^{page 20 note 1} Carlsson, W., Gustaf II Adolf och Stralsund (Uppsala, 1912), pp. 71–2, 102–21, 125–30Google Scholar; Rikskans eren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling [AOSB] (Stockholm, 1888–), I. iv. 209ff.Google Scholar, 214 ff.: cf. Carlsson, , op. cit., p. 69Google Scholar, and Sverges traktater med främmande magter (Stockholm, 1890–), v. 342ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 20 note 2} Carlsson, , op. cit., pp. 248, 250–2Google Scholar; Ahnlund, Nils, Gustaf Adolf inför tyska kriget (Stockholm, 1918), p. 276Google Scholar. In February 1638, however, Oxenstierna told the rad that there was no ground for the suspicion (not unreasonably entertained by the burghers) that Sweden desired to acquire the town; ‘which neither his late Majesty nor the now reigning sovereign ever thought of, since their Majesties sought nothing other than that the Emperor might not get a foot-hold in the harbour there…Nor is it profitable to the crown of Sweden to keep Stralsund alone, but rather the garrison is a burden’: Svenska Riksraders Protokoll [RRP] (Stockholm, 1878–), vii. 151Google Scholar.

^{page 20 note 3} ‘Si Wismaria quoque potiremur’; RRP, i. 224 (27 10 1629)Google Scholar.

^{page 20 note 4} AOSB, II. i. 595.

^{page 20 note 5} And ‘quia non nisi papyracea securitas’: RRP, ii. 1–4.

^{page 20 note 6} AOSB, II. i. 603.

^{page 21 note 1} To the rad: RRP, i. 128 (23 04 1629)Google Scholar.

^{page 21 note 2} RRP, i. 222.

^{page 21 note 3} ibid. 224.

^{page 21 note 4} AOSB, II. i. 544, Gustav Adolf to Oxenstierna, 4 Dec. 1629.

^{page 21 note 5} Ahnlund, , Gustaf Adolf inför tyska kriget, p. 260Google Scholar. Johannes Paul thinks it meant no more than that protestant princes would be constrained to help him: Paul, J., Gustaf Adolf (Leipzig, 1932), ii. 156Google Scholar.

^{page 21 note 6} RRP, ii. 3.

^{page 22 note 1} ‘The Imperialists in Pomerania and Mecklenburg, and their fleet in Wismar harbour, had for the Swedish diet of 1629 the same significance as had the Germans in Belgium for the English parliament of 1914’: Arnoldsson, S., Krigspropagandan i Sverige före trettioariga kriget (Göteborg, 1941), p. 28Google Scholar.

^{page 22 note 2} ‘The Chancellor retorted, that that [sc. religion] was not our principalis scopus. But his late Majesty had other large causes of war. True it is, that religion ought not to be propagated armis, but its arma are rather spiritualia, as preces and lacrymae; but the true principalis scopus is, that regnum Sueciae and consortes religionis nostrae may remain in security, and be in their esse preserved, tam in statu ecclesiastico quam politico. It is therefore in this case not so much a matter of religion, but rather of status publicus, within whose ambit religion also falls’: RRP, vii. 53. Yet on 3 February 1633 Oxenstierna wrote to Salvius (whom he certainly had no motive for misleading) that the king's aim had been ‘first and foremost to liberate these and all his coreligionists and relatives in the Empire from the popish yoke, shift the war from them to the papists, and keep it going until the enemy, weary of it, should himself seek peace, so that all evangelical estates might thus with the more security and reputation come again to their former dignity, liberty and estate’: AOSB, I. viii. 131.

^{page 22 note 3} ‘Ita tanto erit Suecia securior, quanto illi [the north German states] debiliores’: RRP, i. 224.

^{page 23 note 1} RRP, i. 229–37; Fridericia, J., Danmarks ydre politiske Historie i Tiden fra Freden i Lybek til Freden i Prag (Copenhagen, 1876), i. 130–5Google Scholar; AOSB, I. v. 295–8; II. i. 579–81: not for him the ‘Empire of Scandinavia’ which Oxenstierna seems to have believed to be within his grasp: on this see Ahnlund, N., ‘Kejsardömet Skandinavien’, Historisk Tidskrift, liv. (1934)Google Scholar; RRP, vi. 394.

