^{page 18 note 1} April 1890, p. 385.

^{page 18 note 2} See the narrative of Prince Rupert's march printed in the Appendix to this paper, p. 53. A letter from Arthur Trevor to Ormond, dated April 13, 1644, says that the Prince had then at Shrewsbury 5,000 foot and 3,000 horse (Carte's, Life of Ormond, vi. 87Google Scholar). Conflicting accounts of his numbers are given in Parliamentary reports. The usual estimate was 8,000 or 10,000 men, and they were said to be mostly horse Cal State Papers, , Dom. 1644, pp. 187, 188, 192Google Scholar; Rushworth, v. 623; Lancashire Civil Wat Tracts, Chetham Society, p. 187Google Scholar).

^{page 18 note 3} Report on the Duke of Portland's MSS., i. 170. Rupert's regiment was apparently the blue regiment mentioned in reports of the battle. See Phillips's, Civil War in Wales ii. 195Google Scholar.

^{page 18 note 4} Lord Byron, writing to Rupert on April 4, stated that these three regiments would make up over 1,000 men. See also Phillips's, Civil War in Wales, ii. 131. 133Google Scholar.

^{page 18 note 5} Phillips's, Civil War in Wales ii. 125, 137Google Scholar. With Tillier and Broughton came Sir William Vaughan and four troops of horse.

^{page 19 note 1} See Byron' letters to Rupert, April 4 and May 5, 1644, Rupert Mss.

^{page 19 note 2} See the narrative of Rupert's march on p. 54, and A Discourse of the Civil War in Lancashire, ed. by Beamont, W. for the Chetham Society, p. 53Google Scholar.

^{page 19 note 3} see narrative of Rupert's march, p. 54.

^{page 19 note 4} Life of the Duke of Newcastle, p. 71, ed. 1886; Tenth Report of the Historical MSS. Comm. i. 53 (Papers of the Earl of Eglinton).

^{page 19 note 5} On April 10 George Goring had been despatched from Oxford (accompanied I by the regiment of Colonel Evers) to take command of any forces that could be got together for Newcastle's assistance. Goring bore the title of general of all the horse north of Trent, and established his headquarters at Newark about April 26, where he collected all the cavalry he could from Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire(Rupert MSS.). Newcastle' horse joined Goring' at or about Mansfield, who ‘together withem made up about 100 troops.’ On May 5 they recrossed the Trent, and endeavoured to interrupt Manchester's attack on Newark. Cromwell's and Manchester's horse drove them off, and forced them to recross the river. ‘The enemy,’ says Ashe's Relation, ‘had above 90 colours, which we esteemed 4,000, and themselves accounted 6,000 horse’ (Ashe's Intelligence from the Earl of Manchester's Army, Nos. 1 and 2). They then retired into Leicestershire, and Goring wrote to Rupert from Brookesby on May 10 urging the Prince to join him and relieve York. On May 25 the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote to Manchester that Lord Newcastle's horse that had come out of York had recruited themselves to a great strength, raised at least 1,000 horse, and now were 3,000 horse and dragoons, and lying near Uttoxeter, in Staffordshire. On May 31 Newcastle's horse were said to be upon the frontiers of Yorkshire, between Woodhead and Stockport, with 3,000 horse and 100 foot Cal. State Papers, , Dom. 1644, pp. 171, 177, 188Google Scholar; cf.Micro-ckronicon, June 20 and 25, 1644). Goring himself, about the end of May, marched through Derbyshire and Cheshire to join Rupert. His force was estimated at 2,000 men. Colonels Frecheville and Eyre followed him from Derbyshire with detachments from the local garrisons computed to be about 300 horse and as many foot (Cal. State Papers, , Dom. 1644, p. 191Google Scholar). Goring joined Rupert about Bolton or Bury on June 1, according to the narrative of Rupert's march. See also, on his movements, the letters from Goring to Prince Rupert in the Rupert MSS.

^{page 20 note 1} Carte MSS. For Parliamentary estimates of his strength, vide Cal. Slate Papers, , Dom. pp. 257, 265Google Scholar. Vane, writing from York on June 23, estimates Rupert's strength at 11,000. Sir John Meldrum's estimate was 6,000 foot and 8,000 horse(Fourth Rep. Hist. MSS. Comm. p. 268).

^{page 20 note 2} During the latter part of June Goring was quartered in the north of Lancashire, about Garstang and Ormskirk, and at the end of the month he was at Skipton.

^{page 20 note 3} Fairfax Correspondence, iii. IIIGoogle Scholar.

^{page 21 note 1} The exact size of the army with which Newcastle began the campaign against the Scots, and how much of it he brought back from the north, are points not very easy to determine. ‘I know they tell you I have great force,’ he wrote to Rupert on January 28 from York; ‘truly I cannot march 5,000 foot, and the horse not well armed.’ Next day he set out against the Scots, and Sir Charles Lucas wrote to Rupert on February 2 saying that, Newcastle ‘having sent the greatest part of his army before, the number of his foot is uncertain, because many are to come to him as he passes through the bishopric; yet I believe they are going out of those parts about 5,000 foot and above 3,000 horse.’ The Marquis and General King, in a joint letter to Charles dated February 13, say, ‘We cannot possibly draw into the field full 5,000 foot and about 3,000 horse,’ i.e. after deducting the necessary garrison for Newcastle. But the object of the whole letter is to minimise their strength, in order to get reinforcements (Warburton, , Prince Rupert, ii. 368, 371, 483Google Scholar). Early in March Newcastle's army was strengthened by additional forces from Durham, and by the arrival of some cavalry under Sir Charles Lucas from the south. Lucas is said by Rushworth to have brought twelve troops of horse, and Sir Henry Slingsby states that he had 1,000 horse and dragoons. The Scots estimated that this raised Newcastle's army to 14,000 horse and foot, which is probably an over-estimate (Rushworth, v. 615; Slingsby's, Diary, p. 103Google Scholar; cf. Warburton, ii. 356, 371). Newcastle himself, in a letter dated March 25, says: ‘The Scots are as big again in foot as I am, and their horse, I doubt, much better’ (Warburton, ii. 397). As he estimated the Scottish foot at 14,000, it is probable that he had not less than 7,000 foot, which, added to 4,000 horse, makes a total of 11,000.

Though the fighting during Newcastle's campaign against the Scots was not very severe, the hardships of the season and the difficulty of supplying the two armies diminished considerably the strength of each. The English suffered more than the Scots. His northern expedition, says Bowles, lost him many men, who were wearied out with the hardiness of the Scots (Manifest Truths, p. 4). A letter of intelligence from the Scottish camp, dated April 14, says: ‘Newcastle hath lost half his army without fighting.’ He began his retreat to York on April 13, and entered it April 19 (Rushworth, v. 620). A letter from, the Scottish army, dated Weatherby, April 20, says that Newcastle's army now in York is ‘betwixt 4,000 and 5,000 horse and about 6,000 foot, for by those who were killed and taken at several skirmishes in Northumberland, and those that ran away, he is-fnade weaker in his foot about three or four thousand.’ (A similar figure is given by the Committee of Both Kingdoms, Cal. State Papers, dom, . 1644, p. 137Google Scholar.) This is an over-estimate in each case, but it seems likely that he reached York with not less than 4,000 or 5,000 foot, seeing the number he was able to put into the field after a two months' siege, which had involved a considerable amount'of fighting. The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, May 7–14, describes Newcastle as having in York ‘4,000 Papists, besides the soldiers in arms, being 5,000 foot and horse, and all the inhabitants in York besides.’

^{page 22 note 1} According to Sir Robert Byron, writing to Ormond on July 8, Newcastle had in the town 6,000 foot and 1,200 horse. A Scottish officer, writing on May 1, states that ‘four troops of horse were kept by Newcastle in York when Lucas and the rest of the cavalry left him’ (Tenth Report Hist. MSS. Comm. i. 53). Horse belonging to the garrison are mentioned in the narratives of the siege (Slingsby's, Diary, pp. 110, iiiGoogle Scholar; Ashe's, Relations, No. 3Google Scholar).

^{page 22 note 2} The forces left to guard York were the three regiments of Colonel Bellasis, Sir Thomas Glemham, and Sir Henry Slingsby (Slingsby's, Diary, p. 112Google Scholar). Slingsby's was a city regiment; Bellasis being the governor left by Newcastle to defend York, his regiment was, no doubt, part of the original garrison; Glemham had been with Newcastle in the north, so his regiment was pretty certainly part of Newcastle's marching army.

^{page 22 note 3} For Cholmley's, narrative, see English Historical Review, 1890, p. 347Google Scholar; Warburton, ii. 449; Newcastle's divisions are marked ‘z’ in the plan.

^{page 23 note 1} Life of the Duke, of Newcastle, ed. 1886, p. 78: SirCholmley's, Hugh narrativeGoogle Scholar. Slingsby states that Newcastle brought with him all the forces he had except the three foot regiments mentioned above. It is probable, therefore, that he brought 300 or 400 horse at least, besides this troop of gentlemen.

