1 See John 1:14, 1:18, 3:16, and 1 John 4:9. For a summary discussion of the scriptural grounding of the doctrine of the Son as begotten of the Father, see Dahms, John V., “The Generation of the Son,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 32 (1989): 493–501. Rational Arianism was a formidable threat to Nicene orthodoxy. As background to the theological dilemma centered on divine generation, and particularly its strong linguistic elements in the Greek East, see, e.g., the discussion of the Anomoeans, and Eunomius and his orthodox opponents, including Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, and Pseudo-Dionysius in Kelly, J. N. D., Golden Mouth: The Story of John Chrysostom, Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1995), 60–63.Google Scholar

2 Ozment, Steven, The Age of Reform: 1250–1500 (New Haven, 1980), 21.Google Scholar

3 “Respondeo dicendum, quod generationem esse in divinis, ratione efficaciter confirmari non potest, sicut supra dictum est, sed auctoritate et fide tenetur” (Aquinas, Thomas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, [In Sent.] 4 vols., ed. Mandonnet, R. P. and Moos, M. F. [Paris, 1929–47], I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1). The doctrine is also treated in the Summa Theologiae (ST), I, q. 39, a. 4.Google Scholar

4 “In his call for the removal of theological studies away from so much emphasis on generational distinctions in the Godhead, Gerson cited such propositions as, ‘In God the generation of the Son, as such, is nothing,’ and ‘The eternal Son can generate another Son because He has equal power with the Father’” (Ozment, S., The Age of Reform , 75 n. 6). Gerson pointed to John of Ripa and other rigid interpreters of Duns Scotus.Google Scholar

5 Lorenzo Valla's criticism of scholastic efforts to base a theology of the Trinity on metaphysics, and his preference rather for studying the way language affects the approach to the mystery is an excellent case in point. See Trinkaus, Charles, “Lorenzo Valla on the Problem of Speaking about the Trinity,” Journal of the History of Ideas 57 (1996): 27–53. It is not the purpose here, nor is it necessary, to reenter a discussion of the meanings of humanism or whether Giles should be considered a humanist. Giles's interest in poetry, grammar, biblical philology, and the church fathers has much in common with Valla's methodology, but throughout his Sentences commentary, Giles works to harmonize the scholastic philosophical legacy with the newer rhetorical theology favored by scholars like Valla.Google Scholar

6 On the Commentarium ad mentem Platonis and its author see especially O'Malley, John W., Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform (Leiden, 1968); Nodes, Daniel J., “Homeric Allegory in Egidio of Viterbo's Reflections on the Human Soul,” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 65 (1998): 320–32; and Nodes, D., “Humanism in the Commentary ad mentem Platonis of Giles of Viterbo,” Augustiniana 45 (1995): 285–98. All citations from Giles's commentary in this article are based on Vat. Jat. 6325. Corrections are based on readings of four other MSS (Rome, Biblioteca Angelica 636; Naples, BN VIII F 8; Naples, BN XIV H 71; Hamburg, Staats- und Universitätsbibliotek, Codex Philol. 308).Google Scholar

7 O'Malley, John W., “Egidio da Viterbo and Renaissance Rome,” in Egidio da Viterbo, O.S.A. e il suo tempo , Atti del V Convegno dell'Istituto Storico Agostiniano (Rome, 1983), 72.Google Scholar

8 For Giles's education see Martin, Francis X., “Giles of Viterbo as Scripture Scholar,” in Egidio da Viterbo, O.S.A. e il suo tempo , 191–221.Google Scholar

9 Quaestiones de materia coeli, De intellectu possibili, and Commentaria in VIII libros Physicorum Aristotelis. See the list of Giles's works in Martin, F., “The Writings of Giles of Viterbo,” Augustiniana 18 (1979): 141–93.Google Scholar

10 Allen, Don Cameron, Mysteriously Meant, The Rediscovery of Pagan Symbolism and Allegorical Interpretation in the Renaissance (Baltimore, 1970), 24–25, assigns that honor to Agostino Steuco of Gubbio (1496–1549, appointed Bishop of Kisamos in Crete in 1538).Google Scholar

11 The intellectual influence was mutual, as on Giles's recommendation, Pontano studied Augustine's De immortalitate animae. Google Scholar

12 In the late fourteenth century this monastery had been selected as the flagship for reform in the Augustinian order.Google Scholar

