¹ The fundamental study of πν∊νμα in the ancient world remains G. Verbeke, L'Évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoïcisme à S. Augustine (Louvain–Paris 1945). For fuller bibliography see my doctoral dissertation, 'The Languages of Life: Jean Fernel (1497–1558) and Spiritus in Pre-Harveian Bio-Medical Thought' (Harvard 1981). I am indebted to the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation and the National Science Foundation for supporting my research on this topic. I would also like to thank Luke Demaitre, Karen Reeds, Charles Schmitt, and Nicholas Steneck for their help.Google Scholar

² For a sense of the broad, syncretistic tendencies of twelfth-century speculative thought see M.-D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle (Paris 1957); Stock, B., Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard Silvester (Princeton 1972).Google Scholar

³ Temkin, O., 'On Galen's Pneumatology,’ Gesnerus 8 (1951) 180–89 (rptd in his The Double Face of Janus [Baltimore/London 1977] 154–66); L. G. Wilson, 'Erasistratus, Galen, and the Pneuma,’ Bulletin of the History of Medicine 33 (1959) 293–314.Google Scholar

⁴ Apart from the specific case of the psychic πν∊νμα which may be regarded as a medium for the operation of the rational soul, πν∊νμα does not in Galen achieve any unique ontological status or require privileged, super-elemental properties. The vital spirit, in its intimate connection with respiration and the respiratory organs, is closely associated with life. Like breath, it is essential to life. But this medical function of πν∊νμα should in no way be construed as supplying the ontological foundation for the possibility of the existence of an animate being. The problem of πν∊νμα's connection to the possibility of the existence of living things is of no speculative interest to Galen, as far as I am aware. While there may well be precedent for defining such a speculative problem in the tradition of antique Stoic natural philosophy and Neoplatonism, the present article argues for its increased centrality to medical, Galenic thought as a direct legacy of medieval Latin speculative thought. On the other hand, I do not wish to deny Galen's genuine philosophical interests or his interest in the soul.Google Scholar

⁵ Qust˙ā ibn Lūqā (fl. c. 912) was known in the Latin West as Costa ben Luca and cited as the author of the work in question by twelfth- and thirteenth-century writers like Alfred of Sareshel and Albertus Magnus. By the late Middle Ages and Renaissance the Latin form of his name, through the variants Contabulus and Constabulus, was confused with that of the medical author and translator Constantinus Africanus. As a result the work came to be credited to the latter and appears in printed editions of his works. We have used the following edition of Costa ben Luca's text: De animae et spiritus discrimine liber, ut quidam volunt from Constantinus Africanus, Opera (Basel 1536) 308–17, as reprinted in: M. Putscher, Pneuma, Spiritus, Geist: Vorstellungen vom Lebensantrieb in ihren geschichtlichen Wandlungen (Wiesbaden 1973) 145–50. See also Costa ben Lucae De differentia animae et spiritus liber ex arabico in latinum translatus a Johanne Hispalensi (C. S. Barach, ed.; Bibliotheca Philosophorum mediae aetatis 2; Innsbruck 1878; repr. Frankfurt 1968) 120–39. For more information on Costa ben Luca see Barach, ed. cit., and Quadri, C., 'Qust˙ā ibn Lūqā,’ Enciclopedia filosofica 3 (1957) s.v.Google Scholar

⁶ In particular, see the scheme for ‘animal spirits’ presented in Descartes' Traité de l'homme, in: E. Adam and P. Tannery, edd., Œuvres de Descartes XI (Paris 1909) 119–202; Descartes, treatise of Man (French text with trans, and comm. T. S. Hall; Cambridge, Mass. 1972). Google Scholar

⁷ ben Luca, Costa, De differentia (Putscher 147). I have not been able to check Putscher's text against the 1536 edition. However, where the quotation above gives animatio, Barach's edition reads: et ejus emanatio est a corde (p. 130).Google Scholar

⁸ Temkin, , ‘Galen's Pneumatology’ (supra n. 3). As part of the so-called Articella, Iohannicius' Isagoge became a standard part of the medieval medical curriculum. Together with Avicanna's Cantica, it taught a pneumatology which introduced three types of medical spirits in the Latin West. See O. Temkin, Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y. 1973) 100ff. esp. 107. The Cantica was translated in the thirteenth century by Armengaud of Montpellier and is available in a modern translation as Avicenna's Poem on Medicine (H. C. Krueger, tr.; Springfield, Ill. 1963).Google Scholar

⁹ See, for example, Pagel, W., 'Medieval and Renaissance Contributions to Knowledge of the Brain and its Functions,’ in: The History and Philosophy of the Brain and its Functions (Oxford 1958) 95–114; H. A. Wolfson, 'The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts,’ Harvard Theological Review 28 (1935) 69–133.Google Scholar

¹⁰ ben Luca, Costa, De Differentia (Putscher 145–47).Google Scholar

¹¹ The connection between spiritus and imagination and its consequent importance for generation, health, and psychological states is fairly commonplace in the sixteenth century. Such a connection was strengthened by Renaissance Neoplatonic and occultist tendencies. See D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (London 1958); W. Pagel, Paracelsus: An Introduction to Philosophical Medicine in the Era of the Renaissance (Basel-New York 1958) and his William Harvey's Biological Ideas (Basel-New York 1967). Google Scholar

