¹ Phaedo 96A-98D.Google Scholar

² Timaeus 49C-52D.Google Scholar

³ Ibid, especially 52A. See also Republic 476A-D.Google Scholar

⁴ See Richard McKeon, ‘Aristotle's Conception of the Development and. the Nature of Scientific Method,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 8 (1947) 3-44. This article, though interested primarily in distinguishing Aristotle's method from that of his predecessors — especially Plato and Democritus — also suggests the extent to which Aristotle was indebted to these same predecessors.Google Scholar

⁵ Posterior Analytics 1.2 (71b 8).Google Scholar

⁶ Metaphysics A 6 (988a 7-9).Google Scholar

⁷ Ibid. Ζ 7 (1032a 24); Η 4 (1044a 37). See Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto 1951) 221, 225.Google Scholar

⁸ Met. Ζ 3 (1029a 20). Google Scholar

⁹ Ibid. 7 (1033a 24 – 1034a 8). Google Scholar

¹⁰ Categories 5 (2a 13).Google Scholar

¹¹ Met. Ζ 7 (1033a 24 – 1034a 8).Google Scholar

¹² Ibid. Η 6 (1045a 20 - b 23).Google Scholar

¹³ On this entire point, see Owens 220-25. Google Scholar

¹⁴ Owens 225: ‘So in terms of scientific knowledge, matter will ultimately be explained in terms of form.’ Compare Aquinas: ‘Quicquid igitur est in re quod non potest cognosci per cognitionem substantiae eius, oportet esse intellectui ignotum’: Summa contra Gentiles 3.56. Google Scholar

¹⁵ Post. Anal. 2.19 (100a 10; 100b 12). Google Scholar

¹⁶ Ibid. 1.28 (87a 38 - b4). Google Scholar

¹⁷ Post. Anal. 2.3 (90b 23-25). Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid. 1.2 (71b 9-23). Nicomachean Ethics 6.3 (1139b 18-35).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Met. Ζ 5 (1031a 12); Post. Anal. 2.3 (90b 16; 91a 1).Google Scholar

²⁰ Post. Anal. 2.13 (96b 15-24).Google Scholar

²¹ For the philosophical issues involved, see Owens 210.Google Scholar

²² See Roland-Gosselin, M. D., O.P., ‘Les méthodes de définition chez Aristote,’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 6 (1912) 673.Google Scholar

²³ De anima 1.1 (402a 11-19). Unless otherwise indicated, quotations are from the Oxford translations.Google Scholar

²⁴ Roland-Gosselin 670.Google Scholar

²⁵ For a classification of Aristotle's various techniques of definition, see Roland-Gosselin 660-65.Google Scholar

²⁶ Topics 6 and 7.Google Scholar

²⁷ Ibid. 1.1 (100b 19); De caelo 1.3 (270b 3).Google Scholar

²⁸ For the shades of meaning of πίστις, see Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s.v. (595b 8-59).Google Scholar

²⁹ Topics 7.5 (155a 2-18).Google Scholar

³⁰ Prior Anal. 1.30 (46a 18-22); Top. 1.2 (101a 36 - b 4).Google Scholar

^30a For a discussion of the structure of the De caelo, especially the first two books, see P. Moraux, ‘Einige Bemerkungen über den Aufbau von Aristoteles’ Schrift De caelo,’ Museum Helveticum 6 (1949) 157-65; and in much greater detail Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World (Ithaca 1960) 253-318. This latter work contains an extensive analysis of certain sections of De caelo, but from a point of view different from that of the present study.Google Scholar

³¹ De caelo 1.2 (268b 15).Google Scholar

³² Ibid. (b 14).Google Scholar

³³ Physics 2.1 (192b 18).Google Scholar

³⁴ Ibid. (193b 3-7).Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid. 5.4 (228b 19-25).Google Scholar

