1 Reichert, B. M., ed., Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum , 2 vols., in Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum, vols. 3–4 (Rome, 1889–99). See particularly the years 1278, 1279, and 1286. As for the capitular legislation concerning Aquinas during Durandus's time, see the 1309 General Chapter at Saragossa (Acta, 2:38), the 1313 Metz General Chapter (Acta, 2:64–65), the 1315 Bologna General Chapter (Acta, 2:81), and the 1316 Montpellier General Chapter (Acta, 2:93). See also Walz, A., ed., Ordinationes capitulorum generalium de sancto Thome eiusque cultu et doctrina, Annales sacri ordinis fratrum Praedicatorum, 16 (Rome, 1923–24).Google Scholar

2 For a fundamental study on Durandus's life and career, see Koch, J., Durandus de S. Porciano O. P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts , Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 26 (Munster, 1927). See also Fournier, P., “Durand de Saint-Pourçain, théologien,” Histoire littéraire de la France 37 (1938): 1–38.Google Scholar

3 Both censure lists have been edited by Koch, J., Articuli nonaginta tres extracti ex Durando S.-Porciano O. P. primo scripto super Sententias et examinati per magistros et baccalarios Ordinis, and Articulis in quibus magister Durandi deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae , Schriften, Kleine, 2 (Rome, 1973). See also Koch, J., Philosophische und theologische Irrtumslisten von 1270–1329. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Zensuren, Kleine Schriften, 2 (Rome, 1973).Google Scholar

4 Durandus first read the Sentences around 1307–8, probably at a Dominican studium in Paris. This work (henceforth A In Sent.), was allegedly taken from him at a premature state and disseminated outside the order against his own will. Book 1 is in Paris, BNF MS Lat. 14454, fols. 31r–114v; books 2 and 3 are not extant except in passages cited in Pierre de la Palud's Commentary, in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Vat. lat. 1073; book 4 is contained in Venice, Biblioteca Marciana MS Z. L. 104. The second recension, B, of Durandus's Commentary constitutes his first reading of the Sentences at the University of Paris. It was composed around 1311, after the Dominican legislations of 1309, as a result of which it is a highly conciliatory work. It is found in Munich, Staatsbibliothek MS Clm. 26309. Finally, the last recension, C, was composed between 1317 and 1327, and is the only version Durandus recognises as a fair and mature expression of his thought. This version has been printed: In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri 4 (Ridgewood, N. J., 1964).Google Scholar

5 Already in his Commentary on the Sentences (ca. 1302), Hervaeus develops Aquinas's thought along the lines of Scotist insights and terminology. Hervaeus's incorporation of Duns Scotus's formal distinction ex natura rei is particularly evident in his Quodl. IV (1310), in which he elaborates the Scotist insight in a way compatible with the accepted interpretation of Thomism.Google Scholar

6 For the Council's explicit mention and endorsement of the Lombard: “Damnamus ergo et reprobamus libellum sive tractatum, quem abbas Ioachim edidit contra magistrum Petrum Lombardum de unitate seu essentia Trinitatis. … Nos autem, sacro et universali concilio approbante, credimus et confitemur cum Petro, quod una quaedam summa res est. …” (emphasis mine): Tanner, Norman, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (London, 1990), 231–32. See also Southern, R. W., “The Changing Role of the Universities in Medieval Europe,” Historical Research 60 (1987): 137–38.Google Scholar

7 Durandus was summoned to Avignon in 1313, where he determined in two quodlibetal disputations between 1314 and 1316. He lectured in Avignon until 1317, when he was appointed bishop of Limoux, a diocese which, for reasons extraneous to Durandus, was dissolved shortly after. Durandus was then appointed to the bishopric of Le Puy, an episcopate which proved to be a failure. In the following years, until a third episcopal appointment sent him to Meaux in 1325, Durandus preserved a close link with the papacy as theological adviser in difficult matters. For more details on this period of Durandus's life, see Koch, , Durandus de S. Porciano O. P. , 396–409, 417–36.Google Scholar

8 Courtenay, William J., Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987), 171–78.Google Scholar

9 Leff, Gordon, “The Faculty of Arts,” in Universities in the Middle Ages, ed. de Ridder-Symoens, H., vol. 1 of A History of the University in Europe , ed. Rüegg, W., 4 vols. (Cambridge, 1991), 328–33.Google Scholar

10 The relevant passage reads as follows: “Nos autem … credimus et confitemur cum Petro, quod una et quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, tres simul personae ac sigillatim quaelibet earundem, et ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo non quaternitas, quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia sive natura divina … et illa res non est generans neque genita nec procedens. …” (emphasis mine). See Tanner, Norman, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils , 232.Google Scholar