¹² ben Luca, Costa, De differentia (Putscher 150): Dicamusque quod prima differentia haec est, videlicet, quod spiritus est corpus. Anima vero res incorporea est.Google Scholar

¹³ De differentia (Putscher 145): haec est causa vitae humani corporis propinquior, and: Patet autem … quod vita fit per hunc spiritum, qui est in ventriculis cordis.Google Scholar

¹⁴ De differentia (Putscher 147–50 esp. 147): Dicamus itaque qualiter Plato philosophus diffinit animam, dicens: Anima est substantia incorporea movens corpus. Aristoteles vero in diffinitione animae sic ait: Anima est perfectio corporis agentis et viventis potentialiter.Google Scholar

¹⁶ De differentia (Putscher 150).Google Scholar

¹⁶ De differentia (Putscher 148).Google Scholar

¹⁷ De differentia (Putscher 149–50) sketches briefly a model for the ontological relationship between soul and spiritus, but the sketch leaves far too many questions unasked to count as a serious effort toward bridging theoretical accounts of spiritus (physiology) and soul (philosophy, psychology). The text speaks of certain virtutes animae, and specifically the vegetativa, sensibilis, and rationalis anima. The operations of the soul manifest in the body are specifically related to these powers of the soul, which in turn depend in some manner upon the constitution and operations of the spirits in the body. Finally, Costa ben Luca speaks of spiritus as a secunda causa and as the proximate cause of life, and of the soul as the more remote cause of life. Much of this language is, of course, quite close to Galenic formulations.Google Scholar

¹⁸ De differentia (Putscher 145–47). On Galen see Temkin, ‘On Galen's Pneumatology’ (supra n. 3).Google Scholar

¹⁹ For a general orientation the article of M.-D. Chenu is fundamental: 'Spiritus: le Vocabulaire de l'ame au xii ^e siècle,’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 41 (1957) 209–32.Google Scholar

²⁰ Chenu, , La théologie (supra n. 2).Google Scholar

²¹ What follows in this article aims partially at elucidating the context of problems affecting discourse about spiritus, and hence about speculative medicine and physiology in the Middle Ages. I believe that focusing attention upon such historical objects forces one to recognize the extent to which the ideas of one discipline are implicated in others. While building upon the linear filiation of ideas, this type of historiographical perspective yields a broader and more complex panorama. As a result, such traditional labors as source analysis are modified; what matters is not simply what sources are used, but how sources are constituted and transformed by individual readers responding to them with historically contingent interests, problems, and 'languages.’ Google Scholar

²² I have treated these matters in my dissertation (supra, n. 1). Google Scholar

²³ Chenu, , 'Spiritus' (art. cit. supra n. 19). Compare also the pseudo-Augustinian tract De spiritu et anima (PL 40.779–852); L. Norpoth, Der pseudo-augustinische Traktat: De spiritu et anima (diss. Munich 1924; Bochum 1971). This work belongs to Alcher of Clairvaux (fl. c. 1175).Google Scholar

²⁴ de Lille, Alain (f 1202), Contra haereticos I (PL 210.305–430 at 329).Google Scholar

²⁵ This tendency can be seen in such speculative ‘systems’ as Stoicism and Neoplatonism. The Stoic πν∊νμα, while still a material substance and part of a monistic materialism, could be spoken of as a ‘divine’ principle of nature and closely associated with the 'heavens.’ Perhaps archetypical of this mode of thinking were the Vergilian spiritus or ‘fiery seeds’ of the sixth book of the Aeneid:Google Scholar

Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis / lucentemque globum lunae titaniaque astra / spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus / mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet … / igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo / seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant / terrenique hebetant artus moribundaque membra (724–27, 730–32).

Vergil's words were often quoted, from Augustine through the twelfth-century authors we shall soon be considering to Fernel in the sixteenth century, as pagan allusions to heavenly virtues in the sub-lunary world of nature. For philosophical readings of Vergil, see Pierre Courcelle, 'Interprétations néoplatonisantes du livre vi de l'Enéide,’ in: Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne (Fondation Hardt iii; Verona 1957) 95–136. Neoplatonism further amplified the tendency to regard as superior to ordinary elemental matter, particularly through such notions as the. Insofar as, in Galen's conception, constituted an indispensable medium of sensation and thought and an essential instrument of the vital principle, he might be regarded as imputing a superior status to πν∊νμα. But this interpretation is, I believe, less than clear from the texts themselves. In general, Galen seems not to have attached any special speculative importance to spiritus itself. For Galen purposiveness did not reside in any ‘divine’ principle within the organism itself, but was a function of all-embracing nature. Hence the Galenic πν∊νμα need not have an inherently super-elemental, ‘divine’ nature. At the same time, Galen's teleology differed from the more immanent Aristotelian teleology. Consequently, it opened the door to later, transcendent readings of his physiological scheme. Combined with Stoic and Neoplatonic tendencies, Galen's thought could easily lead to a notion of spiritus which emphasized its transcendence. On ancient teleology see D. M. Balme, Aristotle's Use of the Teleological Explanation (London 1965).