³⁶ De caelo 1.2 (268b 17-20); see Phys. 8.8 (261b 2): ibid. 9 (265a 14).Google Scholar

³⁷ De caelo 1.2 (268b 21-24).Google Scholar

³⁸ Ibid. (269a 2-7). Is this argument simply a saltus from the geometrical to the physical order? Perhaps, but it seems not. At least such is not the only interpretation possible. The argument seems to be rather from the fact of bodies moving in a circle-like way to the conclusion that there is some real body to which such motion belongs by nature. That the fact of such motion was assumed is clear from De caelo 1.5 (272a 5-9). See also Duhem, Pierre, Le système du monde (Paris 1954) I 9.Google Scholar

³⁹ It is to be noted, even if only in passing, that Aristotle's science does take its start from experience, though this ambient fund of experience may be but vaguely. defined. This experience, however, is not the ‘purified’ experience of later sciences. For Aristotle, experience includes the ‘natural’ interpretation which the intelligent, observant man puts upon the events and things of our world. Thus, it is experience for Aristotle that certain bodies fall down, and the the ‘down’ is as integral a part of experience as the body itself. The entire question of the nature and functions of experience in Aristotle deserves more extended treatment than is possible here.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ De caelo 1.2 (268b 15-16). Italics as in the Oxford translation, though it is questionable whether the Greek warrants them.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development, tr. Robinson, Richard (2nd ed. Oxford 1948) 300, points out the note of triumph with which Aristotle exploits the idea of natural motion.Google Scholar

⁴² De caelo 1.8 (276b 4-10).Google Scholar

⁴³ Ibid. 1.7 (274a 30-34). The last sentence in the Greek reads δτι μεν τοίννν ούχ οίον τε εξ άπειρων, φανερόν, ει τις ήμΐν εάσει μένειν τάς υποθέσεις.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Ibid. 1.8 (277a 9-13, Loeb translation), ως άναγκαΐον ή κινείν τας υποθέσεις, ή τό μέσον εν είναι και τό εσχατον. Τούτου δ δντος ανάγκη και τον οϋρανον ενα μόνον και πλείους, τοις αύτοΐς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις και ταίς αυταϊς άνάγκαις. I have used the Loeb translation here and in the following passages because it renders the Greek somewhat more exactly. Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Ibid. 1.3 (270b 1-4). Διότι μεν οϋν άίδιον και οϋτ’ αϋξησιν εχον οϋτε φθίσιν, αλλ’ άγήρατον και άναλλοίωτον και άπαθές εστι τό πρώτον των σωμάτων, εΐ τις τοις ύποκει- μένοις πιστεύει, φανερόν εκ των είρημένων εστίν. Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Ibid‥ 2.13 (294b 30-295a 2). όλως ôè πρός γε τους οϋτω λέγοντας περί της κινήσεως ού περί μερών εστίν η άμφισβήσις, άλλά περί δλου τινός και παντός, εξ αρχής γαρ διοριστεόν πότερον εστί τις τοις σώμασι φύσει κίνησις ή ουδεμία, και πότερον φύσει μεν ουκ εστι, βία δ’ εστίν, επεί δε περί τούτων διώρισται πρότερον όσα κατά την παροϋσαν δύναμιν εϊχομεν, χρηστέον ώς ύπάρχουσιν.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Ibid. 3.1 (299a 1-6).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ De partibus aiiimalium 1.5 (644b 23 – 645a 7, Loeb translation). Jaeger, p. 337, sees in this text a sharp change from an earlier attitude toward science and a program for a new kind of study. There certainly is a change, but it seems rather a change in emphasis than a fundamentally new conception of science. The difference is perhaps this: Aristotle here takes more seriously the limitations on human knowing which he had earlier experienced and described in the De caelo. On the early dating of De caelo, see Moraux (η. 30a supra) 165.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ i.e. the passages cited above.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Robinson, Richard, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (2nd ed. Oxford 1953) 77–89, 108. Gf. Gorgias 506c-507c; Sophist 259A; Statesman 260B; Theactetus 171D.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Met. Ζ 17 (1041a 33 - b 5).Google Scholar