11 See Robb, Fiona, “Intellectual Tradition and Misunderstanding: The Development of Academic Theology on the Trinity in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 1993), 12–22. Robb makes an excellent study of medieval interpretations of the dogmatic formula of the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council, in strict connection with the recurrent preoccupation with the question of whether the divine essence begets.Google Scholar

12 See, for example, Natalis, Hervaeus, Quodl. II (1308), q. 7, a. 2, 47r^a .Google Scholar

13 I believe with Robb (and also Decker, Bruno, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz: Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts , Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen, begründet von C. Baeumker, 42 [Munster, 1967], 381–82) that the dogmatic formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity as presented in 1215 primarily envisioned Joachim of Fiore's accusation of quaternity against Peter Lombard. Thus, the question underlying the notion of quaternity was more immediately connected to that of divine unity and the generation of the essence than to the sum of “relative things” in God. As a reading of the conciliar condemnation, therefore, the latter is not strictly correct.Google Scholar

14 For Henry's metaphysics of modes, see his Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum (Paris, 1520), particularly 32.5 and 55.6; also Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo Doctoris Solemnis (Paris, 1518), especially Quodl. VII. qq. 1–2; IX, q. 3; III, q. 4; V, q. 2. See also Paulus, J., Henri de Gand: essai sur les tendences de sa métaphysique (Paris, 1938).Google Scholar

15 Henry, , Quodl. VII, qq. 1–2, 32.92–104; Quodl. XV, q. 5, 577v.Google Scholar

16 Henry, , Quodl. IX, q. 3: “relatio realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento, et quod ex se non est nisi habitudo nuda, quae non est nisi modus quidam rem habendi ad aliud, et ita non res quantum est ex se, sed solummodo modus rei, nisi extendendo rem ut etiam modus rei dicatur res …” (emphasis mine).Google Scholar

17 “Sabellianism,” thus named after Sabellius, an early third-century theologian, refers to the modalist form of Monarchianism, according to which in the Godhead the only differentiation is a mere succession of modes or operations. That Durandus was particularly repelled by Sabellianism, we know from his so-called confessio, allegedly a report he is said to have sent to the Carmelite Guido Terreni, approximately a year before the 1314 censure list: “est condempnata haeresis Sabelliana … per symbolum Nicenum, … et per documentum Athanasii et per Innocentium in … ‘Firmiter’ et ‘Dampnamus’. …” For an extract of this document, see Koch, , Durandus de S. Porciano O. P. , 107 n., quoted from Guido Terreni, Quodl. I, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. Burgh. 39. In this respect, I cannot agree with Joseph Koch that “theology for Durandus … was applied philosophy” (Koch, , Durandus de S. Porciano O. P., 192). Rather, Durandus was always arguing as a theologian, and his philosophical views seem to have responded to the safeguarding of the Trinitarian dogma.Google Scholar

18 The Filioque (literally, “and from the Son”), constitutes the dogmatic formula expressing the double procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son as its common principles. The formula was added by the Western Church to the Nicene-Costantinopolitan creed, an addition which aroused strong opposition from the Eastern Church. Despite successive attempts at compromise (especially at the Council of Lyons in 1274 and Florence in 1439), it still is a very sensitive issue dividing the Eastern and Western Churches.Google Scholar

19 For a comprehensive study on Aquinas's theory of relations, both categorical and Trinitarian, see Krempel, A., La doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas (Paris, 1952). See also Henninger, M., Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325 (Oxford, 1989), 13–39.Google Scholar

20 Aquinas, , Scriptum super libros Sententiarum I (In Sent. I), d. 8, q. 4, a. 3; d. 26, q. 2, a. 1; De potentia, q. 8, a. 4, ad 5; Summa Theologiae (ST) I, q. 28, a. 2. Although the Thomist tradition does include the notion of transcendental relation as a type of logical relation, this paper will only consider real relations, for it is on the latter that Aquinas's account of Trinitarian relations is based. For more detail on Aquinas's understanding of transcendental relations, see Krempel, A., La doctrine de la relation, 339–65.Google Scholar

21 See Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3: “Quantitas enim habet propriam rationem in comparatione ad subiectum. … Ad aliquid autem … non importat aliquam dependentiam ad subiectum, immo refertur ad aliquid extra.” See also In Sent. I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 1: “Ea quae absolute dicuntur, secundum proprias rationes ponunt in eo aliquid in quo dicitur [i.e. in subiecto], ut quantitas et qualitas.” Also Sententia super Physicam (In Phys.), 3, lect. 1, n. 6: “Relatio … consistit tantum in hoc, quod est ad aliud se habere.” In De pot., q. 7, a. 9, ad 7, Aquinas states that as an accident, relation is in its subject, and in that way relation is something inherent. In virtue of that by which it is a relation, however, relation is only a condition towards another (esse ad).Google Scholar

