¹ For a differentiation of these concepts see Schmitt, Carl, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Köln 1950) 248ff.Google Scholar

² Cf. Wilhelm Roscher, Leben, Werk und Zeitalter des Thukydides (Göttingen 1842) 447.Google Scholar

³ 1.118.2-3. Further evidence of the religious element in Spartan thinking was Archidamus’ invocation of the gods as witnesses that he was not the aggressor in the action against Plataea, 2.74.Google Scholar

⁴ 1.125.Google Scholar

⁵ 1.126.1. The qualms of conscience of the Spartans are also revealed in a speech of the Corinthians, 1.123.2.Google Scholar

⁶ 2.12.Google Scholar

⁷ Formally, the war was started by the Peloponnesian confederacy, and the first acts of war were the Theban attack on Plataea, 2.2ff., and the Spartan invasion of Attica, 2.12. In fact, the formal beginning of the war was marked by the Theban attack since only a direct attack on one's own territory created a state of war under Greek international law. Cf. 1.125; also Eduard Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums (2nd ed. Stuttgart, and Berlin, 1915) IV 288.Google Scholar

⁸ 7.18.Google Scholar

⁹ 6.105.Google Scholar

¹⁰ 1.44, 53.4, 144. Cf. Gomme, A. W., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 1945) I 177.Google Scholar

¹¹ 1.49.Google Scholar

¹² 1.145.Google Scholar

¹³ There existed, to some extent, a sense of a wider, though less binding, society than the Hellenic as reflected in Greek-Persian relations. Cf. Herodotus 1.4; 7.136. Perhaps, too, the mention of κατά τòν πάσι νόμον in 3.56.2 may be interpreted as a reference to universal law transcending Hellenic society. It has been so translated by Crawley, Heilmann, and Horneffer (as revised by Gisela Strasburger, Bremen 1957). Also see Gomme, , op. cit. I 175. However, the sense of a distinct and exclusive Hellenic society is brought out clearly in 1.82.1 and 8.44 as well as in Xenophon's Hellenica 1.6. and 2.1. Nevertheless, the conclusion of treaties with βάρβαροι was a frequent occurrence, see 2.8, 68; 3.34; 6.17, 18, 88; 7.27, 29, 42; 8.28, 31, 37, 56, 57. Xenophon, Hellenica 2.1. But there seems to have been occasional doubt as to the binding force of such treaties. See 8.43.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Thucydides’ account is replete with references to νόμοι, κοινά τῶν ‘Ελλήνων νόμιμα, κοινά δίκαια τής ‘Ελλάδος, τά πάτρια. Google Scholar

¹⁵ Busolt, Georg, Die Lakedaimonier und ihre Bundesgenossen: Bis zur Begründung der athenischen Seehegemonie (Leipzig 1878) I 143.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cf. Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Staehlin, Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur V 2.2 (Munich 1948) 69–70. Gomme, op. cit. I 172-3.Google Scholar

¹⁷ This is revealed with particular force in the Melian dialogue 5.84-114. Cf. Erik Wolf, Griechisches Rechtsdenken (Frankfurt a.M. 1956) III 2.118.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid. 87.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Ibid. 278.Google Scholar

²⁰ 1.38; 2.5; 3.11, 39, 56, 65; 7.77.Google Scholar

²¹ 1.40, 44, 45, 53, 67, 68, 79, 87, 118, 146; 4.23; 7.18.Google Scholar

²² 1.98-99.Google Scholar

²³ 1.28, 78; 4.118; 5.18, 31, 79.Google Scholar

²⁴ 1.37, 85.Google Scholar

²⁵ This was the bitter fate the Plataeans had to suffer at the hands of the Spartans sitting in judgment over them after their defeat, and causing them to complain (3.53): ‘We have to submit to a trial the result of which is already decided.’ (All quotations from Thucydides are taken from the Crawley translation.) The Melians were subjected to an equally cruel, though less hypocritical, treatment by the Athenians, 5.84-114.Google Scholar

²⁶ 1.73.Google Scholar

²⁷ Judicial settlement became even more problematical after the Athenian defeat at Aigospotamoi when Philocles bade Lysander not to play prosecutor where there is no judge. Plutarch, Lysander 13.Google Scholar

