1 See my “William of Auvergne's Debt to Avicenna,” a paper presented at the Colloquium on “Avicenna and his Heritage,” held at Leuven and Louvain-la-neuve, 8–11 September 1999, to be published in the proceedings. In the paper I argue that William made his own more elements of Avicenna's thought than has previously been acknowledged.Google Scholar

2 William, , De anima ch. 2, pt. 12 (2, 82b): “Quamquam autem in multis contradicendum est Aristoteli, sicut revera dignum et justum est, et hoc in omnibus sermonibus quibus dicit contraria veritati, sic suscipiendus est, id est, sustinendus in eis omnibus in quibus recte sensisse invenitur.” Except for De trinitate, all references to William's works will be to Guilelmi Alverni Episcopi Parisiensis Opera omnia, 2 vols., ed. Hodot, F., with Supplementum , ed. LeFeron, B. (Orléans-Paris, 1674; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967). References to the De trinitate will be to Switalski, Bruno, ed., William of Auvergne: De Trinitate. An Edition of the Latin Text with an Introduction (Toronto, 1976). I have throughout slightly modified the punctuation of the 1674 edition.Google Scholar

3 In Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World (Leiden, 1990), Richard, C. Dales says, “It has usually been assumed that the thirteenth-century debates on the eternity of the world were occasioned by the libri naturales of Aristotle, and by the works of certain Arabic authors, especially Avicenna, Algazel, and Averroes” (p. 50). Dales claims that in the early years of the thirteenth century the questions about the eternity of the world arose out of arguments contained in patristic sources, specifically Augustine and Boethius, and in Peter Lombard (pp. 50–51). That does not seem to be the case with William, as we shall see.Google Scholar

4 See “William of Auvergne on the Eternity of the World,” Modern Schoolman 67 (1990): 187–95, and “William of Auvergne's Arguments for the Newness of the World,” Medievalia: Textos e Estudios 7–8 (1995): 287–302.Google Scholar

5 See Dales, , Medieval Discussions , 74.Google Scholar

6 William's, De universo is divided into two principal parts, each of which is further divided into three parts. The first principal part deals with the material universe, the second with the spiritual universe. For a more detailed description of the contents of the parts, see my William of Auvergne: The Universe of Creatures. Selections Translated with an Introduction and Notes (Milwaukee, 1998), 17–28.Google Scholar

7 See Dales, , Medieval Discussions , 18–85, for a history of the period from Boethius up to and including the early thirteenth century.Google Scholar

8 In “Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 1 (1926): 5–127, here 66, Gilson, Etienne says, “Aristote se confond souvent pour lui avec Avicenne.” So too, In Notes et textes sur l'Avicennisme latin aux confins des xii^e—xiii^e siècles (Paris, 1934), Roland de Vaux notes, “C'est done Avicenne encore que nous allons retrouver derrière les sequaces Aristotelis.“ Google Scholar

9 William's, failure to appeal to Boethius is all the more peculiar insofar as at that time, according to Dales, questions about the eternity of the world arose out of Boethius, Augustine, and Peter Lombard rather than out of Aristotle or Avicenna. See Dales, , Medieval Discussions , 50–51.Google Scholar

10 In De trinitate ch. 1 (ed. Switalski, , 17), William cites an axiom from Boethius's De hebdomadibus; he also seems to allude to De consolatione philosophiae 5, Prose 6, in De universo IIIa–Iae, ch. 15 (1, 778aE–780aF), where he discusses foreknowledge and necessity. So too, he cites Boethius's De trinitate in De universo Ia–IIae, ch. 11 (1, 819aD). In De anima ch. 7, pt. 1 (2, 203b), he paraphrases Boethius's De musica 5, ch. 1.Google Scholar

11 William, , De universo Ia–Iae, ch. 1 (1, 683aA): “opinati sunt quidem aeternitatem aliud non esse in essentia quam tempus.” Google Scholar

12 Ibid., “tempus esse perfectae partem aeternitatis.” Google Scholar

13 See my “The Identity of the Italici in William of Auvergne's Discussion of the Eternity of the World,” Proceedings of the PMR Conference 15 (1990): 191–203.Google Scholar

