¹ The Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 36 (1973) 1–34 (hereafter cited as MHP). The passages already cited there which it has been necessary to mention again in a new context or to re-emphasize for purposes of presenting the additional materials are clearly indicated. Since the evidence presented in both essays supports a single interpretation, the reader is encouraged to examine these additions in connection with the passages assembled in the text and notes of MHP.Google Scholar

² Q. Horati Flacci Opera, ed. Klingner, F. (Leipzig 1959) 307. (The internal bracketed additions are mine.) ['Yet faults there are which we can gladly pardon; for the string does not always yield the sound which hand and heart intend, but when you call for a flat often returns you a sharp; nor will the bow always hit whatever mark it threatens. But when the beauties in a poem are more in number, I shall not take offence at a few blots which a careless hand has let drop, or human frailty has failed to avert. What, then, is the truth? As a copying clerk is without excuse if, however much warned, he always makes the same mistake, and a harper is laughed at who always blunders on the same string: so the poet who often defaults, becomes, methinks, another Choerilus, whose one or two good lines cause laughter and surprise; and yet I also feel aggrieved, whenever good Homer “nods,” but when a work is long, a drowsy mood may well creep over it. A poem is like a picture: one strikes your fancy more, the nearer you stand [A₁]: another, the farther away [A₂]. This courts the shade [B₁]; that will wish to be seen in the light, and dreads not the critic insight of the judge [B₂]. This pleased but once [C₁]; that, though ten times called for, will always please [C₂].' Trans. Fairclough, H. R., Loeb Classical Library (hereafter LCL [London 1936] 479, 481). All future Latin citations of Horace will be from Klingner's edition.Google Scholar

³ For Virgil's detractors, see Suetonius, , Vita Vergili 43–6, and for his imitation of Homer, Macrobius, , Saturnalia 5.2–13 — even his imitation of Homer's faults, which, apparent to the diligens lector (5.14.8), was criticized by some out of ignorance (5.14.1). Virgil was criticized for making Homer νεωτεϱιχώτεϱος with fashionable modern colors, for not sufficiently polishing his adaptations from Pindar, and for echoing the archaism of Ennius (Gellius, A., 13.27, 17.10, 12.2).Google Scholar

⁴ Aristotle implies that a suitable ‘distance’ is involved when he compares the proper length of a play, determined by what the memory can hold in unity, with the size of a living organism which the eye can take in at a glance. (He makes similar observations upon the length of a period: Rhet. 3.9.3, 1409a35–9b6.) When Else, G. comments (on 1450b32–51a6) that ‘in Aristotle's theory of vision the size of the thing seen and the time required to see it are interconnected,’ he cites Physics 219a10, 220b15, and 233a10 to show how ‘magnitude, motion, and time are strictly correlative’ (Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument [Cambridge 1963] 285 n. 10). If one adds to these correlatives the first two propositions, among others, of Euclid's Optica, the size of the object seen and time required to see it involve as well its remoteness from the observer.Google Scholar

⁵ For Lambinus' earlier suggestion of this parallel, see MHP n. 5. If one excepts the occurrences of ‘skiagraphia’ discussed infra in this volume of Traditio, in my ‘The Early Metaphorical Uses of Aristotle's comparison between qualities of rhetorical and/or poetic style and a picture better seen at a distance seems to be unique before Horace. With the exception of Aristotle, Horace is the only writer I have found who refers to a kind of painting which is more striking (te capiat magis) if seen from farther away, let alone who compares such a picture to a literary work. I know, furthermore, of no statement that a picture which is more striking if seen from a distance is, by virtue of that fact, an inferior picture — excepting again the epistemological metaphors discussed in my paper in the Miscellany, , infra — before the first scholia on Horace's lines. Such negative evidence does not demonstrate that Horace borrows the analogy from Aristotle or a peripatetic beneficiary, but given the congeniality of his other attitudes with those of the third book of the Rhetoric, such evidence makes this source more plausible. See n. 6.Google Scholar

⁶ Similarly, Fuhrmann, M.: ‘die erste Hälfte spricht Zugeständnisse aus, die zweite verwahrt sich gegen eine mögliche Missdeutung dieser Zugeständnisse. “Gelegentliche Verstösse gegen die Gesetze der Kunst darf man einem in der Hauptsache trefflichen Werke nicht allzu sehr ankreiden; hiermit soll jedoch dem verbreiteten Dilettantismus kein Freibrief ausgestellt werden” — so etwa liesse sich die Quintessenz des 11. Abschnitts [= 347–90] wiedergeben. Horaz sucht wieder einmal die richtige Mitte durch den Hinweis auf zwei ungesunde Extreme zu bestimmen’ (Einführung in die antike Dichtungstheorie [Darmstadt 1973] 116). Throughout his astute and comprehensive commentary (to which I am continually indebted), Brink, C. O. attributes, among other things, Horace's subtle adjustments between various faulty extremes to his underlying debt to Aristotelian, in addition to later Hellenistic, poetic and rhetorical principles (Horace on Poetry: The ‘Ars Poetica’ [Cambridge 1971] 75–6, 80–5, 106–16, 132–4, 174–5, 418–9, 520 [hereafter cited as Brink]). See as well Brink's first volume, Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles (Cambridge 1963) 96–9, 143–50, 166–8, 195, 214, 219–20 (hereafter cited as Brink, , Prol.). Brink seems to see the Pisones as vulnerable to the self-indulgence of wealthy dilettanti (509–10). The passages he associates with the ironic elevation of the word pango (416) would accord with Horace's cautioning the Pisones against justifying faults on the grounds of ambitious aspirations (399–400). Pliny is still sensitive about being criticized for hiding his faults behind any attempt at elevation (Ep. 9.26.7). Longinus expressly rejects the justification of tumidity on the grounds that “‘failure in a great attempt is at least a noble error”’ (Longinus on the Sublime 3.3, trans. Roberts, W. R. [Cambridge 1935] 49) — which perhaps suggests less emphasis might be placed on his ‘romantic admiration of “necessary faults”’ (Brink 363). Horace criticizes the self-satisfied poet in Ep. 2.2.106–8 and AP 291–4, 442–4.Google Scholar

⁷ Controv. 9. pr. 1–5, quoted in MHP 9–10 from Sénèque le Rhéteur, Controverses et Suasoires, trans. Bornecque, H., 2 vols. (Paris 1932). Philostratus, Compare, Lives 614.Google Scholar

⁸ The Institutio Oratoria, of Quintilian, trans. Butler, H. E., 4 vols. (LCL; London 1953). All references will be to this edition. Like the declamatory student, the pastoral poet will also ‘fear’ the forum: musa illa rustica et pastoralis non forum modo, verum ipsam etiam urbem reformidat (10.1.55), and Ovid comments how reformidant insuetum lumina solem (Ep. ex. P. 3.4.49). The more ‘public’ style of the epic or the deliberative speech, on the other hand, need not fear the subtle concentration of the critic or judge (iudicis argutum… acumen, 364) whose conscientious alertness would be more appropriately expended in judging the intricate arguments or the courtroom than the power to please the many listeners of a large assembly. As Aristotle suggested that private cases were to be argued before fewer or even a single judge in an increasingly exact style (Rhet. 3.12.5), Cicero comments on the indecorum either of employing ‘general topics and the grand style when discussing cases of stillicide before a single referee (unum iudicem)’ or of speaking calmly and subtly (summisse et subtiliter) when discussing the majesty of the Roman people (Orat. 72). The intricate private case was called the obscurum genus causae (De inv. 1.20, De orat. 2.100), the δνσπαϱαχολούθβτον (Quint., 4.1.40). See Cope's commentary, which is the most helpfully detailed for Rhet. 3.12, The Rhetoric of Aristotle , edd. Cope, E. M. and Sandys, J. E., III (London 1877) 152–4. For the relation of the spectator as ‘critic’ (θεωϱός) to ‘judge’ (χϱιτής), see Rhet. 2.18.1 and Hellwig's, A. reconsideration of the terms in Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles (Göttingen 1973) 129–36. What is addressed to the large audience, Cicero observes, lacks the subtlety of philosophical discourse (De fin. 2.17). A vehement eloquence can sweep to one side the critic's censures, while a closely reasoned argument must defend itself with difficulty (De nat. de. 2.20). Dionysius says that Lysias, who lacks emotional force (Lys. 19), ‘is more capable of speaking well on small, unexpected or difficult matters than of speaking forcefully on weighty, important or straightforward subjects’ (Lys. 16). Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Critical Essays, trans. S. Usher, 2 vols. (LCL; London 1974) I 53.Google Scholar