13 “Giles here shows himself the humanist and neoplatonist, harmonizing the writings of the Grecian and Christian worlds” (Martin, Francis, Friar, Reformer, and Renaissance Scholar [Villanova, Penn., 1992], 44). When Alexander VI died, for example, and was replaced by Francesco Piccolomini, cardinal of Siena (as Pope Pius III), Giles was called upon by the people of Siena to preach during a celebration in that city. The theme of that sermon, the divine harmony in events, provided Giles with an opportunity to quote liberally from Augustine, Boethius, Ptolemy, and the Timaeus of Plato.Google Scholar

14 See the letter to prior Seraphino dated 20 Sept. 1502 in Maria, Anna Roth, Voci, ed., Egidio da Viterbo OSA, Lettere Famigliari , 2 vols. (Rome, 1990), 1:174.Google Scholar

15 On the dates of composition, O'Malley says that Giles was working on the commentary at least to 1512 ( Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform , 16). Martin says that the greater part was written by 1510 and that over the next two years only five additional pages were written because of Giles's growing administrative duties (Friar, Reformer, and Renaissance Scholar, 161).Google Scholar

16 See Jedin, H., “Die römischen Augustiner-Quellen zu Luthers Frühzeit,” in Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 25 (1928): 266–69.Google Scholar

17 Massa, E., “L'Anima e l'Uomo in Egidio da Viterbo e nelle fonti classiche e medioevali,” in Testi umanistici inediti sul “De Anima,” (Padua, 1951), 37–38.Google Scholar

18 “Hic oritur quaestio satis necessaria. Constat et irrefragabiliter verum est quod Deus Pater genuit Filium. Ideo quaeritur utrum concedendum sit quod Deus genuit Deum. Si enim Deus genuit Deum, videtur quod aut se Deum aut alium genuerit” ( Sent. I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1).Google Scholar

19 “Dicit tamen Augustinus in epistola ad Maximum quod Deus Pater se alterum genuit, his verbis: ‘Pater, ut haberet Filium de se ipso, non minuit se ipsum, sed ita genuit de se alterum se, ut totus maneret in se, et esset in Filio tantus, quantus et solus.’ Quod ita intelligi potest: id est de se alterum genuit, non utique alterum Deum, sed alteram personam” ( Sent. I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 4).Google Scholar

20 “Quaeritur an Pater genuit divinam essentiam, vel ipsa Filium, an essentia genuit essentiam, vel ipsa nec genuit nec genita est” ( Sent. I, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1).Google Scholar

21 “Hic autem nomine ‘essentiae’ intelligimus divinam naturam, quae communis est tribus personis et tota in singulis” ( Sent. I, d. 5, q. 1, a.1).Google Scholar

22 In answer to the third and fourth alternatives Lombard writes, “And so we say also that the divine essence did not beget essence: for since the divine essence is one certain substance, if the divine essence begat essence, then the same thing begat itself, which cannot be at all, but the Father alone begat the Son” (“Ita etiam dicimus quod essentia divina non genuit essentiam: cum enim una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia, si divina essentia essentiam genuit, eadem res se ipsam genuit, quod omnino esse non potest; sed Pater solus genuit Filium” [Sent. I, d. 5, q. 1, a. 6]). Google Scholar

23 P. O. Kristeller named the commentary genre as probably the most important form of scholarly literature in the Middle Ages, used in all branches of knowledge and cultivated without interruption until the sixteenth century and beyond. He noted that the commentary as a distinct literary form remained visible right into the Renaissance. Stegmüller's, F. Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi , 2 vols. (Würzburg, 1947) gives ample evidence of the popularity of Sentences commentaries throughout this period.Google Scholar

24 See Ozment, , The Age of Reform , 106–7.Google Scholar

25 Luther comments that error crept into the Church when “the pseudo philosophy of Aristotle began to make its inroads. … During this time many things have been wrongly defined, as, for example, that the divine essence is neither begotten nor begets” (The Babylonian Captivity of the Church , trans. Lull, Timothy F., Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings [Minneapolis, 1989], 287).Google Scholar