^{page 23 note 2} And also with the story, told to the raad at third hand on 11 November 1635, that from the beginning he intended ‘an imperium Macedonicum’ in Germany, and a permanent diminution of the power of the Emperor: RRP, v. 298.

^{page 24 note 1} Inner, G., Die Verhandlungen Schwedens und seiner Verbündeten mit Wallenstein und dem Kaiser von 1631 bis 1634, Publicationen aus den Staatsarchiven, K. Preussischen, 99 (Leipzig, 1899)Google Scholar [Irmer, , VS] ii. 26Google Scholar, Oxenstierna to the Brandenburg ministers, 30 Jan. 1633. The preceding passage runs: ‘Sei ins gemein gewesen, des feindes conatus zu brechen, dessen vorhaben, und was er durch die Ostseh thuen wollen, bekant. Haben also ihre maj. die meinung gehabet, ihr reich und die Ostsehe zu versichern und die bedrengte lande zu liberiren, hernach weiter zu gehen, oder zu stutzen, nachdem es sich schickete; hetten anfangs so weit Zu kommen, nicht vermeinet’: [my italics].

^{page 24 note 2} ‘If we cannot say, bellum se ipsum alet, then I see no way out of what we have undertaken’: Gustav Adolf to Oxenstierna, 1 April 1628: Konung Gustaf II Adolfs Skrifter, ed. Styffe, C. G. [Styffe] (Stockholm, 1861), p. 520Google Scholar.

^{page 24 note 3} RRP, ii. 8.

^{page 25 note 1} Droysen, G., Brandenburgische AudienZen bei Gustaf Adolf (Berlin, 1878)Google Scholar, supplants Helbig, K. G., Gustav Adolf und die Kurfürsten von Sachsen und Brandenburg (Leipzig, 1854)Google Scholar, for these talks.

^{page 25 note 2} Droysen, , Audienzen, p. 18Google Scholar; cf. RRP, i. 231 (10 11 1629)Google Scholar; ‘Res nostrae non patiunrur neutrales in Germania’.

^{page 25 page 3} Droysen, , Audienzen, p. 21Google Scholar.

^{page 25 note 4} Text in Sverges traktater, v. 380–8; a Swedish draft in Bär, M., Die Politik Pommerns während des dreissigjährigen Krieges (Leipzig, 1896), pp. 263ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 25 note 5} Sverges traktater, v. 395–404.

^{page 25 note 6} Ibid. 387–8.

^{page 26 note 1} Bar, , op. cit., p. 272Google Scholar.

^{page 26 note 2} Kretzschmar, J., Gustaf Adolfs Pläne und Ziele in Deutschland und die Herzöge zu Braunschweig und Liineburg (Hannover, 1904), p. 161Google Scholar.

^{page 26 note 3} Bär, p. 278. Compare Oxenstierna's statement in the raad on 9 April 1638, when he said ‘we had a jus belli inasmuch as his late majesty recovered the country from the Emperor's armies, which jus his majesty transformed into a jus foederis, simply with the purpose of keeping the Pomeranian estates in a good humour’: RRP, vii. 187.

^{page 26 note 4} AOSB, I. vi. 44–5.

^{page 26 note 5} Sverges traktater, v. 491–504; Struck, W., Das Bündnis Wilhelms von Weimar mit Gustaf Adolf (Stralsund, 1895), pp. 33ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 27 note 1} See, e.g., Falkenberg's remarks to the Pomeranian Rath, 12 Aug. 1630: Bär, p. 272; Gustav Adolf's interview with Leutchmar, 19 Oct. 1630: Generalstaben, , Sveriges krig 1611–1632 (Stockholm, 1936), iii. 520–1Google Scholar.

^{page 28 note 1} AOSB, II. i. 714.

^{page 28 note 2} Kretzschmar, Die Allianzverhandlungen Gustav Adolfs mit Kurbrandenburg [Kretzschmar, , Allianzverhandlungen (Berlin, 1904), pp. 3–4Google Scholar.

^{page 28 note 3} Arkiv till upplysning om svenska krigens…historia [Arkiv] (Stockholm, 1860), ii. 247–8Google Scholar.

^{page 28 note 4} Kretzschmar, , Allianzverhandlungen, pp. 9–11Google Scholar.