⁹ Cicero says that Isocrates forensi luce caruit intraque parietes aluit eam gloriam (Brut. 32) and that he used blunt gladiatorial weapons in his oratory because he refrained from serious forensic conflicts (De opt. gen. orat. 17). In addition to the references to Dionysius' Isocrates in MHP n. 21, sections 1, 12, and 20 should be cited: the dramatic qualities (ύποχϱιτιχά) of Aristotle's deliberative oratory (ἀγωνιστιχή) are here replaced in the periods and figures of Isocrates by subtle affectation (χομφά), declamatory display (θεατϱιχά), and preciosity (χαϱιεντισμός), all of which are out of place in the forum (12). See also Dem. 18, 22 and Plutarch, , Mor. 350b–51b. For the general distinction between spectators at a sophistic display and actual advisers of the state, see Thucydides 3.38, to which compare Dem. 44; for that between ludus campusque and pugna et acies with respect to the orator, see De orat. 2.84, Orat. 42, and Leg. 3.14. An interesting expansion of Cicero's De orat. 1.157 (quoted MHP n. 15) occurs in Julius Victor's Ars rhetorica 25 where one, described in the phrasing of Quintilian (12.5.2, 1.2.18), who studies too long in situ quodam secreti and in eiusmodi secretis, upon emerging caligat in sole et omnia nova offendit (Halm, C., Rhetores Latini Minores [Leipzig 1863] 445). Literary studies will increasingly seek contemplative secreta away from the active forum as Quintilian (2.18.4) and Tacitus (Dial. 9, 12) noted: the declamations of the ancient auditoria will become the debates of the medieval gardens (see my ‘The Quality of Fiction: the Rhetorical Transmission of Literary Theory,’ Traditio 30 [1974] 61–75, 81–97).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Russell, D. A., ‘Longinns’ On the Sublime (Oxford 1970) 68, gives ‘and if you hold them up to the light to examine them’ for χἁν… πϱὸς αὐγἀς ἀνασχοπῆς, citing the Phaedrus 268a. Such an examination is certainly suggested, but the perceptual connotations, I believe, are subservient to those of being brought out into the open before the public at large for unbiased judgment. Such a public may be either the intelligent consensus of the living or that of the great writers of the past whom we must imagine to be summoned as our judges (χϱιταῖς) and witnesses (μάϱτνσιν) into a timeless tribunal (διχαστήϱιον), a theater (θέατϱον) for the most severe ordeal (ἀγώνισμα;). Only in this way shall we know if our work can survive being seen in the light of other periods and standards than our own (14). Only if it is repeatedly examined through and through (ἄν εὔ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐπιπισχοπῆς) can we be sure of its enduring reception (7.3). To be πϱὸς αὐγά (or ὑπ' αὐγάς, Polybius, 10.3.1) in this sense is to be where such an examination can be made repeatedly by both the living and the dead. All imitation or emulation is, finally, a contest (ἀγών), every writer an ἀνταγωνιστής in an eternal rivalry with his predecessors. To lose to them brings no discredit (13.2–4; cf. Quintilian, 10.2.9–10). Quintilian warns (1.2.18–9) that the future orator must live in maxima celebritate et in media rei publicae luce, lest he fear (reformidare) society and grow pale in a solitaria et velut umbratica vita. Left in the darkness without stimulating competition, either he will become listless and precious or overweening and tumid — the two extremes noted by both Horace and Longinus — for he who has ‘no standard of comparison by which to judge his own powers will necessarily rate them too high.’ If he does not practice what he is learning in public, when he does leave his study, he will be blinded by the glare of the sun (caligat in sole). Again, too much modesty can cause bona ingenii studiique in lucem non prolata situ quodam secreti consumerentur (12.5.2). See below n. 21. For the perceptual connotations of πϱὸς αὐγάς, see Hippocrates, , Off. 3; of ὑπ' αὐγάς, see Euripides, , Hec. 1154.Google Scholar

¹¹ I agree with Brink's citation of Longinus' πςὸς αὐγάς in relation to Horace's sub luce if the Greek phrase is taken in the sense described in the preceding note (cf. Lewis, and Short, , A Latin Dictionary [Oxford 1962] lux II A: ‘the sight of all men, the public view, the public, the world,’ citing Isocrates forensi luce caruit from Brut. 32 and familiam abjectam et obscuram e tenebris in lucem vocare from Pro Rege Deiotaro 30). This is the sense in which Cicero, while stressing the approval of one's own conscience, says, nevertheless, that all things well done wish to be placed in the light of day so that all men may see them (omnia enim bene facta in luce se collocari volunt, Tusc. 2.64). The phrasing resembles Horace's volet haec sub luce videri, and both, I believe, emphasize the necessity of public examination rather than the conditions of perception. Again, in distinguishing a private philosophical style from a public oratorical style, Cicero says that he rewrote the Stoic paradoxes to see whether they might be brought ‘into the light of common daily life (proferri in lucem, id est in forum) and expounded in a form to win acceptance, or whether learning has one style of discourse and ordinary life another (an alia quaedam esset erudita alia popularis oratio)’: Paradoxa Stoicorum 4, trans. Rackham, H. (LCL; London 1960). The erudita oratio would correspond to the style of a poem which amat obscurum and is seldom requested; the popularis oratio, which seeks to win acceptance in lucem id est in forum, to the more popular style of the Homeric epic which is called for again and again (deciens repetita). When perception is involved, Cicero uses a different phrase, and there is no doubt about his meaning: when Caesar combines his elegant Latinity with other embellishments of the oratorical style, he achieves the effect of placing a well-painted picture in good light (videtur tamquam tabulas bene pictas collocare in bono lumine, Brut. 261). Despite the fact that Horace is also referring to a picture, his sub luce is not equivalent to in bono lumine. Lewis and Short cite many meanings of luce which are more narrowly temporal (lux I 2 a and b) — in which sense they take Horace's sub luce (v. sub I B) — but cite no passage with an optical or perceptual meaning equivalent to examining something in good light or from close up sub oculis or ad manum. Greek phrases using ὑπαίθϱιος and ὕπαιθϱος, meaning ‘in the light,’ ‘in the public view,’ or ‘in the field,’ seem relevant. See Lucian, , Apology 14: ‘how better could he employ himself than… in full view under the open sky to let his loyalty… be put to the test ,’ Lucian, trans. Kilburn, K. (LCL; London 1959) VI 211. Pliny, unfortunately, says very little about the qualities of pictures erected in foro or about how they were placed (NH 35.25–9). While the text is uncertain, his passage on Apelles' black glaze is important for colors seen e longinquo (35.97). The glaze apparently reflected a luminosity (= splendor in 35.29?) which toned down those colors which otherwise would have appeared disproportionately bright at a distance and thus, according to Sellers, , ‘brought the colours into unison’: ne claritas colorum aciem offenderet… et e longinquo eadem res nimis floridis coloribus austeritatem occulte daret (The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art, trans. Jex-Blake, K. and ed. Sellers, E. [London 1896] 132 n. 6). In this case, the reflecting daylight, by making certain colors too pronounced (which the glaze could prevent from happening), would shade out others and thus destroy the delicate balance of the whole. For textual variants and an alternative translation, see Pollitt, J. J., The Ancient View of Greek Art: Criticism, History, and Terminology (New Haven 1974) 325–6.Google Scholar