22 Aquinas, , De pot. , q. 7, a. 8, ad 5: “Non oportet ad hoc quod de aliquo relatio aliqua de novo dicatur, quod aliqua mutatio in ipso fiat, sed sufficit quod fiat mutatio in aliquo extremorum.” Cf. Wippel, John F., The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington D.C., 2000), 199–255.Google Scholar

23 Aquinas, , De pot. , q. 7, a. 11; In Sent. I, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.Google Scholar

24 Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1; d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; De veritate (De ver.), q. 21, a. 1; ST I, q. 28, a. 2; In Sent. I, d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3: “Quamvis relationi, ex hoc quod ad alterum dicitur, non debeatur quod sit res quaedam, est tamen res aliqua secundum quod habet fundamentum in eo quod refertur.” Google Scholar

25 Aquinas, , Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) IV, c. 14; 7c: “Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam … et relatio realiter substantiae adveniens, et postremum et imperfectissimum esse habet.” However, this weakness of being only occurs in categorical relations. Divine relations partake in God's supreme being whereas relations of reason have no real being. It is on this account that categorical relations introduce in their subject only very little difference.Google Scholar

26 Aristotle, , 14 Metaph. , c. 1, 1088a23, b3. Aquinas, , De ver., q. 27, a. 4; In Sent. I, d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: “Ens minimum, sc. relatio;” De pot., q. 2, a. 5: “Relatio creata habet esse debilissimum, quod est eius tantum.” Google Scholar

27 Central to the Thomistic belief in the primacy of substances is the notion of accident as something which does not enjoy existence (esse) by itself and apart from its subject. This reductionist view of accidents is also expressed in Aquinas's belief (see De ente et essentia, c. 6) that an accidental being results from the union of an accident and its subject. Accident is being only in a qualified sense. See Wippel, , The Metaphysical Thought , 255. Although in the Divinity relation cannot be understood as an “accident” in the strict sense, it is however supposed to function like one insofar as its being must be identical to the being of the divine essence in order to safeguard the substantial (and not accidental) unity of the essence.Google Scholar

28 Aquinas, , ST I, q. 28, a. 1.Google Scholar

29 Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1: “Istud ergo esse paternitatis non potest esse aliud esse quam esse essentiae; et cum esse essentiae sit ipsa essentia, et esse paternitatis sit ipsa paternitas; relinquitur de necessitate quod ipsa paternitas secundum rem est ipsa essentia; unde non facit compositionem cum ea.” Google Scholar

30 Aquinas, , ST I, q. 36, a. 2: “Non autem possunt esse in divinis aliae relationes [realiter] oppositae nisi relationes originis.” See also In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2: “omnis autem distinctio formalis est secundum aliquam oppositionem.” Google Scholar

31 Relative opposition refers to “opposite relations.” An “opposite relation” is the relation between two terms which stand at opposite ends of one and the same process of production. Thus, active generation (or paternity) is related to passive generation (or filiation) by opposition. “Opposite relations” are alternatively known as “relations of origin,” since they account for the constitution and distinction of the persons. Thus, active generation and passive generation refer to the procession of the Son, just as active spiration and passive spiration refer to the procession of the Spirit. Since the terms of these processions are divine persons, they are by definition equal in Divinity and simultaneous in the order of origin.Google Scholar

32 Aquinas, , SCG IV, c. 24: “In relationibus vero omnibus super actionem vel passionem fundatis [as that of “curing” and “being cured”], semper alterum est ut subiectum et inaequale secundum virtutem, nisi solum in relationibus originis, in quibus nulla minoratio designatur, eo quod invenitur aliquid producere sibi simile et aequale secundum naturam et virtutem.” Cf. De pot. , q. 2, a. 4; q. 7, a. 9.Google Scholar

33 Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3; De pot., q. 2, a. 5; q. 7, a. 6; ST I, q. 39, a. 1.Google Scholar

34 Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2; ST I, q. 30, a. 2.Google Scholar

35 In this connection, Aquinas and later followers often adduce the authority of Anselm of Canterbury, according to whom “Totum est unum in deo, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.” See Anselm, , De processione spiritus sancti , ed. Schmitt, F. S., S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia (Rome, 1940), 2:181, line 2 (c.1). Cf. Aquinas, In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2; ST I, q. 31, a. 2; De pot., q. 10, a. 2.Google Scholar