^{page 23 note 2} Clarendon, in a paper of notes on Marston Moor, gives very nearly the same figures. ‘On the Kinge's syde, of the prince's and the Marq. of Newcastle's, the army was not much less than 18,000. The enemy, at the least, 26,000' (Clarendon's, Rebellion ed. Macray, , viii. 75Google Scholar, note). After the battle Sir Charles Lucas, who was taken prisoner, was said to have confessed that the Royalist foot numbered 12,000 men (The Glorious and Miraculous Battel at York). Watson, Manchester's Scoutmaster, says in his narrative: ‘Their whole army is so broken, that of foot I am confident they are not able, of 13,000 or 14,000, to rally 2,000, and of 8,000 or 9,000 horse, not above 2,000.’

^{page 23 note 3} A Full Relation of the late Victory, &c., sent by Captain Stewart, p. 10; cf. Warburton, , Prince Rupert, ii. 465Google Scholar.

^{page 23 note 4} See list of authorities, p. 49, on the authorship and value of this pamphlet.

^{page 23 note 5} By the treaty of November 29, 1643, the Scots were to send an army of 18,000 foot, 2,000 horse, 1,000 dragoons, and a train of artillery (Thurloe, i. 29). A report made to the House of Lords on January 30, 1644, stated that the army which had actually entered England consisted of 18,000 foot and 3,000 horse (including dragoons) (Lords' Journals, vi. 399). A pamphlet entitled The Scots Army advanced into England contains a letter from the Scottish headquarters at Addarston, dated January 24, 1644, saying the army is ‘in all 18,000 foot and 3,000 horse, and betwixt 400 and 500 dragoons.’ Rushworth says 18,000 foot, 3,000 horse, and between 500 and 600 dragoons (Collections, v. 603). His ‘list of the regiments and chief officers’ enumerates eighteen regiments of ten companies each, besides one of five companies, one of three companies, and Lord Sinclair's regiment, of which the number of companies is unspecified. We know from the Memorie of the Somervilles that this regiment consisted of twelve companies of 100 men apiece. Had the twenty-one regiments been complete the army should have consisted of 21,000 foot, instead of 18,000. As it was, the 200 companies of which the infantry of the army was composed averaged ninety men apiece instead of 100. Spalding mentions the fact that the orders for levying men were imperfectly obeyed (History of the Troubles, ed. 1829, pp. 363, 380). Leven, in a despatch written in July, repeats the statement that many regiments were deficient in numbers from the start (Thurloe, i. 39). Somerville, lieutenant-colonel of Sinclair's regiment, goes so far as to allege that the whole army only came to 18,000 men, including 2,500 horse (Memorie of the Somervilles, ii. 279).

^{page 24 note 1} Eighth Report Hist. MSS. Comm. ii. 60. Sir Thomas Fairfax, in his Short Memorial, says that the Scots, added to Lord Fairfax's forces, made up a total of 16,000 foot and 4,000 horse, but does not say what proportion of the infantry were Scots.

^{page 24 note 2} Two regiments were left in Sunderland, one in Blyth, 500 men in Morpeth Castle, 150 in South Shields, and other detachments in Lumley and Warkworth Castles (Somerville, , Memorie, ii. 286Google Scholar; Bowles, , Manifest Truths, 1646, pp. 3, 9Google Scholar; Thurloe, i. 35, 37; Rushworth, v. 615; Napier, , Memoirs of Montrose, ed. 1856, p. 398Google Scholar).

^{page 24 note 3} Leven joined Lord Fairfax at Tadcaster on April 20. The Scottish army had then been three months in the field, enduring all the hardships of a winter campaign. The snow and the frost are frequently mentioned in the accounts of their marches. At the beginning of March, when Newcastle found it impossible to persuade Leven to attack his position on the Bowden Hills, near Sunderland, he returned to Durham, ‘with an intention to straiten the enemy's quarters, who were all this time much incommoded, and under great difficulties for provision … so that sometimes the whole army had neither meat nor drink, and never had above twenty-four hours’ provision beforehand (Rushworth, v. 615). This is confirmed by Bowles (Manifest Truths, p. 30). In their march from Darlington to Weatherby in April, in pursuit of Newcastle, one of the Scottish relations says: ‘Our army … suffered much hunger by the way for want of provisions’ (Extract of letters dated Edinburgh, April 14, 16, and 17, 1644, p. 13).

Of the extent of the loss caused by these hardships no particulars are given by the pamphlets.

^{page 25 note 1} Lord Lindsay wrote to the Committee of the Scottish Estates on June I, on behalf of the army before York, saying: ‘We find that by our keeping of the fields these full five months our regiments are become somewhat weaker than the beginning; whereof we are not to expect any recruits from this (country). We do therefore entreat your lordships to think upon some course for the recruiting of the several regiments which are already of this army.’ On July 18, Leven himself wrote: ‘As in my former letters, I must likewise by this entreat that your lordships will take into consideration the weakness of the several regiments of this army, occasioned by much service and very hard usage since our coming from Scotland.’ There are also complaints in the letters of Lindsay and Leven of the number of officers absent from their regiments, and of desertion amongst the soldiers (Thurloe Papers, i. 36, 39).

^{page 25 note 2} Rushworth, v. 622; Markham, , Life of the Great Lord Fairfax, pp. 145–149Google Scholar; Ashe, Relation; Bowles, , Manifest Truths, p. 5Google Scholar.

^{page 25 note 3} Thurloe, i. 36; Cal. State Papers, dom, .. 1644, pp. 173, 193, 206Google Scholar. The regiment's name is not mentioned, but as a letter describes the soldiers as ‘redshanks,’ they were probably either Highlanders or a regiment recruited from the Scots in Ulster (Carte, , Original Letters, i. 53Google Scholar).

^{page 25 note 4} By the treaty of November 29, 1643, the Scots were pledged to bring 2,000 horse and 1,000 dragoons (Thurloe, i. 29). The Scottish Parliament, however, endeavoured to raise a larger number of horse, estimating, doubtless, that a greater proportion of horse was necessary for the safety of so large an army. An Act printed by Spalding orders the levy of seven regiments of horse, of eight troops each, consisting of sixty men per troop, and specifies the districts in which the troops are to be raised. This would make a force of 3,360 soldiers, exclusive of officers. It is certain, however, that the orders were not completely carried out, and that the number of the cavalry actually raised fell short of these figures. The list of horse regiments reprinted by Rushworth mentions fifty-two troops of about sixty in a troop, divided into seven regiments, and a couple of ‘loose troops,’ which would equal 3,120 troopers, exclusive of dragoons, whose numbers are not given. Rushworth's estimate is 3,000 horse and 500 or 600 dragoons. The report made to the House of Lords mentions 3,000 horse, including dragoons. Somerville speaks of 2,500 horse, and makes no mention of dragoons. Newcastle, writing on February 13, said the Scots had 2,000 horse (Warburton, ii. 348). Some of the regiments were certainly deficient in numbers. In Lord Dalhousie's one whole troop was missing as late as February 17, besides ‘many other troopers elsewhere’ (Thurloe, i. 32). The hardships of the campaign affected the cavalry more than the foot, as the difficulty of procuring forage for their horses is specially mentioned in the accounts of the campaign (Rushworth, v. 615; Napier, , Memoirs of Montrose, ii. 390Google Scholar), and considerably hampered their movements. In a skirmish at Corbridge with Sir Marmaduke Langdale the Scottish cavalry lost 150 prisoners, including three officers, and about 200 killed, according to Langdale's account, which is to some extent confirmed by the narrative in Rushworth. They lost men also in the skirmishes near Sunderland, though the Royalist accounts greatly exaggerate their loss (Rushworth, v. 614, 616; Newcastle's Life, pp. 350, 353, 355).

^{page 26 note 1} Colonel Michael Weldon's regiment of horse was certainly not at Marston Moor. If it joined Leslie's army at all, it was immediately sent back to the north, but it was more probably detained on its march to join him. Weldon's regiment appears in Rushworth's list as consisting of seven troops, i.e. 420 men. Six troops of horse and four of dragoons, making in all a body of about 800 men, who were marching south to join Leven's army in May, were ordered by him to retrace their steps and attempt to raise the siege of Morpeth Castle, where half of Lord Sinclair's regiment were besieged by Montrose (Memorie of the Somervilles, ii. 310). They failed in the attempt, but were kept inDurham to oppose Montrose and Clavering, and were absent at the battle (Thurloe, i. 36, 41;Napier, , Memoirs of Montrose, ii. 398Google Scholar).

^{page 26 note 2} By the treaty the dragoons were to be 1,000 in number, and they formed a single regiment under the command of Colonel Frizell, or Freiser, and Lieut. -Colonel Crawford of Skeldon. According to Rushworth, between 500 and 600 dragoons entered England with the Scottish army in January 1644 (Rushworth, v. 603, 605). This accounts for six troops; the other four troops were detained in Durham to fight Clavering and Montrose. The dragoon regiment became subsequently amous as one of the two stoutest regiments in the Scottish army (Somerville, , Memorie, ii. 315Google Scholar; Napier, , Montrose, ii. 398Google Scholar).