14 William, , De universo IIa–Iae, ch. 1 (1, 685bAB): “qui dixit tempus partem esse aeternitatis vocavit totum tempus, scilicet infinitum, aeternitatem, propter quod in ratione, seu definitione sua non est locutus de illo, sed de partibus determinatis ipsius, et ideo cum dixisset: Tempus est pars aeternitatis, adjunxit, cum anni mensuantis, diurnique certa commensuratione.” The last phrase of the Latin is impossible as it is, though it is not hard to figure out how Cicero's words were corrupted to this. See the following notes. The 1674 edition suggests in the margin “animi” in place of “anni.” Google Scholar

15 Cicero, , De inventione 1.26.39: “Tempus autem est — id quo nunc utimur, nam ipsum quidem generaliter definire difficile est — pars quaedam aeternitatis cum alicuius annui, menstrui, diurni, nocturnive spatii certa significatione.” Google Scholar

16 William of Conches says, “Tempus est quedam pars eternitatis, id est illius magni spacii, cum certa significatione alicuius spacii diurni, nocturni mensurnive” ( Glossae super Platonem 32. Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables , ed. Jeauneau, Edouard [Paris, 1965], 177). He also says, “tempus est pars eternitatis, id est illius magni spacii quod a philosophis eternitas vocatur — vera enim eternitas caret omni parte — cum certa significatione certi spacii, sed non magnum spacium” (Glossae super Priscianum, cited from Jeauneau, p. 177).Google Scholar

17 William, , De universo IIa–Iae, ch. 5 (1, 688bE): “aeternitas … non est nisi tempus aeternum, hoc est, duratio ex utraque parte infinita.” Google Scholar

18 Ibid., ch. 1 (1, 685bA): “si tempus esset juxta opinionem Aristotelis sine principio scilicet et sine fine, revera perpetuitas esset dimidium temporis ex utraque parte infiniti; hoc autem dici non potest nisi equivoce aeternitas.” Google Scholar

19 Ibid., ch. 5 (1, 688bF): “eas nihil habere in potentia et propter hoc nihil eis addi posse, nihil minui vel acquiri ab eis, sed totum habere actu quidquid habere naturaliter poterant, et propter hoc nihil eorum quae habent eis posse fluere, nihil eorum quae non habent ad eas posse influere, et haec est quaedam indubitanter propinquitas et vicinitas ad aeternitatem.” Google Scholar

20 See ibid., ch. 8 (1, 690bH): “Quidquid dicatur et quicumque conentur excusare Aristotelem, haec indubitanter fuit ejus sententia, quod mundus est aeternus et quod non coepït esse; et de motu similiter sensit. Et Avicenna post eum.” Google Scholar

21 Ibid., ch. 1 (1, 683aB): “non differt aeternitas a tempore nisi sicut totum a parte sua et sicut majus tempus a minori.” Google Scholar

22 See ibid. (1, 684bG). William, also points out, however, that perpetuity and anti-perpetuity do not in every case constitute an eternal duration since there can be a duration between anti-perpetuity and perpetuity; see ibid. (1, 686bEF): “perpetuitas animae humanae quae nunc creatur et antiperpetuitas ipsius non esse coeli non complent unam durationem aeternam. Deest ab hujusmodi duratione aeterna tota duratio coeli a creatione sua usque in presens nunc.” Google Scholar

23 Ibid. (1, 683aC): “Manifestum autem quod omnes diffiniunt aeternum quod nec habet principium neque finem, et intelligitur principium et finis durationis sive permanentiae suae.” Google Scholar

24 Ibid., “Similiter aeternum dicunt homines communiter quod nec incipit nec desinit esse; quare aeternitas infinita est secundum communem intelligentiam hominum.” Google Scholar

25 Ibid., “Dico insuper quod aeternitas impartibilis est secundum prius et posterius….” Google Scholar

26 Ibid. (1, 683bBC): “In aeternitate non posse esse prius neque posterius secundum successionem aut fluxum, sive desinentiam; quare esse aeternitatis totum simul est, non, inquam, simul concomitantia temporali, sed abnegatione prioritatis et posterioritatis, quemadmodum si dicerem quod in ea nihil ante, nihil post.” Google Scholar

27 Ibid. (1, 683bC): “similiter nec habere primum, nec habere ultimum, et proper hoc nec habere medium. Ubi enim est medium in duratione, necesse est esse prius et posterius et successionis ordinem; quare simplicem et impartibilem necesse est esse aeternitatem.” Google Scholar