36 Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2; ST I, q. 28, a. 3; In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2: “relationes oppositae sunt personae, et sunt duae personae, sicut duae relationes; sed relationes quae sunt in eadem persona non oppositae, sunt quidem duae relationes vel proprietates, sed non duae personae, immo una persona.” Google Scholar

37 Aquinas, , ST I, q. 41, a. 5: “Potentia generandi significat divinam essentiam.” See also In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 1, a. 3: “Potentia spirativa dicit aliquid quasi medium inter essentiam et proprietatem, eo quod dicit essentiam sub ratione proprietatis: sic enim actus notionalis ab essentia egreditur, non sicut ab agente, sed ab eo quo agitur. [E]t ita spirativa potentia dicit essentiam sub ratione talis proprietatis.” Cf. In Sent. I, d. 7, q. 1, a. 2.Google Scholar

38 Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1: “Natura communicatur per actum naturae, communiter loquendo; sed determinata communicatio debet esse per actum naturae sub aliqua propria ratione acceptae; et ideo communicatio quae est per spirationem, est actus divinae naturae, inquantum habet rationem spirationis. Et hoc intendit Anselmus, quod impossibile est dicere, quod processionis, quae terminatur in naturam, non sit aliquo modo natura principium, cum sit ibi quasi communicatio univocal.” For Anselm, see De processione spiritus sancti, 296 (c. 6).Google Scholar

39 See Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1: “Spiritus sanctus procedit a filio, hoc enim remoto, inevitabiliter removetur distinctio filii et spiritus sancti. Cum enim divinae personae secundum nihil absolutum distinguantur, oportet quod omnis ipsarum distinctio sit secundum relationem originis. Unde si spiritus sanctus et filius non distingueretur per hoc quod unus est ab alio, oporteret quod uterque esset una persona.” Google Scholar

40 Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 12, q. 1, a. 3; d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 and ad 4; De pot., q. 10, a. 4.Google Scholar

41 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, 83v^a .Google Scholar

42 See Aquinas, , Sententia super Metaphysicam (In Meta.), 7, lect. 4, nn. 1352–53; In Sent. I, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1; De pot., q. 7, a. 8, ad 5; q. 8, a. 4, ad 5; ST I, q. 28, a. 1. Cf. Hervaeus, , In Sent. I, d. 31, q. 1; d. 32, q. 1.Google Scholar

43 See Durandus, , Avignon Quodl. I, q. 1, pp. 47–49: “Respectus, autem, et omnes modi essendi, sunt entia quia entis, non solum concomitative, sed etiam quidditative et formaliter, qui nullam entitatem habent, nisi earn qua est huius. …” Durandus's Avignon quodlibets were composed between Advent 1314 and Advent 1316, and have been edited by Stella, P. T., Magistri Durandi a Sancto Porciano O. P. Quodlibeta Avenionensia Tria. Additis Correctionibus Hervei Natalis supra dicta Durandi in primo quolibet, Textus et Studia in Historiam Scholasticae, 1 (Zürich, 1965).Google Scholar

44 See Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV, qq. 1–2, 31.47–71; Quodl. V, 2, 154v.Google Scholar

45 Presumably Durandus meant by formis that which, apart from the substantial form, informs a substance by adding to its perfection, that is, accidents.Google Scholar

46 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, 84r^a .Google Scholar

47 See Henry of Ghent, Summa , 55.6.111r; Quodl. IX, 3: “relatio realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento, et quod ex se non est nisi habitudo nuda, quae non est nisi modus quidam rem habendi ad aliud, et ita non res quantum est ex se, sed solummodo modus rei, nisi extendendo rem ut etiam modus rei dicatur res …” (emphasis mine). Durandus certainly followed the last suggestion and extended his ontology to include modes of being.Google Scholar

48 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, 84r^a .Google Scholar

49 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, 83v^b–84r^a .Google Scholar

50 See Hervaeus, , In Sent. I, d. 32, q. 1, 135^a–b; Quodl. II, q. 7, ad 2, 47r^b: “quod essentia divina non sit idem convertibiliter cum paternitate non sequitur quod in eodem vel inter se essentia et paternitas sint diversae res. … Et ideo quantum ad istum modum realiter differunt: non quod unum non sit res quae est alterum secundum se accepta, sed quod non sit omnis res quae est illud alterum.” Google Scholar

51 The “argument of separability” is used by Scotus to disprove Henry of Ghent's view, which Scotus understood as being propounding an identity between essence and relations. See Scotus, , Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 5, nn. 200–206.Google Scholar