^{page 27 note 1} Cal. State Papers, dom, . 1644, p. 246Google Scholar.

^{page 27 note 2} At the close of 1643, Sir Thomas Fairfax with about 1,500 horse had marched into Lancashire to help Sir William Brereton and the local Parliamentarians against Lord Byron's army from Ireland, whom he defeated at Kantwich on January 25, 1644. Lord Fairfax remained behind at Hull with the foot and the rest of the Yorkshire forces. Newcastle and King wrote on February 13, saying: ‘My Lord Fairfax hath sent forth out of Hull into the East Riding 2,000 foot and 500 horse, all threatening towards us, which will make them a great bod}-. Besides, Sir Thomas Fairfax's success in Cheshire hath made him capable of drawing from Lancashire a very great force into the West Riding of Yorkshire, which he is ready to do’ (Warburton, ii. 483). In the West Riding, Colonel Lambert was waiting for Sir Thomas Fairfax's advance with eight troops of horse and 600 foot (Markham, , Life of Robert Fairfax, p. 15Google Scholar).

In March 1644 Sir Thomas Fairfax was ordered to return into Yorkshire and, joining his father, to fall upon Newcastle's rear. He was instructed to take with him six troops of Lancashire horse and two regiments of foot. The two regiments of foot were estimated to amount to 1,500 men, and he was also to gather up 500 horse and 500 foot from Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire. These Derbyshire forces do not seem to have joined him, but some Lancashire forces did (Cal. State Papers, dom, . 1644, pp. 35, 87, 99, 164Google Scholar).

The Royalist Commissioners at York, writing to Rupert on March 29, estimated Sir Thomas's force at 2,000 horse and as many foot.

^{page 27 note 3} The two Fairfaxes united their forces about the beginning of April. On April 7 the Committee of Both Kingdoms informed the Committee of Kent that Lord Fairfax and his son are joined in Yorkshire, and make up 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot going to join with the Scots army (Cal. State Papers, dom, . 1644, p. 103Google Scholar). Mercurins icus for April 11–18 is more explicit, stating, on the authority of a special messenger from Sir Thomas Fairfax, ‘that upon the advance of the Lord Fairfax from Hull with twenty troops of horse on Friday was seven night last (i.e. April 5), he joined with Sir Thomas Fairfax and Colonel Lambert (who made up above sixty troops more, besides foot) at Leeds; from whence, having left 500 foot there and two troops of horse at Bradford, they advanced towards York.’ On April 11 they attacked and defeated Colonel John Bellasis at Selby, taking about 1,700 prisoners. Their force, according to Mercnritis Civicus, was ‘about 5,000 strong in horse and foot, Sir John Meldrum's 2,000 foot being also with them.’ Meldrum's foot belonged to Lord Fairfax's army, and may perhaps be included in this 5,000. Lord Fairfax himself, on the other hand, says that the whole army ‘under his command at Selby consisted of 2,000 horse and as many foot,' including apparently both his son's cavalry and Meldrum's foot. Fairfax then marched to York, pitching his camp at Fulford, on the east side of the Ouse. The united cavalry of Fairfax and the Scots amounted, according to Sir Thomas Fairfax, to 4,000, and their foot to 16,000. This would make the strength of Fairfax's army between 3,000 and 4,000 foot and about 2,000 horse. The King-dom's Weekly Intelligencer for May 7–14 says that after the fall of York Lord Fairfax would be able to spare 3,000 choice foot and 2,000 horse to join Manchester.

^{page 28 note 1} During the siege one regiment of Yorkshire horse, under Colonel Charles Fairfax, was sent to Durham to assist Weldon against Montrose, and a regiment of Lancashire foot, under Meldrum, to Manchester to aid in its defence against Rupert (Lancashire Civil War Tracts, p. 188; Thurloe, i. 36; Cal. State Papers, dom, . 1644, pp. 173, 206, 242, 257Google Scholar).

^{page 28 note 2} On the other hand, the foot who had been employed under Meldrum in the capture of Cawood and Ayremouth, and possibly other detachments of Yorkshire infantry, must have joined the besieging army, so that its numbers remained much the same (Vicars, , God's Ark, p. 233Google Scholar). Moreover, the Yorkshire army, being in its own district, was better able to recruit its numbers than that of Manchester or the Scots.

^{page 28 note 3} Manchester was authorised by ordinance of August 10, 1643, to raise an army of 14,000 men, and a second ordinance, passed on January 20, 1644, states that he had raised that number or thereabouts (Husbands, , Ordinances, 1646, pp. 286, 492Google Scholar). A Parliamentary newspaper at the end of February 1644 stated that the army of the Eastern Association consisted of 10,000 foot, 3,000 horse, and 2,000 dragoons (Sanford, , Studies and Illustrations of the Great Rebellion, p. 581Google Scholar).

^{page 29 note 1} Mercurius Civicus, quoted in Cromwelliana, p. 8, states that the force which assembled at Gainsborough at the end of April consisted of 9,000 men. See also Vicars's, God's Ark, p. 209Google Scholar.

^{page 29 note 2} On May 22, Manchester wrote from Lincoln saying that he had four regiments of foot with him, and four more at Gainsborough and elsewhere, in readiness to march towards the Scots on news of Prince Rupert's approach. Most of his horse were already joined with the Scots horse, but 1,200 were still with him (Tenth Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, part vi. p. 152). Cromwell, with near 3,000 horse and dragoons, had been sent to join the cavalry of Fairfax and the Scots immediately after the capture of Lincoln (i.e. after May 6), so that Manchester's cavalry must have been at this time 4,000 in number, rather than 3,000 (Ashe's, Relation, No. 2Google Scholar). Sir John Palgrave's regiment of foot was left to guard Lincoln (Carte MSS. lxxiv. 159). Some horse also must have been left in Lincolnshire.

^{page 29 note 3} Ashe's Relation does not specify the force Manchester brought with him to York. Rushworth, v. 622, says 600 foot (a misprint for 6,000) and 100 horse. Sir Thomas Fairfax says 6,000 foot (Short Memorial; Arber's, English Garner, viii. 605Google Scholar).

^{page 29 note 4} Manchester states his loss in this assault as near 300 men, in a letter, dated June 18, to the Committee of Both Kingdoms (Cal. State Papers, Dom, . 1644, p. 246Google Scholar). See also Baillie's Letters, ii. 195, 200; and for other losses during the siege, Ashe's, Relations, Nos. 3 and 4Google Scholar.

^{page 29 note 5} Manchester seems to have had six regiments of foot at York—his own, which was a regiment of eighteen companies, and those of Major-General Crawford and Colonels Montagu, Russell, Pickering, and Sir Michael Hobart. Musters taken about the middle of May, June, and July exist for all these regiments except that of Pickering. The diminution in their numbers was very rapid. Crawford's regiment of eight companies mustered 802 privates in May, 529 in June, and in July, after Marston Moor, only 325. In June, Manchester's, Crawford's, Russell's, Montagu's, and Hobart's regiments, numbering fifty-two companies, mustered 3,145 privates, and if we add an estimate for Pickering's, of which no muster exists, the total may have been 3,700. The officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of the regiments would bring the total of Manchester's infantry to about 4,500. There may possibly have been a few detached companies present belonging to other regiments of Manchester's command, but his foot at Marston was certainly not more than 5,000, and probably only about 4,500.

^{page 30 note 1} The cavalry of Manchester's army was much nearer its original strength than the infantry. It had done no fighting in the campaign, and had good quarters in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire most of the time. Cavalry soldiers, being better paid, deserted very little. Occasional muster-rolls of different troops during 1644 show that their ranks were kept pretty full, especially in Cromwell's own regiment. The regiments present at Marston Moor were Cromwell's own regiment, consisting of fourteen troops; Manchester's regiment of horse, which had eleven troops; Colonel Vermuyden's of five troops, and Colonel Fleetwood's of six; also Manchester's regiment of dragoons, which consisted of five companies. The pay-roll of Manchester's army from April 29, 1644, to March 1, 1645, gives these particulars of the number of troops composing the different regiments. The presence of the regiments at Marston Moor is shown by references to their officers in newspaper narratives of the battle, accounts, &c. Whether all the troops specified as belonging to the respective regiments were present at Marston is, of course, open to doubt; but, certainly, nearly all were. The troops of horse in Manchester's army numbered 100 men, and therefore the thirty-six troops of horse in question may very well have had a strength of from 2,000 to 2,500 at Marston Moor. To each troop there were four commissioned officers and four or five non-commissioned. The five companies of dragoons would amount to 500 men normally.

^{page 30 note 2} Warburton, ii. 455; Sanford, p. 594; Markham,' p. 164; cf. Gardiner, , Great Civil War, i. 375Google Scholar. Mr. Gardiner gives very few details, but follows in the main Sir C. Markham's plan.

^{page 31 note 1} Addit. MS. 16370, f. 64.

^{page 31 note 2} Life of Nexvcastk, p. 77.