⁵² De caelo 1.10.Google Scholar

⁵³ Ibid. 1.7 (275b 30-32).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Phaedo 97B-98D.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ De caelo 2.5 (287b 27-31).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Ibid. 1.6 (271b 18-25); 1.7 (274a 30). Aristotle attempts a more general solution to the problem, one that will go beyond the strict limits of the De caelo, in 1.7. He clearly recognizes this as something of an extended footnote.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Ibid. 1.6 (274a 25-29).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Ambiguity? Zürcher, Aristoteles’ Geist und Werk (Paderborn 1952) 134-35, takes a harsher view: ‘ Dass das reine Sophisterei ist, muss jedermann zugeben.’Google Scholar

⁵⁹ On natural place as form, see De caelo 4.3 (310b 10).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ De caelo 1.3 (270a 33-35).Google Scholar

⁶¹ For the meaning of the eternal in Aristotle, see Bonitz s.v. άίδιος (14b 15-25).Google Scholar

⁶² De caelo 1.9 (279a 12-18).Google Scholar

⁶³ Ibid. 2.4 (287a 11-23).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Ibid. 2.3 (286a 11-12).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ibid. (20).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Ibid. (23-24).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Ibid. (28).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Ibid. (286b 1-4). W. D. Ross c?lls this entire chapter, ‘one of his boldest essays in a priori construction’: Aristotle (3rd ed. Oxford 1937) 95.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ The Greek for this last phrase is πώς εχων τώ πιστεύειν, πότερον άνθρωπινώς ή καρτερικώτερον. Some more recent editors take this last word to be καρτερώτερον. Google Scholar

⁷⁰ De caelo 2.5 (287b23-288a 2). The Greek ends with νϋν ôê τό φαινόμενον ρητέον. Google Scholar

⁷¹ cc. 4-5 (705a 27-706b 17).Google Scholar

⁷² De caelo 2.5 (288a 2-11).Google Scholar

⁷³ Ibid. 2 (284b 32).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ In 1.9, for example, he tries to prove on the basis of matter and form what he has just proved on the «.basis of natural motion.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ De caelo 1.3.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Regulae ad directionem animae, in Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam et Paul Tannery (Paris 1908) 10.368.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World, tr. Andrew Motte, revised by Florian Cajori (Berkeley 1947) 400.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ This statement is certainly simpliste, yet it does express something of the spirit with which Aristotle approaches science.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Cf. De caelo 2.5 (287b 30); Post. Anal. 1.9 (76a 26-30).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ It is worth noting that we are not generalizing for the entire Aristotelian corpus, but only for the De caelo. The empirical observation systematized in the biological works is significantly different from that in the De caelo. Perhaps the most obvious difference is the much greater attention given to the accumulation of factual detail in certain of the biological works. See, for example, Historia animalium 9.40 (623b 3 – 627b 22).Google Scholar

⁸¹ De caelo 1.3 (270b 4-12). See also 1.9 (279a 22-30); 2.1 (284a 11-14).Google Scholar

⁸² Ibid. 1.3 (270b 13-17). See also 1.8 (277a 28 - b 3); 2.4 (287a 11); 2.6 (289a 7-8).Google Scholar

⁸³ Ibid. 3.7 (306a 14-18). See also 2.13 (293a 25-28).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Top. 7.5 (155a 2-3).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Ibid. 1.11 (104b 13-18).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Prior Anal. 1.30 (46a 17-22); Nie. Ein. 6.8 (1142a 12-18). For further references see Bonitz s.v. εμπειρία (242a 59 - b 10). Google Scholar

⁸⁸ L.-M. Régis, O.P., L'opinion selon Aristote (Paris 1935) 138-139. Google Scholar