52 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, 84r^a. In this way, Christ's human nature still exists even though it lacks the mode of being subsistent in itself. Likewise, in the Eucharist the accidents of the bread and the wine still exist even though they have ceased to inhere in a substance.Google Scholar

53 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, 84r^a–b. Interestingly, this passage is excluded from C, d. 33. In C Durandus has divided the question into two separate issues concerning categorical relations (d. 30) on the one hand, and divine relations (d. 33) on the other. Presumably, his parallel treatment of both in A led to infer that he was applying categorical realities to God, as a result of which he decided to be more cautious in the last redaction.Google Scholar

54 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, 84r^b. See also C In Sent. I, d. 30, q. 2, 84v^b. Note the contrast with Hervaeus's position, according to which those things which are really distinct cannot form a unity except by composition. In this view, Durandus's mode of being would necessarily effect composition with its foundation. See Hervaeus, , In Sent. I, d. 31, q. 1, 132^a .Google Scholar

55 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 54v^b: “subsistere et inhaerere solum absolutis conveniunt, relatio enim qua est modo essendi ad aliud et quicumque modus essendi sive in se sive in alio non subsistit per se nec inhaeret fundamento suo eo quod non est res absoluta a suo fundamento distincta pluralitas. Ergo respectu relationum in eodem supposito nullo modo est pluralitas subsistente suppositorum nec eorum per qua supposita divina subsistent. …” Google Scholar

56 Cf. Aquinas, , In Phys. , 5, 1.9, 885: “primo distinguit ens in ens per se et per accidens. … Divisio vero entis in substantia et accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens.” Google Scholar

57 For Durandus's understanding of univocity, see Avignon, Quodl. III, q. 1, a. 3, 230–49. A univocal name, according to Durandus, is predicated of a plurality of things according to a common ratio, that is, quidditatively. Thus, Durandus admits essential univocity only regarding absolute things in respect to one another. See Avignon, Quodl. I, q. 1, 47–49: “res, autem, non dicitur univoce de omnibus de quibus dicitur, sed aequivoce vel analogice, hoc est secundum plures rationes, quarum una attributionem habet ad alteram. Cum enim rerum quaedam sint absolutae, et quaedam puri respectus, res dicitur per prius et simpliciter de re absoluta, de qua dicitur formaliter, praedicatione dicente hoc est hoc; per posterius autem et secundum quid solum, dicitur de respectu, qui non est res vel ens reale, nisi quia est rei, tanquam modus essendi eius.” Google Scholar

58 This passage amounts to Durandus's initial credo on relations. Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, 84r^b; 84v^a: “Ista opinio si esset veram evitaret multas difficultates circa distinctionem personarum; nihilominus tamen illud quod est manifestum in ea sc. quod diverse res non faciunt compositionem non omnino videtur efficaciter probatum.” Considering the circumstances under which A was disseminated (prematurely stolen by some curiosi), one wonders whether these lines were meant as a personal, provisional note that Durandus was making to himself as a reminder for a deeper consideration of the matter. Cf. C In Sent. I, d. 30, q. 2, 84v^b .Google Scholar

59 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 54v^b: “non enim sunt incompossibilia in eodem supposito quacumque realiter distinguuntur.” Although a plurality of supposita may entail a plurality of things, the converse is not necessarily true — otherwise it would be impossible to distinguish between processions in the same person.Google Scholar

60 What follows can be seen as Durandus's interpretation of Augustine, De Trinitate , 5.6, PL 42:914: “quia et Pater non dicitur Pater nisi ex eo quod habet Patrem, non secundum substantiam haec dicuntur. … Quamobrem quamvis diversum sit Patrem esse et Filium esse, non est tamen diversa substantia: quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relativum. …” Note the contrast with Hervaeus, who, following a Thomistic lead, posits only one formality in the Divinity, namely that of the divine substance. See Hervaeus, , In Sent. I, d. 25, q. 1, 120^b .Google Scholar

61 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 54v^b: “licet enim suppositum divinum sit id quod subsistit, tamen per aliud est formaliter suppositum et per aliud subsistit; constituitur enim in esse suppositi formaliter et complete per proprietatem relativam, subsistit autem solum per essentiam vel substantiam qua sicut est una in pluribus suppositis sicut in eis est una subsistentia, unde distinctio suppositorum divinorum non est secundum distinctionem subsistentorum. …” Google Scholar

62 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 54v^b: “sola supposita sunt quae subsistent sola autem essentia vel substantia per quam subsistunt. Relationem autem non per se subsistent nec per eas aliud subsistit sed solum respectum.” As we shall see, this statement was to be condemned as heretical in article 6 of the censure list of 1314.Google Scholar