^{page 31 note 3} Sir William Vaughan's command consisted of horse belonging to the English army in Ireland, whom Ormond had sent over in January 1644 (Phillips, , Civil War in Wales, ii. 125Google Scholar). Vicars states, following one of the newspapers, and referring no doubt to Vaughan's regiment, that ‘Rupert had designed certain troops of horse (all Irish Papists and gentlemen, old soldiers all, who had been in service in Spain and France) to give the first charge to the brigade or party in which General Cromwell was, and that they did confidently believe there was not a man of them but would rather dye than fly; but they mist their expectations, for many of them being indeed slain in the place, all the rest fled’ (Vicars, ,God's Ark, p. 280Google Scholar; cf.Cromwe'liana, p. 10, quoting The Parliament Scout).

^{page 32 note 1} Urry is credited with some responsibility for the order of battle adopted. ‘Some suspected Colonel Urry (lately converted to the King's party) for foul play herein; for he divided the King's old horse, so valiant and victorious in former fights, into small bodies, alleging this was the best way to break the Scottish lancers. But those horse, always used to charge together in whole regiments or greater bodies, were much discomposed with this new mode, so that they could not find themselves in themselves’ (Fuller's, Worthies, ii. 536, ed. 1811Google Scholar). Cholmley partly confirms this statement, describing Urry as ‘having the marshalling of the horse in the Prince's right wing.’ Watson erroneously puts Urry on the left wing.

^{page 32 note 2} Diary of Richard Symonds, p. 181.

^{page 32 note 3} Scoutmaster Watson, who fought under Cromwell, says: ‘The right wing of their horse was commanded by Prince Rupert, who had in it some twelve divisions of horse consisting of 100 troops, and might be 5,000 men.’ This is a great exaggeration. Watson, no doubt, counts in the reserve cavalry from the centre, who came to the relief of the right wing after Cromwell's first success. On the other hand, this figure of 2,600 or so, derived from De Gomme's plan, seems, for reasons given hereafter, somewhat too low, for Rupert doubtless posted the bulk of his cavalry on the right, knowing that he had there opposed to him Cromwell and the flower of the Parliamentary horse, and also because the ground on that wing seems to have been more open and level.

^{page 33 note 1} ‘There was a great ditch between the enemy and us, which ran along the front of the battell, only between the Earl of Manchester's foot and the enemy there was a plain; in this ditch the enemy had placed foure brigades of their best foot’ (A Full Relation of the late Victory, &c, sent by Captain Stewart, p. 6).

^{page 33 note 2} English Historical Review, 1890, p. 345.

^{page 34 note 1} Symonds, , Diary, pp. 181, 182Google Scholar.

^{page 34 note 2} Eng. Hist. Rev., 1890, p. 384.

^{page 34 note 3} Symonds, , Diary, p. 182Google Scholar.

^{page 34 note 4} Short Memorial, p. 3; Arber, 607.

^{page 35 note 1} Sir Thomas Dacres of Cumberland?

^{page 35 note 2} See the King's letter of April 17, 1644, amongst theRupert MSS.

^{page 35 note 3} One difficulty remains to be noticed. De Gomme states that the total of the King's horse was 6,500, but unluckily does not give the strength of every division. Taking the figures given in the text, which, with the exceptions mentioned in their place, are derived from his plan, we get a total of 2,600 horse for the right wing, 2,100 for the left, and 1,200 for the reserve; in all, 5,900. Six hundred, therefore, remain to be accounted for. Either De Gomme in the round numbers he gives understates the strength of the different regiments and divisions, or the estimates I have given where he gives no numbers are too low. Or it may be that dragoons not stationed in the line of battle, but scattered along the ditch and in the rough ground, account for the missing six hundred. I can only state the problem.

^{page 36 note 1} ‘I had the right wing, with some Scotch horse and lances for my reserve’ (Fairfax, Short Memorial). The Full Relation, which Mr. Gardiner attributes to Lord Eglinton, gives the names of these three regiments, and says that Balgony's regiment (or at all events one squadron of it) were lancers (pp. 4, 7). The three regiments, according to Rushworth's table of the Scottish, consisted of twenty-two troops. The reasons for putting their effective strength so low have already been stated. Watson's narrative states that Fairfax had eighty troops of horse under his command. This number is so large compared with the total force that one naturally suspects a misprint or a mistake. On the other hand, in imperfectly organised local armies of the period troops of very low strength were quite common.

^{page 36 note 2} ‘He had many new raised horse which had never seen service’ (Bowles, , Manifest Truths, p. 7Google Scholar). ‘Sir Thomas Fairfax his new levied regiments being in the van, they wheeled about’ (Full Relation, p. 7). See p. 77, post.

^{page 36 note 3} Fairfax in his Short Memorial mentions the services of Lambert. Lambert's major, William Fairfax, and Colonel Charles Fairfax were both mortally wounded.

^{page 36 note 4} ‘Next unto them’ (i.e. the right wing of horse) ‘was drawn up the right wing of the foot, consisting of the Lord Fairfax, his foot, and two brigades of the Scottish foot for a reserve’ (Full Relation, p. 5). Watson's narrative is silent as to the relative positions of Fairfax's foot and the Scots, and the True Relation of the late Fight says nothing as to the order of battle. The language used by Bowles in Manifest Trutks, p. 7, is ambiguous, and will bear either interpretation.

^{page 37 note 1} The evidence that the infantry of Lord Fairfax was in the centre is as follows. Mr. Ashe's Relation says: ‘General Lesley's foot were on the right hand, the Earle of Manchester's foot were the left hand of the Lord Fairfax his foot who were the body.’ Thomas Stockdale's letter to Rushworth makes the same statement: ‘The Yorkeshire forces, strengthened with a great party of the Scotts army, having the maine battle, the E. of Manchester's forces the left wing, and the Scotts the right wing.’ Stockdale's evidence is of special value, because he was attached to Fairfax's army, and therefore likely to know and state accurately facts concerning it.

This arrangement of the Parliamentary forces is most consistent with the incidents of the battle. (1) Ashe explicitly states that Fairfax's infantry after their first success were driven back by Newcastle's foot. (See p. 48, note, post.) As Rupert's plan of battle shows, this could scarcely have happened if Fairfax's infantry were on the extreme right of the Parliamentary line, but might very well have happened if they were in the centre. (2) Before the battle began the Parliamentary foot was in full retreat south. When the order to return was issued, the Scots in the van had almost reached Tadcaster, and Manchester's foot were at Marston. Ashe, from whom this statement is taken, does not specify the position of Fairfax's foot; it was probably somewhere between Marston and Tadcaster. Is it not likely that, in drawing up the army for the battle, the relative position of its three component parts was maintained? To place the Scots in the centre, instead of stationing them at the point nearest to Tadcaster, would have lengthened their march and increased the time required for drawing up the army.

^{page 37 note 2} That these four regiments were in the first line is stated in the Full Relation, on p. 5, and repeated again on p. 6. As this narrative was probably based either on a letter from the Earl of Eglinton, as Mr. Gardiner suggests, or on information from the Scottish officer whose name is on the title-page, its statement on this point may safely be accepted.

^{page 38 note 1} The list of the Scottish regiments given in Rushworth shows in what districts they were raised, and he prints in italics the names of those amongst the field officers who had seen service on the Continent. Of the discipline of the Scottish army in general, and of the skill of its officers, Sir James Turner gives a very unfavourable report. Visiting Leslie's camp before Newcastle, he says, ‘I found the bodies of the men lusty, well clothed, and well moneyed, but raw, untrained, and undisciplined, their officers for most part young and inexperienced’ (Memoirs, p. 31).

^{page 38 note 2} The list of the regiments forming the reserve is also given in the Full Relation, which is to some extent confirmed by the first letter in the Glorious and Miraculous Battel, which mentions three of the regiments concerned as in the reserve, though apparently placing the regiment of Cassilis in the second line also. From the words used, ‘some of Clydesdale's regiment that were in the battle,’ it might be inferred that only a portion of that regiment fought at Marston Moor. But it is not improbable that the Edinburgh regiment and the Clydesdale regiment were in charge of the train and posted in a third line.

^{page 38 note 3} There is no evidence whether these regiments formed four or five brigades. Watson says in his narrative that the whole Parliamentary infantry consisted of twenty-eight regiments, in twelve brigades. The brigade was usually two regiments, as in the Swedish army, but three or four weak regiments were frequently combined into one brigade. Ashe says: ‘Our army … divided themselves into brigades consisting of 800, 1,000, 1,200, 15 hundred men in a brigade.’ Manchester's army, according to the Full Relation, consisted of three brigades, and two brigades of Scots formed Fairfax's reserve; therefore, the seven brigades remaining consisted of Fairfax's army and the main body of the Scots. Of those, two, or at most three, brigades must have been Fairfax's, and five, or perhaps four, the Scots.

^{page 38 note 4} A Full Relation, p. 5. Hamilton, the general of artillery, is also described as leading on the first line.

^{page 38 note 3} See Memorie of the Somervilles, ii. 307. Probably the regiments of Fairfax and Manchester were armed with the same proportion of pikes and muskets, but in their case evidence is lacking.