¹² Op. cit., 145, 225. Pfuhl, E., Malerei and Zeichnung der Griechen (Munich 1923) I 14–5, II 808, mentions the Dutch painters in relation to Peiraïkos. Van Laer might be the best example, who, Passed, G. B. comments, ‘era singolare nel rapresentar la verità schietta, e pura nell'esser suo, che li suoi quadri parevano una finestra aperta, per la quale si fussero veduti quelli suoi successi senza alcun divario, et alteratione,’ quoted from Haskell, F., Patrons and Painters (New York 1971) 132 n. 1. In the late sixteenth century Cesare Crispolti compares the difficult stylistic precision necessary in a small painting, where the slightest defect can be seen, to that in a sonnet, while long poems (and, by implication, large pictures), though of only moderate value as a whole, contain many things whose compensating graces make up for what is less beautiful (Weinberg, B., A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance [Chicago 1961] I 237).Google Scholar

¹³ The ‘xenia’ as a genre would be an interesting counterpart to the invitational poem — such as those of Catullus 13; Horace, , Ep. 1.5; Martial 5.78, 10.48, 1.52; Juvenal 11; and Jonson, Ben, Epig. 101 — were not the poets often using the form to comment more seriously on social customs.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Plutarch's Moralia, trans. Babbitt, F. C., 15 vols. (LCL; London 1960) I 289. Later (64a) as a comparison for the flatterer's frenetic activity and strained appearance, Plutarch describes a painting which has characteristics similar to those of late sixteenth-century Mannerism: his behavior ‘is like an extravagantly wrought (πεϱίεϱγον) picture, which by means of gaudy pigments, irregular folds in the garments (χεχλασμέναις στολίσι), wrinkles, and sharp angles, strives to produce an impression of vividness (ὲναϱγείας φανταşίαν).’ πεϱίεϱγος, meaning superfluous or overly elaborate ornament or fussiness (Quintilian, 8.3.55), is used frequently by Dionysius for literary styles (e.g., Lys. 6, 15; Isoc. 2, 3; Dem. 26, 35). Longinus (3.4) calls a puerile style (μειςαχιῶδες) pedantic triviality (σχογαστιχὴ νόβσις) which begins in learned trifles (πεϱιεϱγασίας) and ends in frigidity. See Pliny, , NH 35.101–2 and Sellers' citation of Strabo 14.652, as well as Vitruvius on decadence in fresco painting (7.5.7–8). In Act. Apost. 19.19, τὰ πεϱιέϱγα = curious arts.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The proper subjects are naval battles and cavalry engagements, which give the painter every opportunity to represent men and animals in action, for in painting, as in prose and poetry, ‘elevation results from the choice of a great subject’ ( On Style 76, trans. Roberts, W. R. [LCL; London 1953]). The passage reflects a combination of Hellenistic variety and Aristotelian unity reminiscent of lines 1–45 of the Ars poetica. Nicias, Pliny reports, did paintings which were out of doors (in foro; NH 35.27) and, by manipulating lumen et umbras, made his figures stand out against the background (ut eminerent e tabulis picturae). He was famous for large, as well as smaller, pictures of heroic figures and scenes (35.131–3). For further comments on the neglect of the whole in favor of the part and the sacrifice of overall grace to diligent detail, see Lucian, , Hist. Conscrib. 27, Pliny NH 34.92, and MHP 17–18. In the Renaissance, Roger Ascham compares the writer to be imitated to the painter who excels in portraiture as a whole rather than in just a single feature (The Schoolmaster , ed. Ryan, L. V. [Ithaca 1967] 137). For Platonic anticipations of these strictures, see Rep. 420cd, Phaedrus 264c, and Hip. Maj. 290bd.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cicero: Brutus, trans. Hendrickson, G. L., and Orator , trans. Hubbell, H. M. (LCL; London 1952). All references are to this edition. The Attic/Asian stylistic controversy does not correspond to Aristotle's distinction between written (epideictic) and oral (deliberative) expression. Both Attic and Asian styles were written and both in their conservative forms cultivated refinements essentially antithetical to agonistic debate. Yet the ‘patina’ of archaic diction, abrupt simplicity, and rhythmical coarseness of self-conscious ‘Attic’ imitators of the Thucydidean ‘austere’ style, as well as the histrionic repetition, spontaneous copiousness, and elevated rapidity of ‘Asian’ orators, are all characteristics which, if isolated, might be artistically used to evoke the excitement of oral composition and of the epic past. Meticulousness, on the other hand, be it within Attic or Asian conventions, will connote the umbratical leisure of the schools. Despite varying realignments of qualities across these two distinctions, however, Asian volubility more often tended to be associated with oral conventions as in the case of Hortensius (Brut. 325) who, Quintilian notes, must have been more pleasing when heard than read (11.3.8). Longinus‘ discussion of allowances to be made in excellent works for slighter errors of detail, which reflects Aristotle's agonistic/graphic distinction, is itself a response to an excessive admiration of Lysias’ ‘Attic’ precision (32.8). For the practicing orator, if he cannot hit the ‘mean’ between brevity and volubility, the latter, Pliny says, though rougher (non limatioris), is preferable (Ep. 1.20.21). Quintilian (12.1.22), reporting that Cicero used the same metaphor (dormitare) to explain the lapses in Demosthenes as Horace did to explain those of Homer (10.1.24), associates these with lapses, unfairly criticized by Atticists, in Cicero's own more Asian style (cited MHP n. 27).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Terence, trans. Sargeaunt, J., 2 vols. (LCL; London 1964). Pertinent to Terence, and especially to Horace, is Pindar's justification of his taking liberties with the strict sequence of encomiastic topics in order to include an important digression (N. 4.25–43). In contrast to his hypothetical critic, who busies himself to no purpose in the darkness (σχόῳ) and enviously carps at his license, Pindar will ultimately appear a formidable opponent in the light of day (ἐν φάει) as a result of having justifiably departed from the rules (I follow Bundy's, E. L. interpretation of this passage in his Studia Pindarica I [Berkeley 1962] 3 n. 11). Varro testifies to the Augustan association of obscurus with diligentia: haec diligentius quam apertius dicta esse arbitror, sed non obscurius quam de re simili definitiones grammaticorum sunt (De ling. lat. 10.75). Cicero associates obscurus with what is difficilis and non necessarius which all too often attracts magnum studium multamque operam (De off. 1.19). Quintilian later criticizes grammarians who carry their diligence in explaining narrative sources and curiosities usque ad supervacuum laborem until the mind becomes too encumbered with detail to concentrate on the more important themes. If the texts are sufficiently obscure, they may even safely make up explanations whose fraud would easily be detected were the subject familiar to everybody (1.8.18–21). It is difficult to improve on the comments of Wolseley, Robert about the Earl of Rochester in 1685 as a gloss on Terence's prologue, especially in its relation to App. B of MHP and the neoclassical comparisons of poetry to painting. 'But as the loosest Negligence of a great Genius is infinitely preferable to that obscura diligentia of which Terence speaks, the obscure diligence and labour'd Ornaments of little Pretenders, and as the rudest Drawings of famous Hands have been always more esteem'd (especially among the knowing) than the most perfect Pieces of ordinary Painters, the Publishers of Valentinian cou'd not but believe the World wou'd thank ‘em for any thing that was of my Lord Rochester's manner, tho’ it might want some of those nicer Beauties, those Grace-strokes and finishing Touches, which are so remarkable both in his former and latter Writings' (Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century , ed. Spingarn, J. E. [Oxford 1963] III 1–2).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Plato's Critias, in speaking after Timaeus, fears the same greater demand for exact representation of familiar subjects (107bd). Meeting this demand becomes increasingly a serious challenge to the writer of comedy, as Horace himself, perhaps echoing Aristophanes, observes: “Tis thought that Comedy, drawing its themes from daily life, calls for less labour; but in truth it carries a heavier burden, as the indulgence allowed is less (creditur, ex medio quia res accersit, habere / sudoris minimum, sed habet comoedia tanto / plus oneris, quanto veniae minus [Ep, 2.1.168–70, trans. Fairclough, H. R. in LCL]).' For similar reasons, Dio Chrysostom says that the eye is more difficult to convince than the ear (Oral. 12.71–9, quoted in MHP 23). Longinus, who comments that Euripides lacks a natural elevation (15.3), contrasts the Iliad with the Odyssey (9.11–5). The Iliad presents dramatic events (δϱαματιχόν) full of contention (ἐναγώνιον) in language characteristic of political oratory (πογιτιχόν), while the Odyssey offers descriptive narrative and depiction of character, indeed might be called in parts a ‘comedy of manners’ (χωμῳδία… ἠθογογουμένβ). Like Longinus (36.3 — see MHP 18–9), Quintilian associates the diligent accuracy of Polycleitus with human rather than divine subjects (12.10.7–8).Google Scholar