28 Ibid. (1, 685bB): “ipsa impartibilis est partibilitate continuitatis … ipsa est propria creatoris benedicti et sublimis.” Google Scholar

29 Ibid., “Solum enim esse creatoris est necesse per se ex omnibus suis modis, omne autem aliud esse possibile est esse per se et non necesse esse….” Google Scholar

30 Ibid. (1, 685bC): “Quod si dixerit quia est ipsum esse creatoris, qualiter igitur erit contraria tempori? Esse quippe creatoris non habet contrarium neque oppositum nisi non esse, sicut jam te scire feci in aliis.” Google Scholar

31 Ibid. (1, 685bD–686aE): “aeternitas non est nisi esse creatoris aut creator ipse, sed nomen aeternitatis plus dicit quam esse ipsius, videlicet, privationes incipiendi et desinendi, similiter et fluxus atque mutationis, et hoc tam actu quam potentia, quod revera esse creatoris sequuntur multae privationes hujusmodi, quibus utcumque insinuatur nobis gloria et magnificentia ejus.” Google Scholar

32 See William, , De trinitate ch. 3 (ed. Switalski, , 25–28).Google Scholar

33 William, , De universo IIa–Iae, ch. 1 (1, 683aD): “fluens esse et nullo modo permanens, id est, nihil sui habens permanens in actu vel potentia.” Google Scholar

34 Ibid., “jam non esset illud tempus vel pars temporis cum esse temporis non sit nisi fluere secundum totum, fluere, inquam, irretentibiliter et inflectibiliter.” I have conjectured “inflectibiliter” in place of “influxibiliter.” Google Scholar

35 Ibid. (1, 683aD–bA): “Desinentia vero essentialis est temporis, sicut et fluere; fluere enim in tempore non est nisi continue cadere in non esse; cadere autem in non esse non est nisi desinere; quare desinentia essentialis est temporis.” Google Scholar

36 Ibid. (1, 683bC): “cum aeternitas sit impartibilis, tempus autem in infinitum partibile, est igitur aeternitas ad tempus, quemadmodum ipsum nunc impartibile ad totum tempus; quare tempus est infinitum majus quam aeternitas.” Google Scholar

37 Ibid. (1, 683bC–D): “aeternitas sit major in infinitum tempore et quia tempus intra aeternitatem est; ipsum enim et praecedit aeternitas et sequitur. Si enim cessaret tempus, post ipsum esse aeternitas, hoc est dicere, si desineret esse tempus, similiter, si coepit tempus, ante ipsum fuit aeternitas.” The 1674 edition has “infra” in the margin in place of “intra.” Google Scholar

38 See ibid. (1, 683bD).Google Scholar

39 Ibid. (1, 684aE): “individuum est in amplitudine speciei, sicut punctus in linea, et hoc est quoniam [numerus] individuorum infinitus est; quare amplitudo speciei potentialiter infinita est quantum ad individua.” Google Scholar

40 See ibid. Ia–Iae, ch. 26 (1, 621bB).Google Scholar

41 Avicebron, , Fons vitae 3, 57, ed. Baeumker, Clemens in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 1 (Münster, 1896), 205, where the disciple says, “Iam inueni quod iussisti, et eleuaui me per gradus substantiarum intelligibilium, et deambulaui in amoenitatibus earum floridis; et inueni corpora sensibilia in comparatione illarum in ultima uilitate et imperfectione, et uidi totum mundum corporalem natantem in illis, sicut nouicala in mari et auricula in aere.” Google Scholar

42 William, , De universo IIa–Iae, ch. 1 (1, 684aH): “Quantitates non sunt proportionaliter comparabiles quae non sunt ejusdem generis et quibus non est unus modus mensurandi, et propter hoc aeternitas et tempus non sunt ad invicem comparabiles.” Google Scholar

43 Ibid., “Amplitudinem namque corporalem facit multitudo partium et aggregatio; amplitudinem vero spiritualem unitas et simplicitas.” Google Scholar

44 Ibid., “Et qui est ordo simplicitatis et impartibilitatis, idem est ordo amplitudinis spirituals et capacitatis….” Google Scholar