^{page 28 note 5} It is true that Gustav Adolf had on 16 February 1631 told von Pfuel, ‘Ich nehme weg, was ich bekommen kann, und Pommern gebe ich ihm auch nicht wieder’ (Droysen, , Audienzen, pp. 32–3Google Scholar); but this was Gustav Adolf in his blackmailing mood, in the course of a heated interview, and need not be taken as an expression of serious policy—though the elector took it so (Boëthius, B., Svenskarne i de nedersachsiska…kretsarna [Boëthius, NSK], p. 3)Google Scholar. And in April he had said that he would demand ‘oram maritimam’ (Kretzschmar, , Gustav Adolfs Pläne und Ziele, p. 164)Google Scholar; in a vivid letter to the electress of 3 June he had compared himself to Jacob serving Laban, and now denied his reward (Droysen, G., Schriftstücke von Gustaf Adolf zumeist an evangelische Fürsten Deutschlands (Stockholm, 1877), pp. 203 ffGoogle Scholar.: cf. Sveriges krig, iv. 324, n. 4, for correct dating of this letter); on 5 June he had complained that he had done all the work in recovering Pomerania, while George William proposed quietly to step into the succession at the appropriate moment, without adequate acknowledgment (Schriftstücke, pp. 118–19); but he made it quite clear that he asked only ‘reasonable’ compensation and ‘etzliche wenig Plaätze’ on the coast—and even this was not a sine qua non (ibid. p. 119). The wording runs: ‘allein gegen roial versicherung Ihrer freundtschafft vnd einer geringen ved ganz ertreglichen abstattung ezlicher vnkosten, zu deren versicherung Sie allein etzliche wenig Plätze an der Ost See beghret (welches jedoch bei vendrhandlung veleicht noch moderirtoder bei köm. Kayser, noch ganz aufgehebt bette werden ko:onnen).

^{page 29 note 1} Schriftstucke, p. 128; Sverges traktater, v. 449–54, 457–63.

^{page 29 note 2} Arkiv, i. 743–50. Arnim reported to the Brandenburg Rath that Gustav Adolf desired the Direktorium; but he also considered that he wanted Pomerania, realized this would create a bad impression in Germany, and was seeking pretexts to adduce for keeping it: Kretzschmar, , Allianzverhandlungen, p. 34Google Scholar.

^{page 29 note 3} Kretzschmar, , Allianzverhandlungen, pp. 38–41Google Scholar; also Paul, Gustaf Adolf, ii. 198 and n. 2.

^{page 29 note 4} For the marriage question, see in general Schulze, R., Das Projekt der Vermählung Friedrich Wilhelms von Brandenburg mit Christina von Schweden (Halle, 1898)Google Scholar; Armstedt, R., Der schwedische Heiratsplan des grossen Kurfürsten (Königsberg, 1896)Google Scholar; AOSB, II. i. 766–7; Ahnlund, N., Axel Oxenstierna (Stockholm, 1940), pp. 658–61Google Scholar; Kretzschmar, , Gustaf Adolfs Pläne und Ziele, pp. 204–19Google Scholar; Kretzschmar considered that Gustav Adolf used the marriage as a mere ‘bait’—a view difficult to reconcile with his contention that it was on account of the marriage that the king was prepared to make concessions in 1631.

^{page 30 note 1} On 7 June 1631 Arnim visited Gustav Adolf's camp and told him that harsh treatment of George William would make a bad impression in Germany, and might suggest that he was himself coveting the Brandenburg electorate. Gustav Adolf admitted that this would not be an unreasonable interpretation, to those ignorant of his real intentions: Kretzschmar, , Allianzverhandlungen, p. 32Google Scholar.

^{page 30 note 2} Ahnlund, , GustafAdolf inför tyska kriget, pp. 419–20Google Scholar; Sveriges krig, iii. 535–7.

^{page 30 note 3} Boëthius, B., ‘Filip Sadlers beskickning 1629–30’, Historisk Tidskrift, I Series, xxxvii (1917)Google Scholar, passim.

^{page 30 note 4} For the Leipzig Convention, Struck, , Das Bündnis Wilhelms von Weimar mit Gustav Adolf, pp. 61–95Google Scholar.

^{page 31 note 1} Arkiv, i. 726, 736; Boëthius, , NSK, pp. 127–9Google Scholar.