²⁶ The term ‘symbolic literalism’ is used here of a mode of thinking in which metaphor and analogy reflect archetypal divine ideas, in which things are regarded as vestigia Dei. Nonetheless, one may regard not only twelfth-century symbolism, but also the use of metaphor and analogy in the thirteenth century as abstract. For example, because of the symbolic significance of the term spiritus a variety of entities were associated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries under the heading of spiritus. The vital breath, imagination, intellect, the Holy Ghost, etc. are all designated spiritus. What they share is not just a common name, but, as we shall see in the discussion of Hugh of Saint Victor below, common functions and qualities. All are intermediaries and all are, in some sense, subtle. The term spiritus signifies an abstract analogical order of meaning which reflects the structure of creation. Such abstract, symbolic thinking manifests the presence of an ordering Creator. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, by contrast, symbolic thinking turned toward concreteness or literalism. Symbols which had been abstract were transformed into cosmological connections which bound levels of being and the universe together in a systematic causal network. In this period, the various kinds of spiritus mingle in sometimes indiscriminate ways: spiritus, as subtle alterations of a universal World-Soul or Stoic πν∊νμα, literally become the vital and animal spirits, the imagination and intellect, etc. Indeed, spiritus becomes the Holy Spirit and even, in Servetus, an emanation of the Godhead itself. Where abstract symbolism preserved the balance between a transcendent mens and a contingent creation, the symbolic literalism of the Renaissance disrupted the analogical network that is the reflection of the divine in nature. The correspondences were transformed from reflections of divine ideas to concrete microcosmic and macrocosmic links, from images of a transcendent ordering of Creation to immanent cosmological virtues. Where the former style of thought fostered rational, analogical theological science and contemplative mysticism, the latter style fostered magic and occultism, an active experiential mysticism and natural or pantheistic religion. See: M.-D. Chenu, La Théologie (cit. n. 2 supra) and id., 'Théologie symbolique et exegèse scholastique aux xii ^e et xiii ^e siècles,’ Mélanges de Ghellinck (Louvain 1951) 509–29; M.-T. d'Alverny, 'Le cosmos symbolique du xii ^e siècle,’ AHDL 28 (1953) 31–81; Robert Javelet, Image et ressemblance au douzième siècle de St. Anselme à Alain de Lille (Paris 1967).Google Scholar

²⁷ One example of such sensitivity would appear to be the Parisian condemnations of Aristotle in the early thirteenth century. These condemnations extended not only to the reading of Aristotle's natural philosophy, but also to the works of Amaury of Bène and David of Dinant. Against the pantheistic interpretation of Aristotle by these two authors the thirteenth century stressed the immanentist naturalism of his philosophy. This tendency is found above all in Albertus Magnus and Saint Thomas Aquinas. See G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History (New York 1968) 196. Google Scholar

²⁸ For such trends in the sixteenth century see the works of Copenhaver, Festugière, Garin, Kristeller, Pagel, Walker, and Yates. Google Scholar

²⁹ I have discussed the social, religious, and cultural backgrounds to such tendencies in chapter three of my dissertation (n. 1 supra): 'Humanism, the University, and the Crown in Sixteenth Century France: The Roots of Fernel's Reform of Medicine and the Galenic Language of Life.’ Google Scholar

³⁰ The dilemmas posed for Harvey by the inherited medieval-renaissance language of life are discussed in my dissertation (n. 1 supra). Descartes' response was decidedly different from Harvey's, moving in the direction of dualism and mechanism rather than a vitalistic, biological, and monistic materialism. Google Scholar

³¹ Chenu, , ‘Spiritus’ (art. cit. n. 19 above) and La Théologie (cit. n. 2) passim. The notion of man as imago Dei and the complementary idea of the vestigia Dei in nature are of course familiar themes within the Augustinian tradition. Their full flowering may be seen in St. Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum. Google Scholar

³² Hierarchies and intermediaries abound, of course, in late antique and medieval Platonism and Neoplatonism. Such influences, particularly as transmitted by Arabic sources, like the Fons vitae or the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de causis, are surely pertinent to understanding the uses made of spiritus in the Latin West. Here I should like to stress the Biblical and theological origins of hierarchical thinking, and emphases upon intermediaries as a backdrop to the attraction of such Platonizing tendencies for medieval Latin thought. Google Scholar

³³ De unione corporis et spiritus (PL 177.285–94). On Hugh of Saint-Victor (c. 1096–1141) see R. Baron, Science et sagesse chez Hughes de St.-Victor (Paris 1957); id., Études sur Hughes de Saint-Victor (Paris 1963).Google Scholar

³⁴ De unione (col. 285).Google Scholar

³⁵ See, for comparison, St. Augustine's discussion of ‘living after the flesh’ and ‘living after the spirit’ in De civitate Dei 14.2–5. The importance of the Pauline distinction of flesh and spirit is often closely linked, in Christian thought, with the notion of the imago Dei in homine and its religious significance for a Christian anthropology. Google Scholar

³⁶ De unione (col. 285). Following the quotation from John (3.6.), Hugh starts his treatise with the statement of an ontological premise and its consequence: Si nihil inter spiritum et corpus medium esset, neque spiritus cum corpore, neque corpus cum spiritu convenire potuisset. Although Hugh proceeds to deny the premise, he nonetheless takes as evident the ontological dichotomy between body and spirit: Multum autem distat inter corpus et spiritum; longe sunt a se duo haec.Google Scholar