²⁸ The unilateral decisions of the Spartan assembly meetings preceding the outbreak of the war that the Athenians had been guilty of sufficient provocations justifying resort to war are a reflection of that state of affairs. See also 1.118.Google Scholar

²⁹ The uncertainty accompanying all wars is well brought out in a speech of Hermocrates 4.62.Google Scholar

³⁰ 1.44, 49.Google Scholar

³¹ 1.35. See Gomme, , op. cit. I 169.Google Scholar

³² Cf. Gomme, , op. cit. I 174-5.Google Scholar

³³ In preferring their charges the Corinthians complained of a violation of the spirit, rather than the letter, of the treaty, 1.40.Google Scholar

³⁴ 1.43.Google Scholar

³⁵ 1.40.Google Scholar

³⁶ 1.55.2. Thucydides states here that this was the first cause (αἰτία) of the war of the Corinthians against the Athenians without, however, evaluating the respective claims of the two sides.Google Scholar

³⁷ 1.66.Google Scholar

³⁸ 1.68.Google Scholar

³⁹ 1.75.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ 1.77.Google Scholar

⁴¹ 1.76.Google Scholar

⁴² 1.81.Google Scholar

⁴³ 1.85, 145.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Cf. Gomme, op. cit. I 447.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Cf. ibid. I 227; also Ernst Curtius, Griechische Geschichte (Berlin 1869) II 323-4.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Cf. Gomme, op. cit. I, 449.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ 1.145.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ 1.139.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ 1.96. The war of Athens against Naxos to prevent its secession from the confederacy ended in its subjugation. This indicates that a transition from the original hegemony to an imperial relationship had taken place. Thucydides terms this practice, followed later by the subjugation of most of the other allies, a breach of customary law: 1.98.4. However, he is quick to add that the allies had themselves to blame for the Athenian severity toward them; having contributed more than their fair share, the Athenians had acquired, in the process, more power than could be matched by the allies: 1.99. One may indeed be inclined to concede to the Athenians that measure of discipline, including the right to challenge secession, without which their unilateral task of protecting the Aegean Hellenes against the Persians could not be carried out.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ 1.76.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Cf. Hermann Bengtson, Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die römische Kaiserzeit (Munich 1950) 209.Google Scholar

⁵² 1.23.6, 88, 118-119.Google Scholar

⁵³ Sealey, R., ‘Thucydides, Herodotos, and the Causes of War,’ Classical Quarterly N. S. 7 (1957) 9–11.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Schmid-Staehlin, op. cit. (n. 16 supra) 23.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Sealey, op. cit. 10-11.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Meyer, Eduard, op. cit. (n. 7 supra) IV 288-93. Similarly Bengtson, op. cit. 208.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ 1.71.4; 4.19; 5.26, 35; 6.10.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ 1.37.4, 86.3; 4.122.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ 1.1.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Thucydides expresses that conviction in direct statements, 1.23.6, 88, 118. Moreover, he lets it appear repeatedly in speeches, 1.33, 36, 144.Google Scholar

⁶¹ 1.75.Google Scholar

⁶² That the actual policy of the Spartans was containment is apparent from their promise to refrain from war if the Megarian decree were repealed. By contrast, the ultimatum to restore independence to all Hellenes cannot seriously be considered the expression of a definite policy. The ultimatum rather expressed the desire to commence war since it had become clear that no other containment of Athenian expansionism was possible.Google Scholar

⁶³ Jaeger, Werner, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture (New York 1945) I 394-5, sheds an interesting light on this point by calling attention to the fact that, in spite of subsequent ratification by the second congress of the plenum of the allies, the decision to go to war was taken by the first congress attended by only a few of the allies. He also remarks that the Spartan decision was not impelled by the allies but was her own motivated by the political situation confronting them.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See speech of Sthenelaidas, , 1.86.5; also 1.120.1-2.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The Spartan fear was aroused by the sudden realization that most of Hellas was already subject to Athens, 1.87-88.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ 1.118.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ This was the charge of the Corinthians, 1.124.3.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ 2.61.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ 1.127.3, 140.1, 144.3.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ 1.141.2.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Under the unfavorable and frustrating conditions imposed upon Athens by the treaty of 446, the logic of the argument with which the Corcyraeans were trying to lure them into an alliance must have appeared compelling to the Athenians: ‘Remember that there are but three considerable naval powers in Hellas, Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth, and that if you allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce you in the struggle’ (1.36). — Surely, acceptance or rejection of the alliance no longer seemed a matter of free choice as war appeared imminent.Google Scholar