45 Ibid. (1, 684bE): “Simplicitas enim prohibet eam ab aggregatione partium et ordine ipsarum; quare prohibet eam habere prius et posterius, et consequenter primum et ultimum.” Google Scholar

46 Ibid., “horam vel aliam partem temporis majorem esse vel minorem vel aequalem milario.” We can, of course, say that Chicago is an hour and a half from Milwaukee, where we introduce the idea of a vehicle traveling at a velocity of sixty miles per hour.Google Scholar

47 Ibid. (1, 684bF): “Aristoteles autem dixit lineam curvam et lineam rectam incommensurabiles esse; causa vero propter quam haec dixit quia non est eis idem modus mensurandi….” See Aristotle, , Physics 7, ch. 4, 248b4–7, for a possible source.Google Scholar

48 Ibid. ch. 2 (1, 686aG): “utrum aeternitas praecesserit et quantum et qualiter.” Google Scholar

49 Ibid., “quare simul incoepit cum tempore et simul desinet, et erit aequalis eidem, et erit finita, si tempus finitum est; si vero infinitum, non erit major aeternitas quam tempus.” Google Scholar

50 Ibid. (1, 686aGH): “Manifestum autem est quia non parte aliqua sui praecessit ipsum cum partem non habeat; quare praecessit ipsum tota se, quemadmodum dicitur quod linea quaelibet tota se major est quolibet puncto.” Google Scholar

51 Ibid. (1, 868bE): “Aeternitas vero et se tota praecessit tempus, et se tota est posterior tempore. Causa autem in hoc est quoniam tota semper est aeternitas, nihil de ea succedit, nihil ejus omnino fuit; quare non sequitur si tota fuit ante tempus vel praecessit aeternitas, quoniam propter hoc nihil ejus futurum sit.” Google Scholar

52 Ibid., “quoniam totus ubique est.” Google Scholar

53 Ibid., “Sic aeternitas tota semper; et propter hoc esse ipsam ante tempus non prohibet ipsam esse post tempus.” Google Scholar

54 Ibid. (1, 686bF): “Non enim sicut linea dicitur puncto suo initiali vel terminali major se tota, sic potest dici aeternitas major tempore se tota, quemadmodum nec ipse creator potest dici mundo major se toto.” I have removed an extra “major” from after “dicitur.” Google Scholar

55 Ibid. (1, 686bFG): “punctus initialis vel terminalis alicujus lineae sit in eodem situ ut punctus in linea et de linea, sic tota linea revera est post punctum, et detracto puncto de linea, nulla particula propter hoc detrahetur, et ideo linea non fieret minor.” Google Scholar

56 Ibid. (1, 686bG): “non enim aeternitas punctus temporalis est, nec velut in eodem situ aut eadem serie sunt aeternitas et tempus.” Google Scholar

57 Ibid., “quemadmodum et cum dicitur an Deus sit in tempore. Non enim est in tempore mensurabiliter, sicut saepe dictum est, sed comitabiliter, ut ita dicatur. Est enim dum tempus est et quandocumque aliquid temporis est.” Google Scholar

58 Ibid. (1, 686bGH): “esse in tempore et esse in loco non dicuntur intentione una. Esse enim in loco est circundari et contineri ab ipso loco.” Google Scholar

59 Ibid. (1, 686bH): “motus autem qui est in tempore non circumdatur eo modo a tempore, hoc est, per omnem dimensionem et partem, sed quasi per longum successionis applicatur ei, et propter hoc solum breve et longum dicitur de tempore in nominibus dimensionum.” Google Scholar

60 Ibid., “Motus igitur dicitur esse in tempore proprie quod ipsum praecise comitatur, videlicet quod nihil habet ante primum seu principium motus, nihil post ultimum seu finem ipsius, et ista concomitantia est mensuratio temporalis.” Google Scholar

61 Ibid. ch. 3 (1, 687aD): “Contraria enim simul in eodem esse non possunt….” Google Scholar

62 Ibid. (1, 687bA): “nihil enim temporalium, prout jam tibi patefactum est, in aeternitate vere et proprie esse potest.” Google Scholar

63 See my “William of Auvergne's Rejection of the Platonic Archetypal World,” Traditio 55 (1998): 117–30.Google Scholar

64 William, , De universo IIa–Iae, ch. 3 (1, 687bA): “omnia quae habet aeternitas sunt apud eam semper praesentia cum nihil apud eam fluat aut praetereat, incipiat aut desinat.” Google Scholar