^{page 31 note 2} Struck, W., ‘Gustav Adolf und die schwedische Satisfaktion’, Historische Vierteljahrschrift, 2 (1899), p. 357Google Scholar; cf. von Chemnitz, B. P., Königlich Schwedischen in Teutschland geführten Kriegs Erster Theil (Stettin, 1648), i. 137–8Google Scholar.

^{page 31 note 3} AOSB, II. viii. 44, Horn to Oxenstierna, 26 April 1631; cf. Arnim's forebodings: AOSB, II. ix. 567, Teuffel to Oxenstierna, 29 March 1631. Text of the Resolution in Lundorp, iii. 145–7. Oxenstierna commented, 2 February 1633: ‘Der Leipzische Schluss machet den kaiser gar zum tyrannen, und dass er keinen articulum capitulationis gehalten. Nur haben sie die conclusion ausgelassen: “Drumb bistu nicht kaiser mehr, sondern tyrannus et hostis libertatis ac patriae, wo du es nicht enderst!”’: Irmer, , VS, ii. 41Google Scholar.

^{page 31 note 4} Struck, , Das Bundnis Wilhelms von Weimar, p. 93Google Scholar.

^{page 31 note 5} Boëthius, B., ‘Norma futurarum actionum’, Historisk Tidskrift, I Series, xxxi (1911), pp. 199 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 32 note 1} cf. his offer to Brandenburg on 26 April 1631: ‘Man sollte ihn ein formatum consilium [beijordnen, er wolle exequieren, was sie haben wollten; man sollte es an die andern Fiirsten bringen und es machen wie die [General–]–]Staaten'’; Brandenburg Geheimratsprotokoll, cited in Kretzschmar, : Gustaf Adolfs Pläne und Ziele, p. 168Google Scholar.

^{page 32 note 2} Sveriges krig, iii. 530–1.

^{page 33 note 1} In May, the king concluded a draft agreement with John Albert of Mecklenburg; in June, Salvius signed a treaty with John Frederick of Bremen; in July, he was instructed to proceed to a definitive treaty with both the Mecklenburg dukes; in August, the final treaty with William V of Hesse was concluded; in December, Salvius completed an alliance with Christian of Lüneburg-Celle: Sverges traktater, v. 463–73, 476–90, 588–99; Boëthius, , NSK, pp. 150 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 33 note 2} Sverges traktater, v. 513–16.

^{page 34 note 1} Robert Monro His Expedition (1637), ii. 89Google Scholar.

^{page 34 note 2} e.g. In his relations with Mecklenburg: see below.

^{page 34 note 3} Boëthius, , NSK, pp. 171–2Google Scholar.

^{page 34 note 4} Sverges traktater, v. 717–19.

^{page 35 note 1} ‘Donec de ijs nobis plenius cum imperio Romano convenerit’; Boëthius, , NSK, p. 185Google Scholar, n. 2.

^{page 35 note 2} The Mecklenburg negotiations are discussed in Boëthius, , NSK, pp. 170–203Google Scholar; Cothmann's Relation of the negotiations in Frankfurt is printed in Kretzschmar, , Gustaf Adolfs Pläne und Ziele, pp. 316–62Google Scholar. Salvius had more than once urged that Mecklenburg ‘ob situm cum Svecia’ ought to be a Swedish fief; Boëthius, , NSK, p. 54Google Scholar.

^{page 35 note 3} Sverges traktater, v. 588–99.

^{page 35 note 4} The Wolfenbüttel line had owned all the Hildesheim lands, but in October 1631 Gustav Adolf had promised George of Lüneburg the three Amter of Peine, Steuerwald and Marienburg (the ‘kleine Stift’): for all this, Kretzschmar, , Gustaf Adolfs Pläne und Ziele, pp. 1–6, 18–19Google Scholar.

^{page 36 note 1} The Halle compact is printed in Sverges traktater, v. 691 ff.; and see Kretzschmar, , op. cit., pp. 31 ff.Google Scholar; criticisms of Kretzschmar's conclusions in review by C. H. H [allendorff], in Historisk Tidskrift, xxiv (1904), pp. 45–8Google Scholar; Boëthius, , NSK, pp. 274Google Scholar, n. 2.

^{page 36 note 2} Kretzschmar, , op. cit., p. 32Google Scholar.