³⁷ De unione (col. 285).Google Scholar

³⁸ De unione (col. 285): Ascendit Moyses in montem, et Deus descendit in montem. Nisi ergo Moyses ascendisset et Deus descendisset, non convenissent in unum. Magna sunt in his omnibus sacramenta. Ascendit corpus, et descendit spiritus. Ascendit spiritus, et descendit Deus. Quo ascendit corpus, superius est corpore. Quo descendit spiritus, inferius est spiritu.Google Scholar

³⁹ Compare, for example, Hugh's fellow Victorine, Richard, or Hildegard of Bingen. Google Scholar

⁴⁰ To name but a few major figures, Bonaventure, Ramon Lull, Meister Eckhardt, Nicholas of Cusa, Johannes Tauler, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, and Charles de Bovelles. Google Scholar

⁴¹ De unione (col. 285): Vide scalam Jacob, in terra stabat, et summitas ejus coelos tangebat. Terra corpus, coelum Deus. Ascendunt animi contemplatione ab infimis ad summa. A corpore ad spiritum, mediante sensu et sensualitate. A spiritu ad Deum, mediante contemplatione et revelatione.Google Scholar

⁴² William of Saint-Thierry (#x2020; 1148), De natura corporis et animae libri ii (PL 180.695–726). Book I in particular, Physica humani corporis, offers an epitome of physiology and psychology in which spiritus looms large. William remains concerned, however, with the imago Dei in homine and with the reflection of the Trinity in nature and man. Google Scholar

⁴³ Isaac of Stella (#x2020; c. 1169), Epistola ad quemdam familiarem suum de anima (PL 194. 1875–90). Again, the repetition of familiar themes: the understanding of man as imago Dei; the soul as the imago Dei in homine; the presence of the soul in the whole of the body, just as God is present in all things; a concern with intermediaries. Indeed, we find in Isaac verbal echoes of Hugh of Saint–Victor (e.g., Omne enim quod natum ex carne [col. 1881]) and of William of Saint-Thierry (compare Isaac: Universitas etenim creaturae quasi corpus est Divinitatis, singulae autem quasi singula membra. Sicut vero Deus in toto, et in singulis totus, sed in semetipso; sic anima in toto suo corpore, et in singulis membris in semetipsa tota [col. 1883] with William: Anima enim spiritualis est substantia ad imaginem Dei facta, Deo simillima, sic quodam modo se habens in corpore suo, sicut Deus in mundo suo, in corpore scilicet ubique existens et ubique tota [col. 702]). On Isaac see B. McGinn, The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella (Cistercian Studies 15; Washington, D.C. 1972); P. Bliemetzrieder, 'Isaak von Stella,’ Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie 18 (1904) 1–34. Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Alcher of Clairvaux (fl. c. 1175), De spiritu et anima (PL 40.779–832). On this text, see Norpoth, Pseudo-augustinische Traktat (cit. supra n. 23). Isaac of Stella had addressed his Epistola de anima to Alcher and there are a number of close parallels between the two works. Alcher's work draws together a great variety of opinions about spiritus, but Chenu, 'Spiritus' (cit. supra n. 19), clearly regards this work as without much of merit. Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Achard of Saint-Victor (#x2020; 1171), De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis (G. Morin, ed., 'Un traité inédit d'Achard de Saint-Victor,’ in: Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Studien Grabmann … gewidmet [BGPhMA Suppl. III 1; Münster 1935] 251–62). For Achard spiritus is inferior to mind, though superior to soul; furthermore, it is a mean, unifying mind and soul: Spiritus enim utpote utrique illarum affinis, utrique per se uniri potest: illae vero, a se distantes longius, sibi ad unionem nisi spiritu mediante non consentiunt (p. 260). Achard's treatise is more concise and rigorous than that of Alcher. Google Scholar

⁴⁶ The term spiritus is used in a great variety of ways in the texts noted above. Alcher, De spiritu et anima cap. 10 (cols. 785f.), lists a number of psychological and physiological meanings attributed to spiritus, but by no means all of those current in the twelfth century. Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Hugh, , De unione (col. 290), links the term spiritus, in one of its senses, with cogitation. Achard, De discretione (pp. 257f.), links it with imagination and dreaming. Alcher's De spiritu et anima illustrates a number of associations the term spiritus may have with higher psychological faculties or higher forms of being. Spiritus may refer to the soul itself, and specifically the rational part of the soul: Anima et spiritus idem sunt in homine, quamvis aliud notet spiritus, et aliud anima. Spiritus namque ad substantiam dicitur, et anima ad vivificationem … . Spiritus est in quantum est ratione praedita substantia rationalis; anima in quantum est vita corporis … . Humana quidem anima, quia in corpore habet esse et extra corpus, anima pariter et spiritus vocari potest: non duae animae, sensualis et rationalis, altera qua homo vivat, et altera qua ut quidam putant, sapiat; sed una atque eadem anima in semetipsa vivit per intellectum, et corpori vitam praebet per sensum (col. 784); but spiritus, as the rational mind, may also reach beyond mere discursive reason toward the divine: Dicitur spiritus mens rationabilibus, ubi est quaedam scintilla tanquam oculus animae, ad quem pertinet imago et cognitio Dei (col. 785).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Hugh, , De unione (col. 285).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Aristotle discusses the soul's ‘powers’ or ‘faculties’ in De anima 2–3. Google Scholar