26 See Aquinas, Thomas, In Sent. I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.Google Scholar

27 “Ex his ad propositum dicendum quod, si in hac ‘deus genuit deum’ deus sive in subiecto sive in praedicato sive in utroque supponit pro communi natura, propositio est falsa: deitas enim nec deum genuit nec deitatem nec divinitatem genuit deus nec deitas hypostasim nec deitatem hypostasis. … Si vero in subiecto et in praedicato supponit pro hypostasi, in subiecto quidem pro persona patris, in praedicato vero pro persona filii, utique ipsa vera est et concedenda. Et, si quaeratur, an simpliciter sine praemissa distinctione debeat concedi, potest dici quod sic, dummodo verus intellectus habeatur de ipsa, quoniam iste terminus ‘deus’ ratione suae concretionis habet ex suo modo significandi quod pro hypostasi possit supponere; quod sic non est de hoc nomine ‘deitas’” (Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum , ed. Trapp, D., Marcolino, V., et al., 7 vols. [Berlin, 1981], 1:443). See also ibid., 435–43, where Gregory analyzes the words generare, pater, genuisse, and their derivatives in various partes orationis. Google Scholar

28 At the heart of Giles's Commentary lies a section addressing the fundamental theological doctrines of the relationship of Son to Father in the Godhead. The overall issue of divine generation occupies a very large section of the second half of the Commentary, as far as Giles was able to write it in 117 chapters. Discussion of generation begins at chapter 67 and continues through chapter 100. The question of generation follows from the earlier major question about the relationship among the persons of the Trinity in the single Godhead. The sections we are concerned with here have the following titles in the MSS: “Generatio in divinis admittenda. Minerva.” 67 “Deus Deum genuit vera est oratio.” 68 “Deus alium Deum genuit falsa est oratio. Homerus caecus. Oraculorum defectus.” 69 “Affirmari de Deo multa possunt. Aegyptiae literae. Ethrusca theologia.” 70 Subsequent titles show the discussion continuing: “Divinitas est Pater, Deus est Divinitas, altera vera ex eodem, altera ex forma.” 71 “Natura sive essentia non generat.” 72 “Essentia est res generans quomodo vera falsaque sit.” 73 “Deus generat vera est oratio. Ordoque nominum ponitur, quae ad essentiam quodammodo pertinent.” 74 Giles conceived of this section as a unit centering on Deus gignens. At the end of 74 he wrote, “Nunc ubi de gignente egimus, de genito iam egendum est nobis,” and in 75 he accordingly shifts the focus onto the Son. But he returns to the divine generating power in 77–78, playing something of a devil's advocate by reconnecting the concept of generation to the divine essence, before turning to the generation (i.e., procession) of the Holy Spirit. On that topic see my, “Dual Processions of the Holy Spirit: Development of a Theological Tradition,” Scottish Journal of Theology 52 (1999): 1–18.Google Scholar

29 “Iuniores theologi neque hoc probari constanti ratione posse, neque philosophiae consentire, neque fuisse umquam a philosophis posteritati mandatum. Nos contra, sicut de divinis fere omnibus facimus, et constanti defendi ratione, et consonare philosophiae, et a philosophis opinatissimis, gravissimis, summis scriptum fuisse” (67).Google Scholar

30 “Nova merito non habemus oracula: haec, quae quaerimus, in antiquis non continentur. Quare ratio consulenda est, quae, quid cuique conveniat rei diiudicare solet” (69).Google Scholar

31 Giles continued to use medieval, nonclassical syntactical descriptors like suppositum, subject, and appositum, predicate. But such terms as those remained in use, even among humanist scholars. The process of replacing the medieval terminology with classical counterparts was gradual. Giles may have been influenced by fifteenth-century grammar books and etymological studies like the Rudimenta grammatices, published by Niccolò Perotti in Viterbo possibly by late 1468 and printed in Rome in 1473. Perotti's work preserves many etymologies used by grammarians from the Middle Ages (Perotti's source was likely the late thirteenth-century Catholicon of John of Genoa). For a basic discussion of speculative grammar and its critics see Jan Pinborg's article in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy , ed. Kretzmann, N., et al. (Cambridge, 1982), 254–69. In the same work see also W. Keith Percival's article, “Changes in the Approach to Language,” 808–17, which notes that many scholastic grammatical terms continued to be used throughout the Renaissance, long after speculative grammar as a genre went out of style. The persistence of the medieval grammatical nomenclature among humanists is confirmed in detail by Rizzo, Silvia, Il lessico filologico degli umanisti (Rome, 1984).Google Scholar

32 For a history of the Neoplatonic exegesis of Plato's Cratylus see Daniélou, Jean, “Eunome l'Arien et l'exégèse néo-platonicienne du Cratyle,” Revue des Études Grecques 69 (1956): 412–32. Ficino's translation of the Platonic dialogues appeared in 1484.Google Scholar