63 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 55r^a: “supposita non possunt esse prima distinguentia. Cuius ratio est, prima distinguentia debent differre a se ipsis et secundum se tota. … Licet omnia opposita sunt distincta, tamen non omnia distincta sunt opposita. … In plus enim est distingui quam opponi.” Google Scholar

64 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 54r^b–v^a: “illa quae non possunt convenire eidem respectu eiusdem non sunt idem realiter, saltern re relata quia rationis essentiae est ad aliud esse. …” Also A and C In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 2, 44r^a (in C): “Relativa sunt ad aliud, et ideo non distinguuntur nisi per hoc, quod sunt ad aliud et quia sunt ad aliud per alium et alium respectum, eo quod respectus plurificatur iuxta numerum terminorum, ideo talia distinguuntur a pluribus personis per plures respectus. De numero autem talium sunt personae divinae, quae sunt et dicuntur relativae.” Google Scholar

65 Note the contrast with Aquinas, for whom the processions cannot be distinguished of themselves but in virtue of their foundation. De pot., q. 10, a. 2: “processiones divinae distinguantur secundum id a quo speciem habent. Nulla autem processio nec operatio nec motus habet speciem a se, sed sortitur speciem a termino vel a principio. Unde nihil est dictu, quod processiones aliquae distinguantur seipsis; sed oportet quod distinguantur penes principia vel penes terminos. … Et sic solus ordo processionum qui attenditur secundum originem processionis, multiplicat in divinis.” Google Scholar

66 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 7, q. 2, 44r^b–45v^a: “omnis productio in divinis constituit suppositum, essentia autem divina a nullo quod sit in divinis distinguitur secundum suppositum, ergo essentia divina non potest esse principium quo vel terminus productiones divinae. … Videtur ergo necessarium quod potentia generandi quae est principium quo generans generat, sit sola relatio paternitatis quae sola distinguitur secundum suppositum a filio et filiatione. Et haec est tertia opinio quae sola poterit habere veritatem secundum ea quae ponit fides.” Cf. C In Sent. I, d. 7, q. 2.Google Scholar

67 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 54r^a. By contrast, Aquinas holds that in the Divinity the productive principle lies in the essence, on account of which the processions may be said to be the result of a “univocal communication,” that is, a communication starting and terminating in the same nature. See Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 1, aa. 2–4; ST I, q. 36, a. 4, ad ultim.; In Phys., 5, 1.3, 661: “Secundum autem quod motus consideratur ut est in hoc ab alio, vel ab hoc in aliud, sic pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis;” ibid., 5, 1.1, 645: “Accipit divisionem motus non ex parte termino a quo, sed ex parte termini ad quem.” Therefore, if the processions were to end in relation, the persons would constitute a different type of substance from the essence.Google Scholar

68 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 54v^a: “ab una actione inmediate non possunt esse duae patientes.” Google Scholar

69 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 12, q. 1, 52v^a, 53r^a: “inter generationem filii et spirationem spiritus sancti est quidem ordo originis, sed non per se et directe, sed indirecte et concomitative et quasi per accidens.” Cf. Durandus, , A and C In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 2.Google Scholar

70 On this basis, Durandus will even speak of an “order of priority” between passive generation and active spiration insofar as active spiration naturally presupposes the constitution of the person of the Son by passive generation. See Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 12, q. 1, 53v^a: “illud quod non est constitutivum personae sed advenit iam composita supponit illud quod constituit personam et non e converso. … Ergo … spiratio naturalis praesupponit paternitatem et filiationem illud autem est prius secundum naturam quod natura supponitur. …” Google Scholar

71 Note, therefore, that the formal principle of personal distinction in the Divinity remains, as in the Thomistic view, relative opposition. In this line, Durandus explicitly rejects Henry of Ghent's “emanational” account, and maintains that if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son by way of origin they could not be personally distinguished, but would only be distinct as two distinct properties of the same person. For Henry, see Summa, 55.6.111v. For Durandus, see A and C In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 2.Google Scholar

72 Koch, , Articuli nonaginta tres , 55.Google Scholar

73 Ibid.: “[6] D.13 q.unica ante medium positionis dicit quod in divinis sola supposita subsistunt, relationes autem non subsistunt. In eadem d. q.unica circa finem positionis dicit, quod generare et spirare in patre realiter differunt et similiter generari et spirare in filio et quod in eodem supposito sunt plura, quae realiter differunt; et prius in solutione ad tertium argumentum primae opinionis in secundo articulo positionis dixerat, quod essentia ponit in numerum rerum cum relationibus, et in eadem quaestione quod essentia et relatio differunt realiter. Totum hereticum reputamus.“ Cf. the censure list of 1316, articles 9, 14, 26, 36–38 (Koch, , Articuli in quibus , 73–80).Google Scholar