⁵⁰ νoνχ is used by Aristotle as a noun (e.g., 428a5 to mean 'intelligence'; or, 429a23: 'mind') and as a verb, νoνχ (e.g., 427b28: 'thinking').Google Scholar

⁵¹ Aristotle distinguishes a number of classes of things known by the various faculties of the soul. Sensation is the mere reception of discrete sensory qualities. Beyond this brute level arise discriminatory perceptions linking sensory qualities to each other or to an object. Imagination and judgment deal with perceived or imagined forms of things. In general, for Aristotle there is a progression of things known and the soul's faculties. The most rudimentary knowledge is of concrete material things; but that which is known becomes progressively abstract and separable from matter. So, too, the soul's faculties rise from the material activity of sensation to the more formal activities of νoνχ. See F. Solmsen, 'Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings,’ American Journal of Philology 76 (1955) 148–64.Google Scholar

⁵² For example, De anima 2.3 (414a29ff). Google Scholar

⁵³ In De anima 2.1–2 Aristotle defines ‘soul’ in such a way as to suggest the interdependence and inseparability of body and soul. The soul is distinguishable in thought from the body as ‘the first actuality of a natural body potentially possessing life’ (412a28–29). But ‘neither the soul nor certain parts of it, if it has parts, can be separated from the body’ (413a4–5). For Aristotle it is the composite that perceives, imagines, knows, though each function represents the activity proper to specific 'faculties.’ Nevertheless, it should be noted that Aristotle's remarks about the rational soul were a source of controversy in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. De anima 3.4–5 (429b-430a) became the locus classicus for discussions of separability and immortality of the soul in Aristotelian circles. Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, De unione (c. 285; cited in n. 41 above). Hugh's treatise is permeated by metaphors which invest epistemological stages with moral and salvific significance. In addition to the passages noted above, see the extended comparison of caro, spiritus, and mens to the Serpent, Eve, and Adam in the Garden of Eden (De unione [col. 290; cf. cols. 288–89]). Google Scholar

⁵⁵ The classic statement of this notion is A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass. 1936). Google Scholar

⁵⁶ For Aristotle natural change is restricted. In De generatione et corruptione he states that ‘only those agents are combinable which involve a contrariety, for these are such as to suffer action reciprocally’ (328a32–33). In the De generatione animalium Aristotle argues for the specificity of generation, and that the maternal catamenia — the ‘matter’ of generation — in its complexity and specificity is limited in the potential issue it may produce. See P. A. Bogaard, 'Heaps or Wholes: Aristotle's Explanation of Compound Bodies,’ Isis 70 (1979) 11–29; R. Sokolowski, 'Matter, Elements and Substance in Aristotle,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970) 263–88. Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Hugh, , De unione (col. 286), including passages cited infra notes 59–60.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See note 25 supra. Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Hugh, , De unione (col. 286): Sunt igitur in hoc mundi corpore quatuor elementa propriis qualitatibus distincta, id est terra, aqua, ignis, aer. Sed ex his primum, id est terra, sola per se immobilis est, quia moveri non potest, nisi extrinsecus impellatur. Reliqua tria mobilia sunt, quia per se moventur sine impulsu extrinseco. Hoc tamen interest quod aqua teneri potest, ut non moveatur, aer et ignis non possunt. Rursum aer ad statum teneri non potest, ad praesentiam potest. Ignis vero nec ad statum tenetur, ut non moveatur, nec ad praesentiam, ut non elabatur. For medieval elemental theory see R. C. Dales's introduction to his critical edition and translation of Marius: On the Elements (Berkeley 1976).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ De unione (col. 286): Quae vero a sensu plus longe sunt, magis a natura corporum recedunt, et ad naturam spirituum accedunt. Hinc est quod ipse aer, quia prae sui subtilitate videri non potest, spiritus appellatur … . Sed ignis qui ipso aere longe subtilior est et mobilior … magis proprie vocatur spiritus.Google Scholar

⁶¹ As a starting point for this sort of conflation, see Hugh, De unione (col. 286): Ubi autem magis subtilis est, quodammodo magis spiritus est, quia in eo quo magis incorporea naturae approximat, nomen pariter et proprietatem illius usurpat. Google Scholar

⁶² There are, of course, significant differences between the Victorines and members of the school of Chartres, regarding the use of pagan philosophical systems. I do not wish to minimize such differences, nor do I intend to dwell on them here. For an excellent guide, see Chenu, La théologie (cit. n. 2 supra). Google Scholar