^{page 39 note 1} The question of the strength of Lord Fairfax's army is more difficult to determine than in the case of Manchester's army or the Scots. It is possible that Fairfax had more men under his orders than I have suggested, and that he may have had three brigades of his own instead of two. His was the only army which had increased since the siege of York began.

^{page 39 note 2} The evidence for the presence of Colonel Bright's regiment is supplied by the Life of Captain John Hodgson, who was one of his officers. Unluckily> Hodgson gives no description of the battle. Overton's presence in command of a regiment is affirmed by Milton in a passage in his Defensio Secunda, in praise of Overton (Masson's, Life of Milton, iv. 602Google Scholar). Ashe, in his sixth Intelligence, praises Lieut.-Colonel Needham as one of Fairfax's officers who ‘did manfully in his place.’ Needham was probably lieutenant-colonel of Lord Fairfax's own regiment. Colonel Dodding's regiment lost many men at Marston, according to the author of A Discourse of the Civil War in Lancashire, edited by Mr. W. Beamont (p. 50).

^{page 39 note 3} The Scottish regiments forming Fairfax's reserve lost considerably. Lord Dudhope was taken prisoner, and died of his wounds (The Glorious and Miraculous Battel at York; Fuller, , Worthies, ii. 536Google Scholar; Spalding, pp. 427, 429). The ministers of Scotland were required to furnish each of them a man, which it was calculated would supply a regiment of a thousand strong; but many neglected to do so, and their regiment, according to Rushworth's list, had only five companies (id. p. 363; Rushworth, v. 605). Its lieutenant-colonel, James Brison, was killed (The Glorious and Miraculous Battel at York). As to Lord Sinclair's regiment, five out of the twelve companies composing it had been taken prisoners by Montrose at Morpeth. Lieut.-Colonel Somerville, who returned to the army just before the battle, found the seven companies with the army ‘much diminished by the negligence of the captaines, the want of authority and prudence in their major, experience and tyme in their colonell, that had other great concerns both of the State and armie upon his hands,’ so that the regiment ‘in a manner was broken’ (Memorie of the Somervilles, ii. 344). The two Scottish brigades forming Fairfax's reserve were evidently composed of the weaker and less efficient regiments of the Scottish army, which helps to explain their disaster.

^{page 40 note 1} According to SirMarkham, Clements(Life of the Great Lord Fairfax, p. 158Google Scholar), Sir William Fairfax, cousin of Sir Thomas, commanded Lord Fairfax's infantry. But there is no evidence as to the nature of the command held by Sir William, though his letter to his wife, printed in the Life of Admiral Robert Fairfax, p. 19), shows he held some command. It is, on the whole, more probable that he served in the cavalry of Sir Thomas Fairfax.

^{page 40 note 2} This arrangement of Manchester's brigades is given mA Full Relation, p. 5.

^{page 40 note 3} The regiments of Manchester, Crawford, Russell, Montagu, Pickering, and Hobart. ‘What should I name,’ says a letter, ‘the brigade of Col. Russell, Col. Montagu, and Col. Pickering, who stood as a wall of brass, and let fly small shot like hail upon the enemy, and not a man of their whole brigade slain?’ (A True Relation of the Late Fight, &c, p. 7).

^{page 40 note 4} ‘There was a great ditch between the enemy and us, which ran along the whole front of the battell, only between the Earl of Manchester's foot and the enemy there was a plain’ (A Full Relation, p. 6).

^{page 40 note 5} ‘The enemy's number was far above the Prince's, having in the front 1,200 more than he.’ News sent from Mr. Ogden (vide Appendix of Documents, p. 55).

‘General Major Crawford having overwinged the enemy, set upon their flank’ (A Full Relation, p. 6).

^{page 41 note 1} The regiments of Cromwell, Manchester, Fleetwood, and Vermuyden. Manchester's regiment was under the command of Algernon Sidney. ‘Colonel Sidney, son to the Earl of Leicester, charged with much gallantry in the head of my Lord's regiment of horse, and came off with much honour, though with many wounds (to the grief of my Lord and many others) who is since gone to London for cure of his wounds’ (Ashe's Relation, No. 6). Harrison, Fleetwood's major, was sent up to London with despatches by Manchester after the battle (Baillie, , Letters, ii. 209Google Scholar). Vermuyden, who was quartermaster-general of Manchester's army, as well as commander of a regiment, was present at a council of war on July 25, and though his name is not mentioned in the accounts of the battle, there is evidence that his regiment was with Manchester both before and after it.

^{page 41 note 2} ‘The Scottish horse on the left wing were none of them drawn up in the front that day, nor yet the next reserve’ (i.e. the second line), ‘but as a reserve to the reserve, and being weaker horse than my Lord Manchester's, were designed rather to the chase, if God should so bless us, than to the charge’ (Bowles, , Manifest Truths, p. 30Google Scholar).

^{page 41 note 3} Sir Clements Markham gives the strength of the three Scottish regiments as twenty-four troops and 1,440 men. On the other hand, one of the regiments (Kirkcudbright's) consisted of seven instead of eight troops, and another, that of Balcarres, of only six; so that the total was not more than twenty-one troops. David Leslie's own was the only one of the three which had eight troops. Moreover, he has calculated each troop at its nominal strength of 60, making no allowance for the losses of the campaign. As to the horses of the Scots, Lieut.-Colonel Somerville says that the cavalry of his army was ‘ill-mounted, except those that came from Ireland, whom the general made his own regiment of horse,’ i.e. excepting Leven's own regiment, which was commanded at Marston by his son, Lord Balgony. Lord Say, in his comments on the battle, describes David Leslie's regiments as mounted on ‘little light Scottish nags (for such they were then, and not such as afterwards they made them out of Sir John Fenwick's breed and our best northern horse, for which they, at their pleasure, would exchange their little Scotch coursers when they came into those parts).’ He goes on to add that ‘the enemy's horse, being many of them, if not the greatest part, gentlemen, stood very firm a long while, coming to a close fight with the sword, and standing like an iron wall, so that they were not easily broken; if the Scots' light but weak nags had undertaken that work, they had never been able to stand a charge or endure the shock of the enemy's horse, both horse and men being very good, and fighting desperately enough.’

^{page 42 note 1} ‘Upon their left hand, near a cross ditch, where the enemy had a regiment of foot, was placed the Scottish dragoons, under the command of Colonel Frizell’ (A Full Relation, p. 5). Manchester's own regiment of dragoons, consisting of five companies, was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel John Lilburne, but Lilburne had been wounded about June 3, and was possibly not present at Marston himself.

Cromwell's horse were formed into squadrons of 300 or 250 apiece. Watson speaks of ‘Lieut.-General Cromwell's division of 300 horse, in which himself was in person.’ Ashe speaks of ‘our brigades of horse, consisting some of three and some of four troops.’ It should be remembered that the troop in Manchester's army consisted of 100 men, and there must have been a considerable number of troops nearly up to their nominal strength, judging by the occasional muster-rolls which have been preserved. Slingsby describes Cromwell's horse as ‘drawn into five bodies’ (Diary, p. 113). Presumably he refers to the first line, which may thus have consisted of five bodies of 300 to 250 men apiece, making between 1,250 and 1,500 men.

^{page 43 note 1} On the nature of this obstacle see p. 33, note 1. Watson describes it as ‘a small ditch and a bank.’ Ashe terms it a ‘hedge and ditch,’

^{page 44 note 1} ‘The Scottish dragoons that were placed upon that wing, by the good management of Colonel Frizell, acted their part so well that at the first assault they beat the enemy from the ditch, and shortly after killed a great many, and put the rest to rout’ (A Ftdl Relation, p. 9). Manchester's dragoons no doubt assisted the Scots in this service, though they are not mentioned.

^{page 44 note 2} This is mentioned by three Royalist writers. The Life of James II. says: ‘The day in all probability had been the King's, if the Lord Biron had punctually obeyed his orders, for Prince Rupert had posted him very advantageously behind a warren and a slough, with positive command not to quit his ground, but in that oosture only to expect and to receive there the charge of the enemy; who must of necessity be much disordered in passing over to him, as being to receive the fire of 700 musketiers in their advance to him, which undoubtedly had been very dangerous, if not ruinous, to them. But instead of maintaining his post, as he ought in duty to have done, when the enemy had only drawn down two or three field-pieces, and with them played upon him, he suffered himself to be persuaded by Colonel Hurry to march over the morass and charge them, by which inconsiderate action he gave them the same advantage which he had formerly over them; for they charging him in his passage over the ground already mentioned, he was immediately routed’ (i. 22).

A similar statement is made in the notes which Warburton terms Rtipert's Diary. ‘The Prince drew his forces into a strong position, making his post as strong as possibly he could. Lord Biron then made a charge upon Cromwell's forces. [Represent here the posture the Prince put the forces in, and how by the improper charge of the Lord Biron much harm was done]’ (Warburton, ii. 468).

‘A right valiant Lord severed (and in some sort secured) with a ditch from the enemy, did not attend till foe forced their way unto him, but gave his men the trouble to pass over the ditch; the occasion of much disorder’ (Fuller, , Worthies, ii. 536Google Scholar).