^{page 36 note 3} Text of Sadler's draft, with Brunswick amendments, in Kretzschmar, , op. cit., pp. 247–77Google Scholar. The demand for ratification by the estates had a parallel in Gustav Adolf's treaty with John Frederick of Bremen, by which a similar guarantee was to be extorted from the chapter: Sverges traktater, v. 467.

^{page 36 note 4} Hugonis Grotii De jure Belli ac Pacts Libri Tres, ed. Whewell, W. (Cambridge, 1853), iiiGoogle Scholar. vi. 4§ 1, 5, 7§ I; III. vii. 4; III. viii. 4§ 2; III. xx. 12 § 2. As early as the beginning of October 1631 Gustav Adolf informed Erfurt that the former rights of the elector of Mainz in the town were his by conquest: Bierehe, J., Gustav Adolf in Erfurt (Erfurt, 1924), p. 6Google Scholar.

^{page 36 note 5} e.g., AOSB, I. viii. 638, 673–4, 683.

^{page 37 note 1} Grotius, , op. cit., III. vi. 7Google Scholar § I. But see also Grotius's restriction in III. xiii. 1 § I: Boëthius, (NSK, p. 5)Google Scholar strains the meaning (and omits the last clause), to make this passage a basis for satisfactio.

^{page 37 note 2} Gustav Adolf to Salvius, 20 12 1631: Arkiv, i. 530–2.

^{page 37 note 3} Kretzschmar, , op. cit., p. 31Google Scholar.

^{page 37 note 4} Grotius, I. iii. 21 §§ 1–3. It is noteworthy that Grotius specifically includes alliances in which one party is bound to preserve the authority and majesty of the other, ‘ad quod genus referenda sunt jura quaedam eorum, quae nunc vocantur protectionis, advocatiae, mundiburdii’ [my italics]; and again: ‘clientes in fide sunt patronorum…sunt sub patronicio, non sub ditione’. Indeed, the provision for arbitration, normally included in alliances of the Hessian-type, seems to Grotius one of the marks of an equal alliance: op. cit., I. iii. 21 § 6; but see too his caution in 21 § 10.

^{page 38 note 1} Sverges traktater, v. 704 ff. The treaty was to be permanent, renewable at every change of ruler, and was to take precedence over all other obligations (even to the Empire); Wismar and Warnemiinde to be at Sweden's disposal for the duration of the war; Sweden to have ‘absolutum foederis hujus idque comitantis belli directorium’; the Swedish copper coinage to be current; money contributions to be made; mutual military aid was specified. Even so there was a loophole for further claims: the dukes were restored ‘salva actione nobis…regnoque Sveciae adversus singulos pluresve imperii status ex hoc bello enata competente’—though Oxenstierna assured the dukes that this was not aimed at them. But diey tried in vain to replace ‘singulos pluresve’ by ‘alios’.

^{page 38 note 2} Sverges traktater, v. 670 ff.; Kretzschmar, , op. cit., pp. 49–50Google Scholar.

^{page 38 note 3} Kretzschmar, , op. cit., pp. 53Google Scholar, 101–3; Ahnlund, , Axel Oxenstierna, p. 653Google Scholar. It was not ratified till 30 October 1633.

^{page 38 note 4} Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav Adolf, 9 12 1631: AOSB, I. vi. 556–7.

^{page 39 note 1} For the project of a universal peace, see the documents in Irmer, , VS, i. 16 ff.Google Scholar; and Droysen, G., Die Verhandlungen über den Universalfrieden im Winter 1631/2 (Archiv fur die sächsische Geschkhte, NS., VI) (Leipzig, 1880)Google Scholar, passim.

^{page 39 note 2} Gustav Adolf to Axel Oxenstierna, 8 oCT. 1630: AOSB, II. i. 654.

^{page 39 note 3} Sverges traktater, v. 439. Struck (‘Gustaf Adolf und die schwedische Satisfaktion’, p. 479) is mistaken in supposing this programme to have been adopted only after Breitenfeld.

^{page 39 note 4} Breyer, C. W. F., Beytädge zur Geschkhte des dreissigjährigen Krieges (Munich, 1812), p. 228Google Scholar.

^{page 39 note 5} RRP, ii. 54; Arkiv, ii. 91, 94, 168; Irmer, , VS, i. 136, 138, 289Google Scholar; Breyer, , op. cit., p. 216Google Scholar, where the king says of Imperial promises that one might as soon expect ‘dass ein bloss papyr, wider eine halbe carthaunen helffen sollte, alss, dass man vnd dergleichen frieden vnd stattliche versprechen halten wurde’.