¹⁹ In The Clouds (1364–1405) by Aristophanes the comparison of Aeschylus with Euripides becomes part of the confrontation between old-fashioned social values expressed in a craggy (χϱβμνοποιόν), unpolished (ἀξύστατοτον), aggressively elevated (στόμφαχα) style and the fashionable interest in modern psychological subtleties (τῶν νεωτέϱων) expressed in sophistic argumentation and cultivated by ‘scholars’ who should not be exposed too long to the open air (198–9). (Aristotle comments on Euripides' cleverness in concealing his art in colloquial constructions [Rhet. 3.2.4–5].) This comparison anticipates the quarrel between ancient vetustas and modern operositas, between the antiquarios and the cacozelos, both of which Augustus avoided in his elegans et temperatum style. His dislike of both ‘Attic’ archaism and ‘Asiatic’ volubility resembles Horace's fine balance between faulty extremes (Suetonius, , Aug. 86; cf. Seneca, , Ep. 114.13–4). The comparison of the passionately elevated austerity of Thucydides with the (deceptively) artless subtlety and charm of Lysias by Dionysius suggests the better forms of some of the qualities burlesqued by Aristophanes (Dem. 2).Google Scholar

²⁰ Cope, E. M., The Rhetoric of Aristotle III 147. Aristotle cites Chaeremon as an example of logographic precision who, Cope reports from Athenaius (15.679f), was known for his partiality for such minute details as the enumeration of flowers in a garland, as centuries later Dr. Johnson was to comment on the enumeration of streaks on a tulip (Rasselas 10).Google Scholar

²¹ In Antid. 46–50 (cited MHP n. 20) Isocrates says that while clever pleaders ‘owe to a capacity for intrigue their expertness’ in debate and are ‘tolerated only for the day when they are engaged in the trial,’ more ambitious speakers are honored and held in esteem ‘in every society and at all times’ (Isocrates, trans. Norlin, G. and Van Hook, L., 3 vols. [LCL; London 1966–8]). Compare Thucydides, whose history is not to be a declamatory exercise (ἀγώνισμα) to be heard once (ἐς τὸ παϱαχϱῆμα) but somethingfor all time (1.22): see Dionysius, , De comp. verb. 22 and Thucy. 7, 20; also Pliny, , Ep. 5.8.11. These passages bear on Horace's haec placuit semel, haec deciens repetita placebit (365) in the same way as Longinus' comments in 7.3–4 (cf. MHP 13 where Brink, who cites the same I, onginian passage [p. 369], should have been mentioned). In adapting the accuracy and variety of the (written) epideictic style to the politically important issues of (oral) deliberative oratory, Isocrates develops an ideal of written discourse which subsequently overshadows Aristotle's agonistic/graphic distinction. Quintilian reflects this overshadowing in 3.8.58–67 and 8.3.11–14 (cited MHP n. 8). Both he (12.10.49–57) and Pliny (Ep. 1.20), while recognizing Aristotle's distinction, feel that there should be little or no stylistic difference between writing well and speaking well. Whatever difference there is should be determined, according to Quintilian, by the sophistication of the audience: one need use an emotionally histrionic and argumentatively simplified style less in a speech to be delivered before cultivated men than in one before a random populace. Dionysius seems to share his view (Dem. 15, 36–8, 44–5; Thucy. 49–51; De comp. verb. 25), which, indeed, goes back at least to Plato (Phaedrus 277c). In general where Aristotle's distinction persists, the public elevated style tends to be associated with simplicity and forcefulness, while the Isocratean ideal seeks to combine elevation with artistically elaborated composition and ornate refinement. For a good account of the complex overlapping of later terminology, see Quadlbauer, F., ‘Die genera dicendi bis Plinius d. J.,’ Wiener Studien 71 (1958) 55–111 — who is not entirely correct, perhaps, in saying that Aristotle is objectively neutral in evaluating the three kinds of oratory (64). Deliberative oratory is clearly nobler (χαλλίονος) and more worthy of a statesman (πολιτιχωτέϱας) than forensic (Rhet. 1.1.10, 1354b23–7) — to say nothing of epideictic — oratory, as well as being less tricky (1354b29–31) and more difficult (3.17.10, 1418a22).Google Scholar

²² However different their stylistic ideals, Isocrates‘ contrast of the statue of Athena with the small figurine — which Lucian later uses to characterize the literary affectations of his belletristic fop (Lexiphanes 22–5) — corresponds to Longinus’ juxtaposition, discussed in MHP (18–19), of the grand Colossus against the verisimilar spearman (36.3) and the correspondingly ‘exact’ literary genres (33.1–5). Quintilian compares proficiency in writing fanciful declamations to that in performing feats of dexterity: however skillfully done, both are useless (2.20.3–5).Google Scholar

²³ The scholastic associations of σχιαμαχέω with the declamatory halls are brought out well by Stephanus, H. (Thesaurus Graecae Linguae [Paris 1831–65]): ‘Scilicet σχιαμαχέω non tam significat Cum umbra pugno, quam In umbra, i.e. non in aperto campo, sed in schola, in gymnasio: quare etiam generatim signif. Exercitationis s. Ostentationis causa pugno, ut ap. Athen. 4.154a; Plato, 18d, 520c, 830c; Plut. De plac. philos. 4[12]; Lucian, Hermot. 33, Pisc. 35.’ Translations from the Republic, Phaedo, and Sophist are by P. Shorey (LCL), Fowler, F. N. (LCL), and Cornford, F. M. (in The Collected Dialogues of Plato [New York]).Google Scholar

²⁴ Aristotle observes that things too bright will appear as obscure as those too dim (De an. 422a20–2) and also that when one — as the philosopher would when descending from the light — turns from a brilliant object like the sun to relative darkness, the image of the brightness, remaining on the retina, temporarily impairs its vision (De somn. 459b9–19) — an observation repeated in later optical treatises (ct. Pecham, John, Perspectiva communis 1.1). Plato's visual analogy of the two types of light and darkness (518ab), particularly in the Phaedo, contributes more to the later mystical than to the optical tradition in philosophy and the arts (cf. Plutarch, , Mor. 764e; Philo, , De somn. 1.83–4; Pseudo-Dionysius, , De cael. hier. 2.2–3; St. Augustine, , Soliloquies: for the Renaissance and its beneficiaries, see Wind, E., ‘The Concealed God,’ Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance [New York 1968] 218–35, and Gombrich, E. H., ‘Icones Symbolicae,’ Symbolic Images [London 1972] 123–95). The literary history of the two kinds of light and darkness, as well as the types of ‘wonder’ they respectively arouse, has not been treated except tangentially when such imagery occurs in famous treatises like Longinus'. With respect to Aeschylus, it is worth noting that Philostratus associates his style with the elevated speeches of the Brahmans who live in a purer daylight near to the gods (Life of Apol. 6.11). In the late Middle Ages Nicole Oresme comments on the ‘skiagraphic’ nature of the proper prophetic style: ‘Hence it is not a characreristic of the prophetic style (stilus propheticus) to determine all things with particularity and in detail but rather to do so less distinctly (minus distincte), as has been said, although some who are not prophets go to the other extreme in an excessive way by inventing speeches with double meaning and obscure, equivocal, and ambiguous words, which can be applied to any occurrence (qui confingunt orationes amphibolicas et verba ambigua, flexiloca, et obscura, que ad omnem eventum possunt applicari),’ De configurationibus qualitatum et motuum 1.39, ed. and trans. Clagett, M. in Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions (Madison 1968) 267. Those who cleverly elaborate enigmatic utterances, which may be bent to any occasion, resemble the ancient sophists of Plato and Isocrates who have a knack for feeling their way in the dark. In the Renaissance, George Chapman's distinction between the two kinds of ‘darkness’ (in dedicating his ‘Ovids Banquet of Sence’) is beguilingly ingenuous: ‘Obscuritie in affection of words, & indigested concets, is pedanticall and childish; but where it shroudeth it selfe in the hart of his subiect, vtterd with fitnes of figure, and expressiue Epethites; with that darknes wil J still labour to be shaddowed’ (The Poems of George Chapman [London 1941] 49). For the ancient distinction between σχιαγϱαφία and σχβνογϱαφία see my study in the Miscellany section of this volume of Traditio. Google Scholar