65 Ibid. (1, 687bAB): “creator aeternus, qui est lucidissimus aut infallibilis conspector omnium saeculorum habet omnia sibi praesentia, hoc est, videt et intuetur, quoniam non magis videt praesentia quam praeterita vel futura vel quolibet modo aliter absentia.” Google Scholar

66 Ibid. (1, 687bB) “creator non videt per aliud quam per semetipsum. Ipse enim est sibi ipsi lux per quam videt, et ipsemet est sibi similitudo vel exemplum vel speculum in quo videt quicquid videt.” Google Scholar

67 Ibid. ch. 4 (1, 687bC): “contactus in tantum est quantum punctatim tantum sua revolutione ipsam tangit punctum, et est ipsum tempus, et propter hoc nihil totum de tempore simul est.” Google Scholar

68 Ibid. (1, 687bD): “hoc est neque secundum totalitatem suam neque secundum totalitatem alicujus ex partibus suis; non fluit lumen essendi ab aeternitate super ipsum nisi punctatim.” Google Scholar

69 Ibid., “ut de ea exire nisi punctatim tempus non possit in actum.” Google Scholar

70 Ibid. (1, 687bD): “Omnium quippe rerum creatarum debilioris esse est tempus; hoc autem apparet ex hoc quia actualitas ejus est in ultimate parvitatis, potentialitas vero econtrario.” Google Scholar

71 Ibid. (1, 688aE): “propter ista duo dixit philosophus ipsum esse horizontem aeternitatis et temporis et post aeternitatem supra tempus….” Google Scholar

72 Liber de causis 2, 22, ed. Pattin, A. (Leuven, 1967), 50: “Esse vero quod est post aeternitatem et supra tempus est anima, quoniam est in horizonte aeternitatis inferius et supra tempus.” Google Scholar

73 William, , De universo IIa–Iae, ch. 4 (1, 688aG): “Potest autem et merito quaeri quid intelligit Philosophus quia omne esse est ante aeternitatem et supra ipsam, aut est in aeternitate et cum ipsa, aut post aeternitatem et supra tempus, ut anima, quae est in horizonte aeternitatis.” William, seems to conflate II, 19 and II, 22 from the Liber de causis. Google Scholar

74 Boethius, , De consolatione philosophiae 5, Prose 6 (CSEL 67, 121): “Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.” Google Scholar

75 See Dales, , Medieval Discussions , 51–52 for William of Durham, 63 for Philip the Chancellor, and 71 for Grosseteste. An electronic search of the Patrologia latina turned up very few citations of the Boethian definition and those comparatively late. Prior to Bonaventure and Aquinas I found only three: two in scriptural commentaries of Paschasius Radbertus (ca. 785–ca. 860) in PL 120: 102C and 1025C, and, in a commentary on Isaiah by Herveus Burgidolensis (ca. 1150) in PL 181: 522C. In God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time (New York, 1992), Alan Padgett claims that the views of Augustine and Boethius dominated the Latin West, but between Boethius and Aquinas he points only to the doctrines of Anselm (d. 1109), in the Proslogion, chs. 13 and 18, and of Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173), in De trinitate 2, 4 and 2, 9: PL 196: 903 and 906.Google Scholar

76 For this dating of the De anima , see Gauthier, R. A., “Notes sur les débuts (1225–1240) du premier ‘Averroïsme,’” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 66 (1982): 321–74, here 362. Gauthier claims that the composition of The Universe of Creatures may well have continued up to 1240 and that William probably began his The Soul only a short time earlier.Google Scholar

77 William, , De anima ch. 1, pt. 1 (2, 65b): “Non intret autem in animum tuum quod ego vellem uti sermonibus Aristotelis tanquam authenticis ad probationem eorum quae dicturus sum, qui scio locum dialecticum ab auctoritate tantum esse et solum facere posse fidem, cum propositum meum sit et in hoc tracatu et ubicumque possum certitudinem facere demonstrativam, postquam non relinquitur tibi dubitationis ullum vestigium.” I have followed the conjecture of “dubitationis” in place of “demonstrationis” in Valois, Noël, Guillaume d'Auvergne. Évèque de Paris: Sa vie et ses ouvrages (Paris, 1880), 239.Google Scholar