⁷² Cf. Alcibiades’ speech to the Athenians, 6.18. The same thought was expressed earlier by Pericles, 2.64.Google Scholar

⁷³ 1.75.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ 1.75; 2.63. A similar view is expressed by Lysander after the Athenian defeat at Aigospotamoi, Plutarch, Lysander 22.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ There can be little doubt that Thucydides’ purpose in injecting the excursus on the Pentekontaetia between the first and the second Peloponnesian congress is to show up the dilemma confronting the two contestants.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Diodotus remarks that interest rather than justice governs inter-polity relations, 3.47. In the same vein Hermocrates, 4.60, and the Corcyraean envoys, 1.28.3.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ 3.45.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ 1.24; 3.82.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ 1.24; 2.61; 3.82, 2; 4.62; 5.111; 6.12.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ 1.1.Google Scholar

⁸¹ 1.24.Google Scholar

⁸² 1.78, 80.2, 122, 140.1; 2.11; 3.42; 4.62, 63, 64; 7.61.Google Scholar

⁸³ 1.124.2; 2.64; 4.59.2.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Cf. Thucydides’ Archeology 1.2-19; also 7.75.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ 1.82.1, 121.5; 5.101; 6.78.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ 1.76; 2.62, 63; 3.45.6; 4.61; 5.105.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ It is often contended — based primarily on 3.82.8 — that in Thucydides’ view the ultimate driving forces of politics anchored in human nature are greed (πλεονεξία) and ambition (φιλοτιμία). If that were so, any concern with moral questions in the study of Thucydides’ political views would be worse than futile. However, even the casual reader cannot fail to be struck by Thucydides’ deep moral concern in unfolding the course of the Athenian tragedy even though he fails to indulge in explicit moral judgments. No one studying his anthropology can, in fact, remain unaware of the derogatory connotation, attaching to his use of the term πλεονεξία with only one exception. Cf. 3.45.4, 82.8; 4.17.4, 21.2, 41.4, 92.2. The one exception occurs in Hermocrates’ speech, 4.61.5, who finds the πλεονεκτεῖν of the Athenians excusable. The reason for this merciful judgment may lie in the recognition by that wise statesman that in the eighth year of the war the demo-realization of the entire Hellenic world had progressed too far to permit a discussion of politics in moral terms. Although all powerful political structures are driven by a natural tendency to conquer, this phenomenon is not to be explained by πλεονεξία alone. Perhaps more basic is the natural desire to be free and independent. Independence can be assured only through the development and exercise of power over others. However, that power must be used with moderation lest it become ὓβριی (Cf. Erik Wolf, op. cit. [n. 17 supra] III 2.82). Hence, human action based on nothing but πλεονεξία seems to appear to Thucydides as a perversion of human nature and as something to be distinguished from empire (ὓρχἠ ἅΛΛων) pure and simple. Empire, like all rule, involves problems of protection and concern for the welfare of subjects. That Thucydides does, in fact, make such a distinction is suggested by the repeated references to Athens — even by Athenian leaders — as tyrannical (especially in 2.63.2 and 3.37.2), implying that ὰρχἡ is not necessarily or even normally identical with tyrannical rule. The mere grabbing of land and dominion to be exploited for one's own benefit without concern for the welfare of the subjects, that is, tyrannical rule, seems an expression of πλεονεξία, an aberration rather than a universal and irrepressible human trait.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ An exhaustive treatment of Thucydides’ basic philosophical categories would exceed the scope of this paper. For an excellent treatment see Wolf, Erik, op. cit. especially 57-68.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ 1.78, 140.1; 3.45; 4.12.3, 18, 20, 62, 64; 5.75; 6.23; 7.61.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ For example Nicias, 6.23, and Hermocrates at Camarina, 6.78.Google Scholar

⁹¹ 1.71.3; 2.64.3; 5.105; 6.78.Google Scholar

⁹² 1.144.3.Google Scholar

⁹³ Cf. Strasburger, Hermann, ‘Die Entdeckung der politischen Geschichte durch Thucydides,’ Saeculum 6 (1955) 416.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ 1.23.6.Google Scholar