²⁵ This qualification is crucial to Horace's argument. The type of pleasure required here is not to be confused with the delectare or dulce which Horace distinguishes for the sake of argument from prodesse or utile in 333–46 (cf. Brink, 378). Neither the pragmatic benefits (fruges 341) nor diverting entertainment (voluptas 338) of the content alone are involved here but rather the poem's final expression in language which must satisfy the critic's sensibilities. There is something reminiscent of Aristotle's preference for the ‘liberal’ arts as opposed to those arts which aim at pleasure (πϱὸς ἡδονήν) and/or at utility (πϱὸς χϱῆσιν) in Horace's discrimination of the ultimate satisfaction which poetry may give from both voluptas and fruges (Meta. 1.1.14–16). With respect to the Augustan period, Horace may well be wishing to distinguish his placere clearly from the cruder hedonism of Erastosthenes (Strabo 1.15), from the exclusive concern with euphony criticized by Philodemus (πεϱὶ ποιβμάτων, ed. Jensen, C. [Berlin 1923]), or perhaps from a more sophisticated hedonism which Philodemus himself may have argued for in the circle of the Pisos.Google Scholar

²⁶ ‘A poem is like a picture: one strikes your fancy more, the nearer you stand; another, the farther away. This courts the shade, that will wish to be seen in the light, and dreads not the critic insight of the judge. This pleased but once; that, though ten times called for, will always please. O you elder youth, though wise yourself and trained to right judgement by a father's voice, take to heart and remember this saying, that only some things rightly brook the medium and the bearable. A lawyer and pleader of middling rank falls short of the merit of eloquent Messalla, and knows not as much as Aulus Cascellius, yet he has a value. But that poets be of middling rank, neither man nor gods nor booksellers ever brooked. As at pleasant banquets an orchestra out of tune, an unguent that is thick, and poppy-seeds served with Sardinian honey, give offence, because the feast might have gone on without them: so a poem, whose birth and creation are for the soul's delight, if in aught it falls short of the top, sinks to the bottom. He who cannot play a game, shuns the weapons of the Campus, and, if unskilled in ball or quoit or hoop, remains aloof, lest the crowded circle break out in righteous laughter. Yet the man who knows not how dares to frame verses. Why not? He is free, even freeborn, nay, is rated at the fortune of a knight, and stands clear from every blemish. But you will say nothing and do nothing against Minerva's will; such is your judgement, such your good sense. Yet if ever you do write anything, let it enter the ears of some critical Maecius, and your father's, and my own; then put your parchment in the closet and keep it back till the ninth year. What you have not published you can destroy; the word once sent forth can never come back’ (trans. Fairclough, H. R. in LCL).Google Scholar

²⁷ Cf. Brink 337–8. Cicero's distinction is useful: ‘in every case while the ability to do what is appropriate is a matter of trained skill and of natural talent, the knowledge of what is appropriate to a particular occasion is a matter of practical sagacity (omnique in re posse quod deceat facere artis et naturae est, scire quid quandoque deccat prudentiae),’ Cicero: De oratore 3.212, trans. Sutton, E. W. and Rackham, H., 2 vols. (LCL; London 1959). I agree with Brink's remarks on the relevance of Aristotle's discussion of music in Polit. 8.3–5 (373, 377). What Aristotle says of the effects of music on the soul in 8.5.4–10 is close to what Horace is saying of those of poetry: it nourishes the soul in the very act of pleasing the senses and the intelligence.Google Scholar

²⁸ Such artistic knowledge is analogous to that necessary to keep one who strives for a given stylistic effect from falling into its excessive form, its neighboring fault, si caret arte (31). See Brink for many rhetorical parallels (105–16). The question in lines 377–8 of the close proximity of aesthetic pleasure in general to disgust or satiety is what distinguishes the present passage (361–90) from such parallels and relates it to Cicero's observations on pleasure discussed below.Google Scholar

²⁹ For the general relationship between Cicero and Horace in AP 366–78, see Brink, 372–8 (similarly in AP 89–118, pp. 131–2). He cites Norden, Rostagni, and others who call attention to important passages in Cicero (esp. De orat. 1.118–9, 259; Brut. 193) which claim a kind of animi libera quaedam oblectatio for rhetoric parallel to Horace's conception of aesthetic pleasure. Rostagni goes so far as to say that Horace ‘non solo attinga a fonti comuni, ma risenta della diretta lettura delle opere retoriche di Cicerone’ (Arte poetica di Orazio [Torino 1930] 107). Brink feels, on the other hand, that Horace is ‘close to the original setting of the argument about poetry and the fine arts,’ while Cicero is simply ‘extending to rhetoric the quality of the finer arts, and is hoping to compromise at the same time’ (because of the practical necessities to be faced in all utilitarian pursuits). In presenting the following similarities between Cicero and Horace, I am trying to clarify the argument of lines 361–90 rather than to claim a direct borrowing by the poet from the orator. If Horace's argument turns, like Cicero's, on the description of pleasure appropriate to language in relation to that appropriate to the senses, Cicero's pictorial illustration becomes relevant to Horace's analogy with painting. Fiske, G. C. and Grant, M. A. point out the specific similarity of Cicero's illustration (3.98) to Horace's analogy (361–5) without clarifying the context as a whole (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature 27 [1929] 37–8).Google Scholar

³⁰ Cicero makes the same distinction but specifically directed to the greater rhythmical precision of poetry with respect to rhetoric. Using concedere, which Horace uses twice (369, 373), he says that the public will notice slips in oratory as it does in versification, ‘but whereas it does not forgive (ignoscit) a poet, it makes allowances for us (nobis concedit), although all the audience… perceives that our remarks were not neatly put or finished in style’ (De orat. 3.198). Brink overstates slightly the difference between Horace and the rhetoricians with regard to the ear (304–5, 309). Whatever natural capacities there may be for distinguishing prose rhythms sine arte (Orat. 203), Quintilian (12.10.73–6) and Cicero stress the cultivation of the ear by art (Orat. 161–2). Similarly, Horace feels that any innate receptivity, any tacitus sensus (De orat. 3.195, Orat. 173) of all rhythm (cf. Aristotle, , Polit. 8.5.4), must be cultivated by all the modern artistic resources and not allowed to relax in the rougher methods of the early Latin poets (AP 251–74).Google Scholar

³¹ Dionysius says that Pindar's lines are vigorous, dignified, austere, and, while harsh to the ear, not unpleasantly so. They exhibit no contemporary prettiness but rather the archaic beauty of a distant past (De comp. verb. 22). Aeschylus and Thucydides share these qualities: all have a ‘patina of antiquity’ (ἀϱχαῖον πίνον), a mellowing deposit (Dem. 5, 38–9, 44), an antiquitas impexa clearly distinct from the argutae sententiae of moderns (Tacitus, , Dial. 20). The ‘beautiful’ and the ‘austere’ are associated with the ‘archaic’ and the older oral style (Dem. 36, 44–5). Like Dionysius, Cicero (see following note) and Quintillian (10.2.7) associate the ancient writers with primitive or archaic art. Such art should be seen at a distance, perhaps, in the way James Boswell can still combine these traditional associations in describing recollections from the past. ‘Even harsh scenes acquire a softness by length of time; and some are like very loud sounds, which do not please, or at least do not please so much, till you are removed to a certain distance. They may be compared to strong coarse pictures, which will not bear to be viewed near’ (The Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson LL.D., Tuesday, 19th October [London 1914] 323–4. I am indebted for this reference to Brigitte Fields).Google Scholar