33 The question is an integral part of the traditional analysis of the doctrine. Cf., e.g., “Utrum generatio sit in Deo” (Aquinas, , In Sent. I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1. Also ST I, q. 27, a. 2).Google Scholar

34 The Cratylus plays a key role in this argument. See, e.g., Cra. 393c, where Socrates and Hermogenes speak of offspring of individual species (horse, lion, cow, human) as requiring the same name (designation) as its parents. Accidental designations, however, would not qualify, just as it would be wrong to argue that an offspring of a king must necessarily be called a king. Among Christian apologists arguing in the same theological context, Athanasius, , Orations against the Arians , 1.46.12, pointed out that the Israelite kings were not kings before being anointed.Google Scholar

35 “Si vis divina nihil gignat a quo ipsa aequetur, cum alia id possint, et ab omnipotentia cadere et rerum naturae cedere videretur. Nam, cum nihil supra speciem et naturam agat, neque enim ovis leonem neque aquilam columba procreabit (de natura nunc loquimur, non de monstris), colligitur tunc rem maximam unumquodque facere, cum sibi aequale gignit; quod si id est maximum, et ex maximis agendi potestas diiudicari vult, haec data est homini; si Deo negata est, aut maiori praeditus virtute homo erit, aut certe non omnipotens habendus Deus erit. Quare tam ista Deo tribuenda, quam proles eripienda non est” (67).Google Scholar

36 “Herculea namque vis ex stadio significata est, quod (uti aiunt) uno percurrere spiritu solebat, ubi spatium praesignandum erat vel maximum quod poterat, vel minimum quod non poterat” (67). This legend about Hercules is found in Isidore, Etymologiarum , 15.16.3.Google Scholar

37 “Definita est hoc loco Pallados Dianaeque virginitas; nam neque prolis divinae, neque humanae animae naturam, silva materiaque contingit. Pura simplexque utraque est, et plane incorporea. Sed haec tametsi silvam ut sui partem non habet, silvam tamen in terris incolit, cuius quidem contagione anima labes permultas contrahit, fitque ut imperfecta inchoataque sit, et inter incorporea minime absoluta. Matrem namque materiam vocat Plato, quae etsi animae humanae mortem non machinatur, ut aliis omnibus, quae in ea iacent, ut tamen Academiae placet, ita earn afficit, ut omnium oblivisci compellat. Quam ob rem silva, quae aliis Cocytus est et mors, oblivio Lethaeusque sit animae. Proinde datus est fabulae locus, quod ex Latona matre orta Diana sit. At Minerva, quae divina intelligentia est, ut in Cratylo Plato scriptum reliquit, hoc est, divinae intelligentiae proles, ut alias de Iove idem docet. Non modo a materiae fluctibus libera est, in qua mala fere omnia incubant, sed summum obtinet in natura locum summumque praestantiae ac probitatis gradum. Quippe quae cum actus sit non modo a materia, sed ab omni potestate alienissimus, iure optimo absque matre nasci dicta est, quod omni prorsus vacet potestate, quae vel materia vel materiae similis esse solet” (67).Google Scholar

38 See Tht. 203e–206e.Google Scholar

39 See, e.g., Euthphr. 277e.Google Scholar

40 Giles has in mind Eph. 1:21.Google Scholar

41 The Divine Names is a frequent theme in the Neoplatonic tradition. Aquinas wrote a commentary on the Divine Names of Dionysius. Giles knew the treatise of Dionysius, and he may also have read Gregory of Nyssa's Contra Eunomium. Google Scholar

42 Verg., G. 4.221–22; Ecl. 3.60.Google Scholar

43 Cf. Vulg. Ps. 147:15; Ps. 18 (19):6. On det omnia (passim), but see Ps. 37:4; 85:13; 104:27; 135:6; 136:25; 146:6–7.Google Scholar

44 “Verum enim vero, undecumque id manarit nomen, quoniam non numerum aut multitudine sectum aliquid, sed unitatem purissimam indicat, quae non esse essentiae additum adventitiumve coniungit, sed idem prorsus esse essentiaque est” (68).Google Scholar

45 “Quasi indicaret diceretque, ‘currere, penetrare, efficere, dare,’ aliaque id genus, ex externis mihi rebus actionibus conveniunt, quae antequam mundum gignerem non conveniebant. At esse, antequam aliquid externarum esset rerum, ex interna mihi natura congruebat” (68).Google Scholar

