereur aux actes de la députation de Radstadt, dont M. de Cobenzl me defia de lui donner la preuve, a été défendu avec opiniâtreté jusqu'au dernier moment. M. de Cobenzl s'obslinait a referer mon insistance a la Cour de Vienne; j'ai dii alors céder Cassel, et je ne dois qu'à cette latitude que vous m'avez laissée, ainsi qu'à l'article secret sur le Grand-Due, la signature obtenue.’

^{page 118 note 1} Joseph to Talleyrand, February 9. Du Casse, p. 319.

^{page 118 note 2} Cobenzl to Colloredo, February 9. Vivenot.

^{page 118 note 3} Colloredo to Cobenzl, February 14. Vivenot.

^{page 119 note 1} Colloredo to Cobenzl, February 10. Colloredo to Thugut, January 16. Vivenot, ii.

^{page 119 note 2} Emperor to Thugut, February 9. Vivenot.

^{page 119 note 3} Thugut to Colloredo, February 13, February 23. Vivenot.

^{page 121 note 1} Given by Fournier, August, Historische Studien und Skizzen, 1885, p. 209Google Scholar.