78 Avicenna, , Metaphysics 9, ch. 2, in Avicenna latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina , ed. Van Reit, S., 488: “Naturalis enim non agit per electionem sed ad modum seruientis….” Google Scholar

79 William, , De trinitate ch. 11 (ed. Switalski, , 75): “His igitur exemplis manifestum est eos imposuisse puro et vero intellectui falsum testimonium. Sed obliti quod ipsi quidem recte dicerunt, quod natura non operatur secundum electionem et voluntatem, sed ad modum servientis.” Google Scholar

80 See De universo Ia–Iae, ch. 9 (1, 603aA); IIa–Iae, ch. 9 (1, 694aF); Ia–IIae, ch. 2 (1, 808bF); Ia–IIae, ch. 8 (1, 816bE); Ia–IIae, ch. 30 (1, 833aB); De legibus ch. 20 (1, 55bBC). See Miller, Michael, “William of Auvergne and Avicenna's Principle ‘Nature Operates in the Manner of a Servant,’” to appear in Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity , ed. Inglis, John.Google Scholar

81 William, , De universo IIa–Ia, ch. 5 (1, 688bE): “Scito etiam quod aeternitas ista non est secundum Aristotelem, neque secundum intentionem ejus Philosophi est iste sermo, nisi tempus aeternum, hoc est, duratio ex utraque parte infinita.” Google Scholar

82 Ibid., ch. 8 (1, 690bH): “Quicquid igitur dicatur et quicumque conentur excusare Aristotelem, haec indubitanter fuit ejus sententia, quod mundus est aeternus et quod non coepit esse, et de motu similiter, et Avicenna post eum.” Google Scholar

83 An electronic search of Avicenna's Metaphysics reveals that the term “eternity” occurs twice, once in 7, 3, and once in 9, 7. In the first case he speaks of something that “potest sustinere aeternitatem,” and in the latter Avicenna contrasts “diuturnitas aeternitatis” with “diuternitati variabili corruptibili.” The term “eternal” occurs only nine times; once it modifies “truth” (1, 8), once it modifies “universals” (4, 2), and once a particular universal, such as humanity (7, 2). Once it occurs in indirect discourse (4, 2). Once it modifies “horror of pain” (10, 2) and once “labor” (9, 7). Once it modifies “principium” (9, 1). Once things always in act are described as eternal (4, 2). Only once does it seem to refer to God: “primus aeternus” (9, 1). But there is certainly no doctrine of eternity as tota simul as compared to the before and after of time.Google Scholar

84 De universo IIa–Iae, ch. 8 (1, 690bH): “creator vel praecessit mundum vel non praecessit. Si non praecessit, non fuit ergo creator quin et mundus non esset. Mundus, igitur, non incoepit esse, et hoc est quod intendunt, vel creator non fuit ante incoeptionem mundi….” I have introduced the major punctuation after “esset,” which the sense demands.Google Scholar

85 Ibid. (1, 690bH–691aA): “Si vero praecessit mundum creator, et non praecessit ipsum, ut ait Avicenna, tempore, non praecessit igitur ipsum nisi quomodo causa praecedit effectum.” Google Scholar

86 See the text above corresponding to notes 25–31.Google Scholar

87 See McGinnis, Jon, “Ibn Sina on the Now,” American Catholic Philosophical Review 73 (1999): 73–106, which contains a new translation of Avicenna's De tempore along with a commentary on it. Though William draws out of Avicenna's teaching on God a doctrine of eternity as tota simul — a doctrine that Avicenna did not have, but ought to have had, according to William — William does not pay much attention to Avicenna's doctrine on time, which seems quite at odds with William's view. For William, time is in perpetual flux with nothing that lasts, as we have seen earlier in this paper. William's account of time is, in other words, very much in accord with the Augustinian account of time found in Confessions IX, while the Avicennian account of time as found in McGinnis's article and Jeck's study (op. cit., pp. 103–13) describes time as a continuum that is not divided by the now or the instant. The fact that William's account of time is similar to that of Augustine reinforces the oddness of William's not appealing to Augustine or to Boethius for his account of eternity and confirms, I believe, my hypothesis that William wanted to refute Avicenna with an account of eternity that he derived from what was implied by Avicenna's account of God.Google Scholar