46 “Hoc quidem huic nomini idcirco evenit, quod rem unitatemque significat longe simplicissimam, quae res aliarum rerum nominibus idcirco non contingit, quod alia est essentia, aliud esse, aliud natura quae habetur, aliud singulum quod naturam habet. In Deo autem idem est quod habet omnino et quod habetur” (68).Google Scholar

47 “Decepti nonnulli sunt, rati hoc nomen Deus ex se quidem essentiam naturamque significare; sed quoniam aliquid additur notionum, (ita enim sacri nominant), idcirco non pro natura sed pro persona nonnumquam usurpari, ut in hac oratione, ‘Deus gignit Deum,’ quam prae manibus ad praesens habemus. Sed quamquam acute subtiliterque id dicatur, tuto, tamen minus dici videtur. Nam si idcirco tantum pro persona ponitur, quod notio generandi addita est, licet ex se naturam significet, pari daremus etiam ratione divinitatem gignere Deum, cum divinitas ex se naturam dicat; addita tamen notione gignendi pro parente poterit in oratione collocari. Quod quidem absurdissimum est, numquam vel a senatu vel a patribus receptum” (68).Google Scholar

48 “Nos itaque dicimus, quod hoc nomen, divinitas, quemadmodum humanitas, naturam significat, turn ex significandi actione, tum etiam ex modo, cum naturam, ut in se ipsa est, non in alio, dicat. Haec vero nomina, Deus, homo, ut paulo ante diximus, naturam significant, sed in habente illam. Quare ex significandi ratione, pro persona legitime poni potest. Haec itaque, quam proposuimus, oratio vera est. Deus Deum genuit, non ex addita notione tantum, sed ex ratione significandi, unde et pro persona capiatur” (68).Google Scholar

49 “Ex quibus itaque rebus constat, hoc nomen naturam per se demonstrare, ex significandi ratione personam, ex notione addita hanc vel illam” (68).Google Scholar

50 Giles addresses these issues in chapter 69, “Deus alium Deum genuit falsa est oratio. Homerus caecus. Oraculorum defectus.” Google Scholar

51 “Qui iungeret omnia, atque unum faceret, nihilque distinguendum putaret, is multum aberraret. Patrem enim esse Filium fateretur. Qui rursus secaret omnia, naturam in plures scinderet deos, quorum utrumque auditum perniciosum est. Media igitur eundum est via: unitas siquidem sola in Scyllam, multitudo in Carybdim nos rapit, unde sacra nos eripit felixque navicula, quae inter monstrum utrumque tendens iter, in portum nos tutissimum convehit, ubi et Macrobium audimus, qui eandem naturam tribuit pluribus, ut Saturno, Iovi, Veneri, modis tamen rationibusque distincta haec esse inter se fatetur” (69).Google Scholar

52 This is the theme of Giles's chapter 70, titled, “Affirmari de Deo multa possunt. Aegyptiae litterae. Etrusca theologia.” Google Scholar

53 “Mentis autem humanae mos hic est, ut aliquid cognitura formet sibi enunciationes, in quibus aliquid de aliquo praedicat affirmatque, ut elementa sunt quattuor, caelum est rotundum, anima rationis est particeps. Statuit autem mens nostra in his omnibus semper hinc unitatem quandam, hinc quandam rursus etiam multitudinem” (70).Google Scholar

54 “Eadem tamen mens, quae in orationis complexu multitudinem parit, in intellectae rei natura collocat unitatem. … Verum crescat quantumvis istaec multitudo, crescat cognitionum, crescat formarum numerus, non fallitur tamen sapientis animus, neque in tanta rerum numerositate confunditur. Intelligit namque id, de quo haec omnia dicuntur, esse unum, tantumque abest, ut haec multitudo impedimento sit, nulla ut alia pateat via ad divina, dum his vivimus, contemplanda, quam per hanc, quam diximus vel orationum vel cogitationum multitudinem” (70).Google Scholar

55 “Diodorus Siculus … informed his contemporaries and later on men of the Renaissance that Egypt had a sacred as well as a demotic script. This script did not express concepts by joined syllables ‘but by means of the significance of the objects which had been copied out and by the figurative meaning which practice had impressed on the memory’” (Allen, , Mysteriously Meant , 109–10). Giles also emphasized the simplicity, by which he means to emphasize what he understood as a nonsyllabic, symbolic form of writing, of Egyptian hieroglyphs. Earlier, Ficino had been influenced by the Hieroglyphica of Hor Apollo, a fifteenth-century work that was purported to have been written by an ancient Egyptian priest, in which Plotinus's presentation of hieroglyphs are interpreted as depictions of the Platonic Ideas (ibid., 112).Google Scholar