³² For Virgil's satirical comment on archaism, see Catal. 2 and Quintilian, 8.3.27–30. A. Gellius reports (12.2.10) that Seneca criticized Virgil for writing 'some verses which are harsh (duros), irregular (enormes) and somewhat beyond the proper length, with no other motive than that those who were devoted to Ennius might find a flavour of antiquity in the new poem (ut Ennianus populus adgnosceret in novo carmine aliqaid antiqaitatis)': The Attic Nights of Aulas Gellius , trans. Rolfe, J. C., 3 vols. (LCL; London 1961–8). Horace would regard the Ennianus populus with as much irony as he does the critici who call Ennius an alter Homerus in his complaint to Augustus and the Pisos about conservative Roman literary tastes (Ep. 2.1.28–92, AP 258–74, 289–94). Yet old terms, spoken by the ancient Cato and Cethegus, may bring, when polished up, their picturesque associations to new contexts and be mixed with words newly sanctioned by custom (Ep. 2.2.115–25; cf. AP 46–72). Lucilius, for all his roughness (S. 1.4.1–13, 1.10.1–71), provides energy and direction (S. 2.1.28–34, 62–78). Horace's view of the proper use of the Latin literary past is complex (see Brink 301–9, 318–23). After allowing for Horace's greater stringency in speaking of prosody, compare Cicero's own attitudes toward ancient writers like Cato, Cethegus, Ennius, Livius Andronicus, with whom he compares the earliest painters and sculptors, and toward their imitators (Brut. 61–76). For Cicero, the ancients had dignity of thought and forceful originality, but those who imitate them in everything, especially in their abrupt rhythms and broken composition, are like critics who prefer the most archaic picture (antiquissima illa pictura), which uses only a few colors, to the developments of modern painting (Orat. 168–73). Perhaps Cicero's final, and harshest, judgment of early Roman oratory is that expressed by Atticus (Brut. 292–9). In his essay entitled ‘The Debate on Primitivism in Ancient Rhetoric’ (The Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 29 [1966] 24–38), Gombrich, E. H., citing a number of these passages, establishes a similar context, which, I believe, might now also include Horace's pictorial analogy (see especially 32–3).Google Scholar

³³ Aristophanes associates the decadent new sophistry with ornate trills and quavering in music (The Clouds 966–72); compare Horace's lines on the decadence of the music accompanying the chorus (AP 212–19). These lines, in turn, resemble Vitruvius' chapter on decadent fresco-painting, if ‘chromatic’ licence may include both musical and pictorial colores: flamboyant ‘tones’ etsi non ab arte sunt posita, fulgentes oculorum reddunt visus (7.5.8).Google Scholar

³⁴ Without giving any example, Cicero simply says that in touch there are degrees of softness (mollitudinis) and smoothness (levitatis). Although Horace may imply touch along with smell in crassus (which has a tactile connotation directly opposed to mollis and levis), its exclusion more probably reflects the view that touch (and sometimes taste) was less ‘pure’ (in the sense described below) and less appropriate to the more refined pleasures of the mind associated with the arts. Cf. Aristotle, , Nic. Eth. 10.3.7, 10.5.7; Eud. Eth. 3.2.6–14; Mag. Mor. 1.21.2–4.Google Scholar

³⁵ For the obligation of language to please the intelligence as well as the ear, see Orat. 162. Brink stresses Horace's insistence upon variety, if properly given unity by art, throughout his commentary. Cicero's use of offenditur here parallels Horace's in 248, 352, 376, which Brink refers to aesthetic taste (293, 378) and compares to Cicero's use of the word in De orat. 1.259 (363). Dionysius comments that beautiful things cause satiety just as much as sweet things when they lack variety; diversity keeps them always new (De comp. verb. 19). More important for Horace is the fact that Dionysius claims other forms of speech may easily hold a middle position between praise and blame, but in stylistic elaboration (ϰατασϰευή) whatever is not a complete success is an utter failure (Ep. ad Pomp. 2). This close parallel to si paulum summo decessit, vergit ad imum (378) suggests that Horace could have had stylistic embellishments specifically in mind which, if attempted, had to succeed, because the poem, like the dinner, could have done sine istis (376). Similarly, for Quintilian (8.3.56) affectation in language, like virtues carried to excess, is inexcusable, since, while other faults are due to carelessness, this is deliberately cultivated: nam cetera parum vitantur, hoc petitur (cf. AP 352–3 on careless, i.e. excusable, errors, quas aut incuria fudit / aut humana parum cavit natura, as opposed to habitual errors (354–8). So Seneca, , Ep. 114.2.Google Scholar

³⁶ How far Horace is from wishing to isolate the aesthetic experience from contamination by any practical or theoretical activity becomes clear from his lines to Florus — seu linguam causis acuis seu civica iura / respondere paras seu condis amabile carmen / prima feres hederae victricis praemia (Ep. 1.3.23–5) — where he even extends to the pleader and jurist the ivy usually reserved for the poet (cf. C. 1.1.29–30). He draws the distinction between the ‘fine’ and ‘practical’ arts in the AP, not to praise the first at the expense of the second, but to emphasize the inescapable responsibility of the fine arts to please a properly discriminating audience. My following discussion traces the origins of this responsibility by elucidating further a philosophical tradition whose main lines of development have been admirably sketched by Pohlenz, M. (‘Τὸπϱέπον: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechischen Geistes’ [1933], Kleine Schriften, ed. Dörrie, H. [Hildesheim, 1965] I 200–39).Google Scholar

³⁷ The terms of Plato's formula, which take different grammatical forms in predicating the fairest things, perhaps share in the direct influence on Horace's lines attributed to Neoptolemus by Jensen and later scholars (see Brink, 352–3 and Brink, , Prol. 56). The influence of Neoptolemus is attractive because he adapts a version of the formula directly to poetry: ‘the perfect poet in order to fulfill his capacity must not only thrill his hearers but improve them and teach them a lesson’ (Brink's translation of Brink stresses the similarity of idonea dicere vitae to χϱησιμολογεῖν and points out that delectare may render citing Strabo 1.15. Dionysius uses the same word in adapting a similar variation of Plato's formula to rhetoric in a context reminiscent of Aristotle's distinction between forensic and epideictic audiences (Dem. 44); see n. 50.Google Scholar

³⁸ Plato: The Statesman, Philebus, Ion, trans. Fowler, H. N. and Lamb, W. R. M. (LCL; London 1962). The artistic considerations in the Philebus, as in the Gorgias, are incidental, of course, to Plato's ethical definition of the Good and to his assignment of the part that pleasure plays in its attainment. In describing the ‘purer’ pleasures which accompany the aesthetic experience of color, shape, scent, and sound, he explicitly says he is not referring to individually beautiful living things or to works of art like painting (51c). That the Greater Hippias (298a) directly contradicts this assertion by including works of art in the experience of the Beautiful is one of the main reasons, as Pohlenz points out (103–4), for questioning its authenticity. Yet the Philebus introduces distinctions which, however qualified by the intervening influences described by Pohlenz, help us to understand the aesthetic attitudes of the Augustan period.Google Scholar