^{page 45 note 1} Cromwell evidently came first into collision with the extreme right of the Royalist horse. Byron's regiment, if we credit the statements contained in the pre-ceding note, was defeated at the very beginning of the fight, and Urry's, the one next to it in the line, was routed at the same time. Urry's own troop, according to Sir Hugh Cholmley, ‘were the first that turned their backs’ (English Historical Review, 1890, p. 348).

^{page 45 note 2} ‘When the alarum was given he [Rupert] was set upon the earth at meat a pretty distance from his troops, and many of the horsemen were dismounted, and laid upon the ground with their horses in their hands. … Upon the alarum the Prince mounted to horse, and galloping up to the right wing met his own regiment turning their backs to the enemy, which was a thing so strange and unusual he said, “‘S wounds, do you run; follow me”; so they facing about, he led them to a charge, but fruitlessly, the enemy having before broken the force of that wing, and without any great difficulty’ (‘Cholmley's Narrative,’ Engl. Historical Review, 1890, p. 348). Rupert was probably somewhere about the spot where the plan places his guard, and doubtless brought his guard and Widdrington's brigade with him to the aid of the right wing. The second line must have been broken before he arrived, if it is true that he met his own regiment flying. See the plan.

^{page 46 note 1} This check is not mentioned either by Watson or by Ashe. Ashe says merely that General Cromwell ‘with much gallantry charged through and through, and routed two of the bravest brigades of horse in the enemie's right wing.’ Stockdale, however, describes Manchester's horse as routing one body of the enemy, and then adds: ‘Yet after a little time the Earl of Manchester's horse were repulsed by fresh supplies of the enemies, and forced to retreat in some disorder’ (p. 59).

^{page 46 note 2} Leslie's charge is mentioned in the Full Relation, which says, ‘he charged the enemie's horse (with whom L. Generall Cromwell was engaged) upon the flanke, and in a very short space the enemie's whole cavalry was routed’ (p. 9). The story is repeated in a different form by Baillie: ‘They ascribe to him (Cromwell) the victorie of Yorke; but most unjustlie; for Humbie assures us, that Prince Rupert's first charge falling on him, did humble him so, that if David Lesley had not supported him he had fled.’

^{page 46 note 3} Sir Hugh Cholmley says: ‘The enemy, keeping close and firm together in a body after they had routed the Prince's right wing, though in that for the active part it is most to be imputed to Cromwell and his horse, yet it is thought the ordering and advice to do so came from David Lesley, an experienced old soldier.’ Cholmley gives this as one of the chief reasons for the Parliamentary victory. Lord Say describes Cromwell as ‘taking special care to see it observed that the regiments of horse, when they had broken a regiment of the enemie's, should not divide, and in pursuit of the enemie break their order, but keep themselves still together in bodies to charge the other regiments of the enemy which stood firm’ (The Scots' Designe Discovered, p. 80). ‘Our fore troops did execution to the walls of York, but our body of horse kept their ground’ (A Full Relation).

^{page 47 note 1} This is implied by Bowles, (Manifest Truths, p. 30Google Scholar), and expressly. stated by Lord Say. ‘Herein indeed was the good service David Lesley did that day with his little light Scotch nags … that when a regiment of the enemie's was broken he then fell in and followed the chase, doing execution upon them, and keeping them from rallying again and getting into bodies’ ( The Scots' Designe Discovered, p. 80).

^{page 47 note 2} ‘General Major Crawford, having overwinged the enemy, fell upon their flank, and did very good execution upon the enemy, which gave occasion to the Scottish foot to advance and pass the ditch’ (Full Relation, p. 6). ‘Upon the advancing of the Earl of Manchester's foot, after short firings on both sides, we caused the enemy to quit the hedge in a disorderly manner, where they left behind them four drakes’ (Ashe). ‘All the Earl of Manchester's foot, being three brigades, began the charge with their bodies against the Marquis of Newcastle's and Prince Rupert's bravest foot. In a moment we were past the ditch into the moor, upon equal grounds with the enemy, our men going in a running march.’ This last sentence has been generally taken by modern writers to refer to Cromwell's cavalry, to whom Watson previously refers: ‘We came down the hill.’ Rushworth in his account quotes it as referring to the foot, and the phrase ‘running march’ seems more appropriate as describing infantry.

^{page 48 note 1} Stockdale says that when the battle began the Lord Fairfax's foot gained ground of the enemie's foot ‘in the main battle,’ but that after a little time the ‘Lord Fairfax foot and the Scots that were joined with them pursuing their advantage were charged by the enemy's horse and so disordered that they were forced to fly back and leave our advance behind them, and many of our horse were also repulsed by the enemy, which coming up in disorder on all sides, did so daunt the spirits of the reswes lhat had not been engaged that many fled away without ever striking blow ’ (p. 75, post) The Full Relation (p. 7) attributes the rout of Fairfax's infantry entirely to the defeat of their own horse. Sir Thomas's new levied regiments ‘wheeled about, and being hotly pursued by the enemy came back upon the Lord Fairfax foot and the reserve of the Scottish foot, broke them wholly, and trod the most part of them under foot.’ Ashe is much more explicit and intelligible. ‘The Lord Fairfax his brigade on our right hand (i.e. on the right hand of Manchester's foot) did also beat off the enemy from the hedges before them, driving them from their cannon, being two drakes and one demi-culvering, but being afterwards received by Marquesse Newcastle's regiment of foot, and being by them furiously assaulted, did make a retreat in some disorder. This advantage being espyed by a body of the enemie's horse, they charged through them unto the top of the hill. But one regiment of the Earl of Manchester's foot, seeing the enemy, both horse and foot, pursuing an advantage, did wheele on the right hand upon their flank and gave them so hot a charge that they were forced to flie back disbanded unto the moore.’ If Fairfax's infantry was posted on the right wing, as the modern accounts tell us, it would have been impossible for Manchester's regiments to cover their retreat in this way. The body of the enemy's horse referred to was probably Sir William Blakiston's division, or perhaps one of Goring's regiments.

^{page 49 note 1} The account which Fairfax gives in his Short Memorial is supplemented by a note which he wrote in a copy of Fuller's Worthies, correcting a statement about the battle. This note is reprinted in the Atttiquarian Repertory, iii. 31, ed. 1808, and in Arber's edition of the Short Memorial (English Garner, viii. 608). Bowles, in his Manifest Truths, published in 1646, gives the following account:—‘The right wing, commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax, was disordered, for he had among other disadvantages these two especial: first, the worst part of the ground, being so full of whinnes as that his horse could not march up, and was next the hedges possessed by the enemy. Secondly, he had also many newly raised horse which had never seen service, who did not play the part of reserves as became them, so that after his own regiment and Colonel Lambert's had charged with valour and good success, for want of supplies that wing was wholly routed’ (p. 7).

The Ftdl Relation is still more specific. ‘The right wing of our horse [mis-printed ‘foot’ in the original] had several misfortunes, for betwixt them and the enemy there was no passage but at a narrow lane, where they could not march above three or four in front; upon the one side of the lane was a ditch, and on the other an hedge, both whereof were lined with musketiers. Notwithstanding Sir Thomas Fairfax charged gallantly, but the enemy, keeping themselves in a body, and receiving them by threes and fours as they marched out of the lane, and (by what mistake I know not) Sir Thomas Fairfax his newly levied regiments being in the van, they wheeled about,’ &c. (p. 6). Fairfax, in his note on Fuller, says that those troops of his who charged ‘took Goring's major-general prisoner,’ referring to Major-General George Porter, who had a command on the left wing under his brother-in-law, Goring. See Mercurius Atilicus, July 13.

^{page 50 note 1} ‘In this ditch,’ says the Full Relation, ‘the enemy had placed four brigades of their best foot, which upon the advance of our battell were forced to give ground, being gallantly assaulted by the Earl of Lindsay's regiment, the Lord Maitland's, Cassilis' and Kelhead's.’ It goes on to explain that it was the success of Crawford's and Manchester's foot which ‘gave occasion to the Scots to advance and pass the ditch.’

^{page 50 note 2} ‘The three Scuts regiments of horse forming Sir Thomas Fairfax's reserve had been routed, as well as the main body of his cavalry. The Scots horse also on that side quit the field, and left the Earl of Lindsay's regiment standing bare’ (Bowles, , Manifest Truths, p. 7Google Scholar). ‘Sir Thomas Fairfax, Colonel Lambert, and Sir Thomas his brother, with five or six troops, charged through the enemy, and went to the left wing of horse; the two squadrons of Balgonie's regiment being divided by the enemy each from the other, one of them being lanciers charged a regiment of the enemie's foot, and put them wholly to the rout, and after joined with the left wing of horse, ihe other by another way went also to the left wing; the Karl of Eglington's regiment maintained their ground (most of the enemies going on in ihe pursuit of the horse and foot that fled), but with the loss of four lieutenants, the lieutenant-colonel, the major, and Eglingturfs son being deadly wounded’ (A Full Relation, p. 7). ‘Lord Eglintown commanded our horse there [i.e. on the right wing], who shewed himself most valiantly, his son relieving his father, who was far ingagded, is sore wounded’ (The Glorious and Miraculous Battel at York).