56 “Aegyptii sacerdotes ne divinae unitatis indicia haberent dissimilia, novam adinvenere scribendi rationem, statueruntque divina omnia non partibili ratione mandare posteritati, sed simplicibus rerum imaginibus, quas sacras appellabant literas, indicant. Extat Hori libellus, extant Romanae urbis monumenta, obelisci, atque animalium imagines, in quibus illae adhuc visuntur effigies, per quas monitos mortales, cum omnes turn praecipue divinarum rerum studiosos volverunt, ut quoties simplices intuerentur. Imagines, quamquam innumerabilia disputentur de Deo, semper divinam unitatem omnium simplicissimam esse recordarentur” (70).Google Scholar

57 “Idem per eadem tempora statuerunt Hetrusci, (simul enim uterque populus post aquarum illuviones floruit auctore Platone in Critia). Ii namque unitatem divinam demonstraturi cum essent, illam quidem in uno Iano cognoscendam constituerunt, sed tanto quam Aegyptii doctius, consultius, sapientius, quod naturae unitatem absque omnis distinctionis significatione non ostendendam mortalibus consueverunt. Quocirca Ianum omnia esse dixerunt, ubi unitas significata est, sed ut etiam gignentis genitique distinctionem animadverteremus, bifrontem confinxerunt” (70).Google Scholar

58 “Nec obstat, quod trinario, non binario a nobis res divina celebrata sit. Nam sat illis fuit gemina sui Dei fronte hac iuniore, illa vetustiore significare, hinc aliquid quod producit, hinc deinde aliquid quod producitur. Quod aetatis differentia etiam a Daniele indicatum est. Parentem enim, interpretum sententia omnium, antiquum dierum nominavit. Nec tamen in Iano bifronte Trinitatis formulam non intelligendam reliquerunt, cum geminae facies surgere voluerunt a reliquo corpore” (70).Google Scholar

59 “Quam quidem Dei imaginem, in ipsa eorum etiam regione monstrari voluerunt, quam hinc in Ciscyminiam, hinc in Transcyminiam, ipso Cyminii montis vertice dispescente, partiti sunt; ut arcana divinarum disciplinarum, ut divina unitas, ut annexa distinctio tum ex habitatoris Dei effigie, tum ex habitatae orae partitione cognosci, intelligi, animadverti possent. Adolescentesque aliarum nationum, qui quotannis in Hetruriam mittebantur rerum divinarum ediscendarum gratia, non modo ex Lucumonum vocibus, et ex Volturno Fano, atque Lycei Luco, verum etiam ex gentilis Dei effigie, et ex regionis forma philosopharentur, ut per illa intelligentiae, per haec memoriae disciplinaeque firmitati consuleretur. Quae quidem instituendi ratio Hetruscos reddidit, teste Diodoro, humanarum divinarumque rerum contemplandarum gloria universo orbi admirabiles” (70).Google Scholar

60 I fondamenti metafisici della “Dignitas hominis,” (Torino, 1954), 3.Google Scholar

61 “Sovente Egidio usa i testi di Platone semplicemente per dimostrare non aristotelicamente le dottrine di Aristotele” (ibid., 18 n. 144).Google Scholar

62 O'Malley, , Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform , 62. Such an anti-Aristotelian description would fit some Renaissance scholars. Mario Nizolio (1488–1567), for example, openly criticized Aristotle and saw Ciceronian rhetoric as a proper replacement for peripatetic logic. Giles's relation to Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition is more complex.Google Scholar

63 Ibid. Google Scholar

64 Ibid., 63.Google Scholar

65 Hankins, James, Plato in the Italian Renaissance (Leiden, 1990), 341, 343.Google Scholar

66 Witt, Ronald G. ( In the Footsteps of the Ancients: the Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni [Leiden, 2000]) argues strongly for an early (thirteenth century) and strictly stylistic origin to the humanist movement. But the book traces the emphasis on classical Latin grammar and prose style to 1430, after which time it sees a full flowering of humanism with strong philological and philosophical impulses. This latter period is characterized by philological and poetic, anti-Ciceronian Latin, with interest in the classical myths as perhaps its primary characteristic. The humanist influence on Egidio in the Sentences commentary is principally of the latter variety, although his early occupation with imitation of classical poetry suggests the major emphasis of Witt's earlier phase.Google Scholar