74 See Natalis, Hervaeus, Reprobationes excusationum Durandi (Winter 1314?), Reims, Bibliothèque municipale 502, fols. 112v–116v; 128v–131v: “articuli, qui ponuntur disputandi a theologis, … quod simpliciter sicut determinati auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae vel auctoritate Ecclesiae; v. gr. de articulo Trinitatis, de processione Spiritus Sancti e Patre et Filio … non licet respondere recitando utrumque modum nec etiam dimittere utrumque modum tanquam possibile teneri, et multo minus licet modum oppositum articulo determinato auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae vel Ecclesiae simpliciter tenere vel magis approbare; et hoc probo, quia illud, quod est manifeste hereticum, asserere ut possibile teneri, est illicitum. Sed quidquid est contra determinationem Sacrae Scripturae vel Ecclesiae commune dictum, tale debet haberi pro heretico manifesto.” Cf. Koch, , Durandus de S. Porciano O. P., 225–27. See also Thijssen, J. M. M. H., Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200–1400 (Philadelphia, 1998), 2–4. Thijssen bases his account of the notion of “academic heresy” on Jean Gerson's short treatise, De Protestatione circa materiam fidei. Google Scholar

75 For the location of these theses in Durandus's works, see A In Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 54v^b: “sola supposita sunt quae subsistent sola autem essentia vel substantia per quam subsistunt, relationem autem non per se subsistent nec per eas aliud subsistit sed solum respicitur.” Towards the end, in 55r^a: “Nunc restat tertium, sc. ut declaretur veritas quaestionis. Est ergo intelligendum quod generare et spirare realiter differunt, similiter generari et spirari. Ratio autem huius differentiae non est sumenda ex parte suppositorum. … In eodem supposito sunt plura quae realiter differunt, turn quia supposita non possunt esse prima distinguentia” (emphasis mine). Finally, in responding to the Thomistic argument, 54v^a: “Tertio sic … duabus relationibus disparatis specie vel quasi specie differentibus correspondent duae relationes disparatae specie vel quasi specie realiter differentes. Sed generari et spirari sunt duae relationes disparatae specie vel quasi specie differentes realiter, ergo relationes quae in eis correspondent, sc. generare et spirare, specie vel quasi specie differunt cum sunt relationes rei non rationis” (emphasis mine).Google Scholar

76 See Aquinas, , De pot., q. 8, a. 2; In Sent. I, d. 34, q. 1; d. 13, q. 1, a. 2; d. 9, q. 1, a. 1c: “Quaecumque distinguuntur realiter, unum eorum est alia res ab alio.” Cf. Hervaeus, , In Sent. I, d. 31, q. 1, 132^a .Google Scholar

77 Hervaeus, , In Sent. I, d. 23, q. 1, 113^a. This echoes Aquinas's tenet that divine persons signify relations per modum substantiae, that is, specifically as relative properties. See Aquinas, ST I, q. 29, a. 4: “Persona igitur divina significat relationem ut subsistentem. Et hoc est significare relationem per modum substantiae.” Underlying this view is the Thomistic premises that everything that is in the Divinity is by that fact subsistent. See Aquinas, ST I, q. 30, a. 2; q. 28, a. 2: “Relatio realiter existens in Deo, est idem essentiae secundum rem.” Google Scholar

78 Hervaeus, , In Sent. I, d. 25, q. 1, 119^a: “Hoc autem habet relatio in divinis, inquantum est ens subsistens. Et ideo omnis pluralitas in divinis oportet quod sit pluralitas plurium realiter subsistentium, et per consequens plurium suppositorum.” Google Scholar

79 Cf. article 5 of the 1314 censure list. For other articles in the 1316 list touching on the same issue, see article 13 (which almost exactly coincides with article 5 of the first list), and article 14 (which coincides with article 6 of the first list). See Koch, , Articuli in quibus , 74–75.Google Scholar

80 Koch, , Articuli in quibus , 74: “[12] D. 12, a. 1 dicit, quod non est de ratione spirati in divinis quod sit a genito et generante nec est per se ab eis sed quasi per accidens. Credo quod hoc sit contra Thomas.” For Aquinas, see In Sent. I, d. 12, q. 1, a. 3; d. 13, q. 1, a. 3; De pot., q. 10, a. 4; ST I, q. 27, aa. 3–5. For Durandus, see A In Sent. I, d. 12, q. 1, 52v^a–b .Google Scholar