⁶³ Alfred's work was partially edited by Barach in the volume cited in note 5 above under the title: Excerpta e libro Alfredi Anglici De motu cordis item Costa-ben-Lucae De differentia animae et spiritus. I cite according to the complete edition by C. Baeumker, Des Alfred von Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift De motu cordis (BGPhMA 23.1–2; Münster 1923). On Alfred see Barach's introductory essay (3–79); C. Baeumker, 'Die Stellung des Alfred von Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus) und seine Schrift De motu cordis in der Wissenschaft des beginnenden 13. Jahrhunderts,’ S B Akad. München (1913) Abh. 9; T. Struve, 'Die Anthropologie des Alfredus Anglicus in ihrer Stellung zwischen Platonismus und Aristotelismus,’ Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 55 (1973) 366–90; J. K. Otte, 'The Life and Writings of Alfredus Anglicus,’ Viator 3 (1972) 275–91. Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Otte, , ‘Alfredus’ 280f.; Struve, ‘Anthropologie’ 367f.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Otte, , ‘Alfredus’ 276, 283, 291.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Otte, , ‘Alfredus’ 286; Struve, ‘Anthropologie’ 368. As Otte 287 states, and a reading of the De motu cordis confirms, Alfred quotes extensively in this work from book IV of the Metheora, De anima, De somno et vigilia, Ethica Nicomachea, Metaphysica, Physica, and De vegetabilibus. In addition to De motu cordis, Alfred translated the De mineralibus and De plantis, and wrote commentaries on the De generatione et corruptione, the Metheora and De plantis. Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Struve, , ‘Anthropologie’ 328. Struve's conclusion is hardly startling, and may even be misleading if taken as suggesting that Alfred's anthropology arises from an incomplete knowledge of Aristotle rather than from a definite theoretical perspective at loggerheads with later Aristotelianism. At issue is not whether Alfred is an Aristotelian, but rather how Aristotle was read and understood. We need to know why the reading of Aristotle was selective, and why texts and ideas that had been inaccessible or simply ignored are suddenly sought out and brought to the forefront of interpretation. But on the positive side, Struve does mention how Alfred's reception of Aristotle was prepared by the influence of Chalcidius and twelfth-century Platonism and concludes: ‘In Alfreds Anthropologie sind neuplatonische, galenische Physiologie und aristotelische Psychologie zu einem neuartigen Versuch, den Menschen zu erklären, verbunden. Alfreds Leistung besteht darin, als erster das Herz als Zentralorgan in die mittelalterliche Anthropologie eingeführt und damit in Grundzügen eine aristotelische Anthropologie entworfen zu haben’ (380f.).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Anglicus, Anglicus, De motu cordis, cap. 1 (Baeumker 5–8): Quod vita sit effectus primus animae in corpore, and cap. 2 (Baeumker 9–12): Quod certum habet in corpore vita domicilium.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ De motu cordis, cap. 3 (Baeumker 12–14): Quod cor domicilium est vitae, and cap. 8 (Baeumker 30–35): Quod motus cordis sit principium omnium aliarum virtutum. Aristotle, of course, stresses the importance of the heart as the first formed organ of the body and ‘seat’ of the nutritive soul, particularly in De generatione animalium II 4 (esp. 740a).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ De motu cordis, cap. 8 (Baeumker 30): Primus et continuus animae actus vita est. Haec cordis motu efficitur, and cap. 5 (Baeumker 17): Virtus cordis in motu est; motu enim vitam distribuit.Google Scholar

⁷¹ De motu cordis, cap. 8 (Baeumker 35): Ratio expostulat ut et speciem motus discernamus. Partimur igitur omnem motum localem, sub quo et situalem motum claudimus, trina specie: animali, naturali, violento.Google Scholar

⁷² De motu cordis, cap. 9 (Baeumker 36f.): Violentum vero dicimus, cuius exterius est principium, nihil conferente vim passo. Cor autem dilatat spiritus et aer ad circumferentiam ducens. Est autem compactae et ponderosae substantiae. Extrinseco igitur principio, contra quam exigat solidi natura, movetur. Is vero motus violentus est.Google Scholar

⁷³ De motu cordis, cap. 9 (Baeumker 37); cf. cap. 7 (Baeumker 25–30): De causis motu cordis, passim. Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Loc. cit. Google Scholar

⁷⁵ De motu cordis, cap. 7 (Baeumker 25–30) passim. Google Scholar

⁷⁶ De motu cordis, cap. 8 (Baeumker 30).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ For example, De motu cordis, cap. 8 (Baeumker 33): Cor igitur animae domicilium est, or cap. 10 (Baeumker 43): Atqui cor et ipsius cordis sinistrum thalamum animae domicilium esse. Google Scholar

⁷⁸ De motu cordis, cap. 10 (Baeumker 38): Id [i.e., medium] ergo primum est animae organum. Eius actus primus vita; qua mediante ceteras corporis virtutes producit.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ De motu cordis, cap. 10 (Baeumker 37–38): His habitis, intuendum diligentius quod corpus, cuius hebes et solida naturaliter essentia est, et animam, quae quidem ob subtilissimam incorporeae essentiae naturam vix cuiusquam providetur ingenio, medium aliquid vincire oportuit, quod in neutrius componentium termino, utriusque tamen naturae participatione aliqua, tarn absque dissidentia in unius eiusdemque essentiae foedus uniret. Id igitur si omnimodam corporeae conditionis naturam effugeret, ab animae subtili essentia nihil disiungeret. Idem etiam, si totius corporeae condicioni leges admitteret, a primi corporis hebetudine non distaret. Nec plene igitur sensibile, nec omnino incorporeum esse oportuit.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ De motu cordis, cap. 10 (Baeumker 39): Hoc igitur extremorum vinculum et moventis organum phisici spiritum vocant, quod ex aere ignito videatur constare. See also 39ff.Google Scholar

⁸¹ De motu cordis, cap. 10 (Baeumker 43–44). Although Alfred mentions the prevalence of three kinds of spirits among medical authors, he himself sides with the view that there are but two sorts of spiritus: vital and animal spirits.Google Scholar