⁸⁹ 292b 11-13. Google Scholar

⁹⁰ This viewpoint could be illustrated abundantly from late medieval Aristotelian natural philosophers. For example, Thomas of Wylton, an English ‘Averroist’ writing early in the fourteenth century, distinguishes two levels of rational cogency in science: ‘An ista simul stent, quod motus sit aeternaliter a Deo productus, cum hoc, quod Deus sic produxit mundum libere quod potuit ipsum non produxisse … dico distinguendo de demonstratione. Sunt enim quaedam demonstrationes, quae procedunt ex propositionibus immediatis et per se notis ex terminis sicut in mathematicis, quas demonstrationes dicit Commentator in primo ordine certitudinis; et in talibus non sunt opiniones contrariae, ut patet de ista conclusione: omnis triangulus habet très angulos aequales duobus rectis, vel quod omre totum est maius sua parte. Alio modo dicuntur demonstrationes omnes illae rationes, quae arctant et firmant intellectum ad adhaerendum uni parti tollendo omnem formidinem ad illam partem, quantumcumque magni aliam partem teneant propter rationes probabiles et difficiles pro alia parte. Et isto secundo modo solum rationes, per quas Aristoteles in- vestigat veritatem circa principia naturae et numerum principiorum et universaliter pro- prietates movenLium et mobilium, de moventibus et mobilibus, de rebus naturalibus in scientia naturali sunt demonstrationes.’ Quoted by A. Maier, ‘Das Prinzip der doppelten Wahrheit,’ in her Metaphysische Hintergründe des spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome 1955) 7 η. 8. Google Scholar

⁹¹ Post. Anal. 2.10 (93b 29). Google Scholar

⁹² Phys. 1.1 (184a 18). Google Scholar

⁹³ Ibid. (19-22). Google Scholar

⁹⁴ This static conception of science is likewise reiterated, by the late Latin Aristotelians. Thus Zabarella (1533–1589), though he occasionally seems willing to grant that science may advance beyond Aristotle, seems to maintain the same static view of science (natural philosophy) as had his master: ‘[Averroes et Olympiodorus] putant esse omnino ne- cessarium particularem, atque distinctam tractationcm de mineris praeter illam generalem, quae habetur in ultimo capite tertii Meteorologici; nunquid autem de mineris scripserit Aristoteles praeter ultimum illud caput tertii Meteorologici, incertum est; … Ego quidem etsi dubito necessarias omnino esse libros de mineris ad liuius scientiae perfectionein, credo tarnen potuisse contingere, ut eos numquam Aristoteles scripserit; non sum enim in eo com- muni errore, ut putem necesse esse Aristotelem ita perfectam tradidisse naturalem philoso- phiam, ut nihil quod ab humano ingenio inveniri, aut cognosci queat, praetermissum ab eo esse potuerit; illud quidem puto esse confilendum, Aristotelem ita artificiose huius scientiae fabricam, quam in praesentia declarandum suscepimus, construxisse, & confecisse, ut quamvis rebus ipsis, ac materiae (ut ita dicam) addi aliquid possit, artificio tamen, & formae nihil; ipsam enim scientiam in omnes suas partes distribuit, easque optime disposuit, ita ut facile cuique sit, si quid in aliqua parte desit, addere, et addita in suis quaeque locis collocare.’ Iacobus Zabarella, De rebus naturalibus libri XXX 1.30 (Coloniae 1597, p. 84A-E). It is of interest to note that he indicates quite clearly that the gaps which Aristotle had left had long since been filled by Theophrastus and Albert the Great. Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Meteorologica 1.3 (339b 27); De caelo 1.3 (270b 20); Met. Λ 8 (1074b 12); Politics 7.10 (1329b 25). See Plato, Timaeus 21D, 25E; Jaeger, Aristotle 130-37. Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Pol. 2.5 (1264a 2-5). Google Scholar