81 See Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 2. Contrast to Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, q. 9, 168, who believes that even if the Son did not spirate he would still be distinct from the Spirit by reason of their different ways of emanating from the essence. Cf. Friedman, Russell L., “Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325,” Studia Theologica 53 (1999): 16–17.Google Scholar

82 Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 12, q. 1, 52v^a–v^b; d. 13, q. 1, 53v^b–54r^a .Google Scholar

83 See Aquinas, , ST I, q. 41, a. 5; In Sent. I, d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1: “communicatio quae est per spirationem est actus divinae naturae, inquantum habet relationem spirationis. [I]mpossibile est dicere, quod processionis, quae terminatur in naturam, non sit aliquo modo natura principium, cum sit ibi quasi communicatio univoca.” Google Scholar

84 See Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 7, q. 1, 44v^b: “Videtur ergo necessarium quod potentia generandi quae est principium quo generans generat, sit sola ratio paternitatis, quae sola distinguitur secundum suppositum a filio et filiatione. Et haec est tertia opinio quae sola poterit habere veritatem secundum ea quae ponit fides. …” Google Scholar

85 See Durandus, , A In Sent. I, d. 7, q. 2, 45v^a: “sicut Aristoteles negavit quod relatio posset esse terminus actionis, ita negasset, et multo fortius, quod relatio posset constituere suppositum. Et quia nos autem non tenemus Aristotelem quantum ad hoc, immo dicimus quod relatio in divinis constituit suppositum, ideo oportet negare … quod relatio non possit esse terminus actionis, vel etiam principium …” (emphasis mine).Google Scholar

86 See Aristotle, , Ph. , 5, 1, 225a30–b10; 2, 225b10–13; 5, 229a10 ff.; Metaph., 5, 15, 1021a. Cf. Aquinas, , In Meta., 5, 1.17, 1027: “unde non dicitur relative propter aliquid quod sit ex eorum parte, quod sit qualitas, vel quantitas, vel actio, vel passio; … sed solum propter actiones aliorum, quae tamen in ipsa non terminatur. … Et propter hoc non ipsamet referuntur ad alia, sed alia ad ipsa. … In omnibus autem his tota ratio referendi in duobus extremis, pendet ex altero. …” Google Scholar

87 See Hervaeus, , Quodl. II, q. 7, a. 2, 47r^a. Cf. Durandus's response in Paris Quodl. I, q. 1, a. 2, Vat. lat. MS 1076, 11v^b. Hervaeus's Quodlibets are printed: Zimara, M. A., Subtilissima Hervei Natalis Britonis theologi acutissimi quolibeta undecim cum octo ipsius profundissimus tractatibus (Venice, 1513).Google Scholar

88 In 1313 the general chapter not only introduced Aquinas's writings to the Dominican curriculum, but also instructed the friars to expound the Lombard according to the mind of Aquinas. Mulchahey, M. M., “First the Bow is Bent in Study …” Dominican Education Before 1350 , Studies and Texts, 132 (Toronto, 1998), 155, reads this identification of Aquinas with the Lombard as an index of the strongly conservative tendencies in Dominican education.Google Scholar

89 Compare the first (ca. 1312) and second recensions of Durandus's Paris Quodl. I, q. 1 (after 1317), in the latter of which Durandus incorporates the Scotist formal distinction ex natura rei, albeit according to his own realist interpretation. Durandus's Paris Quodlibets are in Vat. lat. MS 1076 (first recension), and Vat. lat. MS 1075 (second recension). Also see Avignon, Quodl. I, q. 3, in which Durandus revises his view on the Filioque, although in a rather unconvincing way and always maintaining his own metaphysical parameters.Google Scholar

90 See the Prologue to Durandus's C Sent., 1v^b: “Modus autem loquendi, ac scribendi, in caeteris, quae fidem non tangunt, est ut magis innitamur rationi, quam auctoritati cuiuscumque doctoris, quantumcumque Celebris, vel solemnis. … Ex quibus patet, quod compellere seu inducere aliquem, ne doceat vel scribat dissona ab iis, quae determinatus Doctor scripsit, est talem Doctorem praeferre sacris Doctoribus, praecludere viam inquisitioni veritatis, et praestare impedimentum sciendi, et lumen rationis, non solum occultare sub medio, sed comprimere violenter. Nos igitur plus rationi, quam cuicumque auctoritati humanae, consentientes, nullus puri hominis auctoritatem rationi praeferimus. …” Google Scholar

91 See for example article 7 of Hervaeus's, Reprobationes , Reims MS 502, 112v–116v; 128v–131v (see n. 74).Google Scholar