³⁹ As long as the context is primarily ethical, a perfectly balanced ‘mean’ remains an ideal which for the most part can be only approximated, and therefore degrees of proximity will represent degrees of value, as in any practical activity such as jurisprudence or pleading. Despite the fact that there is but one way to hit the target and an infinite number of ways to miss it (Nic. Eth. 2.6. 13–7) and the ‘mean’ is a consummation (ἀχϱότης), Aristotle clearly states that secondary courses of action have relative benefits when the ‘mean’ is missed (2.9.4). Horace may simply be distinguishing pleasure as an ‘absolute’ requirement in the ‘purer’ arts from a ‘relative’ advantage in ethics, or he may have a much more specific target in mind. One such target could be the curious adaptation by Ariston of Chios of Stoic ethical criteria to literary evaluation criticized by Philodemus. The Stoics divided all things into the categories of the good, the bad, and the indifferent with respect to their desirability for the wise man. When Ariston applies the third category to literature, poems with good technique and/or good composition but with questionable content, or vice versa, are neither good nor bad but in the middle. Similarly in the matter of technique (or composition) alone, since nothing in the world is perfect as a whole, even if poems have perfect sections, as complete works they are ‘mediocre.’ Much of the traditional poetic corpus falls into this third category. Jensen, C. describes Ariston's opinions without suggesting that Horace could have had some such views in mind when he objected to mediocribus… poetis (Philodemos über die Gedichte, fünftes Buck [Berlin 1923] 128–45).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Aristotle's psychological analysis of types of pleasure and of their ethical significance, extending and qualifying Plato's account in the Philebus (Nic. eth. 10.2.3–3.2), contributed distinctions, no doubt, of the greatest importance to subsequent aesthetic theories about the fine arts. ‘The feeling of pleasure,’ he says, ‘is an experience of the soul, and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as “fond of” so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theatre…’ ( Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics 1.8.10, trans. Rackham, H. [LCL; London 1956]). Plato's ‘pure’ pleasures become for Aristotle ‘absolute’ (ἁπλῶς) or ‘natural’ (φύσει) pleasures, which are independent of the processes of bodily depletion and replenishment; they are enjoyed after the body has returned to the state of its natural equilibrium, the soul of its harmony (7.12.2–7). The pleasures derived from intellectual activities are the purest, the most unmixed with pain arising from excess and deficiency, and the most permanent. The sensory pleasures most similar to these are those derived from sight, hearing, and smell, which, like contemplation, involve no antecedent pain (10.7.1–9; Mag. Mot. 2.7.4–18).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Sextus Empiricus, trans. Bury, R. G., 4 vols. (LCL; London 1967). For Aristotle, the sensory part of the soul, while essentially irrational like the nutritive part, shares, nevertheless, in reason (Nic. eth. 1.13.9–19; De an. 3.9). The senses are, to some degree, ‘educatable.’ Each is itself a kind of ‘mean’ between sensible extremes and, therefore, as a ‘mean’ has the power of making judgments (τὸ γὰϱ μέσον χϱιτιχόν) about intensities (De an. 2.11). Each keeps these sensory intensities in harmony, for all sensation is a proportion (ἡ δ' αἴσθησις ὁ λόγος) which excessive intensity either hurts or destroys (3.2, 3.4). In so far as the imagination is sensation actively in motion, it, too, will share to some extent in the act of deliberation (3.3). Such psychological criteria will ultimately be congenial to the Stoic theories of perception which Pohlenz traces as a background for the ‘aesthetic response’ to a literary work described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Without reference to the views of Speusippus, whose terms (quoted above) are identical, Pohlenz describes how the Stoic Diogenes of Babylonia separated ordinary sensory perception (αὐτοφυὴς αἴσθησις) of qualities like heat and cold from an ‘educated’ sensory perception (ἐπιστηmUονιχὴ αἴσθησις) able to evaluate the fitness of things in relation to other things. Since the later Stoics, like Panaetius (as echoed by Cicero in De off. 1.14), considered man the only rational being, he alone could have an innate feeling for order and decorum, as well as for beauty and harmony. Human emotions, therefore, could increasingly become associated with both moral and aesthetic judgment. Since within the human psyche, such emotions — in comparison with its stricter reasoning faculties — were, indeed, ‘arational,’ the intuitive, non-deliberative — even instinctual — response both to an ethical challenge and to a work of art commanded increasing respect. This 'sense of decorum,' which Cicero, reasserting the Stoic conflation of ethical and aesthetic criteria, assumes as a point of departure, becomes for Dionysius the je ne sais quoi, the ἄλογος αἴσθησις, of literary appreciation. Both, like Plato's ‘pure’ (intuitive) pleasure, must be developed by practice and experience rather than by precept and technical instruction (cf. Pohlenz, 112, 123–7).Google Scholar

⁴² On Dionysius' ‘sense of decorum’ in relation to Lysias’ charm (χάϱις), see Pohl, K. (citing Pohlenz, ), Die Lehre von den drei Wortfügungsarten: Untersuchungen zu. Dionysios von Halikarnass, De compositione verborum (Hirschberg 1968) 42–4. Similar distinctions occur in De comp. verb. 12, where words are said to affect the ear as visible objects the eye, things tasted the palate, and other stimuli their respective senses. Good taste lends itself to no systematic treatment (ἔντεχνον) or science (ἐπιστήμῃ) but is apprehended by the personal judgement (δόξῃ) of those who have carefully trained themselves (γυμνάσαντες). The untrained are successful rarely, and then only by luck (ἀπὸ τύχης). Cf. AP 358. Horace associates charm (venus) with ordo (τάξις) directly in the embodiment of what is ‘timely’ (χαιϱཹς) in the sense of decorum (debentia). As of Lysian charm, the aim of the Horatian ordo is to be lucidus (AP 40–5).Google Scholar

⁴³ Cicero distinguishes these two faculties — both of which are involved in judging any form of discourse (De orat. 3.100) — with great care: ‘The decision (iudicium) as to subject-matter and words to express it belongs to the intellect (prudentia), but in the choice of sounds and rhythms the ear is the judge (aares sunt iudices); the former are dependent on the understanding (intelligentiam), the latter on pleasure (voluptatem); therefore reason (ratio) determines the rules of art (artem) in the former case, and sensation (sensus) in the latter’ (Orat. 162).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Aristotle describes that ‘element in the soul, which, though irrational (ἄλογος), yet in a manner participates in rational principle’ (Nic. eth. 1.13.15), as being ‘amenable and obedient (χατήχοον = attentive, hearkening to, giving ear to)’ in the sense ‘in which we speak of “paying heed” to one's father and friends’ (18). That the rational principle may, in turn, appeal to the irrational is shown by our use of admonishment and exhortation, as a father employs them toward his child (18–9; Eud. eth. 2.1.15). With respect to the materials in n. 41, the parental comparison is suggestive for Horace's advice to the elder son to take his father's and his friends' criticism seriously about what pertains particularly to his natural (and hence, to some extent, ἄλογος) powers of perception.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ On pulchra vs. dulcia, see Brink 183–4. Dionysius' terms τὸ χαλόν vs. τὸ ἡδύ (Dem. 47) do not quite coincide with Horace's, except insofar as the two qualities in each case should be combined (De comp. verb. 20). See Pohl, K., 87–90, on Dionysius' distinction as it occurs, however, in De comp. verb. 10–11, where it shares more of the background I have been tracing in Horace. She relates Dionysius' pictorial analogies to Cicero's in his discussion of delectatio sine satietate (De orat. 3.97–100). Dionysius' austere style, which strives for τὸ χαλόν, corresponds to Cicero's antiquis tabulis, while the smooth style, which strives for τὸ ἡδύ, is characteristic of the novis picturis. See Dionysius' detailed description of these styles in De comp. verb. 12–3, 22–3, and for their relation to Aristotle's oral/written distinction, see MHP n. 28 (to which add Demetrius, , On Style 194).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ This passage (cited MHP n. 18) should be taken with that (quoted above) in which such ornaments can only appear citra solera (12.10.73–8). The elder Pliny's distinction between splendor and lumen atque umbras (NH 35.29) may be pertinent for both as well as for Longinus (17.2–3), although splendor may also have had a more technical meaning in painting (see Pollitt, J. J., The Ancient View of Greek Art 440–1).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ For Suetonius, the Aeneid is an argumentum varium ac multiplex et quasi amborum Homeri carminum instar (Vita Vergili 21). In the Saturnalia, Macrobius will compare in detail Virgil's effort to meet the demands of epic variety in imitating Homer's magnitudinem, simplicitatem, and tacitam majestatem (5.13.40–1). He will even see in the banality of bluntly colloquial lines an ‘heroic negligence’ (5.14.5). A style heroice incomptus corresponds to that of the older pictorial style which A. Gellius invokes to describe the words of Cato (10.3.15). They are incompta, brevia, non operosa with a certain native charm (nativa quadam suavitate), a shade, so to speak, and patina of a darkly remote antiquity (umbra et color quasi opacae vetustatis). Cicero himself compares these characteristics in painting — horrida, inculta, opaca — to the bluntness of Ennius' diction (Orat. 36, cited MHP n. 15).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Ennius, as Brink says, ‘is the great poet of the past’ (145), a sacred grove, according to Quintilian, ‘whose huge and ancient trunks inspire us with religious awe rather than with admiration for their beauty’ (10.1.88). Persius, as well as Horace, still derived inspiration from Lucilius (Suetonius, , Vita Auli Persi Flacci).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Quintilian says that what Virgil lacks by way of the immortal and superhuman genius (naturae caelesti atque immortali) of Homer he makes up for in his greater cura and diligentia (10.1.86). This diligentia, revealed as well in Suetonius' account of his methods of composition (Vita Verg. 22–5; cf. A. Gellius 17.10), might be particularly necessary in distinguishing that point at which Homer's sublimity becomes extravagance. This difficulty, especially acute when oral devices are to be transposed to a written style, still bothers Pliny, who ingenuously relates the problem to the elevation of his own style (Ep. 9.26). On specific difficulties in Virgil's literal imitation of Homer, see Gellius 9.9.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Even closer to Aristotle's distinction is a later passage (Dem. 44). 'I think that our orator initially learnt by natural taste (φύσει) and experience (πείϱᾳ) that crowds which flock to festivals and schools (πανηγύϱεις χαό αχολάς) require different forms of address from those who attend the political assemblies and the law-courts (τὰ διχαστήϱια χαὶ τὰς ἐχχλησίας). The former wish to be diverted and entertained the latter to be given information and assistance (ὠφελείας) in the matters with which they are concerned. He did not think either that the forensic speech should employ hypnotic or striking phonetic effects, or that the ceremonial (ἐπιδειχτιχόν) speech should be full of a dry and musty antiquity (πίνου).' It is interesting that Dionysius attributes a sense of decorum in choosing among stylistic alternatives derived from Aristotle's Rhetoric 3.12 to experience and natural ability. The same words for profit and delight occur here as in Philodemus' account of Neoptolemus (see n. 37). On the comparison of ornamental vs. productive gardens to style, see Quintilian, 8.3.8-10. For the physical liabilities of living out of the sun in shaded decadence, see Euripides, , Bacchae 455–9, Plutarch Mot. 764c, and the passages cited in Thesaurus Graecae Linguae under σχιατϱαφέω: in umbraculis nutriuntur et in solem non prodeunt, quales delicati, qui a sole aduri timent.' To Horace's recusationes below, compare Pliny, , Ep. 9.2.Google Scholar