⁸² See the entire discussion in the final chapter of De motu cordis, cap. 16 (Baeumker 84–96): Quod anima mediante spiritu vitae omnes corporis animalis virtutes in actum producit. Google Scholar

⁸³ For this and the previous paragraph see De motu cordis, cap. 11 (Baeumker 46–55): Quod spiritus vitae non movetur, sed fit irradiatione virtutis. Note the following passage (Baeumker 50f.): Est autem fallacia, quod spiritus generatio neque ex calore est neque ex natura, sed ab anima, quae, cum ubique aeque animatum sit corpus, simul operatur in toto. Aperto enim orificio simul fit emicatio ad totum, ut sol oriens aut fulgur sine tempore in quantumlibet remota radios iacit. Comitatur vero lucem calor; sed tardius operatur; minus enim habile est recipiens. Sanguis vero semper adaptus; neque aliqua fit lucis emissio, sed virtutis. Atque hoc quidem admiratione dignissimum, quod cum id ita esse sensus ostendat, negat fantasia, approbat vero intellectus. Simul enim in extremis et medio pulsum sensus comprehendit, nullo temporis interventu. Quod, si fluat spiritus, impossibile fit. Siquidem igitur sine tempore est generatio spiritus simulque per totum spargitur, simul fit in toto; neque fluere possibile. Google Scholar

⁸⁴ For background and context see T. Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la Scuola di Chartres (Rome 1955) and R. Lemay, Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century: The Recovery of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy through Arabic Astrology (Beirut 1962). Google Scholar

⁸⁵ I plan to study this issue more fully in the future. To be sure, interest in astrological influences and in the existence of a world-soul was lively in the twelfth century among both natural philosophers and medical theorists. Such interests affected the discussion of the human soul as well as that of the powers of organic bodies. See Gregory, Anima mundi. Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See note 27 supra. Google Scholar

⁸⁷ An instructive example occurs near the end of Albert's De spiritu et respiratione in the tract De differentia spiritus, et animae, et animati corporis (II.2.4 [Borgnet IX 250]), where he not only distinguishes different meanings of the term spiritus, but, more significantly, the different discourses for which those meanings are appropriate: Si quis autem dicat animam proprie et essentialiter dici spiritum, hoc non erit verum secundum quod philosophi utuntur hoc nomine, spiritus: sed hoc erit secundum scientiam divinam: divini enim in multis significationibus hoc nomine spiritus utuntur: aliquando quidem pro animae superiori parte: aliquando pro imaginativa, eo quod dicunt quod spiritus est vis animae quaedam mente inferior, in qua imagines rerum imprimuntur: sed hoc modo non sumus hic locuti de spiritus, eo quod in hoc opere non nisi physica tractare suscepimus. Google Scholar

⁸⁸ De animalibus XX.1.5–7 (ed. H. J. Stadler, Albertus Magnus: De animalibus libri XXVI [BGPhMA 16; Münster 1920] 1284–94).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ De animalibus XX.1.5 (Stadler 1287). Here the notion that spiritus must be transmitted immediately from the heart to all the members of the body — a notion that Alfred of Sareshel accepted and that led to his idea of irradiation — is taken as support for the contention that spiritus is not an elemental body, but a quintessential body of the substance of light.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ De animalibus XX.1.7 (Stadler 1292, lines 9–24).Google Scholar

⁹¹ De animalibus XX.1.7 (Stadler 1292, lines 25–32). Albertus (XX.1.3; Stadler 1278) had already defined spiritus as a product of seminal moisture, composed of all the elements: Et ideo spiritus qui est in animalium corporibus, est vapor resolutus ab humido seminali in generatione: et cum hoc humidum sit compositum ex quatuor humoribus et elementis, non potest ipse spiritus esse simplicis naturae elementi aeris.Google Scholar

⁹² De animalibus XX.1.7 (Stadler 1293).Google Scholar

⁹³ Ibid. Google Scholar

⁹⁴ De animalibus XX.1.7 (Stadler 1294). See also De spiritu et respiratione I.1.8 (Borgnet 225f.).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ De animalibus XX.1.7 (Stadler 1294, lines 10–12): et hoc est falsum, quia nullum tale medium esse potest inter incorpoream et corpoream substantias.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ De animalibus XX.1.7 (Stadler 1294, lines 22–31).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See, for example, Albert's Quaestiones super De animalibus XVI q. 7: Utrum spiritus sit necessarius in animalibus (ed. E. Filthaut, Alberti Opera omnia XII [Münster 1955] 278–79) and De spiritu et respiratione I.1.8 (Borgnet 225f.). Google Scholar