^{page 39 note 6} Irmer, , VS, i. 138, 290Google Scholar. Oxenstierna's words were ‘In summa der könig werde nicht mehr trauen und so lang mit ihnen fechten, bis er sie zu erden gelegt, mit seinem knie uf ihrem hals saässe und den degen an die gurgel ihnen stehen hette, so wurde er alsdan sagen “so und so mache nun frieden”.’ And cf. a remark of Oxenstierna, very similar to that of the king, on 2 Feb. 1633: ibid., ii. 40.

^{page 39 note 7} Ibid. i. 139.

^{page 40 note 1} Inner, , VS, i. 139–40Google Scholar. Arnim did not fail to point out that Ferdinand had acquired Bohemia jure belli, and that it was undeniably his in international law: ibid., i. 93.

^{page 40 note 2} Ibid., i. 74–7, 125–33.

^{page 40 note 3} Ibid., i. 199–208; Breyer, pp. 218–31, 237–8; Donaubauer, S., Nürnberg urn die Mine des dreissigjährigen Krieges (Nuremberg, 1893), pp. 169–74Google Scholar.

^{page 40 note 4} Irmer, , VS, i. 207Google Scholar; Breyer, p. 218. The suggestion may not have been seriously meant; but it is noteworthy that Gustav Adolf told Nuremberg that they must either join the projected league or ally with Sweden (Breyer, p. 219). On the other hand, Lofflerlater demanded a direktorium for Sweden even after the war: Irmer, , VS, i. lxxv, 216Google Scholar.

^{page 41 note 1} Examples of this in Arkiv, i. 456, 755. He would have agreed with Monro's verdict: ‘They wagge as the bush doth resolving ever to quit their best friends in adversity’: Monro, ii. 44.

^{page 41 note 2} Breyer, pp. 218, 229.

^{page 41 note 3} Salvius's draft treaty of September 1631 would have given him ‘oram maritimam donee plenius nobis cum imperio convenerit’—the same formula as was used for Wismar and Warnemuünde in the Mecklenburg treaty. George William rejected these terms: Boethius, , ‘Aktstycken rörande Salvius' underhandlingar med Brandenburg’, pp. 127–42Google Scholar.

^{page 42 note 1} Breyer, p. 221.

^{page 42 note 2} ‘Alsobalden und schlechterdings.’

^{page 42 note 3} Irmer, , VS, i. 206, 215Google Scholar. The six classes were (i) protestant lands formerly wholly occupied by the enemy—e.g. Mecklenburg; (ii) protestant lands where the prince's authority had been merely nominal—e.g. Pomerania; (iii) lands hostile in spirit—e.g. Brandenburg [!]; (iv) independents, deeply indebted to Sweden—e.g. Saxony, Hesse-Cassel; (v) lands that had favoured and aided the foe [—e.g. Hesse-Darmstadt?]; (vi) open enemies.

^{page 42 note 4} Breyer, pp. 210, 218–19; Spannagel, K., Konrad von Burgsdorff (Berlin, 1903), p. 382Google Scholar. He had earlier told George of Hesse-Darmstadt that he wanted a free hand in Mainz, Wiirzburg and Bamberg: Irmer, , VS, i. 109Google Scholar.

^{page 42 note 5} Ibid., i. 140.

^{page 42 note 6} Salvius to Grubbe, 12 Oct. 1631, ap. Boëthius, , NSK, p. 207Google Scholar. Sadler even told the Nuremberg deputies that Gustav Adolf desired to be emperor, but would refuse to sign any Waklkapitulation: Breyer, p. 239. But Sadler's language at Nuremberg by no means entirely tallied with his master's; and Gustav Adolf said nothing of it.

^{page 43 note 1} On 2 January 1632 Gustav Adolf said to Adolf Frederick of Mecklenburg, ‘Sollte ich Kaiser werden, so sind E. L. mein Furst’: Kretzschmar, , op. cit., p. 176Google Scholar n.

^{page 43 note 2} Droysen, , Audienien, p. 20Google Scholar; Breyer, p. 220. And cf. the king's indignant retort to Brézé's suggestion that they should partition the Rhineland between them: he had come, he said, ‘als protector, nicht als proditor Germaniae’: Paul, iii. 48.