^{page 50 note 3} The letter from a Scottish officer before referred to (p. 22, note 2), writing apparently to Lord Loudon, says: ‘These that ran away shew themselves most basely. I, commanding the battel [i.e. brigade], was on the head of your Lordship's regiment and Buccleuche's, but they carried themselves not so as I could have wished, neither could I prevail with them; for these that fled, never came to charge with the enemy, but were so possesst with a panatick fear, that they ran for an example to others, and no enemie following them, which gave the enemy to charge them they intended not, and they had only the losse’ (The Glorious and Miraculous Battel).

^{page 50 note 4} The regiments which stood their ground were those of Lindsay Maitland, Cassilis, Couper, Dunfermline, and some of the Clydesdale regiment. ‘These briggads that failyied of the van,’ says the officer quoted in the last note, ‘were presently supplied by Cassel's, Cowper, Dunfermling, and some of Clydesdale's regiment who were on the battel, and gained what they had lost.’ This author seems to place the regiment of Cassilis in the second line, whereas the Full Relation puts it in the first, and probably is correct in doing so. Kelhead's regiment, which was in the first line, and next to that of Cassilis, seems to have given way, and as the Scottish baggage was thoroughly plundered, the regiment guarding it must have taken to flight also.

^{page 51 note 1} Ashe says, vaguely, that on the right wing ‘our horse were beaten back: and although the Scots musquettiers had fired there most bravely and to good purpose to the dissipating of the enemie's foot, yet their horse there stood still in great bodies.’ He gives no details about the Scottish regiments, saying merely, ‘Many of the Scots, both commanders and others, did singular good service, and stood to it stoutly unto the end of the day, amongst whom the Earl of Lindsay deserves great honour.’ Watson describes the Royalist cavalry as completely successful against the Parliamentary right, ‘utterly routing all our horse and foot, so that there was not a man left standing before them.’ Stockdale's statement is: ‘The Scots foot that fought in the right wing did most of them retire from their ground except the Earl of Lindsay's regiment.’ ‘They that fought stood extraordinar well to it, whereof my Lord Lindsay's briggad, being commanded by himself, was one,’ says the letter in The Glorious and Miraculous Battel at York. The Full Relation gives more details, and after relating the defeat of the Scottish cavalry, (p. 34, note 2), continues: ‘Sir Charles Lucas and General Major Porter, having thus divided all our horse on that wing, assaulted the Scottisli foot upon tiieir flanks, so that they had the foot upon their front, and the whole cavalry of the enemie's left wing to fight with, whom they encountered with so much courage and resolution that, having enterlined their musquetiers with pikemen, they made the enemie's horse, notwithstanding all the assistance they had of their foot, at two several assaults to give ground; and in this hot dispute with both they continued almost an houre, still maintaining their ground; Lieut.-Generall Baily and Generall Major Lumsdain (who both gave good evidence of their courage and skill), perceiving the greatest weight of the battell to lie sore upon the Earl of Linsie's and Lord Maitland's regiment, sent up a reserve for their assistance, after which the enemie's horse, having made a third assault upon them, had almost put them in some disorder; but that the E. of Lindsey and Lieut.-Colonell Pitscotti, Lieut.-Col. to the Lord Maitland's regiment, behaved themselves so gallantly that they quickly made the enemie's horse to retreat, killed Sir Charles Lucas his horse, tooke him prisoner, and gained ground upon the foote.’ The repulse and capture of Lucas by the Scottish foot is also mentioned by Bowles, and in the Glorious and Miraculous Battel at York. It is evident from these different accounts that it was not the flight of Lord Fairfax's foot, but the defeat of the right wing of horse, which exposed Lindsay's regiment to the attack ot Goring's cavalry, and, therefore, that it must have been posted on the extreme right.

^{page 52 note 1} See Fairfax's Short Memorial; Arber's, Garner, viii. 608Google Scholar.

^{page 52 note 2} This seems to be a fair inference from the conversation between Crawford and Cromwell reported by Holies (see p. 58, note 1), and from the relative position of the forces engaged. It is evident that Crawford, at a critical moment in the history of the battle, brought Cromwell some information which materially affected his movements. One of the regiments under Crawford's command was. according to Ashe, engaged with the cavalry attacking the routed infantry of the Parliamentary centre.

^{page 52 note 3} Watson's narrative, after relating Cromwell's victory over the Royalist right, describes ‘our horse,’ as ‘in the chase of them beyond their left wing.’ Wilstrop Wood, lying directly in their original rear, obliged the Royalist horse to retreat in an easterly direction. ‘They fly along by Wilstrop Woodside,’ says SirSlings, Henry by (Diary, p. 113Google Scholar). This is confirmed by the narrative of Sir Philip Monckton, who, charging with the Royalist left wing, and being left behind owing to the loss of his horse, found himself among the fugitives from the Royalist right:—

‘At the battle of Hessy Moor I had my horse shot under me as I caracoled at the head of the body I commanded, and so near the enemy that I could not be mounted again, but charged on foot, and beat Sir Hugh Bethell's regiment of horse, who was wounded and dismounted, and my servant brought me his horse. When I was mounted upon him the wind driving the smoke so as I could not see what was become of the body I commanded, which went in pursuit of the enemy, I retired over the glen, where I saw a body of some two thousand horse that were broken, which as I endeavoured to rally, I saw Sir John Hurrey, major-general to the Prince, come galloping through the glen. I rid to him and told him, that there were none in that great body, but they knew either himself or me, and that if he would help me to put them in order, we might regain the field. He told me, broken horse would not fight, and galloped from me towards York. I returned to that body. By that time it wa.i night, and Sir Marmaduke Langdale having had those bodies he commanded broken, came to me, and we staid in the field until twelve o'clock at night, when Sir John Hurrey came, by order of the Prince to command me to retire to York.’

In the version of Monckton's narrative printed in the Annual Register, 1805, pp. 884–5, the name of the officer Monckton refers to is printed ‘Hussey,’ but the correction is obvious and certain.

^{page 53 note 1} After describing the success of Cromwell and the cavalry, Watson adds: ‘Our foot on the right hand of us (being only the Earl of Manchester's foot) went on by our side, dispersing the enemie's foot almost as fast as they charged them, still going by our side cutting them down, so that we carried the whole field before us.’ Watson insists throughout on the co-operation of Manchester's foot under Crawford with the horse under Cromwell, both in the beginning and in the end of the fight. According to him, they advanced together, marched with the horse across the moor, and charged again by their side in the final struggle. This helps to explain Crawford's claim that he won the battle, not Cromwell.

^{page 54 note 1} The Full Relation says ‘Lieut.-Generall Cromwell and Major-Generall Lesley … met with the enemie's horse (being retreated upon the repulse they had from the Scottish foot) at the same place of disadvantage where they had routed our horse formerly.’

^{page 54 note 2} 'After which (i.e. the rout of Goring's horse) we set upon the reare of their foot and with the assistance of our main battell, which all this time stood firme, we put them wholly to the route’ (A Full Relation).

^{page 55 note 1} On the Whitecoats, so called because they were dressed in undyed cloth, see Life of the Duke of Newcastle, ed. 1886, pp. 79, 157, 158. Lilly, , in his Diary, p. 178, ed. 1822Google Scholar, gives the following story of their stand, on the authority of one of Cromwell's soldiers: ‘This sole regiment, after the day was lost, having got into a small parcel of ground ditched in, and not of easy access of horse, would take no quarter, and by mere valour for one whole hour kept the troops of horse from entering amongst them at near push of pike; when the horse did enter they would have no quarter, but fought it out till there was not thirty of them living; those whose hap it was to be beaten down upon the ground, as the troopers came near them, though they could not rise for their wounds, yet were so desperate as to get either a pike or sword a piece of them, and to gore the troopers’ horses as they came over them or passed them by. Captain Camby, then a trooper under Cromwell and an actor, who was the third or fourth man that entered in amongst them, protested he never, in all the fights he was in, met such resolute brave fellows, or whom he pitied so much, and said he saved two or three of them against their wills.' Somerville's account of the battle is confused as to the order of events. He places the attack on the Whitecoats before the defeat of Goring's horse. The Whitecoats, he says, resisted the charges of Cromwell's and Leslie's horse, ‘peppering them soundly with their shot,’ and then, ‘when they came to charge, stoutly bore them up with their picks, that they could not enter to break them….until at length a Scots regiment of dragonnes, commanded byCollonellFrizeall, with other two, was brought to open them upon some hand, which at length they did. When all their ammunition was spent, haveing refused quarters, every man fell in the same order and rank wherein he had foughten’ (Memorie of the Somervilles, ii. 347). According to Somerville, ‘this gallant battalione consisted neer of 4,000 foot,’ i.e. the Whitecoats were not one of Newcastle's regiments, but the whole body of his infantry. The Duchess of Newcastle, while styling them the Duke's own regiment, makes them consist of 3,000 men. In the Full Relation it is said: ‘Generall Major Lesley charged the Earl of Newcastle's brigade of Whitecoats and cut them wholly off, some few excepted who were taken prisoners, and after them charged a brigade of Greencoats, where of they cut off a great number, and put the rest to the rout’ (p. 9). The compiler makes this occur at the beginning of the battle, before Cromwell had routed the horse of the Royalist right, which is obviously impossible. See the remarks on this tract in the section on the authorities (p. 66).