⁹⁸ De spiritu et respiratione I.1.8 (Borgnet 225f.) where Albert indicates the role of spiritus by analogy to the tools of a human architect: … dicamus quod spiritus est instrumentum animae, sicut malleus vel dolabrum est instrumentum architecti: et hoc instrumento anima facit vitam in corpore sicut formam artificiati facit artifex per instrumentum. Hic autem necessitas instrumenti non quaeritur propter motoris indigentiam et infirmitatem … sed potius propter indigentiam et necessitatem corporis, quod recipit ab anima actum vitae et formam. Cum enim illa distet a principio vitae indigente ad vehendum vitam: quoniam licet virtutes quaedam sint in organis et partibus animatorum fixae non separabiles ab ipsis quamdiu sustinet animal, sicut visus in oculo; tamen illae virtutes sunt ligatae et immobiles quando continue non influitur virtus alia perficiens eas a principio et fonte vitae, quod est ipsa anima secundum substantiam suam: et ideo spiritus est necessarius qui advehat hanc virtutem. Cujus signum est quod prius diximus: quoniam spiritu ad interiora retracto, organa exteriora contrahuntur et immobilitantur: et eo reducente, laxantur ad actum.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Quaestiones de animalibus XIII q. 5 (Filthaut 240). See also B. H. Hill, Jr., The Grain and the Spirit in Mediaeval Anatomy,’ Speculum 40 (1965) 63–73 at 66.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ See Bertola, E., 'La Dottrina dello “Spirito” in Alberto Magno,’ Sophia 19 (1951) 306–12. There is a marked tendency in Bertola's article to see in Albert a kind of immature Aristotelian ism, or, perhaps more accurately, a flawed Thomism. Though there certainly are Platonic elements in Albert's thought, Bertola has somewhat exaggerated them and ascribed views to Albert that are not quite correct. Thus, for example, he points to ‘un’ altra dottrina neoplatonica … quella della materia spirituale,’ and to its role in the theory of emanations and implies the closeness of Albert's view of spiritus to these notions: 'Anche l'esempio della luce, che Alberto accetta da Avicenna e da Isacco Israeli per indicare l'azione e il muoversi dello spirito, è tipicamente neoplatonico. Giustamente, dice Alberto, Avicenna paragono il cuore al sole e lo spirito vitale alla luce del sole; e Isacco Israeli disse che lo spirito si muove nel corpo come la luce nel mondo.’ Yet, it is precisely such Neoplatonic ideas and metaphors that Albert seeks either to refute outright or to deflate through re-interpretation. Furthermore, Albert's conception of spiritus betrays no affinities to a Neoplatonic spiritual matter: on the contrary, Albert regards spiritus as a vaporous composite of all the elements. These lapses in Bertola's work are perhaps due to the fact that he utilized neither the De animalibus nor the Quaestiones super De animalibus. Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ My treatment of Albertus' spiritus has been far from exhaustive. I plan to discuss his analysis of the history of spiritus and his conception of the role of spiritus in generation and embryonic development in a future article. See N. H. Steneck, ‘Albert on the Psychology of Sense Perception’ (pp. 263–90) and L. Dewan, ‘St. Albert, the Sensibles, and Spiritual Being’ (pp. 291–320) in the collection of essays edited by J. A. Weisheipl, Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980 (Toronto 1980). Google Scholar

¹⁰² Of fundamental importance is the article by P. O. Kristeller, 'The School of Salerno,’ in his Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Rome 1956) 495–551. Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Hewson, M. A., Giles of Rome and the Medieval Theory of Conception: A Study of the De formatione corporis humani in utero (London 1975) esp. chapters 4 and 6.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Bertola, , ‘La dottrina … in Alberto’ (art. cit. n. 100 above). In his complementary study, 'La Dottrina dello “Spirito” in S. Tommaso,’ Sophia 21 (1953) 27–35 at 27, Bertola writes: 'In quel primo esame notammo come questa dottrina [i.e., of spiritus], tipica e dei medici greci e del pensiero platonico, si fosse conservata nel primo aristotelismo della scolastica cristiana [i.e., Albert] come un interessante residuo dell' antropologia e psicologia platoniche.’Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Aquinas, Aquinas, De motu cordis ad magistrum Philippum (Opera XVI [Parma 1865] 358–60). See also the translation with notes and introduction by V. R. Larkin, 'St. Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart,’ Journal of the History of Medicine 15 (1960) 22–30.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ For example, Bertola ('La dottrina … in S. Tommaso' 32) quoting Aquinas, Summa theologica I.76.7: Si vero anima unitur corpori ut forma, sicut iam dictum est, impossible est quod uniatur ei aliquo corpore mediante, cuius ratio est, quia sic dicitur aliquid unum, quomodo et ens. Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ See quotation in last note. Bertola ('S. Tommaso' 33) again quotes Thomas: Est tamen spiritus medium in movendo, sicut primum instrumentum motus. Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Compare Bertola's summary of Thomas' views ('S. Tommaso' 33) with our report of Albert's ideas: 'Lo spirito percio nella dottrina tomistica e causa immediata o concausa dei moti del corpo, non causa dell' essere del corpo o, peggio ancora, dell' essere dell'uomo. Potremmo dire che vi è nell' uomo una doppia unità: l'unità del suo essere e l'unità del suo agire. Per l'unità del suo essere non esistono mediatori, essendo l'anima forma del corpo e in quanto tale unita immediatamente ad esso; per l'unità invece dell'azione, posta la differenza che esiste tra l'anima e il corpo, l'una puro spirito e l'altro materia è lo spirito che, pur essendo corporeo, ma di pocha materialità, trasmette al corpo le virtù dell'anima.’ Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Bertola, ('S. Tommaso') quoting Thomas, Summa theologica Suppl. 70.3 ad 7: Quamvis non sit tactus corporalis inter animam et corpus, tamen est inter ea aliquis tactus spiritualis. Bertola's comments are useful, though the full significance of this problem and the constraints lying behind it are not exploited.Google Scholar