^{page 43 note 3} Though Arnim seems to have believed that Gustav Adolf aimed both at becoming elector of Mainz and at breaking the old constitution: Irmer, G., Hans Georg von Arnim (Leipzig, 1894), p. 170Google Scholar; and cf. John George's remark to the Hesse-Darmstadt envoy, 27 April 1632: ‘Rex gedachte caesari nit viel iibrig zu lassen, welches zu einem accord sehr undienlich’: Irmer, , VS, i. 164Google Scholar.

^{page 43 note 4} Breyer, p. 232. The League of Heilbronn, which arose out of Gustav Adolf's ideas, was expressly declared not to aim at violation of the constitution of the Empire: AOSB, I. viii. 445; and cf. the corpus hanseaticum for which Bremen was working in the spring of 1631: Boëthius, , NSK, p. 117Google Scholar.

^{page 43 note 5} Breyer, p. 212. Kretzschmar missed the point of this by confusing it with another suggestion that the corpus might have a constitution similar to that of the United Netherlands: Kretzschmar, , op. cit., p. 172Google Scholar.

^{page 43 note 6} Irmer, , VS, i. 137 (03 1632)Google Scholar.

^{page 43 note 7} Ibid., i. 161: as reported by Tungel to Schwallenberg, 29 March 1632.

^{page 44 note 1} Irmer, , VS, i. 125–33Google Scholar.

^{page 44 note 2} cf. Grubbe's characteristic comment on the Brandenburg negotiations (25 May 1631): ‘Objection still made on grounds of jura imperii fundamentalia, die Erbverbruderung, and other such stuff, hoc perverso Rom. imperii statu, mighty absurd’: Arkiv, i. 743.

_{page 44 note 3} Invitation to George of Hesse-Darmstadt, 20 Oct. 1632, in Irmer, , VS, i. 284–6Google Scholar; to the nobility of the Franconian circle, 24 Oct., Arkiv, i. 682; instructions for Oxenstierna, 24 Oct., AOSB, II. i. 866–8; and cf. AOSB, I.vii. 601 ff.

^{page 44 note 4} Breyer, pp. 220–1, 223, 234; Ahnlund, , Oxenstierna, p. 667Google Scholar; Egelhaaf, G., ‘Gustaf Adolf und die deutsche Reichsstädte’, Deutsche Rundschau, cxi, (1902), p. 421Google Scholar. In particular, he was anxious to secure the permanent alliance of Ulm, Nuremberg, Strassburg and Frankfort, whose economic strength and military capabilities he much exaggerated: see Paul, iii. 62 ff.

^{page 44 note 5} As Oxenstierna emphasized on 30 January 16331 Irmer, , VS, ii. 27Google Scholar.

^{page 45 note 1} Gustav Adolf to Steinberg, 30 Oct. 1632: Arkiv, i. 687.

^{page 45 note 2} Or again, ‘Der könig wurde sich geendert haben, nach dem, wie er gesehen, dass der feind sich gestellt, die zeiten sich angelassen und die freunde sich erwiesen haben wiirden…De futuribus casibus sei zwar auch wohl ehr geredet, aber magis obiter und das werk nicht genugsamb gefasset’: Irmer, , VS, ii. 27Google Scholar.

^{page 46 note 1} e.g. Kretzschmar, who considered assecuratio as the expression of the king's ‘universalen, welthistorische Plaäne’: op. cit., p. 159.

^{page 46 note 2} Gustav Adolf considered William of Hesse-Cassel and William of Weimar as absolutely sure, Julius Frederick of Wurttemberg as reasonably so: Breyer, p. 236.

^{page 46 note 3} ‘H.M. began to bewail and lament, saying how well he had meant in the German business; but H.M. said that since he now understood that these German gentry little esteemed H.M.'s favour or good will, nor would they suffer H.M.'s direction over them, therefore (said H.M.)… “I will prove it, so that every honest man shall esteem me for an honourable gentleman, let it go afterwards as God will. But those others, that have not heeded my orders, advice and exhortations, they shall be…”—what I do not venture to mention here’: letter of Tonnes Langman: ‘Ett par brev om slaget vid Lützen 1632’, Historisk Tidskrift, I Series, xii (1892), p. 160Google Scholar. And cf. Ahnlund, , Oxenstierna, p. 725Google Scholar.