⁵¹ For repentis per humum , see Brink, 282–3, 112–3, and for the flexibility of Horace's conception of appropriateness, 463–4. Humilis sermo is characteristic of obscuras tabernas rather than nubes (AP 229–30), and the everyday subjects it describes might be said to be more appropriate for, and hence prefer, the obscurum. Generally speaking, Horace prefers neither to be ‘on the ground’ nor ‘in the clouds’ (AP 28). His low-flying bee works somewhere between the cloudy paths of Pindar's swan and the earth itself (C. 4.2.25–32) — as in its amorous pursuits so charmingly preferred to real or legendary conquests and riches in C. 2.12 (cf. Davis, G., Philologus 119 [1975] 70–83, who adroitly resolves the inherited difficulties of this ode by referring its conventions to the recusatio). In his Life of Apollonius (6.11), Flavius Philostratus contrasts the heroic subjects of Aeschylus with trivial themes which are ὑπὸ πόδα.Google Scholar

⁵² As ‘a striking parallel to the Ars,’ Brink cites (366) Philodemus' disapproving comment about how it is commonly thought that Choerilus, Anaximenes, and other bad epic poets are superior in technical skill (ἐμ πο<η>τιχῆι) to Homer and the best poets (ἀϱίστων) and are therefore, Philodemus implies, mistakenly preferred to them. If Philodemus has in mind an Alexandrian critical preciosity which prefers small felicities to the ‘nobility’ of an occasionally nodding Homer, this criticism would support the interpretation of Horace's view of decorum which I have presented. In a closely following fragment, apparently a part of the same context, Philodemus further observes that if technique were the only criterion involved in evaluating poets, there would be no real way to differentiate the better from the worse. Earlier (Poem., HV², VI.147), apparently in opposition to an overly zealous critic, he comes to the defense of Homer's repetitions and cites the famous Nireus passage (Il. 2.671–3) which Aristotle had used to illustrate certain of the more skiagraphic characteristics of the deliberative and epic styles. The example was, then, perhaps as familiar to the Piso circle and to Horace as it was to later writers (cf. Demetrius, , On Style 61f., and Quintilian, 3.8.63–7, both cited in MHP n. 8). I have used here the text and commentary of Gomperz, T., ‘Philodem und die ästhetischen Schriften der Herculanischen Bibliothek,’ Sb. Akad. Vienna 123 (1891) 37–8, 19–20.Google Scholar

⁵³ This is one more reflection of an Aristotelian ‘mean’ whose presence throughout the Ars poetica Brink continually emphasizes. In commenting on carmen reprehendite (292) he remarks that ‘the very tone of his pronouncement puts laborious art in its place, whereas, in the sequel, heavy irony devalues ingenium beyond all recognition’ (322). The sequel begins with the famous lines ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte / credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas / Democritus (295–7). Brink suggests that 'fortunativs perhaps hints at Greek antitheses apart from τέχνη–φύσις…. I am thinking of τύχη–φύσις, τύχη–τέχνὴ' (p. 330). One might say, even furtner, that all three antitheses share something with the more general dichotomy of νόμος–τύχη, custom—law—art versus chance—force—genius. The powers of ‘artistic’ control — μέθοδος, λόγος, εὐβουλία — are brought into an Horatian balance with the ‘given’ — φύσις, εὐτυχία, τὸ εἰχαῖον — by Longinus, who defends art as a necessary means for analyzing and attaining the highest excellence. This attainment is rendered possible by the fact that, in Quintilian's, words, naturae ipsi ars inerit (9.4.120). Longinus' opponent, Caecilius, in insisting that only an innate, unteachable gift can achieve this excellence — unattainable by art — corresponds to Horace's Democritus (On the Sublime 1–2; cf. MHP 20). The most important early discussion of these distinctions occurs in Plato's Laws (888c–90d). Plato is defending the customary beliefs in the gods in opposition to those relativists who think of them simply as products of opinion rather than as principles of nature. This question raises a ‘wondrous argument’ (θαυμαστὸν λόγον) among ‘wise men’ who believe all things come into existence partly by nature (φύσει), partly by art (τέχνην), and partly owing to chance (τύχῃ). The greatest and most beautiful things are the work of nature and chance, they say, while art can produce only the pettier ones (σμοχϱότεϱα) which are ‘artificial’ (τεχνιχά). The beautiful cosmos is brought into existence by the ‘necessary’ mechanical processes of natural elements which owe nothing to rational principles of order. It is only as a later product that art, ‘being mortal itself and of mortal birth, begets later playthings (παιδιάς) which share but little in truth, being images of a sort akin to the arts themselves — images such as painting begets, and music, and the arts which accompany these’ (889cd). Politics and laws are also only products of art and convention (cf. Gorgias 482e–84c, 488a–92c), and therefore these ‘men of science’ (ἀνδϱῶν σοφῶν) teach students to ignore the gods and to live ‘according to nature’ which consists in ‘being master over the rest of reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal conventions’ (890a). In order to oppose such men, who perhaps include Archelaus (cf. Diog. Laer. 2.16) and atomists like Leucippus and Democritus, Plato defends law and art 'as things which exist by nature or by a cause not inferior to nature (φύσεως οὐχ ἥττονι) since according to right reason they are the offspring of mind‘ (890d). This, I believe, is the broader context within which Horace ironically disparages Democritus’ poetic theory of natural inspiration and reasserts the claims of misera… arte. This phrase, in relation to fortunatius, seems to be anticipated in Plato's σμιχϱότεϱα τεχνιχά, and παιδιά. Plato: Laws , trans. Biry, R. G., 2 vols. (LCL; London 1967–8).Google Scholar