^{page 56 note 1} MrGardiner's, words are: ‘Sending a party to follow up Rupert's flying squadrons, and leaving David Leslie to deal with the Whiiecoats, whilst Crawford supported Baillie, he betook himself to the lane's end through which Fairfax had emerged’ (Great Civil War, i. 381Google Scholar).

^{page 56 note 2} This interpretation of Cromwell's letter (No. xxi. in Carlyle) seems to me to be correct, though it would be absurd to press too far the words of a letter which is not an official despatch, but a mere letter of condolence. Colonel Hoenig, however, makes his case more convincing than it would otherwise appear by translating the second passage, and inserting a ‘then’which is not in the original: ‘Dann attackirten wir seine Regimenter zu Fuss’ (Oliver Cromwell, von Fritz, Iloenig, ii. 450Google Scholar).

^{page 57 note 1} Hoenig, , Cromwell, i. 451–2Google Scholar.

^{page 57 note 2} The only passage in the authorities which clearly describes Leslie as attacking Newcastle's infantry before Goring's horse had been routed is the passage in the Full Relation quoted p. 55, note 1. This is contradicted by another passage in the same pamphlet, quoted p. 54, note 2. Watson's narrative of the last part of the battle is too ambiguous to throw much light on the question. He seems, however, to describe Manchester's foot under Crawford as attacking the Royalist infantry in the rear at the same time that Cromwell attacked Goring's horse, and the cavalry as finally aiding the foot to dispose of the Royalist infantry.

^{page 57 note 3} Hoenig, ii. 453. The author erroneously describes Cromwell as having only 39 squadrons at his disposal. In reality he had between 50 and 60 troops, exclusive of the dragoons.

^{page 57 note 4} The dispute arose from the dissatisfaction of the Scottish Commissioners and others in London with the first published accounts of the battle. ‘We were both grieved and angry,’ writes Eaillie on July 16, ‘that your Independents there should have sent up Major Harrison to trumpett all over the city their own praises, to our prejudice, making all believe that Cromwell alone, with his unspeakablie valorous regiments, had done all that service; that the most of us fled, and who stayed, they fought so and so, as it might be.’ Even ‘good Mr. Ashe's relation,’ he complains, ‘gives much more to Cromwell than we are informed is his due,’ though Ashe in reality says very little of Cromwell. Then sending another account, apparently Watson's, to his correspondent, Baillie adds: ‘See by this inclosed, if the whole victorie both in the right and left wing be not ascribed to Cromwell, and not a word of David Lesley, who in all places that day was his leader’ (Baillie's, Letters, ed. Laing, , ii. 209Google Scholar).

^{page 58 note 1} Watson's narrative is the first to mention the wound. ‘Lieutenant-Generall Cromwell, the great agent in this victory,’ he writes, ‘hath received a slight wound in the neck.’ On August 10, 1644, Baillie tells the story of Cromwell's leaving the field in consequence of it. ‘Skeldon Crawford, who had a regiment of dragoons in that wing, upon his oath assured me that at the beginning of the fight Cromwell got a little wound on the craige, which made him retire, so that he was not so much as present at the service; but his troopers were led on by David Lesley’ (Baillie, ii. 218). William Crawford, of Nether Skeldon, the person referred to, was Lieutenant-Colonel of Frizell's dragoons. In the Memoirs of Denzil Holies, written in 1648, but not published till 1699, a similar story is told, on the authority of Major-General Lawrence Crawford. Speaking of Marston Moor, Holies says: ‘However, Lieutenant-General Cromwell had the impudence and boldness to assume much of the honour to himself, or rather, Herod-like, to suffer others to magnify him and adore him for it … Those who did the principal service that day were Major-General Lesley, … Major-General Crawford, … Fairfax. … But my friend Cromwell had neither part nor lot in the business. For I have several times heard it from Crawford's own mouth that when the whole army at Marston Moor was in a fair possibility to be utterly routed, and a great part of it running, he saw the body of horse of that brigade standing still, and, to his seeming, doubtful which way to charge, backward or forward, when he came up to them in a great passion, reviling them with the name of poltroons and cowards, and asked them if they would stand still and see the day lost ? Whereupon Cromwell shewed himself, and in a pitiful voice said, “Major-General, what shall I do?” he (begging pardon for what he said, not knowing he was there, towards whom he knew his distance as to his superior officer) told him, “Sir, if you charge not all is lost.” Cromwell answered he was wounded (his great wound being a little burn in the neck by the accidental going off behind him of one of his soldier's pistols). Then Crawford desired him to go off the field and, sending one away with him (who very readily followed wholesome advice), led them on himself, which was not the duty of his place, and as little for Cromwell's honor as it proved to be much for the advancement of his and his parties pernicious designs. This I have but by relation, yet I easily believe it upon the credit of the reporter, who was a man of honor’ (Memoirs of Denzil Lord Holies, 1699, p. 16). It may be asked, if Crawford led Cromwell's cavalry in the second part of the battle, as asserted here, what becomes of David Leslie and his services? The last part of the story is absurd. However, it is very probable that Crawford, whose rashness and impetuosity was one of his chief characteristics, thought Cromwell too slow and cautious. The interview doubtless took place in the interval between Cromwell's defeat of the Royalist right and his march against Goring. A halt of some length, in order to reform his troops and to ascertain exactly the position of affairs in other parts of the field, was absolutely necessary. ‘Erst, nachdem Cromwell als kluger Reitergeneral selbst gesehen, fiihrte er seine Reiterei weiter. Der Halt war also ein Gebot der Taktik’ (Hoenig: i. 452).

^{page 59 note 1} Bowles answers Buchanan's charge as follows: ‘As for the provocation which the author had to magnifie the aforenamed gentleman, by the unseemly appelation of the Saviour of the three Kingdoms given to Lieulenant-Generall Cromwell, for ought I heare, it was attributed to him by a Scottishman, Major-General Craford by name, which he could not help, and I hope, and think I may say that he is angry at the expression, his modesty and piety in that respect hath been answerable to his valour and success; and upon a strict examination, you will find that he was in the field to the last, though his service might be a little hindred after the first charge, by the shot, which though it was not very dangerous, being but a rake in the neck, yet the pistoll being discharged so neare, that the powder hurt his face, and troubled his eyes, was a better excuse for withdrawing (if he had done so, which yet he did not) than many a gay man had that day’ (Manifest Truths; or, an Inversion of Tiiith's Manifest, 1646, p. 30). Lord Say's answer to Buchanan, which is entitled Vindicitc Veritalis; or, The Scots' Designe Discovered, was not published till 1654, though written earlier. Some extracts on the services of the Scots have been printed in earlier notes. ‘As for that which concerneth Cromwell himself,’ writes Say, 'that he did not appear at all in the heat of the business, but for a little skar kept himself off till the worst was past; what man is there, English or Scot, that hath either worth or honestie in him, who was present, that will not abhor such an envious, malicious falsehood as this, fit to be fathered by none but the father of lies himselfe? for it is known that Cromwell charged in the head of those regiments of horse in my Lord Manchester's army, which horse he commanded, and with those regiments brake all the regiments of the enemie's army, first the horse, and after that the foot, and that he continued with them untill the victory was fully obtained (yea, and the Psalm of praise for it sung to God, to whom alone the glory was due), commanding all the while they charged, &c. (p. 80). For the proceedings against Buchanan, see Commons Journals, iv. 422, 507, 628Google Scholar.

^{page 60 note1 1} David Leslie was styled major-general, but was commander of all the Scottish cavalry. Cromwell, styled lieutenant-general, was in the same way commander of all Manchester's cavalry. Baillie, the lieutenant-general of the Scottish army, commanded the infantry of it. In English armies of the time the lieutenant-general and second in command was always a cavalry commander. Cromwell had been major-general of horse and foot up to January 22, 1644. At that date he was commissioned as lieutenant-general. The change was probably made to find a position for Crawford in Manchester's army.

^{page 60 note 2} Gardiner, , Great Civil War, ii. IGoogle Scholar.

^{page 61 note 1} Carlyle, Letter xxi.; Gardiner, , Great Civil War, ii. IGoogle Scholar; Markham, , Great Lord Fairfax, p. 168Google Scholar.

^{page 69 note 1} Carte MSS. x. 664.

^{page 73 note 1} Harleian MSS. 166, 87.

^{page 74 note 1} Read Tockwith.

^{page 76 note 1} Carte MSS. xi. 444.

^{page 78 note 1} Issue twice repeated.

^{page 79 note 1} A letter or two seem to be omitted in this word, and the handwriting is bad. A list of the Parliamentary Navy, dated May 31, 1645, gives the name of Robert Clark as captain of the ‘Joceline,’ a hired merchant-ship of 196 tons and 12 guns. Granville Penn, Memorials of Sir W. Penn, i. 3.